The Somme

by Robin Prior

  Support on the flanks for 64 Brigade was not to materialise. The destruction of the 34 Division of III Corps to their north has already been described. To their south, the other assaulting brigade from 21 Division (63) had also failed. Neither the bombardment nor the smoke-screen directed against Fricourt had succeeded in neutralising it, with the result that as the men of 63 Brigade left their trenches they were cut down by machine-gun fire from the village. Of the lead battalions probably only two or three hundred men reached the German front line.7 The follow-up units managed some small advances but fire from Fricourt and Fricourt Wood was too intense to allow significant progress. The survivors dug in just behind the German second trench and waited for night.8

  While these events were unfolding, just to the north of Fricourt the 10 West Yorkshires from 50 Brigade9 launched the most disastrous attack of the first day of the Somme. Here the explosion of three small mines was supposed to distract the Germans in Fricourt as the Yorkshiremen skirted the north of the village to provide flank protection for the 21 Division on their left. As far as the first two companies were concerned the expedient worked and they captured the German front line and pushed on to the support trenches virtually unscathed. The rearward companies however were wiped out by the rapidly recovering German garrison within the village. Consequently no reinforcements arrived to assist the forward companies. What happened to these men is not known in any detail.10 They were certainly split up into small groups which mostly fell victim to German bombing parties in the course of the day.11 At nightfall just 21 men from the battalion returned to their front line. In all it had lost 23 of its 24 officers and 717 of the 750 men who attacked.12

  So, in sum, as night fell, the 64 Brigade was in a strong position north-east of Fricourt, the 63 Brigade had captured the German front line but not much more, and the 50 Brigade had failed utterly. Whether this partial success could be turned into anything more substantial rested with 7 Division attacking on the other side of the Fricourt salient.

  II

  In the event, 7 Division was almost entirely successful in its attacks. It is clear from the accounts that the crossing of no man's land was greatly assisted by the creeping barrage. Most battalions were just 50–60 yards from the German line at zero and many were occupying the German trenches within one minute of the barrage lifting.13 Others speak of crossing no man's land close behind the barrage without suffering a single casualty.14 Of course not all proceeded smoothly. One battalion ran into the only intense artillery bombardment fired by the Germans on this part of the front and lost all cohesion.15 Another battalion ran into uncut wire and suffered heavy losses finding a path around it.16 Then as the advance continued and the pace of troops slackened, they lost the protection of the creeping barrage and ran into heavy machine-gun fire from Mametz and on the left from Fricourt. Nevertheless, nowhere was this fire sufficient to bring the attack to a halt. By 1.30 p.m. the southern outskirts of Mametz had been entered, while on the right follow-up battalions had bypassed the ruined village and captured trenches to its north and east. Finally around 4 p. m. the last vestiges of Mametz were captured and 600 enemy troops surrendered.

  The situation on the left nearer Fricourt was not so favourable. Yet even here 7 Division had established a strong defensive flank facing the village.17 All this meant that XV Corps was threatening the village from the salients to the north and the east and that any German forces holding out were in danger of being cut off by subsequent operations.

  The XV Corps headquarters however were not content to wait on subsequent operations. Wildly optimistic reports which seemed to indicate that 21 and 7 Divisions had taken all their objectives and that the German artillery was retreating towards Pozières led them to order a frontal attack on Fricourt at 2.30 p.m.18 At least one of the battalions involved warned that the situation was not so favourable as was thought.19 It was overruled and informed by the command that the attack would go in. The result was much slaughter. The defenders of Fricourt had by no means been overcome by 2.30 p. m. Indeed, they were continuing to pour fire into the flanks of the British advance. As they were doing so, from across no man's land (which at this point of attack was some 500 yards wide), came two battalions of British troops, unaccompanied by a creeping barrage, straight for the centre of the village. Within three minutes one battalion had lost 350 casualties.20 Further south the other battalion managed to capture the German front line and advance to the support trench. By then they had suffered so heavily and so intense was the fire that they could go no further.21 All told, 600 to 700 men had been lost to no effect.

  III

  On the right of the British attack was the XIII Corps commanded by General Congreve and consisting of two New Army divisions, 18 (Maxse) and 30 (Shay). Its direction of attack was due north. There were two main obstacles to the British advance in this area. One was the village of Montauban which with 274 houses was one of the largest in the Somme area.22 The second was Pommiers Redoubt, a circular trench fortress, 1,000 yards from the front line, lavishly equipped with machine-guns and dug-outs, and protected by belts of barbed wire.23

  XIII Corps, 1 July

  As with XV Corps, the British troops in the southern section of the front had some advantages. The first was artillery observation. The high ground behind the British front gave excellent panoramas over the entire German front line system as far back as Montauban.24 Further, XIII Corps had optimised this advantageous position by giving counter-battery operations the highest priority of any British corps during the preliminary bombardment. Then there was the advantage of being alongside the French. To the north of the Somme the French XX Corps was also lavishly supplied with heavy guns and could enfilade from the south many German positions facing the British.

  This concentration of well-placed Allied artillery proved devastating to the Germans. The batteries of the 12 and 28 Reserve German divisions had been badly knocked around during the preliminary bombardment and by midday on 1 July almost entirely destroyed.25 The trenches and their defenders opposite XIII Corps had also suffered greatly. Almost all the wire in the area to be attacked had been swept away and many machine-guns in forward areas opposite 30 Division had been destroyed. Moreover, the majority of trenches in both divisional areas had been caved in or, in some instances, obliterated.26

  In addition, given the accuracy of the XIII Corps and French artillery, German defensive arrangements in the area, like those in front of XV Corps, favoured the British. For reasons that are not at all obvious, the Germans had constructed far fewer deep dug-outs in the south, and those they had constructed were largely under the front line. As a consequence a high proportion of the German garrisons were crowded forward in these dug-outs. Accurate artillery fire and a rapid advance of troops would therefore neutralise large numbers of German defenders in the early minutes of the battle.27

  It is possible that XIII Corps also aided their infantry by firing a creeping barrage. Certainly the corps orders seem quite clear:

  The field artillery barrage will creep back by short lifts.... The infantry will follow close behind the barrage as safety admits.28

  Anstey, however, in his unpublished history of the British Artillery in the First World War, claims that while 18 Division did fire a classic creeping barrage, 30 Division abandoned it and provided four lifts from trench to trench at zero plus 6, 16, 56, and 146 minutes.29 In truth a close reading of after-battle reports from the units of both divisions supports the proposition that both fired modified creeping barrages – ones that crept between trench lines and then halted until the designated time for the next lift. In some parts of the front, as will be seen, these pauses may well have delayed the progress of the troops, but at least the troops could be certain that if they could advance in time with the pre-arranged timetable then they would have artillery protection while they traversed the open ground between the trench lines.

  So, to sum up: in XIII Corps area, the troops had the advantages of good artillery observation, overwhelming
superiority in guns, the high priority given by the corps to counter-battery fire, the French contribution, the faulty German defensive arrangements, and the protection of the creeping barrage.

  IV

  The 18 Division attack, on the left of XIII Corps, started well. A series of mines (the largest 5,000 pounds, several others around 500 pounds) were blown under the German front line at 7.27 a.m. – three minutes before zero. In all, nine dugouts were destroyed along with many of their garrisons.30 In addition eight ‘Russian’ saps (shallow trenches dug across no man's land) containing machine-guns and flame-projectors were employed to enfilade the German line or incinerate those trench-dwellers who survived the bombardment.31

  Nevertheless, all did not go well. In the area of 53 Brigade, some German guns had survived the counter-battery onslaught and managed to inflict heavy casualties on British troops as they huddled in their assembly trenches. The results were particularly grisly, as one observer later noted:

  Our men were lying dead in [the assembly trench], killed by the enemy's shells. In one place a man was kneeling, as if in prayer, his hands covering his face. Lying in the trench behind him was another man, face downwards, half buried in the earth thrown into the trench by the shells. A short distance away another man was sitting on the fire-step, buried to the knees, and looking as if he had suddenly turned to stone. A little further along the trench I stepped on something, and looking down I saw a piece of a man's backbone, and pieces of flesh strewn about the trench. Hanging down from the parapet, in the corner of the traverse, was a mass of entrails, already swarming with flies. And so on, here and there along the trench, wherever the enemy's shells had dropped in.32

  It is perhaps worth noting that the 53 Brigade report described the enemy's barrage in this area as ‘not heavy’.33

  On the right of the attack facing 55 Brigade, German machine-gunners in a cratered section of no man's land survived the British bombardment, machine-guns, and flame-throwers. They inflicted heavy casualties on the leading waves of the brigade and effectively brought the attack in this section of the front to a halt.34

  Luckily for 18 Division, the experience of the 54 Brigade, and of the large section of 53 Brigade which had escaped the early attentions of the German artillery, was quite different. These brigades, aided by the confusion caused by the mines, had captured the German front line shortly after 7.30 a.m. Following the creeping barrage, and with only scattered opposition, they progressed rapidly through the support line and rearward trenches of the German front system. So rapid was their progress that most of the strong Pommiers Trench was in their hands by 8.15 a.m. By 8.30 they had advanced 1,000 yards in total and were closing on Pommiers Redoubt.35 There they encountered their first setback. The wire in front of the redoubt had not been adequately cut and the attack halted. It took them half an hour to cut their way through (‘a nightmare for years to come,’ according to one participant).36 Even when the wire was cut the enemy garrison in the redoubt fought on, prepared, as the Bedfords noted, ‘to defend this last vital point in their line ... to the last’.37 It was at this point that the meticulous training given to the troops by Maxse, and their familiarity with the German trench layout from the realistic models constructed during training, paid dividends. Parties of troops simultaneously swung to the left and right flanks of the redoubt. From the left, it was found, a machine-gun could enfilade the front face of the German position. Some other troops, in contrast, tried to assault from the rear only to be fired on by German troops in a trench behind the redoubt. However, they turned about, charged that trench, subdued the defenders, turned about again, and captured the rear face of Pommiers. By then other troops were entering the trench fortress from all sides. By 9.30 a.m. the formidable Pommiers Redoubt was in British hands.38

  All this action, and the final subduing of the German garrison in the cratered area at 9.30 a.m., relieved the pressure on 55 Brigade, which, as related earlier, had been brought to a halt.39 The survivors of the leading battalions of this brigade, reinforced by their support battalions, were now able to advance on their final objective (Montauban Alley just to the north-west of the village). All went smoothly until they reached a trench halfway towards their objective. There some German riflemen and machine-gunners put up a considerable resistance which failed only when they were outflanked by a party led by the intrepid Lt. Tortoise of the Queen's Battalion, who had already performed other startling deeds of bravery that day.40 At this point German resistance in front of 55 Brigade finally crumbled and the brigade was able to link hands with the 53 Brigade on its left and the troops of 30 Division on its right.41

  All objectives on the front of 18 Division had fallen. On the left elements of the 54 Brigade were holding positions some 500 yards behind Pommiers Redoubt and in the centre patrols had even been sent forward to Caterpillar Wood which lay beyond the final objectives. The wood was found to be empty but as evening was now falling and German shelling growing heavier it was prudently decided to consolidate Montauban Alley and await the new day.

  V

  On the very right of the British attack the 30 Division achieved the greatest advance, at the least cost, of any British division that day. This applied especially to 89 Brigade, which attacked alongside the French. At zero the men from this unit dashed across no man's land to find the wire well cut. Within a minute the German front line had fallen. Most of its defenders were killed or wounded. The remainder were too stunned by the bombardment to offer much resistance. Many of them were soon streaming back to the British lines as prisoners.42 Then, after waiting for the creeping barrage to lift from its respective halts, the men followed it until their final objective (Dublin Trench, south of Montauban) was reached. All this was accomplished by 8.30 a.m. At 12.30 p.m. a company had even secured the Briqueterie, a cluster of buildings on the flank of the Allied advance from which, it had been feared, German machine-gunners might have been in a position to enfilade the troops attempting to capture Montauban.43 So by midday the 89 Brigade had come to a halt, awaiting the arrival of 90 Brigade which was to leapfrog through them and capture Montauban. All this had been accomplished at a cost of just 24 killed.44 One battalion (17 King's) had escaped even a single death on 1 July.45

  On the left of 89 Brigade, the 21 Brigade had also made progress, but with much higher losses. The attack started well. The troops crossed no man's land with light casualties, found the wire well cut, and occupied the front trench before the Bavarian defenders could reach the surface from their dug-outs.46 But then machine-guns in rear and in enfilade, from where the 18 Division to their left were being held up, took a heavy toll. In the case of one company, just 31 of 200 reached the German line.47 Of the 500 casualties suffered by another battalion most were inflicted in this phase.48

  Nevertheless, the attack retained sufficient weight to maintain progress against an increasingly disorganised enemy. (A French shell had wiped out almost all the regimental officers of a Bavarian regiment just after zero.)49 Soon Glatz Redoubt had fallen and contact was made with 89 Brigade on the right.50 Consolidation commenced as the troops awaited the capture of Montauban by 90 Brigade.

  At first glance the Montauban operation bore an alarming similarity to some of 1 July's most unprofitable endeavours. The 90 Brigade had to advance from well behind their own front line, up a slope, to capture the ruins of a large village. In short, it had to accomplish what 32 Division failed to manage at Thiepval, 8 Division at Ovillers and 34 Division at La Boisselle. In all these cases, the result had been much slaughter and little progress. But with 90 Brigade affairs went quite differently. Their operation was covered by a dense smoke-screen put down by the two advanced brigades. It opened at 8.30 a.m., and by 9.30 the leading units had joined up with the troops of the 21 and 89 Brigades just south of the village.51 Just after 10.30 a.m. the barrage moved on to Montauban, followed by troops from three battalions of 90 Brigade.52 Ten minutes later the village (which in the event was deserted ‘except for a fox’)53 fell into British h
ands with hardly a casualty.

  What had happened was remarkable. Montauban had been all but obliterated by the combined might of the British and French artillery – ‘there remained no recognizable ruins although there had been 274 houses there before the war’.54 Moreover, the substantial cellars that in other areas had protected machine-gun detachments, were here either caved in or their inhabitants had been rendered incapable of resistance. An officer from the 17 Manchester, one of the units which captured the village, described the scene:

  Inside Montauban all was wreck and ruin, a monstrous heap of rubble stinking of death, brick-dust and high-explosive. Down in deep dug-outs, a few of which had survived our heavy shells, cowering men in field grey were taken prisoner. In one, which was equipped with electric light, a Brigadier or Colonel with a staff of six officers was captured. Large parties of Bosch laughing and dancing like demented creatures went streaming back to Maricourt unguarded, holding their arms up and calling, ‘Mercy, Kamarad’. They had thrown away their arms and equipment and were utterly demoralised; their uniforms filthy and stinking. In the village the horrors of war were visible on every side; dead and dying Germans, some with terrible wounds lay amidst the brick-dust and rubble.55