During the following weeks, Göring had the ‘possibilities for settlement’ on the island confirmed by a report from the Reich Office for Area Planning.71 At the same time, the Reich Security Head Office, which was involved in the planning process,72 put together its own version of the Madagascar Plan, which was ready by the middle of August. It proposed the establishment of a ‘police state’ in Madagascar for the four million Jews currently living under German rule. The RSHA estimated a period of four years as necessary for transporting the Jews by ship to the east coast of Africa.73
On the question of transport, Viktor Brack, the organizer of the ‘euthanasia’ programme in the Führer’s Chancellery, made a proposal, noted by Rademacher,74 that ‘the transport organization he had established to carry out the Führer’s special mission during the war should later be used for transporting the Jews to Madagascar’. The fact that a further key figure in the ‘euthanasia’ programme, the head of the Führer’s Chancellery, Philipp Bouhler, was to become governor of the future German colony in East Africa75 makes it clear that the experience that had been gained in the mass murder of the mentally ill was now going to be used for the next stage of the solution to the ‘Jewish question’. For years, millions of European Jews would have been deported to Madagascar, where a large number would have fallen victim to Rademacher’s proposed security police ‘punishment measures’, as well as to the hostile living conditions. In reality it was a project for the physical extermination of the Jews living under German rule. How far it was implemented would in part be dependent on the United States’ ‘good behaviour’, which was to be exacted by means of a genocidal threat. The fact that in his memorandum Rademacher referred to a figure of 6.5 million Jews to be settled suggests that the Jews of south-eastern Europe as well as those in the northern French colonies were now also being included in the plan.
Despite appearing to be pure fantasy and irrespective of whether it had a chance of being implemented, the Madagascar project meant that the RSHA was able to continue with its plans for a ‘Jewish reservation’; even though such a reservation could no longer be created in the General Government, planning under the rubric ‘Madagascar’ could go on until another ‘solution’ to the ‘Jewish question’ emerged. After Hitler’s agreement in principle to Himmler’s memorandum, the Madagascar project had emerged independently in the plans of the Foreign Ministry and those of the RSHA, but Hitler remained in control of what was actually going to happen. Thus, under the influence of the Madagascar plans, from July 1940 onwards, Goebbels was preparing for the deportation of all Berlin Jews; but for this to occur he would need Hitler’s express approval.76
The Madagascar plan was also probably responsible for the fact that, immediately after the armistice, the German occupation forces began expelling Jews and other ‘undesirable’ French citizens from Alsace and Lorraine; by September 23,000 people had been deported from these provinces to southern France. This measure, together with Hitler’s appointment, on 2 August, of the Gauleiters Josef Bürckel (Palatinate) and Robert Wagner (Baden) to head the administrations of Lorraine and Alsace, was clearly intended to prepare for the annexation of these two territories.77 On 28 September, Hitler specifically told the Gauleiters that in ten years’ time they were to report that the French territories of which they were in charge were ‘German, and that means completely German’, and he would not enquire about ‘what methods they had used’.78 The two Gauleiters extended their ‘purges’ to their own Gaus; at the beginning of October, the Jews still living in Baden and the Saar-Palatinate, a total of around 6,500 people, were also deported to southern France, a measure that was expressly approved by Hitler and can be seen as a late consequence of the Madagascar Plan.79
The prospect of deporting the European Jews to Madagascar had a direct impact on Jewish policy in Poland, and once again Hitler was involved. On 8 July 1940, as Hans Frank informed his colleagues a few days later, Hitler had assured him that, in the light of the Madagascar project, there would be no further deportations to the General Government.80 The following day, Himmler issued an internal directive halting further deportations into Frank’s territory.81 This put an end to the idea of creating a ‘Jewish reservation’ in the General Government. However, within only a few months, the Madagascar plan had become a fantasy project, a ‘somewhere, anywhere’ to provide a ‘solution’ to the ‘Jewish problem’, for which there was in fact no clear scheme. It continued to be used by Hitler in this sense, as a purely imaginary place, as late as spring 1942, although it was officially abandoned in February 1942 and, in the meantime, the murder of the Jews in death camps had already begun.
The Blitz
On 24 July, after Britain’s rejection of his ‘peace offer’, and following his usual visit to the Bayreuth festival, Hitler indicated that he was going to prepare an air offensive to force her to make peace.82 On 1 August, when final ‘feelers’ put out via non-belligerent states had met with no response,83 he issued Directive No. 17 for the conduct of naval and air warfare against Great Britain. According to the directive, starting on 5 August, the Royal Air Force was to be ‘defeated’ and the air war was then to be directed mainly at ports (with the exception of those on the south coast, which would be needed for the invasion) and against facilities used for storing foodstuffs. ‘I am reserving the decision as to whether to carry out terror raids in retaliation.’84 Also, a massive propaganda campaign was to be launched to create a fear of invasion in Britain, ‘in order to confuse the enemy’. Hitler made it clear to his Propaganda Minister, however, that an ‘invasion was not planned’.85 During the following weeks in various meetings with his military chiefs,86 Hitler told them that Operation Sea Lion was a threat that might, in certain circumstances, be the last resort to force Britain to make peace.
In fact, the massive air raids were delayed. Bad weather meant87 that – after the first large-scale air battles over the Channel88 – the long-awaited major raid with almost 1,500 aircraft could not take place until 13 August. On the following days too there were a considerable number of raids,89 but once again bad weather set in and large-scale raids could not be mounted until the end of the month.90
The German raids elicited a response. Two days after the Luftwaffe had bombed residential districts in the East End of London on 24 August, British aircraft were flying over Berlin,91 and, on 28 August, the RAF mounted its first raid on the city, causing ten deaths.92 Following further British raids (the bombing of an hydrogenation plant near Stettin resulted in seven deaths), in his speech in the Berlin Sportpalast opening the Winter Aid programme on 4 September, Hitler promised ‘retaliation’: ‘And if they [the British, P.L.] drop two, or three, or four thousand kilogram bombs, then in a single night we shall drop 150,000, 180,000, 230,000, 400,000, a million kilograms. If they announce they will mount large-scale raids on our cities, we shall obliterate their cities!’93 The following day, he gave the go-ahead for raids on London and other British cities, which meant that he had begun intervening in the air war at the tactical level.94 The German press, which printed pictures of the damage to German cities, also began to demand ‘retaliation’.95
On 14 September, at a meeting with the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht, Hitler insisted that there was a ‘chance of totally crushing the English’; only four or five more days of good weather were required in order to force a military decision.96 During the following night, London was once again attacked by 200 bombers. However, despite continuing raids in the second half of September, the hoped-for result was not achieved; Britain could not be forced by the air terror to surrender. In the meantime, on 19 September Hitler had ordered the disbanding of the ships assembled in the ‘invasion harbours’, although the ships had to be available again within a few days, so that the option of an invasion of Britain was, in theory, retained.97
At the beginning of October, after a meeting with General Otto von Waldau, the Chief of the Luftwaffe Leadership Staff, Halder noted that they had ‘underestima
ted the British fighters by about 100 per cent’. They would be considerably reducing the air raids during the winter; in the spring they would be no stronger than they were at the start of the air war against Britain; but, in order to ‘smash the English’ they would need four times the strength.98 The German ‘blitz’ had failed. ‘A two-front war impossible’ was thus Halder’s conclusion.
32
Diplomatic Soundings
Germany’s victories in the West had implications for the balance of power that went far beyond Europe. Having had to backtrack on his aim of forcing Britain to make peace, Hitler’s main challenge over the next few months was to recognize this fact, respond to it, and exploit it.
After Germany’s victory in western Europe, Japan was hoping to inherit the Dutch and French colonies in south-east Asia. But Britain’s colonies were also now vulnerable, as it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Germany and could not defend them as vigorously as before. With its eyes on these colonies, the Japanese government decided that it would be advisable to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.1 Japan also concluded that it would make sense to improve relations with Germany, as these relations had been negatively affected by the Nazi–Soviet pact, in order to ensure that Germany did not attempt to take over the colonies of the defeated powers. A clear demarcation of their respective spheres of influence was required. Hitler was initially opposed to a formal alliance with Japan.2 However, he changed his mind in the light of Britain’s rejection of his peace offer and the threat of the United States entering the war, and in August came out in favour of such an alliance.3 The aim was to force the United States to focus on the Pacific region, putting Britain under greater pressure to accede to Germany’s ‘desire for peace’.4
The emerging cooperation between Italy, Japan, and Germany prompted the German government to begin developing more far-reaching plans. Ribbentrop, in particular, put forward the idea of an anti-British continental bloc from Spain to Japan.5 Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Yugoslavia would all be incorporated into the triple alliance of Japan–Italy–Germany, and also Spain, enabling Gibraltar to be conquered and the Mediterranean to be thereby blocked off from the West. In addition, France was earmarked to play an active part in the war against Britain, and, finally, the Soviet Union was to be incorporated into the alliance; this would require the expansionist ambitions attributed to Stalin to be directed away from Europe and towards Iran and India.
Ribbentrop’s initiative was similar to ideas being discussed by the Naval High Command. In two situation conferences with Hitler in September, Raeder proposed eliminating the British military presence in the Mediterranean and the Near East. Germany should seize Gibraltar and the Suez Canal and advance through Palestine and Syria towards the Turkish border. Then Turkey would be ‘in our power’ and the ‘Russian problem’ would ‘look very different’. It would then be questionable whether ‘moving against R from the north would still be necessary’. If they established a link to Italian East Africa, Britain’s position in the Indian Ocean would be weakened. In addition, the establishment of naval bases in Dakar, Casablanca, and in the Canary Islands would improve Germany’s position in the Atlantic. This in turn would benefit her situation vis-à-vis the United States, in the event of its entering the war, which the Naval High Command considered likely. Hitler, who on 11 July had already approved the navy’s request for a large naval construction programme along the lines of the Z plan, responded positively to Raeder’s proposal at the situation conference on 26 September, which took place tête-à-tête; he would consider, he said, whether to implement the plan with Spain or with France, more likely France.6
Between September and December, Hitler and Ribbentrop were actively engaged in diplomacy to realize the continental bloc idea. The problem was trying to reconcile the different interests of the various parties.
This required, in the first place, sorting out the sensitive relationships in the Balkans.7 During the middle of August, after massive intervention by Hitler and his foreign minister, Romania had begun negotiations with Bulgaria and Hungary about their territorial demands.8 However, after a few days the meetings between Romania and Hungary were broken off, and Hungary began to threaten to use force to resolve the conflict.9 Germany and Italy were determined to secure a quick resolution, in order to integrate both adversaries into the Axis; this was agreed at a meeting at the Berghof between Hitler and Ciano on 28 August.10 After a hurriedly convened conference in Vienna on 29 and 30 August 1940 in Schloss Belvedere, attended by the foreign ministers of Italy, Hungary, Romania, and Germany, Ribbentrop and Ciano imposed the so-called Second Vienna Award.11 Romania had to give up a large part of Transylvania to Hungary, whose territory now stretched deep into Romania. In recompense, Germany and Italy guaranteed the integrity of Romania’s remaining territory.12 This produced a wave of anger in Romania, leading to the abdication of King Carol II in favour of his son, Michael. General Ion Antonescu became prime minister with German backing, had himself nominated ‘head of state’,13 and was forced by Hitler to give up further territory; on 7 September, South Ossuja was awarded to Bulgaria. In return, Hitler agreed to Antonescu’s request14 for a German military mission to be sent to Romania. To outward appearances this was to assist Romania in establishing and training its armed forces. However, its ‘real task’ was to protect the oil fields from ‘being seized by a third power’, and to enable the Romanian armed forces ‘to carry out . . . certain tasks’, as well as to prepare ‘for the deployment from Romania of German and Romanian forces in the event of war being forced on us by the Soviet Union’.15 To start with, the German military mission was kept secret by both countries; Hitler also saw no need to inform his main ally, Mussolini.
In the late summer of 1940, alongside this incorporation of Romania into his preparations for war against the Soviet Union, Hitler reappraised his policy towards Finland. Aiming to secure an important ally on the northern flank of his planned invasion, and to integrate the country into his preparations for war as a base for operations and supplies, he abandoned the distant approach adopted towards Finland during the Russo–Finnish war and the succeeding months.16 He ordered a substantial concentration of German forces in northern Norway,17 and, at the beginning of August 1940, approved the revival of arms exports to Finland.18 In return, on 12 September, a German–Finnish transit agreement was signed, permitting German troops and supplies to be transported from Finnish ports to northern Norway and the permanent stationing of German troops along the transit route.19
From July onwards, Hitler had been toying with the idea of mounting a surprise attack on Gibraltar, an operation that was inconceivable without Spain’s support.20 Spain was also expected to allow Germany to establish bases on the Canary Islands. In the subsequent negotiations, Hitler followed the maxim: ‘Promise the Spaniards everything they want, even if not all their wishes can be fulfilled’.21 During the second half of September, Hitler and Ribbentrop promised to deliver large quantities of food and raw materials, and agreed to the Spanish request to hand over the French colony of Morocco.22 However, Franco stalled when, during the following weeks, Hitler refused to commit himself on Morocco. At a meeting with Mussolini on 4 October, Hitler said that ‘there was an issue as to whether it might not be possible to get France and Spain to come to terms and, thereby, secure a continental coalition against England’. For that it would be essential to come to an agreement with France. But this was not going to happen. During an internal discussion before the meeting with Mussolini, Hitler put his finger on the core of the problem: reconciling the conflict of interests between France, Italy, and Spain in Africa would only be ‘possible through grandiose deceit’.23
This was Hitler’s aim when he set off at the end of October on a trip to Montoire (north of Tours) and to Hendaye on the Franco–Spanish border. He told Prime Minister Pierre Laval that a refusal by France to support Germany in the war against Britain would lead to a reduction in France’s colonial possessions
. According to his interpreter, Schmidt, Hitler did not even bother to respond to a proposal by the French president, Marshal Philippe Pétain, for a Franco–German peace treaty. As far as the French were concerned, this meant there was no point in discussing Franco–German cooperation further; the possibility of France’s inclusion in an anti-British bloc was not even touched on.24
In Hendaye Hitler had to inform Franco that, because France might enter the war, the prospect of his receiving the French colony of Morocco was now uncertain.25 Hitler told the Spanish dictator that if they failed to come to an arrangement with France, there was a danger of the French north African colonies breaking away, which would mean they would be lost to the Axis. Subsequently, Ribbentrop and the Spanish foreign minister, Serrano Súñer, discussed a secret German–Spanish protocol, which was finally signed by Ribbentrop, Súñer, and Ciano in November 1940. It confirmed Spain’s willingness to join the Tripartite Pact and the Pact of Steel. After the victory over Britain, apart from Gibraltar, Spain was to receive French colonial possessions in Africa, and France would gain British colonies.26 However, after his return, Hitler told Goebbels that he did ‘not have a good opinion of Franco. A lot of bravado, but no commitment’.27 Hitler’s adjutant, Engel, told Halder that Hitler had called Franco a ‘Jesuit swine’.28
During the same period, Ribbentrop involved himself in another project. Between 19 and 22 September, during a visit to Rome, he tried to persuade Mussolini and Ciano of the advantages of a pact between Italy, Germany, and Japan.29 While the existing alliance between the three powers, the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936/37, had a clear anti-Soviet slant, Ribbentrop suggested to his interlocutors a very different perspective. They should start by waiting for the Soviet Union’s response to the new pact and then, ‘at an appropriate moment, [offer] Russia a free hand to achieve its aims in the south in the direction of the Persian Gulf or India’.30 At this point, the negotiations with Japan had already been substantially completed.31
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