by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
protested vehemently. He understood that Goring might have issued
such a ruling on account of the Stettin “case,” but the Feldmarschall
(Goring) could not have meant the Wartheland, for on February 12,
1940, Frank had already promised to Greiser that the 200,000 Jews of
the city of Löd2 would be taken into the Generalgouvernement. He
was dismayed to hear of this turnabout,'7 but Frank had carried away
his victory. On March 11, Himmler thanked the Staatssekretär of the
Transport
Ministry,
Kleinmann,
for
his
cooperation,
and
with
these
thanks the evacuation program came to an end.“
At this point, however, Frank decided on a little evacuation program of his own. His resettlements were to take place within the Generalgouvernement. In particular, Frank wanted to remove the Jewish population from his capital, Kraköw. Addressing his main division chiefs on April 12, 1940, the Generalgouverneur described conditions
in the city as scandalous. German generals “who commanded divisions” were forced, because of the apartment shortage, to live in houses that also contained Jewish tenants. The same applied to higher
officials,
and
such
conditions
were
“intolerable.”
By
November
1,
1940, the city of Kraköw, with its 60,000 Jews, had to become judenfrei
(free of Jews). Only about 5,000, or at most 10,000, skilled Jewish
workers might be permitted to remain. If the Reich could bring hundreds of thousands of Jews into the Generalgouvernement, Frank reasoned, surely there had to be room for 50,000 more from Kraköw. The Jews would be permitted to take along all their property, “except of
course stolen property.” Then the Jewish quarter would be cleansed so
that German people would be able to live there and breathe “German
air.”“
The Kraköw expulsions were divided into two phases: voluntary
and involuntary. Up to August 15,1940, the Jews of the city were given
an opportunity to move with all their possessions to any city of their
choice within the Generalgouvernement. Gouverneure were instructed 46 47 48 49
46. Summary of interministerial conference in Berlin. April I, 1940, in Centralna
Zydowska Komisja Hisloryczna w Poise«, Dokumenty i materiafy do dziejdw okupaeji
niemeckiej w Police, 3 vols. (Warsaw, Lodz, and Kraköw, 1946), vol. 3, pp. 167-68.
47. Ibid.
48. Himmler io Kleinmann, March 11, 1940, NO-2206.
49. Summary of conference of main division chiefs, April 12, 1940, Frank diary, PS-
2233. The Jewish populaUon of Kraköw had actually risen to 80,000 since September
1939. Dr. Dietrich Redecker, “Deutsche Ordnung kehrt im Ghetto ein," Krakauer
Zeitung, March 13, 1940.
208
POLAND
to accept these Jews. All those still in Krak6w after midnight of August
15 were to be subjected to “organized" expulsion, with limited luggage,
to cities of the administration’s choice.“
By means of an “intensive persuasion campaign against the Jewish
Council [intensives Einwirken auf den Judenrat]," it was possible to
effect the “voluntary” removal of 23,000 Jews.50 51 52 53 On the last day of the
voluntary phase, Frank made a speech in which he repeated that it was
simply intolerable to permit the representatives of the Greater German
Reich of Adolf Hitler to be established in a city “crawling” with Jews to
such an extent that a “decent person” could not step into the street.
The Krakdw expulsions, Frank continued, were meant as a signal: the
Jews
of
all
Europe
had
to
“disappear”
(verschwinden).
Obviously,
Frank was thinking of Madagascar.”
The involuntary phase was put into effect immediately. Through
notifications sent to affected families via the Jewish Council, another
9,000
Jews were expelled by mid-September. The total number expelled was now 32,000.” In spite of these drastic measures, the apartment situation in the city did not improve to the expected extent. For one thing, it was discovered that the Jews had been housed “tightly”
(i.e.,
Jewish
apartments
had
been
overcrowded).
Furthermore,
the
Jewish dwellings were so dilapidated as to be unacceptable for German
habitation.54
Nevertheless,
or
perhaps
because
of
these
results,
the
expulsions continued. On November 25, 1940, the Gouverneur of the
Krakdw district ordered another 11,000 Jews to leave. These evacuations
were
conducted
alphabetically.
All
those
whose
names
began
with A to D were to report on December 2, 1940, the E to J group on
December 4, etc.55 This measure brought the total number of evacuees
to 43,000, close to the goal that Frank had envisaged. The remaining
Krakdw
Jews were crowded into a closed ghetto, the Judenwohn-
bezirk, in the Podgorce section of the city.56
Frank may have been pleased with the Krakdw expulsions, but the
local Kreishauptmanner were as unhappy with the influx of these expellees as the Generalgouvemeur had been with the arrival of the Jews 50. Krakauer Zeitung, August 6. 1940, Generalgouvernement page.
51. Ibid., December 31, 1940/January 1, 1941, GG page.
52. Ibid.. August 17, 1940.
53. Ibid., December 31, 1940/January 1, 1941, GG page.
54. Ibid.
55. Jacob Apenszlak, ed., The Black Book of Polish Jewry (New York, 1943), pp.
80-81.
56. Announcement by the Stadlhauptmann of Kraköw (Schmid) in Krakauer
Zeitung, March 23, 1941, p. 18.
CONCENTRATION
from
the
incorporated
territories.”
In
the
Krakdw
outskirts,
Polish
inhabitants were complaining that the city’s Jews were upsetting the
stability
of
apartment
rents
by
offering inordinately
large
sums of
money and paying a year in advance. It was a mistake, said the
Kreishauptmann of Krakau-Land, to permit the Jews a free choice of
residence. Naturally, most of them were congregating in his area.“
Urban expulsions were carried out elsewhere with similar repercussions. In December 1940, fifteen hundred Jews from the city of Radom,
described
as
“utterly
impoverished
and
decrepit
[völlig
verarmte und verkommene Subjekte]", were dumped in the small town
of Busko. It will not do, said the Kreishauptmann, that cities rid themselves in this manner of their welfare burdens at the expense of rural zones.”
In
February,
> however,
he
received
another
thousand
Jews,
with the result that apartment density in the Jewish quarter had risen to
twenty per room, and typhus was breaking out.“
The evacuation program was creating difficulties wherever its impact was felt. Nevertheless, there were people (notably Himmler) who could see no valid objection to the overstuffing of Jewish quarters. On
June 25,1940, Frank wrote a letter to Lammers in which he said that he
was plagued
by constant rumors from Danzig and the Wartheland
capital of Poznan to the effect that new plans were afoot to send many
thousands of Jews and Poles into the Generalgouvernement. Such a
movement, Frank informed Lammers, was utterly out of the question,
especially since the armed forces were expropriating large tracts of
land for the purpose of holding maneuvers.81
At the beginning of July, Frank was jubilant again. On July 12,
1940, he informed his main division chiefs that the Führer himself had
decided that no more transports of Jews would be sent into the
Generalgouvernement.
Instead,
the
entire
Jewish
community
in
the
Reich, the Protektorat, and the Generalgouvernement was to be 57 58 59 60 61
57. Report by Kreishauptmann of Jasio (Dr. Ludwig Losacker), August 29, 1940,
Yad Vashem microfilm JM 814. Report by Kreishauptmann of Nowy Sgcz, signed by
deputy, Regierungsoberinspektor Muegge, December 31, 1940, JM 814. Report by
Kreishauptmann in Chelm, December 7, 1940, JM 814.
58. Kreishauptmann of Krakau-Land (signed Holler), monthly report for August,
1940, JM 814. Dr. Egon Holler took over the city of Lw6w in February 1942.
59. Report by Kreishauptmann of Busko (signed Schafer), January II, 1941, JM
814.
60. Report by Schäfer, February 28, 1941, JM 814. In Kielce, the Polish population
refused (weigerte sich) to receive a transport of evacuees in an orderly manner. It had to
be stressed, said the Kreishauptmann, that the arriving people were Jews. Report by
Kreishauptmann of Kielce, March 6, 1941, JM 814. On the reception of 2,000 Viennese
Jews in Pulawy, see report by Kreishauplmann (signed Brandt), February 27,1941, JM 814.
61. Frank to Lammers, June 25, 1940, NG-1627.
210
POLAND
transported in the “shortest time imaginable,” immediately upon the
conclusion of a peace treaty, to an African or American colony. The
general thinking, he said, centered on Madagascar, which France was
to cede to Germany for that very purpose. With an area of 500,000
square
kilometers,
Frank
explained,
the
island
(incidentally,
mostly
jungle) could easily hold several million Jews. “I have intervened on
behalf of the Jews of the Generalgouvernement," he continued, “so
that those Jews, too, may profit from the advantages of starting a new
life on new soil." That proposal, Frank concluded, had been accepted
in Berlin, so that the entire Generalgouvernement administration could
look forward to a “colossal unburdening.”“
Radiant with pleasure, Frank repeated his speech in the Lublin
district, which had been threatened most with overflowing transports
of Jewish evacuees. As soon as maritime transport was restored, he
said, the Jews would be removed, “piece by piece, man by man, mrs.
by mrs., miss by miss [ Stück um Stück, Mann um Mann, Frau um
Frau, Fräulein um Fräulein]." Having produced Heiterkeit in his audience (the term used by German protocol experts for amusement registered by an official audience), Frank predicted that Lublin, too, would become a “decent" and “human” city for German men and women.“
But Frank’s jubilation was premature. No peace treaty was concluded with France, and no African island was set aside for the Jews.
Frank was stuck with his Jews, and once more the pressure of new
expulsions was to trouble his administration.
On October 2,1940, Frank met with other officials in Hitler's apartment. The Reichsstatthalter of Vienna, von Schirach, mentioned that he had 50,000 Jews whom Frank had to take off his hands. The
Generalgouverneur replied that this was utterly impossible. Thereupon
the Oberpräsident of East Prussia, Erich Koch, put in that until now he
had deported neither Jews nor Poles, but now the time had arrived
when the Generalgouvernement had better accept these people. Again
Frank protested that it was utterly impossible to receive such masses of
Poles and Jews; there simply was no room for them. At this point,
Hitler remarked that he was quite indifferent to the population density
of the Generalgouvernement, that as far as he was concerned the
Generalgouvernement was only a “huge Polish labor camp [ein grosses
polnisches Arbeitslager]."“
Once more Frank averted the threatened stream, although he could
not prevent some Poles and a trickle of Vienna Jews crossing his bor-
62. Frank to main division chiefs, July 12, 1940, Frank diary, PS-2233.
63. Frank speech to Lublin officials, July 25,1940. Frank diary, PS-2233.
64. Memorandum by Bormann on conference in Hitler’s apartment, October 2,
1940, USSR-172. See also Lammers to von Schirach, December 3, 1940, PS-1950.
211
CONCENTRATION
ders. Finally, on March 25, 1941, Krüger announced that no more
transports would be sent to the Generalgouvernement.“ From now on
the pressure was no longer on Frank. Instead, it hit the administration
of the incorporated territories.
In October 1941, mass deportations began in the Reich. They did
not end until the destruction process was over. The object of these
movements was not emigration but the annihilation of the Jews. As
yet, however, there were no killing centers in which the victims could
be gassed to death, and so it was decided that, pending the construction of death camps, the Jews were to be dumped into ghettos of the incorporated territories and the occupied Soviet areas farther east. The
target in the incorporated territories was the ghetto of L6d±.
On September 18,1941, Himmler addressed a letter to Reichsstatthalter Greiser on the proposed evacuations. The Führer desired, wrote Himmler, that the Old Reich and the Protektorat be “liberated from the
Jews” as soon as possible. Himmler was therefore planning “as a first
step” to transport the Jews to incorporated territory, with a view to
shipping them farther east next spring. He intended to quarter 60,000
Jews in the L6di ghetto, which, as he “heard,” had enough room.
Looking forward to
Greiser’s cooperation, Himmler closed with the
remark that he was entrusting Gruppenführer Heydrich with the task of
carrying out these Jewish migrations.*
Although there is a gap in the correspondence, we may deduce
from subsequent letters that Greiser had succeeded in reducing the
figure of 60,000 migrants to 20,000 Jews and 5,000 Gypsies. But even
this reduced total came as a shock to the local authorities. A representative of the Oberbürgermeister (mayor) of Ldd i (the city w
as renamed
“Litzmannstadt”)
protested
immediately
to
the
Regierungspräsident
of
the area, the honorary SS-Brigadeführer Uebelhoer.65 66 67
In his protest Oberbürgermeister Ventzki announced that he would
divest himself of every responsibility for the consequences of the measure. Then he recited some reasons for his attitude. The ghetto had originally held 160,400 people in an area of 4.13 square kilometers. The
population had now declined to 144,000 owing to deaths and departures
to forced labor camps, but there was more than a corresponding decline of area, to 3.41 square kilometers. Density was now 59,917 per-65. Summary of Generalgouvernement conference, March 25, 1941. Frank diary,
PS-2233.
66. Himmler to Greiser, copies to Heydrich and the Higher SS and Police Leader in
the Wartheland, Gruppenführer Koppe, September 18,1941. Himmler Files, Folder 94.
67. OberbiirgermeisterofLddi (signed VentzkiltoUebelhoer,September24, 1941,
Himmler Files, Folder 94. Honorary members of the SS wore uniforms but had no SS
functions.
212
POLAND
sons
per square kilometer. The 144,000 inhabitants lived in 2,000
houses with 25,000 rooms, that is, 5.8 persons per room.
Within the ghetto, said Ventzki, large factories were producing
vital materials needed by the Reich (figures cited), but only starvation
rations were coming into the ghetto. Lack of coal had impelled the
inmates to tear out doors, windows, and floors to feed the fires in the
stoves. The arrival of an additional 20,000 Jews and 5,000 Gypsies
would increase the population density to seven persons per room. The
newcomers would have to be housed in factories, with the result that
production
would
be
disrupted.
Starvation
would
increase,
and
epidemics would rage unchecked. The digging of additional ditches for
the disposal of feces would lead to an increase in the number of flies,
which would ultimately plague the German quarter. The Gypsies, as
bom agitators and arsonists, would start a conflagration, and so forth.
Uebelhoer forwarded this report to Himmler, underlining some of the
conclusions in a letter of his own.68 69 70
Heydrich’s
way
of
dealing
with
these
protests
was
to
cable
Uebelhoer to the effect that the transports would begin to arrive on