by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
that
the
Jewish
population
was
spreading
typhus
(Fleckfieber)."' Another was the allegation that Jews, as urban residents and as holders of ration cards that—in the words of the Food and Agriculture chief of the Warsaw district—entitled them for practical
purposes only to bread, were bidding for unrationed foods and creating
a black market in rationed items."® The third was the claim that suitable
apartment space was unavailable to German officials and members of
the armed forces."’ The answer each time appeared to be ghettoization.
To be sure, when the ghettos were in place, spotted fever was rising in
the congested Jewish houses, smuggling by Jews was increasing to
stave off starvation, and apartments were still needed by Germans. In
fact, the three principal explanations for creating the ghettos were
going to be revived at a later time as reasons for dissolving them and
for removing their Jewish inhabitants altogether.
Ghetto formation was not an easy undertaking from the start. In
the case of Warsaw, where the process took a year, the first step was
taken early in November 1939, when the military commander established a “quarantine" (Seuchensperrgebiet) in an area within the old part of the city, inhabited largely by Jews, from which German soldiers
were to be barred.IM On November 7, Gouvemeur Fischer of the Warsaw district proposed that the Warsaw Jews (whose number he estimated at 300,000) be incarcerated in a ghetto, and Frank gave his immediate
consent
to
the
proposal.1,1
During
the
winter,
Fischer
created a Resettlement Division (Umsiedlung) under Waldemar Schon,
who was going to have a major role in ghetto planning and who was
subsequently deputized to carry out the plan. The first idea, in February, to locate the ghetto on the eastern bank of the Vistula River, was turned down in a meeting on March 8, 1940, on the ground that 80
percent of Warsaw’s artisans were Jews and that, since they were
indispensable, one could not very well “encircle" them (zernieren). 117 118 119 120 121
117. Remarks by Obermedizinatrat Dr. WaJbaum at meeting of Generalgouveme-
ment division chiefs, April 12, 1940, Prfig and Jacobmeyer, eds., Diensttagebuck. p. 167.
118. Generaigouvemment food meeting of March 3, 1940, ibid., p. 142.
119. Stadthauptmann Saurmann of Lublin complained in a monthly report dated
December 31, 1940, that the city was overcrowded. Yad Vashem microfilm JM 814. The
daily demand for rooms by Germans in Radom was reported by Stadthauptmann Wend-
leron March 8, 1941.JM8I4.
120. See Czemiakdw's entries for November 4 and 5, 1939, in Hiiberg, Staron, and
Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, p. 87.
121. Summary of discussion between Fischer and Frank, November 7, 1939, Frank
diary, PS-2233.
224
POLAND
Doubts
were
also
expressed
about
supplying a
closed ghetto
with
food.'” On March 18, 1940, Czerniak6w noted cryptically: “A demand
that the Community ring the ‘ghetto’ with wire, put in fenceposts, etc.,
and later guard it all.”113 The quotation marks around the word ghetto
refer to the previously established quarantine. By March 29, Czer-
niakdw noted that the ghetto was to be “walled in,” and the next day he
argued with Stadtkommandant Leist about the "virtual impossibility of
building a wall (damaging the water installations, electric and telephone cables, etc.).”1* Wall building was actually suspended in April, while the Germans were considering a short-lived idea of dumping the
Jews in the Lublin district. Schon’s Division Umsiedlung then examined the feasibility of setting up two ghettos, one in a western section (Koto and Wola) and another in the east (Grochdw) to minimize any disturbance in the city’s economy and traffic flow, but this plan was
abandoned after word of the Madagascar project had reached Warsaw.1“ Czemiak6w, on July 16, noted a report to the effect that the ghetto was not going to be formed after all.'3* In August 1940, however,
Subdivision
Health
of
the
Generalgouvemement’s
Interior
Division,
pointing to increased troop concentrations in the area, demanded the
formation of ghettos in the district. The nonmedical officials of the
Interior Division, acquiescing, argued only against sealing the ghettos
hermetically, lest they could not survive economically. On September
6,
1940,
Obermedizinalrat
Dr.
Walbaum,
citing
statistics
of
typhus
among Jews, insisted in a ceterum censeo speech on their incarceration
in a closed ghetto as a health-political measure.1“ Six days later Frank
announced during a conference of main division chiefs that 500,000
Jews in the city were posing a threat to the whole population and that
they could no longer be allowed to “roam around.”1“ Czemiak6w, who
had still harbored hopes for an “open” ghetto that would have combined compulsory residence with freedom of movement, knew of this decision by September 25. On that day he wrote “ghetto" without any
doubt about its character.’” 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129
122. Report by Schon, January 20. 1941, reproduced in large excerpt in Faschis-
mus-Getto-Massenmord. pp. 108-13.
123. Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, p. 130.
124. ibid., p. 134.
125. Schon report, Faschismus-Geito-Massenmord, pp. 108-13.
126. Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, p. 174.
127. Summary of discussion between Frank, Dr. Walbaum, and Warsaw district
Health Chief Dr. Franke, September 6, 1940, Frank diary. PS-2233.
128. Summary of conference of main division chiefs, September 12, 1940, Frank
diary, PS-2233.
129. Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, p. 201. On September 26,
Czemiakdw wrote: "The Ghetto!" Ibid.
225
CONCENTRATION
The
“Jewish
district”
(Wohnbezirk)
of
Warsaw
was
established
over a period of six weeks during October and November 1940, in an
area covering about two-thirds of the old quarantine.m In the course of
the move, 113,000 Poles left the ghetto site and 138,000 Jews took their
place.130 131 132 133 134 T-shaped, the ghetto was narrowest at a point where an
“Aryan” wedge separated the larger, northern portion from the smaller,
southern one. The borders, drawn with a view to utilizing existing fire
walls and minimizing the security problem, were not final. During September
1941,
in
a spirit of creeping annexationism, some German
officials considered severing the southern part of the ghetto. At this
point, an ususual man in the German administration made an unusual
move. He was the chief physician of the German city apparatus, Dr.
Wilhelm Hagen. In a blunt letter to the
Stadthauptmann, he predicted a
worsening of the typhus epidemic and called the proposed plan “insanity”
(Waknsinn).m
The
southern
ghetto
remained,
but
more
blocks
were chopped off, more wall building was ordered, and, as the only
link between the two ghetto sections, there was now a foot bridge over
what had become an “Aryan” corridor.
The Warsaw ghetto was never open to unhindered traffic, but at the
beginning there were twenty-eight points for exit and entry, used by
about 53,000 persons with passes. The Warsaw district health chief, Dr.
Lambrecht, objected to the number of permits, arguing that they defeated the entire purpose of the ghetto. The gates were then reduced to fifteen.1” The Warsaw police regiment (Lt. Col. Jarke) was responsible
for guarding the ghetto. This duty was carried out by a company of the
304th Battalion (from the second half of 1941, the 60th), augmented by
Polish police and the Jewish Ordnungsdienst. At each gate, one man
from each of these services might have been seen, but inside there
were 2,000 men of the Order Service.13*
After the Warsaw ghetto had been closed, Stadthauptmänner and
Kreishauptmänner
in
all
parts
of
the
Generalgouvernement
followed
suit. In town after town, local officials followed the same three-stage
130. See map, prepared by Yad Vashem cartographer, in Hilberg, Staron, and
Kermisz, eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. x-xi.
131. Schön report, Faschismus—Getlo—Massenmord, pp. 108-13.
132. Hagen to Leist, September 22, 1941. Zentrale Stelle der Landeyustizverwal-
tungen, Ludwigsburg, Polen 363c, p. 38.
133. Summary of interagency conference on ghetto, December 2, 1940. Yad
Vashem microfilm JM 1113. Schön report, Faschismus-Gello-Massenmord, pp. 108-13.
134. On police jurisdiction, see conference under Auerswald and Schön, November 8, 1941, Yad Vashem microfilm ]M 1112. Auerswald was then Ghetto Kommissar, Schön was in the Warsaw district Interior Division. The strength of the police company,
as reported by Schön on January 20,1941, was eighty-seven men under a first lieutenant.
Identification of police units from various documents.
226
POLAND
process. They selected the location of the ghetto, issued the sudden
(schlagartige)
movement
orders,
and sealed
off the
finished
ghetto.
There were some variations. A number of small Jewish communities
were incarcerated in ghetto towns; that is, whole towns became ghettos.'55 The larger communities were crowded into closed-off city districts, each of which became a city within a city.
As may be seen from the statistics in Table 6-11, a ghetto was
usually a tightly packed slum area without parks, empty lots, or open
spaces. In spite of its small size, a ghetto, placed in the middle of a
metropolis,
invariably
created
traffic
problems.
In
Warsaw,
trolley
lines had to be rerouted,1in L6di the city administration had to install
a new bus line that skirted the ghetto,1” while in Lublin, Stadthaupt-
mann Saurmann had to build a detour road around the Jewish quarter.'”
Traffic problems also determined to a large extent the method of sealing
a ghetto. Only a few cities, such as Warsaw, Kraków, Radom, and
Nowy S§cz surrounded their ghettos with massive, medieval-like walls 135 136 137 138 139
and built-in gates.'”
Some ghettos
, such as
Lódí, wert
: fenced in only
T A B L E 6-11
DENSITIES IN THE GHETTOS OF WARSAW AND -EÔDZ
City of
Ghetto of
Warsaw,
Ghetto of
¿ódí,
March 1941
Warsaw
Warsaw
September 1941
Population
1,365,000
920,000
445,000
144,000
Area (square miles)
54.6
53.3
1.3
1.6
Rooms
284,912
223,617
61,295
25,000
Persons per room
4.8
4.1
7.2
5.8
note: The Warsaw statistics were taken from the archives of the Jewish Historical
Institute. Warsaw, by Isaiah Think and published by him in an article entitled "Epidemics
in the Warsaw Ghetto," YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science, vol. 8, p. 87. The figures
on apartment density in the Warsaw ghetto are confirmed by Stroop (SS and Police
Leader in Warsaw) in a report to Krilger, May 16,1943, PS-1061. Stroop mentions 27.000
apartments with an average of 2Yi rooms each. L6di statistics from report by Ventzki to
Uebelhoer, September 24,1941, Himmler Files, Folder 94.
135. For adescription of such a ghetto town, see Gustav Andraschko, “Das fiel uns
auf in Szydlowiec . . . !" Krakauer Zeilung, June 21, 1941, pp. 6-7.
136. Ibid·, November 27, 1941, Generalgouvernement page.
137. Office of the Mayor of L6di (Dr. Marder) to Office of the Regierungspräsident
in L6di, July 4, 1941, Dokumentär/ i maleriaiy, vol. 3, pp. 177-79.
138. Report by Saurmann in conference attended by Frank, October 17, 1941,
Frank diary, PS-2233.
139. Photograph of Radom wall in Krakauer Zeitung, November 20, 1940. Generalgouvernement page. Photograph of Kraköw wall, ibid. . May 18, 1941. p. 5, 227
CONCENTRATION
with barbed wire. Still others, including Lublin, could not be sealed at
all.
While not every ghetto could be closed completely, no Jew was
permitted to remain outside its boundaries. In L6d t, Jews in mixed
marriage with their Polish spouses, and Mischlinge of all degrees were
pushed into the ghetto.'® On February 26, 1941, the First Secretary of
the Soviet Embassy, Bogdanov, inquired why certain nationals of the
Soviet Union were forced to live in certain places. Unterstaatssekretär
Wörmann of the Foreign Office replied that the nationals involved were
Jews (dass es sich um Juden handele) and that Jews of Soviet nationality were receiving the same treatment as Jews of other nationalities.
By the end of 1941 almost all Jews in the incorporated territories
and the Generalgouvernement were living in the ghettos. Their incarceration was accompanied by changes in German control machinery and enlargements of the Jewish bureaucracy. In L6d£ and Warsaw, new
German offices for ghetto supervision came into being.1®
The L6di Jewish Council was placed under a "Food and Economic
Office
Ghetto”
(Emährungs-
und
Wirtschaftsstelle
Getto).
Originally
this
office
regulated
only
economic
questions
affecting
the
ghetto.
Soon,
however,
title
was
changed
to
Gettoverwaltung
Litzmann·
stadt (Ghetto Administration, L6d2), and with the change of title there
was also a change of function. The office took charge of all ghetto
affairs. The place of the Gettoverwaltung in the local governmental
structure is indicated in Table 6-12.
In Warsaw the administrative changes also took place in stages.
Initially the Judenrat was answerable to Einsatzgruppe IV, and thereafter
it
received
instructions
from
the
Stadthauptmann.'®
During
the
process of ghetto formation, control over the council passed into the
hands of the Resettlement Division (Schön) of the district administration. Schön formed a Transferstelle (under Palfinger) to regulate the 140 141 142 143
140. Representative of the Regierungspräsident in L6 di (signed Moser) to Polizeipräsident in tdd i. August 26. 1940, enclosing letter by Reichsstatthalter's office in the Wartheland (signed Coulon) to Representative of the Regierungspräsident in Làât, August 6, 1940, Dokumenty i materiaty, vol. 3, p. 172.
141. Unterstaatssekretär Wörmann (chief. Political Division) via deputy chief of
Political Division to Section V of the Division (Soviet affairs), February 24, 1941, NG-
1514. However, the release of Soviet Jews was under consideration; see report by Representative of Foreign Office in Generalgouvernement (Wiihlisch) to Foreign Office.
February 7, 1941, NG-1528.
142. Later, Bialystok also acquired such an administration. Trunk. Judenrat. pp.
270-71.
143. See Czemiaköw's entries for February 6, March 21, and April 26, 1940, in
Hilberg, Staron, and Kermisz. eds., Warsaw Diary, pp. 115, 131, 143. The first two
incumbents were Otto and Dengel. In April the city was taken over by Ludwig Leist.
228
POLAND
T A B L E 6-12
GERMAN CONTROLS OVER THET.ÖDZ GHETTO
Reichastatthalter Greiser
Regierungspräsident Uebelhoer Representative of
Regierungspräsident in LAdt:
Oberregierungsrat
Polizeipräsident:
Oberbürgermeister Ventzki
Bgf. Schafer
(Deputy: Bürgermeister Dr. Marder)
(succeeded by
Bgf. Albert)
Gettoverwaltung Litzmannstadt
Chief: Diplom Kaufmann Hans Biebow
Deputy: Ribbe
Eldest of the Jews: Rumkowski
note: For the appointment of Diplom Kaufmann Hans Biebow as chief of the
Gettoverwaltung and other personnel questions, see Biebow to DAF Ortsgruppe Rick-
mers, April 30, 1940, and Biebow to Biirgenneister Dr. Marder, November 12, 1940,