by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
direct all enterprises to remove their Jewish employees, each company
had to make its own decision about its own Jews. In the business sector
18. "Die Juden im deutschen Heere," Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums (Berlin),
November 25, 1910, pp. 556-59.
19. RGBl I, 609.
20. Text and discussion of the regulation in H. G. Adler, Der verwaltete Mensch
(Tübingen, 1974). pp. 294-95. Germans married to Jewish women were also subject to
removal. Exempted were officers accepted by the peacetime army. Mischlinge of the
second degree were to be retained only for "ample reason" Ibei ausreichender Begründung) and promoted only in exceptional circumstances.
21. RGBl 1.713.
91
EXPROPRIATION
the Jews therefore felt themselves safe. They did not think that purely
private
organizations
would
join
in
the
destruction
process
without
compulsion. The following is an illustration from I. G. Farben.
In July 1933 a DuPont delegation visited I. G. Farben in Germany.
The DuPont representatives held many conferences with I. G. Farben
officials, and in the course of these talks one of the DuPont men had a
conversation with Dr. Karl von Weinberg, who was one of the founders
of I. G. Farben and who served as deputy chairman of its Verwal-
tungsrat, an assembly of “elder statesmen" who had no actual power in
the company but whose advice was considered weighty.“ This is the
impression that one of the Americans had of Weinberg:2’
Following luncheon, we visited Dr. Carl von Weinberg, who is now 73
years old and who comes to the office daily for consultation with the active
members of the I.G. Dr. von Weinberg also discussed the situation in
Germany, and although he is a Jew, has given the movement his full stamp
of approval. He stated further that all his money is invested in Germany
and he does not have one pfennig outside the country. We spoke of the
proposed increase in collaboration with I.G., to which he was in hearty
agreement. In touching upon I.G.’s interest in the U.S.A., Dr. von Weinberg indicated that I.G. was very well pleased with the investment, and by suggestion gave us to understand that they had no intention of retiring
from that market.
Weinberg was a privileged man. A street had been named after him
in Frankfurt and, even though it was the policy to remove such reminders of a Jewish presence in Germany, the city’s Street-Naming Committee
(Strassenbenennungsausschuss)
was
hesitant
to
do
so
in
his case. Still, there was no future for him. He died in exile, albeit in
Fascist Rome.22 23 24 25 As for the other Jewish executives of I. G. Farben,
almost all of them were dropped by 1937.“
The dismissals in the business sector were all the more remarkable
because of two obstacles that German enterprises had to overcome:
22. For list of Verwaltungsrat members, see affidavit by Hermann fiaessler, July
1947, NI-7957.
23. Homer H. Ewing, E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., Wilmington, Delaware, to
Wendell R. Swim, director. Foreign Relations Department of DuPont, July 17, 1933, NI-
9784.
24. (Commission zur Erforschung der Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden,
Dokumenle zur Geschichte der Frankfurter Juden 1933-1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1963),
pp. 171, 173, 174, 552. Karl's older brother. Dr. Arthur von Weinberg, a chemist at the
time of the formation of I. G. Farben and a World War I major with the Iron Cross First
Class, was arrested in the home of his adopted non-Jewish daughter (wife of Graf Rudolf
Spreti) in 1942 and transported at the age of eighty-one to the “Old People's Ghetto” of
Theresienstadt, where he died- Adler, Der verwaltete Mensch, pp, 337-39.
25. Affidavit by Baessler, July 17, 1947. NI-7957.
92
DISMISSALS
employment contracts and efficiency problems. The long-term employment contracts with Jews posed a legal difficulty. Since there was no decree directing business firms to dismiss their Jewish personnel or
freeing the companies from the obligation of employment assumed in
the contracts, many cases actually came to court. In the courts the
German enterprises usually attempted to justify the dismissals on the
ground that there was party pressure or that some clause in the employment contract, however remote, was applicable to the case.“
Just how far these attempts were pursued is illustrated by a case
decided by the highest court in the country, the Reichsgericht. A defendant movie company (German) claimed that it was entitled to fire a Jewish stage manager with whom it had concluded a long-term contract
because of a clause in that contract that provided for termination of
employment in the case of “sickness, death, or similar causes rendering the stage manager’s work impossible.’’ The Reichsgericht held that the clause was “unqualifiedly applicable” (unbedenklich anwendbar)
on the ground that the “racial characteristics" of the plaintiff amounted
to sickness and death.” In the thinking of Germany's highest judges,
the Jews had already ceased to be living organisms. They were dead
matter that could no longer contribute to the growth of a German
business.
The second obstacle to the removal of the Jews from German
enterprises was the matter of efficiency. There was a strong conviction
that in certain posts (such as sales positions in the export trade) Jews
were ideal,“ or even irreplaceable. This notion led I. G. Farben and
several other enterprises that had branches abroad to transfer Jewish
personnel to foreign countries. In that way the Jews were out of Germany, and all the problems seemed to be solved. However, even this solution was only temporary, for invariably the major enterprises decided
on
the
“gradual
reduction"
of
their
Jewish
representatives
abroad.“
As the dismissals gained momentum, the conditions under which
the Jews were fired became worse. The later a Jew was removed, the
less his severance pay, settlement, or pension.“ The process was well
under way before the ministerial bureaucracy stepped in. Early in 1938 26 27 28 29 30
26. See Ernst Ftaenkel, The Dual Stale (New York, 1941), pp. 92, 95; for arguments in dissolution of partnerships, see pp. 90-91.
27. Decision by Reichsgericht, June 17, 1936, cited by Fraenkel, ibid., pp. 95-96.
28. See summary of the Schacht conference, August 22, 1935, NG-4067.
29. See summary of meeting of I. G. Farben Commercial Committee, von Schnitz-
ler presiding, October 17, 1937, Nl-4862.
30. Statement by Hugo Zinsser, member of the Vorstand of the Dresdner Bank.
November 17, 1945, NI-11864.
93
EXPROPRIATION
the Interior Ministry prepared a decree that defined the term Jewish
enterprise. The decree, dated June 14, 1938,31 was to form the basis for
the
compulsory
transfer
of
Jewish
firms
into
German
>
hands.
The
definition, however, was very broad. A business was considered Jewish not only if it was owned by Jews, but also if a legal representative or board member was a Jew. A branch of a German business was considered Jewish if a manager of the branch was a Jew. Such a definition was ample incentive for the firing of Jewish directors, Prokuristen
(managers with powers to represent the firm), or branch managers,
insofar as such executives were still in office. In November 1938 the
ministries stepped in again. The decree of November 12, 1938,” signed
by Gdring, directed German firms to dismiss all their Jewish managers
by the end of the year. Dismissal could be effected after six weeks’
notice. After expiration of such notice, the Jewish manager had no
further financial claim upon his employer.
Thus the expropriations began with the slow but thorough purge of
Jews from the machinery of destruction. This, in Nazi eyes, was the
logical beginning. Before one could dominate the Jews, it was obviously necessary to eliminate their “domination." However, the dismissals constituted only a grazing attack on the Jewish community. In the course of this attack, only a few thousand individuals became casualties. The major centers of Jewish "power," the citadels of Jewish
“domination," the symbols of Jewish “exploitation,” were the independent Jewish enterprises, from the myriads of small stores to the few major companies that might have qualified for the title “big business.”
A R Y A N I Z A T I O N S * 3
Overall, Jewish participation in the German business world before 1933
reveals
the
following
proportions,
configurations,
and
trends:
(1)
A
large
percentage
of
the
Jewish
population
was
self-employed.
The
figures were 46 percent for Jews, 16 percent for Germans. (2) Jews
were heavily represented in such visible activities as retailing, real
estate, the legal and health professions, as well as in the role of middlemen in commercial banking or the wholesale trade in foods and metals.
(3) In several branches of industry and commerce, notably banking and
the metals trade, the Jewish share was declining prior to Hitler’s sei-
31. RGB11,627.
32. RGB1 1, 1580.
94
ARYANIZATIONS
zure of power.1 In fact, a Nazi researcher concluded that Jewish economic influence had reached its peak by 1913.2 This pattern spelled out considerable vulnerability to the coming assault on Jewish Arms.
The fate of a Jewish enterprise could be either liquidation or “Ar-
yanization.” A liquidated business ceased to exist; one that was Ar-
yanized was purchased by a German company. The Aryanizations were
divided into two phases: (1) the so-called voluntary Aryanizations (January 1933, to November 1938), which were transfers in pursuance of
“voluntary”
agreements
between
Jewish
sellers
and
German
buyers,
and (2) the “compulsory Aryanizations” (after November 1938), which
were
transfers
in
pursuance
of
state
orders
compelling
the
Jewish
owners to sell their property.
The word “voluntary” belongs in quotation marks because no sale
of Jewish property under the Nazi regime was voluntary in the sense of
a freely negotiated contract in a free society. The Jews were under
pressure to sell. The longer they chose to wait, the greater the pressure
and the smaller the compensation. This does not mean that the Jews
were entirely powerless. Aryanization was perhaps the only phase of
the destruction process in which the Jews had some maneuverability,
some opportunity for playing German against German, and some occasion for delaying tactics. But it was a dangerous game. Time was against the Jews.
The tendency to hold out or to give in was not a measure of size.
The large Jewish enterprises presented more formidable obstacles to
German buyers, but they were also "tempting morsels.” The more
weapons a Jewish enterprise had at its disposal, the greater the forces
arrayed against it. The speed with which a Jewish business was sold
was therefore no indication of the owner’s resources; it was only a clue
to his expectations and fears. Sometimes an owner would sell part of
his holdings, only to cling desperately to the remainder. Sometimes he
would sell everything at once. We have a few interesting examples of
quick sales in territories occupied by the Germans in 1938 and 1939.
The Germans marched into Austria in March 1938, into the Sudeten-
land of Czechoslovakia in October 1938, into Bohemia-Moravia (the
Protektorat) in March 1939. There are instances when sellouts in these
1. See the detailed discussion of the Jewish distribution in the economy by Esra
Bennathan, “Die demographische und wirtschaftliche Struktur der Juden“ in Werner
Mosse, ed., Entscheidungsjahr 1932 (Tübingen, 1966). pp. 87-131, particularly 106-108,
115. and 119.
2. Wolfgang Hölter, Untersuchungen über die Machtstellung der Juden In der Weltwirtschaft, vol. I, England und das vornationalsozialistische Deutschland (Vienna, 1944), pp. 216-17,235-37.
95
EXPROPRIATION
areas preceded the entry of German troops. Jewish fear, in short, was
operative before the pressure could be applied.
In
Austria
the
most
important
pre-Anschluss
negotiations
were
carried
out
between
the
Rothschild-controlled
Österreichische
Kreditanstalt and the German I. G. Farben company. The subject of
the
negotiations
was
a
Kreditanstalt
subsidiary,
the
Pulverfabrik
Skodawerke-Wetzler A. G. The talks were begun originally with a view
to the joint construction of a new plant in Austria. However, in the
course of the discussions the I. G. Farben plenipotentiary, Ilgner, demanded sale by the Kreditanstalt of 51 percent of its Pulverfabrik holdings to the I. G.’ The Kreditanstalt could not accede to this demand because Austria, a small country, offered few investment possibilities. In other words, the Kreditanstalt could not use the Schillinge that I. G. Farben offered in payment to acquire as good a holding as the
prosperous Pulverfabrik.*
Nevertheless,
negotiations
continued.
In February
1938,
a
month
before the Anschluss, the Kreditanstalt agreed to a merger of the Pulverfabrik
with
another
Austrian
chemical
concern
(the
Carbidwerk
Deutsch-Matrei A. G.). The merger was to be carried out under the
“patronage” of I. G. Farben, so that the new company could be controlled
by the German firm.3 4 5 This understanding is psychologically significant, for it means that the Kreditanstalt had agreed, however
reluctantly, to permit I. G. Farben to control its industrial base. Although the proposed merger did not provide for the complete elimination of the Rothschild interests, such an aim was clearly envisaged by the German negotiators. According to the I. G. Farben officials who
reported on the matter in April 1938, the discussions were in fact
continued after the initial accord had been reached, and the talks were
broken off only when the German army marched into Austria.6 7
What
happened
after
the
Anschluss?
Vorstand
member
Rothenberg of the Kreditanstalt was taken for a ride by uniformed brownshirts
(SA) and thrown out of a moving automobile.’ Engineer Isidor Pollack,
who had built the Pulverfabrik into a major concern and who was its
Generaldirektor, met with a violent end. One day in April 1938, the SA
3. Affidavit by Dr. Fran2 Rothenberg, September 13, 1947, Nl-10997. Rothenberg,
a Jew, was a Vorstand member of the Kreditanstalt. The Vorstand corresponds roughly
to the management (president and vice-presidents) of an American company.
4. Affidavit by Dr. Josef Joham, September 13,1947. Nl-10998. Affiant was another
Vorstand member of the Kreditanstalt.
J. I. G. Farbenindustrie A. G. (signed Halliger and Kroger) to Staatssekretär Kep-
pler, April 9, 1938, Nl-4024.
6. Ibid.
7. Affidavit by Rothenberg, September 13, 1947, NI-10997.
96
ARYAMZATIONS
paid him a visit in his home in order to “search” his house. During the
“search” he was trampled to death.' In the meantime, the German
businessmen went about their business. The Kreditanstalt was gobbled
up by the giant Deutsche Bank, and its subsidiary, the Pulverfabrik, fell
to I. G. Farben.'
As in the case of Austria, Jewish interests in Prague were selling
out before the Czechoslovak state was crushed. In February 1939, a
month
before
the
German
march
into
Prague,
the
Jewish-controlled
Böhmische
Escompte
Bank
passed
into
the
hands
of
the
German
Dresdner
Bank.
Like
the
Kreditanstalt
officials,
the