by Robin Prior
By this time the German rear formations were beginning to respond to the attack. A regiment (probably from Grandcourt) overran the most advanced Irish troops. They then swept on and arrived within 600 yards of the Schwaben Redoubt before British fire halted them. Then, as the afternoon wore on, further German counter attacks developed. Soon almost all troops in advance of the redoubt had been killed or captured and the enemy was closing on the redoubt itself from all sides.13
On the British side confusion reigned. The position of the advanced troops was not known with any accuracy. Possibly because of some optimistic reports about the situation around the redoubt it was decided to commit the corps reserve division (49) to the fray.14 This was unfortunate, to say the least. The reserve brigade had already been consumed because the halt order had never arrived. Since then the situation at the front had greatly deteriorated. Now the remainder of the division was to be committed. In the end they were saved by the chaos prevailing near the front. Communication trenches were by this time choked with dead, dying, and wounded. All the attempts by 36 Division staff to arrange an attack (their persistence in this was incredible: they were still trying to commit 49 Division as late as 1 p. m. on 2 July) failed. At the end of the day the two remaining brigades of the division were still intact behind the British front line.15
From early afternoon the position of the 36 Division was probably irredeemable. They were starved of ammunition and supplies of all kinds. Reinforcement through the German barrage was impossible. Small remnants managed to hold on to some of the German defences, including the Schwaben Redoubt, until the morning of 3 July. Eventually these men too had to be withdrawn. Despite the promising beginning, permanent gains in the area were zero.
III
On the right of X Corps' attack was the 32 Division. In detailing its actions on 1 July it is immediately obvious why the Ulstermen, as they advanced on Thiepval, had no support on their right flank. In this area two battalions from 32 Division had been given the task of attacking Thiepval frontally. They were wiped out. No fewer than 21 machine-guns in the village had survived the bombardment and during the course of the British attack they fired 210,000 rounds.16 In these circumstances the observation of the British Official History that ‘only bullet-proof soldiers could have taken Thiepval on this day’ is hardly an exaggeration.17
The remainder of 32 Division's attack to the right of the village fared little better. In the words of the War Diary of one of the units involved:
When the barrage lifted [the Fusiliers] ... were instantly fired upon by the Enemy's M.G.s & snipers. The Enemy stood upon their parapet and picked them off with rifle fire. The Enemy's fire was so intense that the advance was checked & the waves, or what was left of them, were forced to lie down.18
There they remained until after nightfall, when just 280 survivors of the 800 who had attacked were withdrawn.19
Nevertheless, despite this carnage, a few men from one battalion did enter the German line and were seen by British observers to the east of Thiepval.20 They were soon captured or killed but their supposed presence was to have a ‘baleful’ effect on the battle.21 First, the support battalions were ordered forward to reinforce the supposed occupiers of Thiepval. They suffered 200 casualties and gained no ground towards the village.22 Second, the alleged presence of British forces in Thiepval prevented X Corps artillery from re-bombarding the village, the only expedient which had a chance of redeeming the position.
Meanwhile, the extreme rightward troops of 32 Division had made some progress. As a result of closely following the barrage some troops had entered the Leipzig Redoubt. However, all attempts by them to advance further were halted by fire from the Wonderwerk and Nordwerk, which had escaped bombardment by the artillery.23
So on the front of 32 Division all the troops that delivered the initial attack had failed. Yet that did not put an end to the slaughter. As in many other areas, the almost mechanical forward movement of the reserves proved impossible to halt. The commanders of these units were unaware of the carnage in front of them and devoted all their efforts to fulfilling their task – to provide reinforcement to their comrades. The result was invariably disaster. In the case of 32 Division, first the reserve battalion of the assault brigade was shot down before it reached its own front line, then the division's reserve brigade was mown down in similar fashion as it attempted to debouch from Authuille Wood.24 Of the two leading battalions (about 1,500 men) barely 100 survived the journey to the German front line.25 Let the account of the 1 Dorsets serve for the experience of the entire brigade:
Immediately the leading platoon left Authuille Wood very heavy and extremely accurate machine-gun fire was opened by the enemy from some point on our right not definitely ascertained [it was almost certainly Nordwerk]. As this fire concentrated mainly on the point at the edge of the wood ... past which the whole Battalion had to go – we endeavoured to find some other exit from the wood but could not do so, barbed wire and other obstacles preventing. The whole Battalion, therefore, advanced from this point by sections, and it was during the dash across country from Authuille Wood to our own front trench about 100 yards ahead that at least half our total casualties were sustained. By the time the Battalion had left the wood, the end of ... [the] track and the ground up to our front line trench was covered with our killed and wounded.26
The slaughter of the brigade of which this battalion was a part introduced a grim aspect into the fighting. The 2 Manchesters had advanced over ground littered with the bodies of the attacking battalions. They had also suffered heavily from machine-gun fire and, as they neared the front line, snipers. When they finally reached the portion of Leipzig Redoubt still held by British troops, they were given charge of some German prisoners. What happened next is recorded with unusual frankness by the War Diary of the Manchesters:
Considerable enjoyment was given to our troops by Lieut Robertson who made the prisoners run across the open through their own Artillery barrage, upon reaching our line these men were kept out of our dugouts by the sharp end of a bayonet.27
Needless to say, those reinforcements which did reach Leipzig Redoubt had no capacity to alleviate the situation. The survivors were evacuated to the original British line on the following day.
So, the attack of 32 Division was almost a complete failure. The attack on the left had been stopped by the unsubdued machine-guns in Thiepval. On the right the rapid seizure of the Leipzig Redoubt could not be reinforced in strength.
At the end of the day, therefore, X Corps had suffered 10,000 casualties (36 Division 5,100, 32 Division over 5,100 and 32 Division 600). There was no permanent gain of ground. Essentially, the reason for failure was the same as that in the north. The artillery had not managed to subdue substantial German strongpoints (St-Pierre Divion, Bécourt Redoubt, Thiepval, Nordwerk, Wonderwerk) or eliminate much of the German artillery. Only at two points, the Schwaben Redoubt and Leipzig Redoubt, had the guns actually suppressed the defence for long enough to allow occupation. And in these instances occupation was futile unless the troops could be reinforced or other parts of the line from which enfilade fire could be brought to bear were captured. That is, without reinforcement or success on a wider front the noteworthy achievements of the Ulstermen were bound to be transitory.
It is worth noting once again that the zone of the destruction of British forces was not confined to no man's land. Unsubdued machine-guns and artillery proved capable of destroying many British formations before they reached their own front line. This was especially the case in the area of 32 Division where enemy domination of the debouches from Authuille Wood proved devastating to the follow-up formations. As in the north, the killing zone extended some thousands of yards behind the British front. For many soldiers the ‘race to the parapet’ was actually a race to their own parapet, and it was a race that they lost.
III Corps, 1 July
9 ‘Wave after Wave Were Mown Down’: III Corps on 1 July
I
The cen
tre of the British attack was also central to Haig's great purpose. It was in this area – just south of Pozières – that the breakthrough was to come; that the cavalry, protected from flanking fire by the advance of forces to its right and left, would sweep through to Bapaume followed immediately by Gough's Reserve Army of infantry. However, for Haig's horsemen ever to achieve this sort of advance, it was essential that III Corps first overwhelm the entire enemy trench system confronting them.
Yet there was every indication that III Corps would not succeed in clearing the way for the cavalry. Their gunners had stated during the period of the preliminary bombardment both that no success should be expected from their attempts to cut the distant wire and that they would be hampered even in cutting the more proximate wire by lack of ammunition.
These were surely matters of the utmost import, for if the wire was not cleared, the cavalry could not operate. There is no evidence however that anyone from III Corps headquarters conveyed the doubts of the artillerymen to Fourth Army Headquarters or to GHQ. One possible explanation for this lack of communication is that no one at III Corps or Fourth Army Headquarters was taking the cavalry operations seriously. Certainly clearing the way for the horsemen was given no prominence in III Corps' orders. In this the III Corps was being no more than realistic – the chance of a German collapse and a cavalry sweep was a remote possibility. But underneath all this lay an issue of substance which General Pulteney, the Commander of III Corps and his staff were failing to notice. At the same time that the prospects of a cavalry break-through were being discounted, the artillery plan was being extended to encompass the more distant objectives demanded in the plans for that very same breakthrough. But no one at III Corps headquarters made representations to Fourth Army Artillery to modify their plan along more realistic lines and to concentrate the fire of the guns on the formidable German front defences. No doubt it was considered that any such suggestion would be overruled by Haig. But the failure even to raise the matter left Rawlinson and Pulteney proceeding according to one set of assumptions, yet employing an artillery plan based on a completely different set. A more inappropriate way to initiate a great campaign would be difficult to imagine.
Given the geography of the central section of the front, III Corps could not have been confident of achieving even a fraction of what was expected of it. Behind the British front line there was no cover of any kind, not even the shattered ruins of former woods. The whole rear area consisted of bare, gentle slopes which culminated in the Tara-Usna hills astride the Albert–Bapaume road. This entire area was overlooked by the Germans so that even moving forward small numbers of troops to the front could bring down on them a hail of artillery shells and machine-gun bullets.
In marked contrast, the German positions on the forward slopes of the eastern sector of Thiepval Ridge were of great strength. The key to the German defences were the two villages which lay directly in the path of the British line of advance. To the north of the Albert–Bapaume road on a small ridge which dominated the surrounding countryside stood Ovillers. To the south of the road on lower but still dominating ground was La Boisselle. These villages were small, but before the war had consisted of several score houses with substantial cellars, ideal for the protection of small garrisons and machine-gun nests. In addition, the two villages had small garrisons and were surrounded by trench defences.1
Between Ovillers and La Boisselle ran a long, narrow declivity (called, by the British, Mash Valley) which could be dominated by enfilade crossfire from the villages. Finally, the whole northern section of the III Corps front was also overlooked by two strong defensive positions in the attack zone of X Corps: Nordwerk and the Leipzig salient. It was essential then, if the left of III Corps was to get forward, that these positions be eliminated by X Corps artillery.
As well as the inherent strength of the German defences, another problem confronted some sections of British troops. This was the width of no man's land. In the north, this varied from a fairly standard 200 yards to a terrifying 800 yards in the area between the villages around Mash Valley. Further south, the width varied from just 50 yards directly in front of La Boisselle to 600 yards to the north of the village, to 700 yards in the area of 101 Brigade's attack (see map). There is no indication that any special attention was devoted to the matter of how troops were even going to traverse the widest distances.
The two British assault divisions were (in the north) the 8, consisting mainly of Regulars, and (in the south) the 34, consisting entirely of Kitchener volunteers from around Newcastle.
For the attackers to possess any chance of success, it was essential in the first instance to neutralise the enemy machine gunners in the villages. Yet as the bombardment proceeded, there was every indication that this was precisely what was not happening. We have already noted the statement from a prisoner emphasising the strength of the Ovillers dug-outs.2 During the course of the bombardment, its relative ineffectiveness against this type of defensive position was recorded by Captain Reginald Leetham, a Regular soldier in 8 Division.
It was always a wonderful sight to see our shells bursting in every direction .... One ... saw the houses of Ovillers destroyed and several nights one saw the flames or fires in these and other towns lighting up the sky. But after [a] raid which found the Bosche line so strongly occupied it made one doubt whether all this bombardment was doing us much good. It was all a very fine exhibition of what our Artillery could do, but what was the use of bombing Bosches 30 feet below the level of the ground.3
Given the overall situation – an ineffectual bombardment, strong interlocking defences, and a total lack of cover – any plan made by III Corps was bound to be fraught with danger. The plan they actually made did not address any of these difficulties. At zero hour all six infantry brigades in the corps would be committed to battle. In the 8 Division all three brigades would attack from their front line.4 In 34 Division two brigades would launch the initial assault but simultaneously the reserve brigade on the Tara-Usna hills would also be propelled forward.5 Under this plan, once battle commenced, there would be no reserves on which to call, no time for redeployment, no time to rethink a failing strategy, no way to extricate troops from disaster. Moreover, all the senior officers, of both divisions from brigadier to general, would be located well behind the front and in no position to ascertain, even vaguely, how the battle was progressing. So in the area of III Corps there would be no one in the position and with the authority of Brigadier-General Rees of VIII Corps, who stopped the potentially disastrous deployment of the reserve brigade from 31 Division.
There was some attempt in the plans of the two divisions to take into account the defensive strength of the two villages. At two points held to be particularly dangerous, mines were placed under the German trenches. To the north of La Boisselle 40,000 pounds of ammonal were located under a German trench called Y Sap which jutted out into no man's land. To the south of the same village 60,000 pounds of ammonal were placed under a feature of considerable strength called Schwaben Hohe. In this case it was believed that the lip formed by the mine crater might to some extent protect the advancing troops from the La Boisselle machine gunners.6
The care taken to place these mines is in stark contrast to the rather sloppy planning of III Corps. The work was carried out by two tunnelling companies who started in early 1916. One of the officers in charge of the tunnellers describes how it was done:
The gallery to this crater [was] known as the Lochnager tunnel. The enemy had certainly become aware of these operations for he had put down a defensive mining system deeper than the British tunnel [so] the work was done in silence. A large number of bayonets were fitted with handles. The operator inserted the point in a ‘crack’ in the ‘face’, or alongside a flint, of which there were any number in the chalk, gave it a twist which wrenched loose a piece of stone of varying size which he caught with his other hand and laid on the floor. If, for any reason, he had to use greater force, another man behind would catch the st
one as it fell. The men worked bare-footed, the floor of the gallery was carpeted with sandbags, and an officer was always present to preserve silence. As sand bags were filled with chalk they were passed out along a line of men seated on the floor, and stacked against the wall ready for later use as tamping. Air was forced in from a bellows through armoured hose and ‘exhausted’ out thro’ the gallery. The dimensions of this latter length of tunnel were about 4'6" × 2'6". The work was extremely laborious, and if we advanced 18" in 24 hours we thought we did well. We could hear the Germans quite plainly in their mining system below us, and in their dug-outs. All such dug-outs and the men sheltering in them were destroyed when the mine was blown.7
In addition to these measures, the two villages were to be blanketed by smoke at zero hour. Ovillers was to be bombarded by smoke bombs and La Boisselle obscured by clouds of candle smoke which, it was hoped, would drift towards the village from the British front line.8
To the very end of the bombardment period the III Corps artillery plan served the troops ill. At 7 a.m., 30 minutes before zero, the heavy artillery lifted from the German front line to the rearward support line. The heavy shells then proceeded on their way to Pozières in 250 yard lifts and played no further role in the battle.9 This left just the field guns (18-pounder and 4.5-inch howitzer) to suppress enemy fire for the crucial 30 minutes before the attack. As these light shells had no destructive power against solidly constructed trenches, it should have come as no surprise when they failed.
So, in the event, even the stratagem employed by the left brigade (70) of 8 Division, of leaving their trenches before zero in order to close on the German line while it was still being subjected to bombardment, proved futile.10 Most of the leading troops were shot down by German machine-gunners and riflemen who had emerged from their dug-outs as soon as the heavy artillery lifted. One of the foremost battalions of 70 Brigade had been reduced to just 30 per cent of its strength before zero hour and the other probably suffered in equal measure.11 However, the survivors of these battalions were presented with a brief moment of opportunity. In this sector most of the wire had been cut and many defenders stunned by the bombardment. Further, the enemy were momentarily distracted to the north by the 32 Division assault on the Leipzig salient and to the south by 25 Brigade's (8 Division) advance on Ovillers.12 This distraction briefly enabled the survivors of 70 Brigade to penetrate the German front system. But as they then progressed on to the German intermediate system they were shot down in such numbers that the attack lost all coherence and the survivors were forced to retreat. A few, however, managed to hang on in the German front line.13