Hitler only found the time to inform Mussolini, his most important ally, about the conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Stalin and the background to it in an official letter sent on 25 August. As far as the impending war was concerned, Hitler merely wanted to tell Mussolini that they had been ‘in a state of alert for weeks’, that the German measures were naturally ‘keeping pace with Polish mobilization’ and ‘that I will take immediate measures if Polish actions become intolerable’.146
Later on that day, Hitler met the British and French ambassadors. He told Henderson that he could put up with Britain declaring war on Germany, if Germany attacked Poland.147 However, Hitler was evidently impressed by the firmness with which the British government, supported by its population, was sticking to its policy, and offered Britain comprehensive cooperation for the period after this ‘problem had been solved’. He was determined, he said, to play a decisive role in protecting the British Empire, was willing to accept restrictions on armaments, and had no intention of altering the borders in the West. However, not even Propaganda Minister Goebbels considered this offer convincing: ‘England won’t buy that any more.’148 Nor did Hitler’s meeting with the French ambassador lead remotely to a de-escalation of the situation. Robert Coulondre told Hitler ‘on his word as an officer’ that, if Germany moved against Poland, France would fulfil its responsibilities.149
In the early afternoon, in other words immediately after his meeting with Henderson, Hitler gave Keitel the final order to attack Poland the following morning,150 26 August. This was the date for the attack that he had already given to his generals on 22 August. Thus he did not even bother to wait for the British government’s response to his ‘generous’ offer of an alliance. Evidently, it was merely designed to embarrass the British government the following day, a few hours after the start of the German attack.
At that point, however, a dramatic development completely upset Hitler’s calculations. In the early evening, ambassador Bernardo Attolico shocked Hitler to the core with a message from Mussolini to the effect that, for the time being, Italy was not in a position to take part in the war. Mussolini reminded Hitler that ‘during our meetings . . . the war was envisaged for after 1942’ and, in accordance with this understanding, he would then naturally have been ‘ready on land, at sea, and in the air’; but, at this point, Italy was not ready for war.151 This message shook Hitler, who was visibly affected and downcast.152 Moreover, during the afternoon, news arrived that the military pact between Britain and Poland, which had been agreed on 6 April 1939, had just been ratified in London.153 This made it unlikely that, the day after Germany had started a war, Britain would seriously engage with Hitler’s offer of an alliance. Thus, Hitler responded to this new situation by continuing the clandestine mobilization, but, in order to win time for final diplomatic negotiations and for troop reinforcements on the western and eastern frontiers,154 the attack planned for the coming night was postponed for several days.155 On 26 August, the Army was given 31 August as the new date for the start of the war.156
On 25 August, Hitler, who was not content with Mussolini’s negative response, enquired of the ‘Duce’ what war matériel and raw materials he needed in order to be ready for war.157 The following day Mussolini’s reply arrived containing an enormous list of matériel and raw materials that Italy desperately needed in order to be ready for war. Mussolini could not have made his lack of enthusiasm for war any clearer.158 Hitler responded immediately by giving his ally the chance to save face, while simultaneously diverting attention from his own miscalculation. In a lengthy reply he dealt in detail with the ‘Duce’s’ wish list, but wrote that ‘to my regret, your wishes . . . cannot be fulfilled for purely organizational and technical reasons’. He wrote that he understood Mussolini’s situation and requested that he should ‘as promised, tie down English and French forces through active propaganda and appropriate military demonstrations’.159 Mussolini responded the same evening with a letter to Hitler in which he agreed to his request, but advocated a political solution to the conflict.160
In the meantime, Göring had asked an acquaintance, a Swedish businessman, Birger Dahlerus, to try to mediate in London. Dahlerus had already made an attempt to facilitate discussions between the British and German governments.161 He returned from London on 26 August with a letter from Halifax to Göring, underlining Britain’s willingness to negotiate. Göring immediately passed the letter on to Hitler, and that night Dahlerus was summoned to the Reich Chancellery, where Hitler initially regaled him with a lengthy account of his efforts to reach an understanding with Britain. Dahlerus’s attempts to turn the monologue into a conversation were only partially successful.162
According to Dahlerus, Hitler’s eloquence ‘was undeniable, his ability to make his own opinions appear convincing impressive; however, he suffered from the regrettable inability to acknowledge or respect his opponent’s views’. Hitler appeared to Dahlerus extremely tense and unstable; the scene late at night, with the dictator pacing up and down in his study, in the end uttering wild threats, in fact actually screaming them – all this made an alarming impression on his Swedish visitor.
Finally, Hitler gave Dahlerus a concrete offer to take away with him: Germany sought an alliance with Britain and was prepared to participate in defending the Empire. It was exactly the same proposal that he had made to Henderson. Hitler now increased his demands, however: for the first time he now demanded, in addition to Danzig, most of the Corridor (apart from a strip providing access to Gdingen, which would remain Polish), whereas hitherto he had declared himself content with an extraterritorial transport link through the corridor. Moreover, according to Hitler, Germany would be prepared to guarantee Poland’s borders. At the same time, it wanted guarantees for the German minority in Poland and a settlement of the colonial question. By increasing his demands relating to the Corridor, making it impossible for Poland to agree, while, at the same time, suggesting to Britain his willingness to negotiate, he was trying to drive a wedge between Poland and its guarantor, Britain. This tactic is revealed in a note by Halder, who, in the late evening of 26 August, wrote: ‘Faint hope that we can get Britain to accept demands through negotiation that Poland is rejecting: Danzig-Corridor.’163
This was therefore Hitler’s last attempt before the attack on Poland to use a diplomatic manoeuvre to prevent Britain from intervening, even though she had repeatedly threatened to do so in the event of such an attack. Britain was to be persuaded to accept the German demand for the Corridor, and Germany’s negotiations with Poland were then, using some pretext, to be broken off. It was hoped that, in this event, the British government would pull back from starting a European war and, without Britain, France would not move. If this failed, then he would still be able to put the blame for the war on the other side, as he had, after all, shown himself willing to negotiate right up to the last minute.
On 26 August, a letter from Daladier to Hitler also arrived, in which he implored him to solve the problems in dispute through negotiation.164 Goebbels noted Hitler’s view that the letter was unimportant and evidently written only ‘for the possible future issue of war guilt’.165 Hitler replied the following day with a long letter indicating that he was determined to seek a solution to the Danzig and Corridor questions ‘one way or the other’. He made it clear that he was no longer interested in the idea of an extraterritorial transport link, but rather in a much more extensive annexation: ‘Danzig and the Corridor must return to Germany.’ Although the Germans had promised the French confidentiality, they published the correspondence on 28 August.166
On the afternoon of the 27 August, Hitler received the Reichstag deputies, who had been summoned to Berlin, in the Reich Chancellery. Originally, he had envisaged using this day, which had been intended to be the second day of the war, for an address to the Reichstag justifying the opening of hostilities. As a kind of substitute he made a speech to the deputies in the Ambassadors’ Hall and Halder took notes: ‘Situation
very serious. Determined. Eastern question to be solved one way or the other. Minimum demand: return of Danzig, solution to the Corridor question. Maximum demand: “depends on military situation.” If minimum demand not fulfilled, then war: Brutal! He would be in the front line. The Duce will do his best for us. War very difficult, perhaps hopeless. “So long as I live there will be no talk of capitulation.” Soviet pact perhaps misunderstood by Party. Pact with Satan, to drive out the devil. Economic situation.’ According to Halder, ‘the applause was as required but thin.’ Halder’s general impression of Hitler was not good. ‘Bleary-eyed, haggard, his voice cracking, distracted’.167 Goebbels, by contrast, had encountered his boss on the same day ‘in the best of moods and very confident’.168
On the afternoon of 27 August, Hitler received a telegram from Mussolini, replying to his request to keep the Italian decision secret and to continue with military preparations for appearance’s sake, in order to tie down the Allies.169 Germany too declared Italy’s refusal to act a state secret.170 The ‘Duce’ accepted the German proposals, informing Hitler of what moral and military support Italy was prepared to give.
During the late evening of 27 August, Dahlerus returned from Britain, bringing with him the British government’s reply to Hitler’s proposals.171 Britain declared that, in principle, it was prepared to sign a treaty with Germany, but urged direct negotiations with Warsaw over the questions of Danzig, the Corridor, and the German minority in Poland. The Polish borders ought to be jointly guaranteed by Russia, Germany, Italy, France, and Britain. It rejected Germany’s claim for the return of her colonies, but was prepared to discuss the matter after the crisis had come to an end and following Germany’s demobilization. The German offer to take part in defending the Empire was ‘incompatible with the dignity and interests of the British empire’.
The official response of the British government, brought by ambassador Henderson the following evening, explicitly referred to Britain’s alliance commitments to Poland,172 prompting Hitler to postpone the attack scheduled for 31 August by a further day. 173
On 29 August, during a stormy meeting, Hitler gave Henderson his reply: there was little point in any further negotiations with Poland; he was, however, prepared to receive ‘a Polish emissary with full powers’ for talks in Berlin, but he must arrive by the following day, in other words on the 30th.174 Goebbels was afraid that if the Polish foreign minister, Beck, actually came, people’s sudden hopes of peace might lead to ‘an unstoppable wave of optimism, which would ruin the government’s whole position’.175 This he summed up as ‘possibly still managing to prise London away from Warsaw and finding a pretext to attack’.176
During 29 August Attolico, the Italian ambassador, brought a letter and an oral message from Mussolini, offering his services for mediation with Britain. According to the interpreter, Schmidt, Hitler’s response was distinctly cool: he himself was already in direct contact with the British and had offered to receive a Polish negotiator.177 He wanted to avoid another Munich at all costs.
Late in the evening of this same 29 August, Göring summoned Dahlerus, asking him once again to go to London to underline Germany’s willingness to negotiate, and to announce that further German proposals would be made the following day.178
On the morning of 30 August, Hitler received the Danzig Gauleiter, Albert Forster, to give him final instructions for the intended take-over of Danzig. In addition, on 30 August he signed the ‘Führer Decree for the Formation of a Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich’, creating a committee composed of Göring, Hess, Frick, Funk, Lammers, and Keitel, which was entitled to issue decrees with the force of law.179
During the afternoon, Chamberlain sent a message that the British government was examining the German note in detail and would reply in the course of the day.180 Meanwhile, Hitler was already working on a memorandum designed above all to demonstrate to world opinion that Germany had been willing to negotiate in good faith, even though, as intended, the negotiations had collapsed. The memorandum, comprising a total of sixteen points, demanded the annexation of Danzig, and a plebiscite in the Corridor, with the losing side being provided with extraterritorial links.
At midnight on 30 August, Ribbentrop received Henderson to tell him, in the course of a very heated conversation, that they had prepared proposals for settling the dispute with Poland. However, these were now redundant, as Germany’s demand for a Polish emissary to arrive that day had not been met. Ribbentrop then quickly read out the 16-point memorandum without giving Henderson a copy.181
Hitler also summoned Goebbels at midnight in order to give him details of his ‘proposals for negotiation’ and to fill him in on the background: ‘The Führer thinks it’s going to be war.’ Hitler told Goebbels that he wanted ‘to release [the 16-point proposal] to the world at a suitable opportunity’, demonstrating once again that his memorandum had been intended purely as propaganda. Neither Poland nor Britain was to be permitted to respond to the German proposals before the outbreak of war.
In the early morning of 31 August, Hitler confirmed the order to attack Poland the following day. At 12.40 he signed the ‘Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War’, in which he ordered the attack to begin at 4.45 a.m. In the West, German forces were to remain strictly on the defensive, so that ‘England and France unequivocally bear the responsibility for beginning hostilities’. Around midday, Halder noted: ‘Involvement of the West now said to be unavoidable, but Führer still decides to attack.’ A few hours later, however, the fact that Hitler had initially countermanded the comprehensive evacuation of the frontier zone in the west that had been planned was leading Halder to conclude ‘that he [Hitler] reckons that France and England won’t be marching’.182
On the afternoon of 31 August, the Polish ambassador contacted state secretary von Weizsäcker with a request to be received by Hitler or Ribbentrop. Hitler did not wish to see him, however, and when that evening Lipski visited Ribbentrop to present his government’s response to the British proposal for starting direct negotiations, the German foreign minister terminated the meeting on the pretext that they had waited in vain on the 30th for a Polish emissary with plenipotentiary powers. In fact, Lipski had to concede that even now he did not possess powers going beyond those he already had as ambassador. Shortly afterwards, the Foreign Ministry sent the 16-point programme to the British, French, Japanese, American, and Soviet ambassadors, declaring that Poland had not taken advantage of the opportunity for negotiations.183 Shortly before, around 21.00, both this statement and the memorandum were broadcast on the German radio.184 At this point, Hitler gave Goebbels the impression that he did not believe ‘that England will intervene’. But, Goebbels continued, ‘at the moment no one [can] say’ whether or not this forecast would prove correct.185
Whereas in 1936 Hitler saw himself on the defensive against a looming communist alliance, in 1937 he began to act from a position of strength. Cooperation with Italy, which might turn into an alliance, subsequently extending to east and south-east European states, appeared to him to change the balance of power in Central Europe. At the end of 1937 he was already envisaging the possibility, in certain circumstances, of annexing Austria and Czechoslovakia, without having to fear intervention from France, Britain, or the Soviet Union, an assumption that was not, however, shared by the military. The fact that the alliance with Britain that he had originally sought had not come about appeared initially to increase his diplomatic room for manoeuvre.
The transition to an expansionist foreign policy during 1938 was not, however, part of a long-term plan, but in fact improvised. In February 1938, looking for a foreign policy success immediately after the Blomberg–Fritsch crisis, Hitler forced the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg to make substantial concessions that amounted to the ‘coordination’ of Austria. The further move towards the Anschluss of Austria by mid-March 1938 was not originally envisaged by Hitler as coming about in this way; it arose out of the unexpected countermoves by Schuschnigg and H
itler’s determination to break this resistance through intervention. He only decided to annex Austria immediately when the invasion was already in progress.
This exceptional success encouraged Hitler to accelerate the break-up of Czechoslovakia. The so-called Weekend Crisis of May 1938, which he interpreted as a major loss of prestige resulting from the devious cooperation between Czechoslovakia and the western powers, dramatically radicalized his thinking and actions. For Hitler now became convinced that war with the western powers was unavoidable in the medium term. As far as he was concerned, the destruction of Czechoslovakia was now, unlike in 1937, no longer an option in the event that France was paralysed, but had become for him the precondition for a later war against the western powers, for which he wanted to protect his rear. Thus, at the end of May, he fixed the deadline for a move against Czechoslovakia as 2 October, at the same time initiating a massive increase in rearmament and the building of the West Wall to provide security against an attack by the western powers.
Hitler achieved a remarkable bloodless success when, after several months, the Sudeten crisis was settled by the Munich Agreement at the end of September 1938. However, he interpreted the Agreement as a defeat because he had not succeeded in destroying Czechoslovakia. The ‘bringing home’ of the Sudenten Germans had simply been the pretext for attacking Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the lack of enthusiasm for war, not only among the population, but also among his regime’s political and military leadership, had become very evident. In response, he launched an exceptional rearmament programme and switched the focus of propaganda to preparing the population for war. Finally, in March 1939, as soon as possible, he destroyed the rest of Czechoslovakia, soon afterwards forcing Lithuania to return Memel to Germany.
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