6. See Jan Guccione, “Bar Leaders Take Aim at Incivility of ‘Rambo’ Lawyers,” Los Angeles Daily Journal, p. 1 (April 14, 1997).
7. See id.
8. See Amy E. Bourne, “Holistic: Another Approach,” San Francisco Daily Journal (August 3, 1999).
9. We have played iterative prisoner’s dilemma games with thousands of students. When both sides are able to cooperate consistently, the individual scores are consistently higher than eighty-five percent of those playing. The very highest scores go to players whose counterparts are “suckers”—in the face of consistent defection, they nonetheless naively continue to make cooperative moves. Typically, defection invites retaliation, however. See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).
Index
Absolute advantage, 71
Accommodation, 52, 54, 57
Across the table, 204–223; creation/distribution of value, 34–43; empathy/assertive-ness, 61–68; adopting problem-solving mindset, 204–206; establishing problem-solving processes, 207–211; dealing with hard-bargaining tactics, 211–223; dispute resolution, 227–243; deal-making, 260– 271
Adversarial mindset, 168–169; adopting client-centered mindset, 178–186; dealing with adversarial client, 196–198; adopting problem-solving mindset, 204–206
Adverse selection, 27. See also lemons problem
Agents, 10, 69–70, 90–91; hiring of, 70–74; benefits of, 71–74; costs of, 74–86; and management, 86–90
Agreements-in-principle, 129, 143
Alternative dispute resolution, ADR, 230– 232, 319
Alternatives, 19–20, 32–33, 89; using decision analysis to assess, 232–238
American Arbitration Association, 270
American Association of Matrimonial Lawyers, 318
American Bar Association, 277
Anger, 49, 166–167, 200–201
Aspiration levels, 34, 262–263
Assertiveness, 9–10, 44–46; combined with empathy, 46–50; unproductive tendencies, 50–54; management, 55–68
Assessments of probability distribution, 111–113
Assimilation problem, 170
Assumptions, 176, 178–186, 204–206
Asymmetrical information, 21, 25–26, 228–229, 253–254, 274–277
At table. See Across the table
Attributional errors, 49
Authority, organizational, 298
Autonomy, 178
Avoidance, 52–54, 56–57
Bargaining, 18, 22–23, 27–28, 52, 174; tactics, 23–24, 90, 147–148, 177, 211–223; and explicitness, 207–209
Bargaining in the shadow of the law, 3, 101–105
Barrett, Craig, 248
BATNA. See Best alternative to a negotiated agreement
Bazerman, Max H., 160
Behind the table; adopting client-centered mindset, 178–186; adopting problem-solving mindset, 204–206
Belittling alternatives, 24
Belligerent behavior, 47
Bernheim, Alain, 101
Bernstein, Ed, 148
Best alternative to a negotiated agreement, 19–20, 22, 24, 28, 32–34, 41, 91, 186, 220–221, 226
Bluffing, 25, 212
Bonding, 81–82, 85–86
Bottom line, 89. See also reservation value Boulware, Lemuel R., 215
Boulwarism, 215
Boundaries, professional, 193–194
Brainstorming, 37–39
Brokers, 142–143
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company, 305
Buchwald, Art, 100–102
Capabilities, identification of, 35–37
Carter, Grady, 305
Castano v. American Tobacco Company, 304– 305
Changing the game, 67–68, 176, 216–223, 230–232
Checking in with other side, 66
Child custody/support, 176, 188–191
Cialdini, Robert, 215–216
Claims, extreme, 23, 212–213, 261–264
Client-centered mindset, 178–186
Client-client relationships, 175
Clients: interests of, 180, 188–189, 201–203, 256–258; expectations/risk, 182–183, 189– 191; meeting with, 186–195; with zero-sum mindsets, 196–198; unreasonable expectations of, 198–199; emotional, 200– 201; shifting interests of, 201–203; priorities of, 259–260; wish to mislead other side, 282–286; advice to, 316–317
Clinton, Bill, 277, 306
Closing deals, 145–154
Coalitions, 303–306
Codes of conduct, 275, 277–281
Collaborative lawyering, 319
Commissions, 77
Commitment process, management of, 143– 144
Commitment tactics, 24, 213–215
Communication challenges, 252–253
“Community Game,” 167
Comparative advantage, 72, 87–90; of agents in general, 71–72; of lawyers, 93–96
Compensation mechanisms, 141–143
Competing, 51–54, 57–58
Complete contracts, 136. See also incomplete contracts
Concessions, small, 23, 212–213
Conditions, 134–135
Conflict Tendencies, 50–55. See also accommodation; avoiding; competing
Congress, U. S., 305
Contingencies, in deals, 135–137
Contingency fees, 83, 118
Contracts: incentive, 76–80; and risk, 132– 135; incomplete, 135–137; drafts, 260–265
Coordination, organizational, 301–302; between lawyer and client, 87–90
Costs: transaction, reduction of, 25; agency, 74–86
Covenants, 133–134
Creation of value, 9, 12–17; management, 26–42
Creative financing, 146–147
Culture: legal, 156, 167–172; organizational, 298–301; changing norms, 320–321
Curiosity about other side, 58–59
Deal-making, 127–129, 150–154; definitions, 128–129; lawyer role in, 129–144; closing deals, 145–154; problem-solving advice, 249–271; preparations, 254–260; across the table negotiations, 260–271
Deception: reducing risk of, 25–26; clients wish to mislead other side, 282–286; other side’s, 288–290
Decision analysis, 232–238
Decision trees, 109–110; constructing jointly, 238–240
Dependency diagrams, 234
Differences: between parties, 14–15; principal/agent, 75–76; trading on, 120–121; expecting with client, 179
Digital Equipment Corporation, 243–248
Disclosure, 276–277, 279–281; continuum, 276–277
Discovery, 119–120
Dispute resolution, 97–99, 122–126, 224–248, 251–252; definitions, 99–101; lawyer role in, 101–107; settlement, 107–125; problem-solving advice, 224–248; using net-expected outcome table, 227–240; using interest-based table, 240–247
Distribution of value, 9, 18–21, 25–27; and information asymmetries, 21–22; and strategic opportunism, 22–23; and hard-bargaining tactics, 24–25, 211–223; management, 27–42; discussions of, 191– 193
Divorce, 176–177
Drafts, of contracts, 260–267
Dynamics of negotiation, 4, 9–10
Dynamics of settlement, 111–112
Early settlement, 227–232
Earnest money, 144
Economic model of litigation/settlement, 106–107
Economies of scale, 16
Economies of scope, 16–17
Emotion, 156–157, 166–167, 184–185, 200– 201
Empathy, 9–10, 44–45; combined with assertiveness, 46–50; unproductive tendencies, 50–54; management, 55–68; client’s for the other side, 180–182; with client, 187
Empathy loops, 63–65
Endogenous risks, 131
Endowment effects, 164–165
Endowments: substantive, 102–103; procedural, 104
Environmental Protection Agency, 310
Ethical issues, 274–294
Eva
luation, 37–39
Expectations: and risk, discussing with client, 182–183, 189–191; unreasonable, 198–199; realistic, 258–259
Explanations, 66–67
Exploitation: minimizing risks of, 26–27; client’s fear of, 198
Extreme claims, 23, 212–213
Extreme drafts, 263–265
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 119
Federal Trade Commission, 244, 320
Federated Corporation, 132
Fee, 74–80, 83–84, 87; alternative arrangements, 77, 79–84; negotiations with clients, 185–186, 194–195
Felder, Raoul, 168
Financing, creative, 146–147
First drafts, 260–261
Fischer, Bobby, 114
Fisher, Roger, 20, 89
Flinch, 24
Ford Motor Company, 107
Forecasts, 14, 31
Framing, 207–209
Fraud, 275, 277, 280–281
Freund, James, 148
Future deals, prospect of, 140–141
Future disputes, provisions for, 270–271
Games, changing, 67–68, 176, 216–223, 230–232
Gauthier, Wendell, 304
General Electric, 215
Gilson, Ronald, 154
Goldberg, Victor, 141
Good cop, bad cop, 25
Guthrie, Chris, 161–163
Hard-bargaining tactics, 24–25, 90, 147–148, 177, 211–223
Harvard Law School, 7
Heen, Sheila, 200
Hewlett-Packard, 246
Hired-gun mindset, 169–171
Holdouts, 306–308
Hostage-taking, 138–139
Hourly fees, 77–80, 83–84
Impasses, 269–270
Incentive contracts, 76–80
Incentive terms, 141–143
Incentives, 75–76, 83–84; on other side, 90; organizational, 296–298
Incomplete contracts, 135–137
Influencing perceptions, 111–115, 253–254
Influencing transaction costs, 112–114
Information: different, 76; verification of, 289; sharing of, 291–293
Information asymmetries. See Asymmetrical information
Informed choice, 178
Intel Corporation, 243–248
Interest-based table, 226–227, 240–246
Interests: identification of, 35–37; and empathy/assertiveness, 46–47; of clients, 180, 188–189, 201–203, 256–258; of other side, 180–182, 191; shifting, 201–203; explorations of, 265–267
Irrationality, 156–167
Issues, identification of, 28–30, 254–256
Joint decision trees, 238–240
Joint representation, 312–313
Judgmental overconfidence, 159–161
Kahneman, Daniel, 161, 164
Knetsch, Jack L., 164
Knowledge: of agents, 71; of lawyers, 93–94
Korobkin, Russell, 161–163
Laidlaw v. Organ, 280
Lawyer-client relationships, 6, 82–86, 317; incentive problems, 117–118; and problem-solving, 174–177; assumptions about, 178–186; broadening, 184–185; fee negotiations, 185–186, 194–195; discussing explicitly, 193–195; problems, 195–203; in deal-making, 252–253; severing, 280, 282
Lawyer-lawyer relationships, 175
Lawyers, 3–8; incentives for, 83–84, 319–320; monitoring systems, 85; knowledge of, 93–94; resources of, 94–95; skills of, 95; and strategic considerations, 95–96; role in dispute resolution, 101–106; role in deal-making, 129–144, 252–254; ability to problem-solve, 174–177, 207–211; adopting client-centered mindset, 178–186; meeting with clients, 186–195; problems with clients, 195–203; adopting problem-solving mindsets, 204–206; defending against hard-bargaining tactics, 211–223; ethical issues facing, 274–294; reputations of, 284–286, 318–319; information-sharing with clients, 290–292; in organizational setting, 295–302; in multiparty negotiations, 302–314; joint representation, 312–313; procedural management, 314
Learning, mutual, 179
Legal negotiations, 4–6, 93–96; dispute resolution, 97–126, 224–248; deal-making, 127–155, 249–271; psychological/cultural barriers, 156–172; ethics in, 276–281
Legal process, explaining to client, 187–188
Lemons problem, 25–26, 131
Lewis, Michael, 304
Liaison counsel, 304
Liggett Company, 305
Limiting assumptions, 179–185, 205
Lincoln, Abraham, 3
Listening, 46, 48, 50, 62, 65, 174
Litigation: evaluation of, 101–105; uncertainty about outcome, 109–111; threat of, 115–117
Litigation analysis. See Decision analysis
Los Angeles, Calif., 321
Lose-lose outcomes, 100–101
Loss aversion, 161–164
Lying, 25, 274, 277–278, 288–291
Material facts, misrepresentation or nondisclosure of, 277–279
Merced chips, 246–247
Micro-commitments, 144
Mindsets, 176; zero-sum, 168, 196–198; client-centered, 178–186; problem-solving, 204–208
Misleading statements, 277–281, 282–286, 288–291
Misperceptions, 49
Misrepresentation, 277–278
Mistrust, 49
Mixed fees, 84
Mnookin, Robert H., 7–8
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 277– 281, 286–288, 292–294, 313
Monitoring systems, 80–81, 85, 87
Moral hazard problem, 26–27, 131–132, 138–139
Motorola, 230
Multiparty negotiations, 302–314
Murphy, Eddie, 101
Mutual learning, 179
Neale, Margaret A., 160
Needs, and empathy/assertiveness, 46–47
Negotiations, 3; dynamics of, 4, 9–10; legal, 4–6, 93–96; problem-solving, 6–7, 173–177; modes/styles of, 51–54
Net-expected outcome table, 226–240, 242–243
Nieman Marcus, 132
Noisy withdrawal, 280
Noncompetitive similarities, 16
Nondisclosure, 279–281
Norms, 41–42; professional, 86; reliance on, 266–267; limits of, 268–269; changing, 320–321
Obligationally incomplete contracts, 136
Ongoing ventures, 142
Opportunism. See Strategic opportunism Opportunities. See Value: creation of Optimistic attitude, 206
Options. See Value: creation of Organizational setting, 295–302
Overconfidence, judgmental, 159–161
Over-lawyering, 148–150
Ownership of ideas, 38–39
Palmer, Robert B., 243–244, 248
Paramount Pictures, 100–101, 141
Partisan perceptions, 157–159
Patton, Bruce, 20, 200
Penalties, 77
Pentium chips, 243–247
Percentage fees, 76–80
Perceptions: influencing, 111–115; partisan, 157–159
Personal insults, 24–25
Perspectives: and empathy/assertiveness, 46–47; sharing your own, 59–61
Perspective-taking, 47–48
Persuasiveness, of two-sided messages, 49
Preferences, of an agent, 75
Pre-marital agreements, 149
Preparation, 178, 203; creation/distribution of value, 28–34; empathy/assertiveness, 56–61; client-centered mindset, 178–186; problems, 195–203; deal-making, 254–260
Principals, 10, 69–70, 90–91; hiring agents, 70–74; and agency costs, 74–86; and management, 86–90
Priorities, understanding the client’s, 256– 260
Probability distribution, assessments of, 109–111; 234–238
Problem-solving mindset, 204–206
Problem-solving negotiations, 6–7, 173–177, 315–323; creation/distribution of value through, 12–17, 27, 40–41; empathy/assertiveness in, 46, 48–49; and principals/a
gents, 90–91; in dispute resolution, 119– 125, 224–248; preparation behind the table, 178–203; across the table, 204–223; establishing, 207–211; in deal-making, 249–271
Procedural endowments, 104
Procedural management, 313–314
Process architecture/design, 119–120
Professional boundaries, 193–194
Professional issues, 274–294
Professional reputation. See Reputation, professional
Psychological barriers, 156–167, 171–172
Puffing, 25, 114
Questions, “nightmare,” 286–288
Questrom, Allen, 132
Questrom v. Federated, 132
Rambo Abatement Program, 321
Rational decision-making, 156–157
Reactive devaluation, 165–166
Realistic expectations, 258–259
Reciprocal exchange, 139
Reciprocal processes, 62–63, 209–210
Reframing, 216–217
Relative valuations, 14, 31
Remedies, 134–135
Representations, 133, 289–290
Reputation, professional, 81–82, 85–86, 284–286, 318–319
Reservation value, 19–20, 32–34, 89
Resources, 14, 31; identification of, 35–37; of agents, 71; of lawyers, 94–95
Risk-adjusted certainty equivalent, 237–238
Risk aversion, 237–238
Risk preferences, 14–15, 31, 105, 237–238
Risk premiums, 237–238
Risks: identification of, 130–132, 254–256; allocation of, 132–137, 144; and expectations, 182–183, 189–191; and uncertainty, 232–238
Role allocation, principal/agent, 87–90
Ross, Lee, 165
Rubin, Jeffrey, 114–116
Rubin, Paul, 139
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, 270–271
Schelling, Thomas, 213
Schwartz, Herbert, 244
Securities Act, 148
Self-knowledge, 56–58
Settlement: evaluation of, 102–106; likelihood of, 105–111; decisions against, 106– 107; and value-creating options, 119–121; early, 226–232
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