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  In the western Ukraine, workshops that once produced Panjewagen (wooden carts), soap, candles, lumber, leather, and ropes for the German army stood abandoned at the end of the year. There were no

  replacements. A report by the armament command in Luck tabulated

  the damage: “The leather works in Dubno are closed.... In Kowel all

  Panjewagen

  workshops

  are

  paralyzed.

  ...

  In

  the Kobrin

  works

  we

  have a single Aryan metals worker. ... In Brest-Litovsk the Jewish

  workshops now as before are empty [nach wie vor leer]."m The Jews of

  the Ukraine had been annihilated.58 59 60 61

  A journalist traveling through the Ukraine in June 1943 reported

  kommissar Carl to Kube, October 30, 1941, PS-l 104; affidavit by Franz Reichralh, October 14, 1947, NO-5439; testimony by Rivka Yossalevska, Eichmann trial transcript. May 8, 1961, sess. 30. pp. L2, Ml, M2. Nl. Reichralh was a German eyewitness at Terespol.

  Mrs. Yossalevska dragged herself out of a grave at Pifisk. Dying people, biting her,

  attempted to pull her back.

  58. Armament Command Luck to Armament Inspectorate Ukraine, report for October 1-10, 1942, Wi/ID 1.97.

  59. Himmler to OGruf. Prutzmann, October 27, 1942, NO-2027.

  60. Armament Command Luck to Armament Inspectorate Ukraine, report for October 1 to December 31. 1942, dated January 21, 1943, Wi/ID 1.101.

  61. The figure of Jews killed in Bialystok, South Russia, and the Ukraine from

  August through November 1942 was 363,211. Himmler to Hitler, December 29, 1942,

  NO-1128.

  381

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  that he had seen only four Jews. He had interviewed a high official of

  Reichskommissariat who had summed up the holocaust in these words:

  "Jews were exterminated like vermin [Juden warden wie die Wanzen

  veriilgt].”61

  At the end of 1942 the focus of attention shifted from the Ukraine

  to the Ostland. There, too, most of the Jews were already dead, but a

  sizable number (close to 100,000) were still alive. The killing of these

  remnants was a much more difficult process than the climactic waves

  of the second sweep could have led anyone to expect.

  The Ostland remnant was divided into two groups: the forest Jews

  and the ghetto Jews (including camp inmates). The Jews in the forests

  and marshes were a special problem because they were no longer

  under control. They had run away and were now in hiding. Consequently,

  they

  were

  more

  important

  than

  their

  numbers

  (in

  the

  thousands) would indicate. In the main, we may distinguish among the

  forest Jews three types of survivors: (1) individual Jews who were

  hiding out,“ (2) Jews in the Soviet partisan movement,6* and (3) Jews

  banded together in Jewish units.“ The Jews still under control were

  living in the Ostland ghettos, as follows:“

  Latvia

  4,000

  Lithuania

  34.000

  White Russia

  30.000

  68,000

  62. Report by Dr. Hans-Joachim Kausch. June 26, 1943, Occ E 14-11.

  63. These Jews led a precarious existence. See M. Cherszstein, Geopfertes Volk:

  Der Untergang des polnischen Judentums (Stuttgart, 1946), pp. 26-40. Cherszstein is a

  survivor who hid in the woods.

  64. First reports of Jewish movements to the partisans were received in the winter

  of 1941-42. Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ostland/Propaganda Detachment (signed Oberleutnant Knoth) to commander of Army Group Rear Area North, undated report received February 8, 1942, NOKW-2155. By June 1942 some partisan units were eliminating

  "unpopular Jews and other asocial elements through trial and public shooting." Propaganda Abteilung Ostland to Wehrmachtpropaganda, June 4, 1942, OKW-745. Similarly, Propaganda Abteilung W toOKW/WPr Ie, August 4,1942,OKW-733. See also Schwarz,

  The Jews in the Soviet Union, pp. 321-30.

  63. OKH/Chief of Secret Field Police to army groups and armies in the East, July

  31, 1942, NOKW-2S3S. Kreisverwaltung Koslovchisna to Gebietskommissar in Slonim,

  November 3. 1942, EAP 99/88. RR. Dr. Ludwig Ehrensleitner (deputizing for Gebietskommissar Erren of Slonim) to Kube. March 21, 1943, Occ E 3a-l6. Reports by 69th Jäger Division (in Lithuania) to 3d Panzer Army, August 30-31, 1944, NOKW-2322. For

  relations between Jewish and Soviet units, see Tobias Bielski, "Brigade in Action," in

  Leo W. Schwarz, ed., The Root and the Bough (New York, 1949), pp. 112-14.

  66.

  RSHA Summary Report No. 7, June 12, 1942, NO-5IS8. RSHA Summary

  Report No. 8, June 19, 1942, NO-5157. Generalkommissar White Russia to East Ministry, November 23, 1942, Occ E 3-45. Estonia was judenrein. RSHA IV-A-I, Operational 382

  THE SECOND SWEEP

  These ghettos became a problem because they, too, developed into

  focal points of resistance.

  The drive against the forest Jews was launched early in 1942. During February and March of that year, the SS and Police Leader North (Jeckeln) struck against the partisans in a drive that became the precursor of later “antipartisan” operations by von dem Bach. Each of these operations covered a specific area. As a rule, the smaller ghettos in the

  area were wiped out, and any fugitives encountered alone or with the

  partisans

  were

  shot.

  In

  the

  prototype

  Aktion

  Sumpffieber

  (Action

  Marsh Fever), carried out by Jeckeln in February-March, 389 “bandits” were killed in combat, 1,274 persons were shot on suspicion, and 8,350 Jews were mowed down on principle.6’

  Following

  the

  establishment

  of

  the

  antipartisan

  command

  under

  von dem Bach, Bandenkampfverbande led by Brigadefiihrer von Gott-

  berg were thrown into action in White Russia. On November 26, 1942,

  von Gottberg reported 1,826 dead Jews, “not counting bandits, Jews,

  etc.,

  burned

  in

  houses

  or

  dugouts."

  This

  was

  “Operation

  Nuremberg.”“ On December 21 von Gottberg reported another 2,958 Jewish

  dead in “Operation Hamburg."® On March 8, 1943, he reported 3,300

  dead Jews in “Operation Homung.”’0 In general, we may therefore

  conclude that this type of operation directed against the forest Jews

  Report USSR No. 155, January 14, 1942, NO-3279. The ghetto figures do not include

  several thousand Jews in camps. When the camp Jews were transferred to the ghettos in

  1943, the ghetto population in Latvia increased to almost 5,000. KdS Latvia (Obf. Pif-

  rader) to Lohse, August 1, 1943, Occ E 3ba-29. The ghetto population in Lithuania

  increased to over 40,000. Report by KdS Lithuania for April 1943, Occ E 3ba-95; report

  by Generalkommissar Lithuania for April and May 1943, Occ E 3ba-7. Later in 1943.

  thousands of Jews, most of them from the Vilna ghetto, were brought to Estonia for

  construction projects and shale oil production. See war diary of MineralOlkommando

  Estland/Gruppe Arbeit, November 1943 to January 1944, Wi/ID 4.38, and reports and

  correspondence of K
ontinental 6l A.G. in Wi/1.32.

  67. Report by Higher SS and Police Leader North, November 6. 1942, PS-1113.

  68. Bgf. Gottberg to Gruf. Herff, November 26, 1942, NO-1732.

  69. Gottberg to Herff, December 21, 1942, NO-1732. Also, RSHA Summary Report No. 38, January 22, 1943, NO-5156.

  70. Gottberg to Herff, March 8, 1943. NO-1732. RSHA Summary Report No. 46,

  March 19, 1943, NO-5164. See also report by Kube on “Operation Kottbus June 1,

  1943, R-135. This report does not specify Jewish dead, but Lohse, in reporting about the

  matter to Rosenberg, commented on the 9,500 dead “bandits" and “suspects" as follows:

  'The fact that Jews receive special treatment requires no further discussion. However, it

  appears hardly believable that this is done in the way described in the report by the

  Generalkommissar. . . What is Katyn against that?” Lohse to Rosenberg, June 18. 1943

  R-135. Katyn is a reference to the German claim that the Soviets had massacred Polish

  officers in the Katyn forest.

  383

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  was quite successful, although several thousand Jews in the woods

  were able to survive until the arrival of the Red Army.

  In October 1942, just before the end of the Ukrainian sweep and in

  conjunction with the antipartisan operations, the stage was set for the

  destruction

  of

  the

  remaining

  Ostland

  ghettos,

  which

  held altogether

  about 68,000 to 75,000 Jews. On October 23, 1942, Dr. Leibbrandt, the

  chief of the Political Division in the East Ministry, sent the following

  letter to Generalkommissar Kube:

  I request a report about the Jewish situation in the Generalbezirk

  White Russia, especially about the extent to which Jews are still employed

  by German offices, whether as interpreters, mechanics, etc. I ask for a

  prompt reply because I intend to bring about a solution of the Jewish

  question as soon as possible.’1

  After a considerable delay Kube replied that, in cooperation with the

  Security Police, the possibilities of a further repression of Jewry (die

  Möglichkeiten

  einer

  weiteren

  Zurückdrängung

  des

  Judentums)

  were

  undergoing constant exploration and translation into action.’1 But as

  late as April 1943 von Gottberg complained that Jews were still being

  employed in key positions, that Jews were sitting in central offices in

  Minsk, that even the idea of the court Jew was still alive.”

  As Kube had indicated, the reduction of the Ostland ghettos with

  their remnants of the Jewish skilled-labor force was a slow, grinding

  process.

  In

  the

  course

  of

  this

  process,

  two

  centers

  of

  resistance

  emerged in the territory, one within the ghettos, the other in the person

  of Generalkommissar Kube himself.

  Within the ghettos Jewish attempts to organize a resistance movement were largely abortive. In Riga and to a lesser extent in Kaunas, the Jewish police (Ordnungsdienst) began to practice with firearms.

  (However, in both places the police were caught before a shot was

  fired. )’* 71 72 73 74

  71. Leibbrandl via Lohseto Kube, October 23, 1942, Occ E 3-45.

  72. Generalkommissar of White Russia to East Ministry, November 23, 1942,

  Occ E 3-45.

  73. Speech by vonGottberg before SS and Police officials, April 10,1943, Fb 85/1.

  In this talk he reported having killed 11,000 Jews through March 1943.

  74. On Kaunas, see Samuel Gringauz, "The Ghetto as an Experiment of Jewish

  Social Organization," Jewish Social Studies 11(1949): 14-15, 19. Gringauz was a survivor

  of the ghetto. For an account of the Riga incident, which took place in October 1943, see

  Jeanette Wolff in Eric H. Boehm, ed.. We Survived (New Haven, 1949), pp. 262—63.

  Wolff survived in Riga. An earlier shooting of Ordnungsdienst personnel in the Riga

  ghetto had occurred after some armed Jews escaping from the ghetto had been intercepted on the road. For a description of the earlier incident, see the judgment of a Hamburg court against Karl ToIlkQhn, May 9, 1983, (89) 1/83 Ks, pp. 26-36,66-85.

  384

  THE SECOND SWEEP

  In the Vilna ghetto, where most Jewish inhabitants had been shot

  in 1941, a United Partisans Organization (Fareinikte Partisaner Or-

  ganizatzie) was formed in January 1942. Its leadership was composed

  of Communists, the nationalistic Zionist Revisionists, and members of

  the Zionist movements Hashomer Hatzair and Hanoar Hazioni. The

  command of this unusual political amalgamation was entrusted to the

  Communist Yitzhak Witenberg.

  The self-imposed mission of Vilna's Jewish partisans was to fight

  an open battle at the moment when the ghetto faced total dissolution.

  While they were waiting for the confrontation, they had to cope with a

  ghetto population that was prone to illusions, and they had to resolve

  internal contradictions between Jewish and Communist priorities.

  The dilemma

  of the United Partisans Organization was accentuated when non-Jewish Communists in the woods asked for reinforcements from

  the

  ghetto,

  and

  when

  some

  of

  the

  Jewish

  partisans

  themselves wanted to leave. Such departures were opposed by the

  official Jewish ghetto chief, Jacob Gens, whose policy of saving the

  ghetto by maintaining the largest possible workforce required the presence of strong young people for the protection of vulnerable dependents not capable of heavy labor. Gens knew about the resistance, but he tolerated it only as a means of last resort and only under the condition that it would not interfere with his strategy.

  In July 1943, the Germans captured the Lithuanian and Polish

  Communist leaders in Vilna, and discovered Witenberg’s identity as a

  Communist. The German police demanded Witenberg’s surrender with

  implied threats of mass reprisals. As Witenberg was hiding in a ghetto

  building,

  Gens dispatched

  his

  men armed

  with

  stones against assembled partisans. The attack was repelled, but the argument was not

  over. Witenberg wanted his partisans to fight then and there, yet they

  did not believe that the hour of the ghetto had come or that the Germans were aware of their organization. Hence they overruled him, and Witenberg walked out of the ghetto to his death. According to some

  reports, Gens had given him a cyanide pill; other accounts indicate that

  his body was found mutilated the next day.

  By August and September 1943, the Vilna ghetto was dissolved.

  Most of its inmates were sent to Estonia and Latvia, where they were

  subjected to attrition and shootings, and from where the remainder was

  subsequently

  routed

  to

  the

  Stutthof

  concentration

  camp.

  Other

  thousands were transported to the Lublin death camp, and still others

  were rounded up and shot. During the
se deportations, which were

  represented

  as

  work

  relocations,

  the

  United

  Partisans

  Organization

  realized that it did not have the Jewish community's support for a

  battle. It left the ghetto in small groups for the forest, falling prey to

  385

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  ambushes, regrouping, and holding on. Gens himself was called to a

  meeting by the Germans. A grave had already been dug for him. His

  death left the ghetto leaderless in its last days.’5 A survivor who

  reflected about this history after the war remarked: “Today we must

  confess the error of the staff decision which forced Vitenberg [sic] to

  offer himself as a sacrifice for the twenty thousand Jews. ... We

  should have mobilized and fought.”*

  Generalkommissar Kube's postclimactic resistance was one of the

  strangest episodes in the history of the Nazi regime. His battle with the

  SS and Police was unique. Kube was an “old” Nazi who had once been

  purged (he had been a Gauleiter). As he had pointed out in one of his

  letters, he was certainly a “hard” man, and he was ready to “help solve

  the Jewish question.But there were limits to his ruthlessness.

  In 1943 Kube had a serious controversy with the commander of the

  Security Police and SD (KdS) in White Russia, SS-Obersturmbann-

  fiihrer Strauch. On July 20, Strauch arrested seventy Jews employed

  by Kube and killed them. Kube called Strauch immediately and accused him of chicanery. If Jews were killed in his office but Jews working for the Wehrmacht were left alone, said Kube, this was a

  personal

  insult.

  Somewhat

  dumbfounded,

  Strauch

  replied

  that

  he

  “could not understand how German men could quarrel because of a

  few Jews.” His record of the conversation went on:

  I was again and again faced with the fact that my men and I were

  reproached for barbarism and sadism, whereas I did nothing but fulfil my

  duty. Even the fact that expert physicians had removed in a proper way

  the gold fillings from the teeth of Jews who had been designated for special

  treatment was made the topic of conversation. Kube asserted that this

  method of our procedure was unworthy of a German man and of the

  Germany of Kant and Goethe. It was our fault that the reputation of

  Germany was being ruined in the whole world. It was also true, he said,

  that my men literally satisfied their sexual lust during these executions. I

 

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