by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
the chapter on expropriation.
40
ANTECEDENTS
Goebbels was defeated. His hopes were dashed to the ground, and
his cravings for power were left unsatisfied. The morsel had been taken
right out of his mouth. From now on we shall have little to say about
Goebbels. While he made a few attempts at a comeback, his role in the
destruction of the Jews was never again of paramount importance. As
Gauleiter of Berlin, he was to have some say in the deportation of Jews
from the capital; as Propaganda Minister and chief of the party’s
Propaganda Office, he remained the principal dispenser of words, but
even this function he had to share with others. In the meantime, the
Propaganda Minister was a very unpopular personality in the German
bureaucracy, for he had saddled the bureaucrats with a host of undesirable problems.
First on the list of unfavorable repercussions was the foreign reaction. Comments in the foreign press were critical, international negotiations were jarred, and the creeping boycott of German goods was intensified.
Ambassador DieckhofT, in Washington, wrote to the Foreign Office
that he hoped that “the storm at present sweeping across the United
States will subside again in the foreseeable future and that we shall be
able to work again.” Until November 10 a large proportion of the
American people had still remained aloof from the anti-German campaign. Now this was no longer the case. The outcry came not only from the Jews but from all camps and classes, including even the German-American camp. “What particularly strikes me,” continued the German ambassador, “is the fact that, with few exceptions, the respectable patriotic
circles, which
are thoroughly
anti-Communist,
and, for
the
greater part, anti-Semitic in their outlook, also begin to turn away from
us. The fact that the Jewish newspapers write still more excitedly than
before and that the Catholic bishops’ campaign against Germany is
waged more bitterly than before is not surprising; but that men like
Dewey, Hoover, Hearst, and many others who have hitherto maintained a comparative reserve and have even, to some extent, expressed sympathy toward Germany, are now publicly adopting so violent and
bitter an attitude against her is a serious matter. ... In the general
atmosphere of hate, the idea of boycotting German goods has received
new fuel, and trade negotiations cannot be considered at the moment.”
Such reports poured into the Foreign Office from all over the world.“ 29 30
29. Dieckhoff to Foreign Office, November 14, 1938, Akten zur Deutschen
Auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945, Ser. D. vol. IV, No. 501. In English translation, also in
Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, same series, same volume, same
document number.
30. See, for example, the report by the German legation in Uruguay (signed Lang-
mann) to the Foreign Office, November II, 1938, NG-3235.
41
ANTECEDENTS
But if the diplomats received a few jolts, the sharpest disappointments were reserved for the exporters, the armament experts, and all those interested in the supply of foreign currency. German trade had,
for some time, suffered from organized boycotts in foreign countries.
Still, the boycott movement had been confined largely to the consumer
level; it was not directed against Jewish firms, and it did not have many
non-Jewish followers. The riots changed all that. For the first time the
boycott
movement
gained
many
adherents
among
retailers,
distributors, and importers.
This meant, in practice, large-scale cancellations of contracts, particularly in France, England, the United States, Canada, and Yugoslavia. The Armament-Economy Staff of the Armed Forces reported that many companies had lost 20 to 30 percent of their export business.
Among the hardest hit were leather goods and toy manufacturers. One
toy enterprise lost all its business in England; another lost all its outlets
in the United States. Because of the elimination of Jewish firms in
Germany, much of the foreign exchange that these firms had earned
was also sacrificed. Thus one company, whose Jewish owner had been
arrested, was unable under new “Aryan” management to procure a
contract in the amount of 600,000 reichsmark, which had already been
negotiated before the pogrom. Most painful, however, was the severance
of
old
connections
between
“Aryan”
firms
in
Germany
and
“Aryan” firms in foreign countries. The Germans simply could not
understand why non-Jewish enterprises should have felt compelled to
join in the boycott. Yet this is what happened. In Holland one of the
largest
Dutch
trading
companies,
Stockies
en
Zoonen,
Amsterdam,
which had represented such German firms as Krupp, Ford (German
branch), DKW, and BMW, terminated all its German contracts and
took over the representation of English firms.’1
Clearly the first consequence of the pogrom was the loss of much
good will abroad. The second result was the damage to property at
home.“
On November 12, 1938, two days after the riots. Goring called a
conference to survey the damage and to discuss measures to deal with
it. The conference was attended by Economy Minister Funk, Propa- 31 32
31. Report by Armament-Economy Staff lib IWehrwirischaftssiablHb), December
21.1938, WV]. 149a. The Armament-Economy Staff was a forerunner of the Winschafts-
Rustungsamt (Wi Rii).
32. Incomplete reports indicated the following damage: 81S shops destroyed; 171
houses set on fire; 191 synagogues burned out; 14 cemetery chapels, community halls,
and similar buildings demolished. TWenty thousand Jews were arrested, thirty-six were
killed, another thirty-six were seriously injured. Heydrich to Gating, November 11,
1938, PS-3038.
42
ANTECEDENTS
ganda
Minister
Goebbels,
Finance
Minister
von
Krosigk,
representative of the German insurance companies Hilgard, Chief of the Security
Police Heydrich, Chief of the Order Police Daluege, representative of
the Foreign Office Wormann, and many other interested parties." In his
opening remarks Goring emphasized that he had had "enough of these
demonstrations. They don’t harm the Jew,” he said, “but me, because I
am the authority ultimately responsible for the coordination of the
German economy. If today a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are
thrown into the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which the Jew does not even have. ... It is insane to clear out and burn a Jewish warehouse, then have a German insurance company
make good for the loss. And the goods which I need desperately, whole
bales of clothing and what-not are being burned, and I miss them
everywhere. I may as well bum the raw materials before they arrive.”
After
the
opening
remarks,
Hilgard,
the
insurance
expert,
was
called in. His recital is vaguely reminiscent of the medieval Kloster-
neuburger Chronik, which had grudgingly admitted that the damages
caused by a mob in the Jewish quarter of Vienna had hurt Christians
more than Jews, for the damage had been done to Christian property in
the Jewish pawnshops. Now, in 1938, Hilgard unfolded a similar story.
Windows that were insured for about $6,000,000 had been smashed. At
least half this amount would have to be produced in foreign exchange,
for the expensive window panes were manufactured in Belgium. What
was more, the windows of Jewish shops belonged not to the Jewish
storekeepers but to the German house owners. The problem was similar in the case of consumer goods looted in stores. Damage in the Margraf jewelry store alone was reported at $1,700,000.
Goring
interrupted
at
this
point:
"Daluege
and Heydrich,
you'll
have to get me this jewelry through raids, staged on a tremendous
scale!” Heydrich replied that recovery might not be so easy. Things
had been thrown into the street. "The crowd was naturally rushing to
pick up minks, skunks, etc. It will be very difficult to recover that.
Even children have filled their pockets, just for fun.” Then Heydrich
added sarcastically, for the benefit of Goebbels: “It is suggested that
the Hitler Youth is not to be employed and to participate in such
actions without the Party’s consent.”
Hilgard, continuing his account, said that the total damage in property would be about 25,000,000 reichsmark. Heydrich suggested that, if the loss in consumer goods, lost taxes, and other indirect losses were
added, the damage would be measured in the hundreds of millions. He 33
33.
Minutes of GOring conference, November 12, 1938, PS-1816. The minutes are
divided into seven parts. Three parts (11, IV, and VI) are missing.
43
ANTECEDENTS
added that 7,500 stores had been ransacked. Daluege elaborated that in
many cases the goods in stores were not the property of the store
owners but were still owned by the German wholesalers.
hilgard: We will have to pay for them too.
gOring (to Heydrich): 1 wish you had killed two hundred Jews, and
not destroyed such values.
heydrich: Thirty-five were killed.
In the end the conferees decided upon the following regulation of
damage claims—that is, they apportioned the damage in the following
way: (1) The uninsured losses of Jewish property remained Jewish
losses. Jewelry, furs, or any other loot was not returned to the Jewish
owners. To the extent that anything was recovered, the items were
confiscated by the state.” (2) Insured property of the Germans (mainly
window glass and shipments of consumer goods) had to be made good
by the insurance companies. (3) Insured losses of Jewish property were
dealt with as follows: the Jewish insurance claims were confiscated by
the Reich: the companies were directed to make payments to the government; the Jewish property owners, in turn, were ordered to repair the damage “for the restoration of the street appearance.”” However, a
subsequent decree allowed the Jews to deduct the cost of repairs from
payments toward the billion-mark fine.34 35 36 The net effect of these regulations, therefore, was to place the burden of the insured damage upon the insurance companies.
Hilgard admitted that the companies would have to make payments,
lest
public
confidence
in
German
insurance
would
be
destroyed. But he had hoped for a government refund in secret. Goring,
however, would not “dream” of it; that would be a “present.” Still, in
the course of the conference Hilgard received a promise that something
would be done for the “small" companies—of course, only in cases
where it was “absolutely necessary." At this point there is a gap in the
conference record, but in part V of the proceedings Goring pointed out
that “after all is said and done, there will remain some profit for the
insurance companies, since they wouldn’t have to make good for all
the damage. Mr. Hilgard, you may enjoy yourself."
hilgard: I have no reason for that—the fact that we won’t have to pay
for all the damage is called profit!
gOring: Just a moment! If you are compelled under the law to pay five
million, and all of a sudden there appears an angel in my somewhat corpu-
34. See directive by Darmstadt State Police (Gestapo), December 7, 1938, D-183.
35. Decree, signed by Gôring, November 12, 1938, RGB1 1,1581.
36. Decree signed by von Krosigk, November 21, 1938, RGB1 1, 1638.
ANTECEDENTS
lent form before you, and tells you that you can keep one million, why
cannot that be called a profit? I should actually split with you, or whatever
you'd call it; I can see it looking at you, your whole body grins. You made
a big profit.
(Remark: Let's initiate a tax for damages resulting from public disturbances, to be paid by the insurance companies.) Hilgard rejoined that, in his view, "the honorable German merchant”
was still footing the bill. The insurance companies were still the losers.
"That is so, and that will remain so, and nobody can tell me differently.”
GOring: Then why don’t you take care that a few windows less are
smashed! You belong to the people, too!
A third problem that arose from the Goebbels pogrom was the
destruction
of
synagogues.
Compared
with
the
foreign
repercussions
and the insurance claims, this was a relatively minor problem. Since
Goring had no use for synagogues, he did not regard them as German
property. But the ruins were in the way. After much correspondence on
this problem, the Church Ministry hit upon the solution of invoking the
building code in order to saddle the Jewish communities with the rubble clearance.”
The fourth matter to be dealt with was the possibility of Jewish
actions in the courts. The Justice Ministry took care of this problem by
issuing a decree that Jews of German nationality would have no legal
claims in any case arising from the “occurrences” of November 8—10.58
The foreign Jews who had suffered injury or damage naturally had
recourse
to
diplomatic
intervention
and
claims
against
the
state.
Goring could find no way out of this dilemma, although he was annoyed that “the minute the Itzig has left Poland, he should be treated like a Pole!” When the Foreign Office representative put in that one had
to deal with countries like the United States, which was in a position to
retaliate, Goring replied that the United States was a “gangster state"
and that German investments there should have been liquidated long
ago. “But
you are right, Mr. Wormann, the matter has to be considered.””
The fifth problem was, in some respects, the most difficult of all. In
the course of the riots many acts had been committed that were crimes
under the penal code. Personal belongings had been stolen (without 37 38 39
37. Circular by Church Ministry, probably March 1939, NG-26. See also correspondence in documents NG-2088, NG-2089 and NG-2090.
38. Decree, signed by Stuckart, Hess, Schlegelberger, and Reinhardt, March 18,
1939, RGB1 1,614.
39. Minutes of Gdring conference, November 12, 1938, PS-1816.
45
ANTECEDENTS
subsequent delivery to the state), women had been assaulted, men had
been killed. On January 23-26, 1939, Justice Minister Gürtner called
the prosecutors of the highest courts into conference to discuss the
problem.
Staatssekretär
Freisler
(second
highest
man
in
the
Justice
Ministry) explained that the problem was twofold: prosecution of party
members and prosecution of non-party members. As for the non-party
men, the judicial machinery could act at once, without “shouting about
its work all over the place.” Gürtner remarked that only the “big
crumbs” should be prosecuted. Rape, for instance, would have to be
dealt with. Minor matters, such as the appropriation of a few cans of
food, would, on the other hand, have to be quashed. Oberstaatsanwalt
Joel (a prosecutor) agreed that it was not necessary to prosecute anyone for taking a pair of underdrawers. Furthermore, one would have to take into account that the temptation was great, the need was present,
and the instigation was clear. With regard to party members, action
could be taken only after their expulsion from the party, since there
was a presumption that they had acted upon orders."
In February 1939 the Supreme Party Court met in order to decide
the cases of thirty men who had committed “excesses.” In his report to
Goring, Chief Party Judge Buch pointed to the extenuating circumstance
that
the
pogrom
had
been
not
spontaneous
but
organized.
Twenty-six of the defendants had killed Jews. Not one of these party
men was expelled. On behalf of all twenty-six, the Justice Minister was
urged to quash proceedings in the criminal courts. In all these cases the
court had found no “ignoble” motives. Even if the men had acted