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  of

  the

  Propaganda

  Ministry.

  The

  Interior

  Ministry’s

  expert

  on

  Jewish

  affairs

  (Ministerialrat

  Lösener), who attended this meeting, said after the war: “I had assumed that, as usual, it would be a small conference of the participating experts." Instead, there were speeches. “Then there was applause, not

  like in a conference—but as if it were an election campaign.”*1 However, in the end, the drafting of the decree was entrusted to Lösener."

  In its final form the decree, dated September 1, 1941,76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 * provided

  that Jews six years or over were to appear in public only when wearing

  the Jewish star. The star had to be as large as the palm of a hand. Its

  color had to be black, the background yellow, and for the center of the

  star the decree prescribed the black inscription Jude. The victims were

  to sew the star tightly on the left front of their clothing. Jews in privileged mixed marriages were exempt.

  The stars were manufactured by the Berliner Fahnenfabrik Geitel

  & Co.“ and distributed immediately. There were no major repercussions. Some Jews attempted to hide the emblem with a briefcase or a book,

  a

  practice

  the

  Berlin

  Gestapo

  considered

  inadmissible.*’

  The

  factory management of Siemens, Kabelwerk Gartenfeld, did not want

  its Jewish work force to wear the star on the premises, claiming that

  the Jews were already segregated there. The question of whether a

  76. Lammers to Frank, August 10, 1941, NG-llll.

  77. ¡bid.

  78. Stuckan to Lammers, August 14, 1941, NG-1111.

  79. Unterstaatssekretär Luther (Foreign Office/Division Germany) to Staatssekretär Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office. September 19.1941, Document Weizsäcker-488.

  80. ¡bid.

  81. Testimony by LOsener, Case No. II, tr. pp. 7636-38.

  82. Affidavit by Losener, February 24, 1948, NG-1944-A.

  83. RGB1I.547.

  84. Memoranda of September 17 and 20, 1941, by Paul Eppstein of Jewish

  Reichsvereinigung on meetings with Hauptsturmführer Gutwasser of Reich Security

  Main Offtce/lV-B-4 on September 16 and 20, Leo Baeck Institute, microfilm roll 66 of

  original documents in Deutsches Zentralarchiv. Potsdam.

  8$. Memorandum by Eppstein, September 20, 1941, on meeting with representative of Berlin Gestapo (Prüfer). Ibid.

  178

  THE REICH-PROTEKTORAT AREA

  plant was a public place within the meaning of the decree consequently

  had to be pondered by the Reich Security Main Office.“ The party,

  apprehensive about the possibility that the display of the star in the

  streets

  would

  result

  in

  new

  disturbances,

  issued

  circulars

  warning

  party members not to molest Jews." Children especially were to be

  cautioned. But there is no record of violence. In fact, there is a story of

  a little girl who went out of her way to greet politely a Jewish community worker. She said, “Heil Hitler, Mr. Jew.’’*8

  An awkward situation was created for the churches when baptized

  Jews with stars turned up for services. In Breslau, the elderly Cardinal

  Bertram, head of the Catholic Church in eastern Germany, issued instructions that "the conduct of special services [die Abhaltung von Sondergottesdiensten]’' for star wearers was to be "weighed” only in

  the event of “major difficulties,” such as the staying away or ostentatious departure from services by civil servants or party members.86 87 88 89 The representatives of the Evangelical-Lutheran church in seven provinces

  invoked the teachings of Martin Luther to declare that racially Jewish

  Christians had no place and no rights in a German Evangelical church.90

  The Security Police, in the meantime, extended the marking to

  apartments. In 1942 the Jews were ordered to paste the star on their

  doors, in black print on white paper.91

  The whole identification system, with its personal documents, specially assigned names, and conspicuous tagging in public, was a powerful weapon in the hands of the police. First, the system was an auxiliary

  device

  that

  facilitated

  the

  enforcement

  of

  residence

  and

  movement restrictions. Second, it was an independent control measure

  in that it enabled the police to pick up any Jew, anywhere, anytime.

  Third,

  and

  perhaps

  most

  important,

  identification

  had

  a

  paralyzing

  effect on its victims. The system induced the Jews to be even more

  docile, more responsive to command than before. The wearer of the

  star was exposed; he thought that all eyes were fixed upon him. It was

  as though the whole population had become a police force, watching

  86. Memorandum by Eppstein, September 26, 1941, on meeting with Gutwasser.

  Ibid.

  87. See the previously mentioned Bormann directive in NG-1672.

  88. Account by Dr. Hugo Nothmann (Jewish survivor) in Hans Lamm, “Über die

  Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums,’' (mimeographed, 1951), p. 313.

  89. Milleilungen zur Weltanschaulichen Lage, April 15, 1942, pp. 13-17, EAP 250-

  c-10/5.

  90. Announcement of December 17. 1941, signed by Klotzsche for Saxony, Bishop

  Schultz for Mecklenburg, Kipper for Nassau-Hessen, Dr. Kinder for Schleswig-

  Holstein, Wilkendorf for Anhalt, Dr. Volz for Thuringia, and Siewers for Lübeck, reprinted in Helmut Eschwege, Kennzeichen ./(Berlin, 1966).pp. 161-62.

  91. Jüdisches Nackrichtenblait (Berlin), April 17, 1942.

  179

  CONCENTRATION

  him and guarding his actions. No Jew. under those conditions, could

  resist, escape, or hide without first ridding himself of the conspicuous

  tag, the revealing middle name, the telltale ration card, passport, and

  identification papers. Yet the riddance of these burdens was dangerous, for the victim could be recognized and denounced. Few Jews took the chance. The vast majority wore the star and, wearing it, were lost.

  We have now seen how, in consecutive steps, the Jewish community was isolated socially, crowded into special houses, restricted in its movements, and exposed by a system of identification. This process,

  which we have called ghettoization, was completed with the institution

  of a Jewish administrative apparatus through which the Germans exercised a stranglehold on the Jewish population. For our understanding of how the Jews were ultimately destroyed, it is essential to know the

  origins of the Jewish bureaucratic machine. The Jews had created that

  machine themselves.

  Before 1933 the Jewish community organization was still decentralized. Each city with a Jewish population had a Gemeinde with a Vorstand responsible for the operation of Jewish schools, the synagogues,

  hospitals,

  orphanages,

  and

  welfare

  activities.

  By

  law,

  the

  Gemeinden could levy a tax from all those who had been bom into the

  Jewish faith and who were livin
g in the locality, so long as they did not

  formally resign from membership.’2 There were also regional organizations (Landesverbände), which in the southern German states (Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria) had statutory powers to control budgets

  and appointments in the Gemeinden, but which were only confederations of local community delegates in Saxony and Prussia. The Prussian Landesverband covered 72 percent of Germany’s Jews, including the important cities of Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, Breslau, and Cologne. Its chairman. Rabbi Leo Baeck, was working on a “concordat"

  with Prussia in 1932, on the eve of Hitler’s rise to power.”

  At

  that

  time,

  the

  Jewish

  communities, mirroring

  the post-1918

  political trend in Germany as a whole, were on the verge of centralization. Various drafts of a central Jewish organization had been prepared during the days of the Weimar Republic.” In 1928, pending an establishment of a "Reichsorganisation," delegates of the Landesverbände, meeting in conference, constituted themselves into a working group 92 93 94

  92. Nathan Stein, "Oberrat der Israeliten Badens, 1922-1937,” Leo Baeck Year

  Book 1 (1956): 177-90, particularly p. 183. On finance see also Adler-Rudel, Jüdische

  Selbsthilfe, pp. 161, 178.

  93. Leo Baeck, “ln Memory of Two of our Dead," Leo Baeck Year Book 1 (1956):

  51-56, 52-53.

  94. Drafts of 1926, 1931, and 1932 in Leo Baeck Institute, New York, Kreutzberger

  collection, AR 7183, Box 18, folder 3.

  180

  THE REICH-PROTEKTORAT AREA

  (Arbeitsgemeinschaft),

  deputized

  the

  Prussian

  Landesverband

  to

  keep

  the books of the group, and created a committee that would represent

  Jewish interests before official agencies in the German Reich.’5

  In the spring of 1933, a rudimentary central Jewish organization

  was formed. During the following years, it was to evolve in several

  steps into a Jewish apparatus with increasingly significant functions.

  The stages of its evolution, two of them in 1933 alone, are indicated in

  the following changes of title:*

  1933 Reichsvertretung der jüdischen Landesverbände

  (Reich Representation of Jewish Land Federations)

  Leo Baeck and Kammergerichtsrat Leo Wolff, cochairmen

  Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden

  (Reich Representation of German Jews)

  Leo Baeck, president

  Ministerialrat Otto Hirsch, deputy

  1935 Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland

  (Reich Representation of Jews in Germany)

  Leo Baeck

  Otto Hirsch, deputy

  1938

  Reichsverband der Juden in Deutschland

  (Reich Federation of Jews in Germany

  Leo Baeck

  Otto Hirsch, deputy

  1939

  Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland

  (Reich Association of Jews in Germany)

  Leo Baeck

  Heinrich Stahl, deputy

  When the Jewish leadership was confronted by the Nazi take-over

  in 1933, it sought first of all an “open debate” (offene Aussprache), a

  "dignified controversy” (Auseinandersetzung . . . mit Waffen der Vornehmheit) with the Nazis on the subject of anti-Semitism and the Jew- 95 96

  95. Hans-Erich Fabian. "Zur Entstehung der 'Reichsvereinigung der Juden in

  Deutschland,’ " in Herbert A. Strauss and Kurt R. Grossman, eds., Gegenwart im Rückblick (Heidelberg, 1970), pp. 165-79, p. 167.

  96. Adler-Rudel, Jüdische Selbsthilfe, pp. 9-18; K. Y. Ball-Kaduri. ‘The National

  Representation of Jews in Germany.” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 159-78, containing

  texts of recollections by Emst Herzfeld (chairman of Central-Verein) and Franz Meier

  (Zionist); Max Gruenewald, “The Beginning of the 'Reichsvertretung,'" Leo Baeck Year

  Book 1 (1956): 57-67; Fabian, "Reichsvereinigung," in Gegenwart im Rückblick, pp. 165—

  79; Hugo Hahn, “Die Gründung der Reichsvertretung,” in Hans Ttamer, ed., In Zwei

  Welten (Tel Aviv, 1962), pp. 97-105; Abraham Margaliot, "The Dispute over the Leadership of German Jewry (1933-1938),” Yad Vashem Studies 10 (1974): 129-48; Leonard Baker, Days of Sorrow and Pain—Leo Baeck and the Berlin Jews (New York, 1978).

  Adler-Rudel. Ball-Kaduri. Gruenewald, Fabian, and Hahn are veterans of the Reichsvertretung.

  181

  CONCENTRATION

  ish

  future

  in

  Germany.”

  In

  March

  1933,

  Baeck

  himself

  and

  the

  Vorstand of the Berlin community at the time, Kleemann, dispatched a

  letter to Hitler in which they enclosed a public statement (Aufruf)

  expressing consternation about the Nazi boycott, calling attention to

  the 12,000 Jewish dead of the First World War, and refusing responsibility for the “misdeeds of a few” (Verfehlung einiger Weniger).* Again and again the heads of various Jewish interest groups—among them

  the

  Central-Verein,

  war

  veterans,

  and

  Zionists—sought

  interviews

  with Hitler and other high-ranking Nazi officials. One delegation was

  received by Goring on March 25,1933," but this meeting was to be the

  last of its kind. In later years the Jewish leaders, not only in the Reich

  but also in occupied territory, were forced to deal with German officials

  of lower and lower rank, until they were appealing to SS captains. In

  1933 they did not foresee this future, and they strove to create an

  overall

  representation

  (Gesamtvertretung)

  as

  a matter of

  the

  highest

  priority.

  The

  Reichsvertretung

  der

  jüdischen

  Landesverbände

  was

  the

  initial manifestation of this aim, but it was little more than an enlargement of the Berlin community and the Prussian Landesverband. Rabbi Baeck recognized the limitations of this powerless agency and resigned

  from it after a few months.1”

  During the late summer of 1933, a group of Jewish leaders in Essen

  led a campaign to revamp the Reichsvertretung. They wanted much

  heavier representation from communities outside Berlin and the inclusion

  of

  national

  organizations.

  Their

  strategy

  was

  to

  “isolate”

  (isolieren) Berlin and to offer the leadership of the new Reichsvertretung to the man who, in their eyes, stood above factional politics: Leo Baeck.“' On August 28, 1933, a meeting was held in the Essen

  synagogue to hammer out a plan. The participants formed a working

  committee under the direction of Dr. Georg Hirschland (Essen) and

  authorized him to recruit the Zionists—heretofore a small minority but

  now

  growing

  in

  influence—into

  their

  fold.

  Ministerialrat

  Dr.

  Otto

  Hirsch of Stuttgart was asked to work out the guidelines.'® Hirsch

  drafted

  a proclamation

  addressed

  “To

  the
<
br />   German Jews,”

  informing

  them in the original wording that “with the consent of all Jewish Lan- 97 98 99 100 101 102

  97. Lamm, "Über die Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums,'’ pp. 98-99.

  98. Baeck and Kleemann lo Hitler, March 29, 1932, in Adler-Rudel, Jüdische

  Selbsthilfe, pp. 183-84, and in Klaus Herrmann. Das Drille Reich und die Deutsch-

  Jüdischen Organisationen (Cologne. 1969), pp. 60-61.

  99. Baker, Days of Sorrow, pp. 153-54.

  100. Baeck, "In Memory,” Leo Baeck Year Book 1 (1956): 54.

  101. Hahn, "Reichsvertretung," ln Zwei Welten, p. 101. Rabbi Hahn belonged to

  the Essen group.

  102. A summary of the meeting can be found in the Leo Baeck Institute, Reichsvertretung collection, AR 221.

  182

  THE REICH-PROTEKTORAT AREA

  desverbände and all major organizations, we have taken over the leadership of the Reichsvertretung of German Jews [An die deutschen Juden!

  Wir haben mit Zustimmung aller jüdischen Landesverbände Deutschlands

  und

  aller

  grossen

  Organisationen

  der

  deutschen

  Juden

  die

  Führung der Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden übernommen].''"0

  On September 3, 1933, Hirschland's working committee met in

  Berlin. The conferees spoke of a leadership of personalities (Persönlichkeiten), which was to supplant the existing establishment. The list from which the future leaders were to be drawn included Martin Buber, the

  philosopher, and Richard Willstätter, the Nobel laureate in chemistry.

  The committee then chose Baeck as president and Hirsch as executive

  chairman (geschäftsführenden Vorsitz j.1“

  Two weeks after the September 3 meeting, the new Reichsvertretung came into being. It did not include some of the Orthodox Jews (Agudah), who looked askance at the liberal Rabbi Leo Baeck and his

  scholarly studies of Christian doctrines, nor was it supported by assimilationist

  Jews

  espousing

  German

  nationalism

  (Verband

  nationaldeutscher

  Juden),

  who

  believed

  that

  their

  special

  sacrifices

  for

  Germany entitled them to rights greater than those of other Jews, nor—

  at the opposite end of the spectrum—by Zionist Revisionists, who

  believed in the necessity of total emigration.1“ Still, the group had a

  broad enough base to require care in the allocation of positions to its

  presidium. Spaces had to be reserved for the newly recruited Zionists,

  the other major Jewish organizations, and the larger communities, including that of Berlin, which numbered a third of all the Jews in Germany. In the end, there was no room for Buber or Willstätter.1“ All the men at the helm of the Reichsvertretung were experienced in the political arena, and almost immediately they were called on to use their expertise, not merely in dealing with each other but with the German

 

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