The Somme

  The account ... does not bring out a very important point, namely that this attack was carried out at such short notice that no previous reconnaissance or adequate preparations were possible and there was no time to arrange any effective fire plan. When it received orders to move the Bde was in bivouac at Talus Bois and was not expecting to be engaged immediately. In my opinion this attack demonstrated the futility of such hastily considered and ill-prepared attacks. At the time I thought that XIII Corps made a grave mistake in not allowing sufficient time for its preparation and I am even more firmly of that opinion today ... I notice that the Official History does not comment on the wisdom or otherwise of attacks such as this ... The failure of these attacks was not due to lack of determination on the part of the troops: the units of the 53rd Bde were in great form after their successes of the 1st July and their moral[e] was high ... I know it is extremely difficult in an account of operations of so great magnitude ... to give more than a bare outline ... but if you can bring to light the hasty nature of the attack I will feel that the official account does justice to my old Brigade.14

  It seems certain that Higginson would have been disappointed with Edmonds' efforts. While mentioning that the brigade was brought forward ‘hurriedly’ and ‘with no time for reconnaissance’ the Official History gives no prominence to the botched preparations either for this attack or for the countless others made in this period of the Somme fighting. Neither Higginson nor his brigade got their due.15

  II

  Final orders for Rawlinson's much-postponed and tactically dubious broad-front attack were issued on 21 July. At the strong urging of Haig, but with Rawlinson's full agreement, it was decided once more to employ the ruse of a night attack.16 Six divisions in all were to be employed – from left to right, 1, 19, 51, 5, 3, 30. The main part of the attack was to commence at 1.30 a.m. on 23 July. On the right, however, the joint action with the small French component would be at an hour which suited the respective corps commanders, Congreve and Fayolle. For reasons that are not at all clear they decided on 3.40 a.m., 2 hours and ten minutes after the main attack.

  The preliminary bombardment began at 7 p.m. on 22 July. Only hours earlier the Fourth Army commander had learned of two disturbing developments. First, at 2 p.m. he was told that the token contribution of the French would not now be ready until some time on the 24th. Given the insignificant nature of French support, Rawlinson was not prepared to alter his main start time. But he did not bring the zero hour for Congreve's XIII Corps into line with his major attack, even though its later hour had no justification except co-operation with the French.17 So 3 and 30 Divisions were, in short order, divorced from the main attack.

  Then, aerial reconnaissance revealed a newly dug trench (later called Intermediate Trench) across the line of advance of the 19 and 51 Divisions. Rawlinson therefore determined that these divisions would attack this objective at 12.30 a.m. and then proceed to attack their main objective, the Switch Line, at 1.30 a.m.18

  In fact Rawlinson should already have been alerted to this. On the 21st the new trench was discovered by patrols of 19 Division but their reports were not passed on to Fourth Army headquarters by the divisional command.19

  So now only 1 and 5 Divisions were to adhere to the original 1.30 a.m. zero hour, 19 and 51 were to go forward at 12.30 a.m., and 3 and 30 at 3.40 a.m.

  The proliferation of start times, however, did not end there: 5 Division also found itself confronting a new German trench line (Wood Lane) between it and its main objective (the Switch Line). It was therefore decided by the divisional command, apparently without reference to the corps or army commanders, that Wood Lane would also be captured in a preliminary operation.20 For reasons that are obscure, this attack would commence not at 12.30 a.m. as for the division on its left, but at 10 p.m. the previous night. And to further compound the obscurity, it was decided that the amended start time would only apply to the left of this division. The other brigade would conform to the start times of the divisions to its right (3 and 30), that is 3.40 a.m.21

  Failures of communication, and unilateral actions by divisional commanders, occasioned yet further variety in the start times of this operation. On the left flank of the attack 1 Division had been told by the Australians in the Reserve Army that they intended to assault Pozières at 12.30 a.m. As 1 Division's advance would take them just to the right of this village they decided to conform to the Australians' start time instead of 1.30 a.m., as ordered by Rawlinson.

  This brought about a bizarre situation. Not one of the Fourth Army divisions was now adhering to the initial start time of 1.30 a.m. On the right the 30, 3, and half of 5 Division would go over at 3.40 a.m., the other half of 5 Division would already have attacked at 10 p.m. the previous night, while on the left the 1, 19, and 51 Divisions would attack at 12.30 a.m., although the synchronicity obtained by 1 Division was accidental.

  However, by another mischance one division would move to the attack at 1.30 a.m. Neither Fourth Army headquarters nor 19 Division had informed 51 Division of the discovery of Intermediate Trench or of the new start time of 12.30 a.m. The 51 Division therefore would advance at 1.30 a.m. as planned, but against an objective of which it was not aware and deprived of support on either flank.

  What we are observing is a process by which an operation intended as a ‘concerted’ major attack degenerated into a series of distinct and uncoordinated minor attacks. All told, the attacking divisions of the Fourth Army had not one but four separate zero hours: 10 p.m. on the 22nd, 12.30 a.m., 1.30 a.m., and 3.40 a.m. on the 23rd. There was no reason to doubt that the first of these attacks would alert the whole German line and so eliminate any possible element of surprise from the assault. Clearly this was reason enough either to rethink the entire operation or anyway to delay it until its various elements could be synchronised – with the additional prospect that the French might also participate. Yet nothing of the kind happened. Rawlinson's ‘concerted’ attack proceeded in a palpably uncoordinated fashion.

  Nor were the shortcomings in the planning of the attack confined to the matter of timing. In most respects the artillery preparations compare very unfavourably with those of 14 July. On that occasion, it has to be said, the task of the artillery had been relatively simple. Its task for the 23 July operation was anything but simple. On the left flank and in the area of Wood Lane the British divisions were attempting to advance into areas where fire could be directed against them from three sides: straight ahead and on both flanks. These flanking positions were so proximate to the forces attempting to advance that it was difficult for the British gunners to engage them without placing their own troops at risk.

  The British artillerymen had a further problem. Intermediate Trench, the Switch Line, and Wood Lane were all concealed behind a reverse slope. The gunners therefore had to rely on aerial observation to ensure accurate registration and this could only occur in fine weather. In the days before the attack the weather was rainy and overcast. Moreover, on the right where there were areas of the German line which could be directly observed by the British, the defences being attacked were part of the old German second line and therefore lavishly supplied with deep dug-outs which could often resist all but a direct hit.

  Furthermore, as noted, the bombardment only commenced on the evening of the 22nd. This gave the British artillerymen just a few hours of daylight in which to subdue the enemy defences. This may be compared to the three days allowed for the bombardment which proceeded the attack on 14 July.

  Given all these adverse factors, it can hardly be deemed remarkable that the operation of 22/23 July failed dismally. Quite apart from Rawlinson's decision to send different units forward at a succession of times, there was no reason for the Germans – given their experiences of 14 July – to be taken by surprise by a night attack. And the inadequacy of the bombardment in most sectors left the enemy's trenches and their occupants intact. Consequently even the first of the attacking divisions, the left of the 5, which went forward at 10
p.m. on the 22nd, found itself up against an enemy alert and unimpaired. These defenders poured a hail of fire into the advancing British. On the left just fifty men from an assaulting battalion entered the enemy's front trench; on the right none got within bombing distance. Faced, as one of the war diaries comments indignantly, ‘with an impossible situation’, all further attacks were cancelled. By 2 a.m. all the survivors had retired to their own line.22

  The next set of divisions to attack were the 1 and 19, two and a half hours later at 12.30 a.m. Even before it had managed to deploy, 1 Division was immediately deluged by shells, machine-gun fire, and rifle bullets from directly ahead and then, as a result of the failure of the British artillery to engage positions in such proximity to its own troops – from the flanks as well. They retired to their own line but were ordered forward again at 1.20 a.m., with similar results. At the end of the day there was nothing to show for over 1,000 casualties.23

  The 19 Division on the right of this débâcle fared no better. They too were heavily shelled and machine-gunned as they left their trenches and were back in their own front line by 4 a.m.24

  Further right, and still unaware of the existence of Intermediate Trench, 51 Division attacked an hour later. They first suffered flanking fire from the unexpected obstacle and then ran into the fire from the unscathed and alerted defenders of High Wood. Any survivors were then confronted by uncut wire and lost their way in the tangled ruins of the wood. They failed even to come within hailing distance of the Switch Line.25

  The defenders of High Wood had of course been alerted by the left brigade of 5 Division which had attacked two and a half hours earlier. The battalions here were met by withering fire from Wood Lane and were soon back in their own trenches.

  To the right of Wood Lane, and 5 hours and 40 minutes after the attack had commenced, the last of the strangely staggered attacks began their advance. Around Longueval and Delville Wood the attack was an immediate failure. In the maze of Delville Wood events bordered on the farcical. First, notwithstanding the delayed start time, the orders for the attack only arrived just before zero hour. Then it was discovered that just one operational map of the area was available. During the approach march in dim light troops soon became lost in the maze of trenches and shattered trees that by this time constituted the remains of the wood. Soon the attack disintegrated, with small groups stumbling around the tree trunks in the dark. The German defenders, untouched by the bombardment, had little difficulty in stopping the attack with machine-gun fire alone. Not a yard of ground was gained.26

  On the far right of the Fourth Army's operations the 30 Division failed in its attack against Guillemont but for rather different reasons. These need to be noted because they were to have important implications for subsequent operations in the Somme campaign. In the sector around Guillemont the British artillery had good observation over the German defences. Consequently their bombardment wrought great damage on the German trench lines.27

  However, in this particular area it no longer proved sufficient to target just the enemy line. For, in response to previous well-directed British bombardments the German machine-gunners had changed their tactics. Rather than remain in trench lines which were inevitably subjected to bombardment they had redeployed in shell holes, well clear of their trenches. As G. C. Wynne points out, this development converted a series of trenches into a ‘zone or defended area, within which the front units moved as the situation demanded’. This change in German tactics meant that the British artillery now had ‘no known and easily located trench line’ on which to direct their fire. Instead they ‘had to batter down a whole area of ground, using an immense quantity of ammunition’ to ensure the destruction of the German defenders.28 The amount of ammunition required and the guns to fire it were not available to the British at this stage of the battle.

  So when Guillemont was assaulted, the British initially made good progress against the thinned-out German defence. Troops soon entered the village and penetrated to its far side. It was at this point that the machine-guns in shell holes on the flanks of the attack opened up. Many troops were prevented by the hail of bullets from pulling back and a company of the 19 Manchesters was never seen again. Soon those troops who could withdraw were back in their own lines. It is clear from their accounts that they had little idea of the cause of either their sudden success or their ultimate failure.29

  On the morning of the 23rd both Haig and Rawlinson recorded the failure of the previous night's attack in meticulous detail.30 Neither pondered the inappropriate nature of the disjointed start times but Rawlinson at least reflected on the paucity of artillery support. In a subsequent attempt to capture Delville Wood and Longueval he ensured that he had the guns to give his troops a decent chance of success. And on this occasion the attack was not to go in until there had been 24 hours of fine weather to allow the aerial spotters to give accurate directions to the guns.31

  To carry out this attack a fresh division (2) was introduced into the line and an enormous amount of artillery assembled. The troops would be supported by the entire artillery of XV and XIII Corps, the 35 Divisional artillery, the guns of the French XX Corps, with some assistance provided by the largest-calibre guns of III Corps.32 In all, 368 guns were to support the attack of a single division.33

  The attack went in on 27 July after a furious bombardment during which 125,000 shells weighing 4.5 million pounds were fired.34 Nothing in the wood and village could survive this storm. The troops pressed forward and within two hours had occupied most of the formidable objectives which had previously defied two weeks of assault.35

  Many German attempts to drive the British from their newly won positions failed and for a time Rawlinson's troops were in sure possession of Longueval and Delville Wood. Nevertheless, their line was still most awkwardly placed. In truth, what the fighting from 15 to 29 July in this area had accomplished was to move forward the sharp angle of the British line from the near side of Delville Wood to the far.

  III

  During this period of the Somme fighting a corps commander was sending home his thoughts on the battle in daily letters to his wife. General Horne, commander of XV Corps which was opposite High Wood and Wood Lane, had, in Somme terms, experienced a reasonable battle. His corps had gained ground on the generally disastrous first day, gone on to capture Mametz Wood, and then taken the second German line on 14 July. Now he found himself unable to make any progress at all. In his letters he reflected on his difficulties. His reflections are a combination of insight and obtuseness but they also reveal a distressing inability to translate any of his insights into action or to impress them upon his chiefs. The extracts from Horne's letters are best read as a block and then subjected to analysis.

  16 July: Yesterday I failed to make any progress as the German has [recovered? ] & I could not get on with-out a regular artillery preparation. I [drew?] my men back from High Wood where they were being too much exposed in order that I might be able to shell it. I thought that we had got the whole of it, but we only had half of it & it is so placed on a slope that the Hun's artillery can see into it and we cannot. The clouds are low ... which makes it difficult for aeroplanes to see well to direct our artillery on to the Hun trenches. He has succeeded in digging a line in front of us [the Switch Line] ... and we can only get the guns put on by aeroplane.

  17 July: The weather is sadly against us thick heavy weather with occasional drizzle, this is all in favour of the Hun, as we cannot get full use out of our aeroplanes.

  18 July: Not fighting today.... There must be pauses in a great battle in order to arrange matters, as you can imagine.

  19 July: The last few overcast days have prevented our air work, and the Hun has been able to place guns and bring up troops out of sight.

  20 July: I attacked High Wood again this morning and we got in all right, but there is a great deal of confusion there now ... once we get to close quarters it is difficult to assist with the guns because the gunners cannot tell where our men are.


  21 July: We got the whole of High Wood yesterday by evening time ... but about 11.30 I was woken up to [the news?] that the Hun had shelled it very heavily & counter-attacked and that we had lost the wood! I could not know whether we had lost the whole or only part so I could not get the guns on & had to wait until morning when I found that we were still hold- ing a portion of it.... The Huns have fallen back to ... very cleverly sited positions where it is not possible or at any rate easy to get observed artillery fire & the approaches are very open.... However we must press on & see what we can do.

  22 July: We had a nice bright day yesterday and our aeroplanes were able to do some work, but today it is overcast & dull again and I particularly wanted it to be bright for we are going for High Wood again tonight. We are in possession of half of it, but we want the rest badly. The German has brought up much more artillery during the last few days. I hope anyway to be able to make a good job of our next attempt, but it is very difficult and I am not ... too certain. However it is [not?] any good fretting. ‘Do the best you can and trust in God’ is the best way, I think.

  23 July: The weather here is dry but overcast all day ... annoying as I cannot get full value out of the aeroplanes – it leaves us in the dark as to what the Hun is doing. Today has been dull & overcast all day. We have got a portion of High Wood but not all of it, and as things are now it is very difficult to get on any further. I puzzle my brains how to do it. We attacked again last night but it was not successful – The Hun has been reinforced to a certain degree and has a strong position.

  24 July: Only one bright day for a long time. It handicaps me because we cannot get the use out of our aeroplanes. Still fighting away but nothing very violent at the moment.... I do not want to give up pressing the Germans as hard as I can. The longer we can go on doing that the better.