Raul Hilberg
Page 19
70,000
2,450
42,500
1,477.5
160,000 to
5,600 to
83,000 to
2,900 to
Total
150,000
5,250
189,000
6,615
92,500
3.877.5
note: Dresdner Bank to Ministerialdirigent Nasse (Finance Ministry), listing par value of the stocks, February 10.1939, NI-13719. Finance Ministry memorandum, listing percentage interests. February 17. 1939, NI-IS635 Memorandum by Ansmann (Aryanization expert, Dresdner Bank), discussing differences of estimates. April 18, 1939, NI-15607.
According to the financial expert of the Weinmann group. Gciringcr. the value of the Weinmann holdings in 1938 was between 200 and 250
million crowns, or S7.000.000 to $8.750,000 at the March 1938 rate of exchange. Affidavit by Ernest Gciringcr. October 15, 1948, Nl-15679.
Geiringer was a director of the österreichische Kreditanstalt. Vienna.
EXPROPRIATION
and Ansmann, the two Dresdner Bank Aryanization experts, arrived in
Paris on May 25, 1939, to discuss with Fritz Weinmann and his finance
expert (Dr. Geiringer) the purchase of the enterprises, Fritz started the
discussion
by
demanding
his
20,000
francs
back.”
Apparently
encouraged by Hans’s escape, Fritz Weinmann then demanded payment
for his mines in foreign currency. To back his claim, he recited the
following reasons: First, he was entitled to foreign exchange because
he
had
rendered
important
services
to
the
German
people
(das
Deutschtum). With what seemed to the Germans “unheard-of impudence,” he then “began to discuss National Socialism, whose principles he had
espoused even before Hitler [/« ungewöhnlich frecher
Weise zog er dann über den Nationalsozialismus her, dessen Grundsätze er schon vor Hitler vertreten habe]." The mining headquarters of
“Aussig would simply be inconceivable without him, then or now
[A«s.sjg sei weder früher noch jetzt ohne ihn denkbar]." Finally, Weinmann reminded the Germans that in 1938 he had not sold his property to the Czechs because the local Sudeten German interests had not
wanted him to. This could be proved by such leading Sudeten personalities as Richter, Schicketanz, Henlein, and last, but not least, Goring himself.
The Fritz Weinmann speech did not have the intended effect upon
the Germans. The Dresdner Bank officials were annoyed. Rasche and
Ansmann pointed out that their understanding of Weinmann's services
was quite different, and they reiterated that his solution to the payment
problem (foreign exchange) was “utterly out of the question.” The
German negotiators then declared that the illegal emigration of Hans
had created a new situation. The entire Weinmann property might now
be confiscated.
Fritz Weinmann thereupon played his last card. There were some
exports by a company in which he had a financial interest. The foreign
exchange received from the sale of these exports, he promised, would
never find its way back to Germany. This was a weak defense, and the
conference broke up. Weinmann had lost.
In September 1939 the Economy Ministry ordered the sale of the
Weinmann enterprises for the benefit of the Reich.73 74 75 In October the
Dresdner Bank was busy collecting the shares deposited in various
banks.7’
Gradually,
the
Hermann
Goring
Works—through
its
subsidiary, the Subag—moved in. The Finance Ministry was not altogether
73. Summary of Weinmann conference, prepared by the German negotiators. May
26,1939, NI-15629.
74. Memorandum dated September 21, 1939, in tiles of Westböhmische Bergbau
Aklien-Verein, NI-15623.
75. Dresdner Bank to Economy Ministry/Division II, attention Assessor
Scheidemann, October 16,1939, NI-15624.
114
ARYANIZATIONS
happy with the sale of the Weinmann holdings to the Goring Works,
because the Subag paid only about 60 percent of the value as determined by the Economy Ministry’s experts.76 It is true that the Goring Works were “Reich owned.” Nevertheless, they were financially autonomous. What Goring retained for his enterprises, the Reich could not use in its budget. In other words. Goring had cheated the Reich out
of 40 percent.
What had brought about this rapid development in which the Wein-
manns lost not only the physical possession of their enterprises but
their claim to ownership as well? The Weinmanns were completely
subservient.
Fritz
Weinmann
claimed
that
he was
indispensable. He
did not hesitate to call himself a Nazi. Of course, we would be very
much mistaken to take these petitions literally. Fritz Weinmann was no
more a Nazi than he was indispensable. He was merely acting out an
ancient Jewish reaction pattern, and he was doing it more fervently
than his Jewish colleagues.
In 1941 the Weinmann family came to the United States. Fritz
Weinmann
became Frederick Wyman. Hans remained Hans, but
his
son Charles “soon became a part of the American industrial pattern.”
In an account printed by The New York Times on January 4,1953, there
is no mention of the fact that the Weinmanns were Jews whose property had been Aryanized. Instead, the impression is created that they lost their mines because they lent financial support to the Czech government. In fact, the article does not mention the word Jew. It does mention that Charles Wyman, the son of Hans, was already a member
of various firms and that he was “also a leader in the Unitarian
Church.” The article goes on: “How well the Wymans have fitted into
the American pattern is probably best illustrated by the names Charles
and his wife, Olga, gave their three children. They are John Howard,
Thomas Michael and Virginia Ann.”77 This indeed is adaptability.
The Dresdner Bank and the Economy Ministry responded to the
Weinmann approach quickly and decisively. The petitioning by Fritz
Weinmann merely smoothed the way to complete confiscation, for in
the German mind the Weinmann appeal was construed not as subservience (which it was) but as mockery (which it was not intended to be).
The idea that a Jew should be indispensable or that he might even hold
National Socialist ideas could only be treated as an insult, for if it were
otherwise, the entire rationale of the destruction process would collapse.
The last of the Aryanization histories to be discussed is that of the
76. Memorandum by Finance Ministry, March 1941, NX-15638.
77. Robert H. Fetridge, “Along the Highways and Byways of Finance," The New
York Times, January 4, 1953, p. F3.
115
EXPROPRIATION
T A B L E 5-8
THE PETSCHEK ENTERPRISES
Germany:
Anhaltische
Kohlenwerke A. G., Halle
RM
24,012.000
Werschen-Weissenfelser
&n
bsp; S
9.604,800
Julius Petschek Braunkohlen A. G., Halle
(headquarters
in Prague)
Czechoslovakia (Sudeten):
Nordbohmische
Kohlenwerke A. G., Brüx
Cr.
200-243 million
S 7-8,5 million
Brüxer Kohlen-Bergbau
Gesellschaft
Germany:
Öhriger Bergbau A. G.
Preussengrube A. G.
Niederlausitzer Kohlenwerke A. G,
Hubertus Braunkohle A. G.
RM
200.000.000
"Ilse" Bergbau A. G.
$
80,000,000
“Eintracht'' A. G-
Ignaz Petschek Other holdings
(headquarters
in Aussig) Czechoslovakia (Sudeten):
Britannia A. G., Falkenau
Vereinigte Britannia A. G.,
Cr.
36,700,000
Seestadt
$
1,286.500
(Majority of) Duxer
Kohlengesellschaft A. G.,
Teplitz-Schönau * 78
Petschek
enterprises.
The
Petschek
properties
were
owned
by
two
families: the sons of Julius Petschek and the sons of Ignaz Petschek.
Both families operated coal mines in Germany and Czechoslovakia. (A
list of these holdings may be found in Table 5-8.)
The Aryanization of the Petschek "complex" was entrusted to two
negotiators: Friedrich Flick's Central Steel Works (Mittelstahl) and the
Dresdner Bank. The division of work was territorial. Friedrich Flick
was empowered to negotiate for the transfer of the Julius and Ignaz
Petschek
properties
in
Germany;
the
Dresdner
Bank
was
the
plenipotentiary for mines in Czechoslovakia.™ This division reflects a
certain
preference
for
“territorial
solutions.”
The
central
German
mines had to be Aryanized first.
78.
Goring to Flick, February 1,1938, NI-899. Dresdner Bank to Ministerialdirigent
Nasse, February 10, 1939, NI-13719. Gerichtsassessor Dr. Hahn (Office of the Four-
Year Plan) to OberfinanzprSsidenl in Berlin, attention Regierungsrat Dr. Miiller and
Ministerialrat Gebhardt (Finance Ministry). February 10,1939, Nl-10086.
116
ARYANIZATIONS
The two Petschek groups, for their part, were not united. They
competed with “and even opposed” each other.’5 When the threat of
Aryanization confronted the two families, they reacted in contrasting
patterns.
The
Julius
Petscheks
were
in
an
excellent
bargaining
position.
They had created a British dummy corporation which, in turn, was
controlled by an American dummy. The entire setup was “obscure” to
the
Germans.
It
seemed
to
the
Flick
negotiators
that
the
Julius
Petscheks had actually sold the mines to foreign interests but that the
Petschek group had retained an option to repurchase. At any rate,
nothing could be proved.® Suddenly, without giving the Germans time
to become organized, the Julius Petschek group offered to sell out. The
Petscheks
explained
that
they
wanted
to
dissolve
their interests
in
Germany; hence they would accept only foreign exchange. To back up
their claim, they pointed to immunity from Aryanization by reason of
their foreign arrangements.*'
Flick speculated that the Petscheks feared war or a similar catastrophe,® but he acted quickly. “By order of Generalfeldmarschall Goring,” a syndicate formed by Winterschall A. G., I. G. Farben, and Flick’s own Mitteldeutsche Stahlwerke took over the Julius Petschek
German mines. The syndicate was represented by Flick. Petschek was
represented by the United Continental Corporation, New York. Under
the
terms
of
the
contract,
the
purchasers
acquired
24,000,000
reichsmark worth of stock for 11,718,250 reichsmark. However, payment was made in foreign exchange, which was made available by the Economy Ministry “at the express wish of Generalfeldmarschall Goring.” The dollar price was $4,750,000. The contract was signed on May 21, 1938.“
After this fast work, the Dresdner Bank had no trouble with the
Julius Petschek enterprises in the Sudetenland. Less than a year later
the Dresdner Bank, acting on behalf of the Reich, had acquired the
mines,
which
were
worth
200-243
million
crowns,
for
70
million
crowns (Czech currency) plus coal deliveries. Only the money had to
be paid immediately; the deliveries were to be spaced over a period of
five years. Präsident Kehrl of the Economy Ministry was overjoyed
with
the
transaction
(“extraordinarily
satisfactory
and
advantageous”).
He thought that the Reich could always get rid of the property for 79 80 81 82 83
79. Memorandum by Finance Ministry. September 26, 1938, NG-4034.
80. Memorandum by Steinbrinck (Flick representative), January 10. 1938. NI-3254.
81. Memorandum by Steinbrinck, January 10, 1938, NI-3254.
82. Memorandum by Flick. January 19, 1938, NI-784.
83. Memorandum by Finance Ministry, September 26, 1938, NG-4034. Report by
Oberregierungsrat Dr. Müller and Tax Inspector Krause to Oberfinanzpräsident in Berlin, October 26. 1938. NG-4033.
117
EXPROPRIATION
double the purchase price.“ But when the Dresdner Bank presented its
bill for its troubles, the faces of the Reich officials fell. The commission
was 4 percent instead of the usual 2 percent. Since the Dresdner Bank
had advanced its own funds to make the purchase, the Reich also had
to pay interest at 6.5 percent. After a dispute with the Finance Ministry, it was agreed that in future deals the commission would be 2
percent and the interest 5.5 percent.“ Moreover, there was no 100-
percent profit in the sale of the mines, because the purchaser of the
Julius Petschek Sudeten properties was, of course, the Subag, Hermann Goring subsidiary.“
Although the Julius Petscheks had rid themselves of their mines
only at great loss, they had moved quickly and adroitly. Behind their
demands they had employed just the right amount of pressure. That is
why they were remarkably successful in comparison with other Jewish
negotiators. The Germans realized this fact and regretted it as soon as
the Ignaz Petschek A
ryanizations had run their course.
Unlike their cousins, the sons of Ignaz Petschek decided to hold on
to their property. For the Germans this decision was a very serious
matter, because the Petschek mines were a major part of the central
German coal industry. In the beginning of January 1938, Goring set up
a commission for “the solution of the Petschek problem.” The commission had the following members:'7
Staatssekretär Posse, Economy Ministry
Staatssekretär Keppler, Office of the Four-Year Plan
Staatssekretär Pleiger, Hermann Goring Works
Flick, in his capacity as industrial expert
Sauckel, as the local Gauleiter
Flick was to be the principal negotiator. This choice is of interest for
two reasons. In the first place. Flick was not a disinterested expert. He
was the biggest industrialist in the area, and he had a personal stake in
the outcome of the discussions. (As we have seen, Flick was to profit
from the Aryanization of the Julius Petschek parcel.) Flick is interesting also because he was no stranger to the Petscheks and the Petscheks were not strangers to him. 84 85 86 87
84. Finance Ministry memorandum, February 17, 1939, N1-15635.
85. Finance Ministry memorandum. March 13, 1939, Nl-15637. In 1940 the Dresdner Bank offered to accept a lump sum for services rendered in the Weinmann and Petschek Aryanizations in the amount of 300.000 reichsmark. Dresdner Bank (signed
André and Rasche) to the Vorstand of the Subag, July 16, 1940, NI-15665.
86. Dresdner Bank to Ministerialrat Gebhardt (Finance Ministry), March 30, 1940,
N1-147J6.
87. Memorandum by Steinbrinck, January 5, 1938, NI-3252.
118
ARYAN1ZATI0NS
Like Hick, old Ignaz Petschek was a self-made man. Starting as a
Prokurist (assistant to a director with power to represent the firm) in
the
Weinmann
enterprises,
Ignaz
had
become
independent
and
had
acquired one mine after another. Friedrich Flick had served in an Auf-
sichtsrat of a Petschek company. Later he was to head his own industrial
empire,
the
Mitteldeutsche
Stahlwerke.
Flick
and
Petschek
remained in touch with each other, and just before Ignaz Petschek’s
death in 1934, Flick sent him birthday greetings on the occasion of his
seventy-fifth birthday. “I was on most friendly terms with old Ignaz
Petschek at all times,” said Flick after the war.“
How could a man function properly on behalf of the Reich if he had
such interest in the Petschek property and such relations with the
Petschek family? So far as Flick’s desire for personal acquisition was