by Robin Prior
Meanwhile back at Reserve Army headquarters Gough was also issuing orders. He instructed the Australians to capture the OG lines to the north of the village to remove the threat of counter-attack from that direction. Then he ordered that operations by X Corps and 1 Anzac Corps should be directed northwards to Mouquet Farm, so threatening Thiepval from the rear. As always, the first of these objectives was to be captured immediately.18
The first attempt to take the OG lines need not detain us. It was made in haste and in the dark by tired troops who had extreme difficulty in identifying any of their objectives in the moonscape battlefield.19 In truth the First Australian Division was exhausted. Since 23 July it had suffered 5,283 casualties, most caused by enemy shelling of Pozières after its capture. The men were described as ‘drawn and haggard and so dazed that they seemed to be walking in a dream’.20 They were withdrawn on the 25th and replaced by 2 Australian Division.21
The new operation proved that fresh troops in themselves would make little difference if other aspects of planning went awry. First there was the artillery factor. Certainly, given that the attack was to take place at night, no close support from the guns could be expected. Even so, the expedient adopted to support the night attack defied common sense. The OG lines were to be subjected to an intense bombardment immediately before they were attacked. But before the bombardment commenced the assault troops were to leave their trenches and move to within striking distance of their objective. This movement would take place across open ground and occupy 12 minutes, during which period not one gun would be firing on the German defences.22
Moreover, the OG lines were on a reverse slope, so no direct observation could be obtained of the effect of the bombardment on the German wire and trenches. Patrols did send in reports which indicated that the German wire still represented a formidable obstacle but these seem to have been ignored.23
Under these conditions the results of the attack could have been predicted. As the attacking troops left their trenches and proceeded into no man's land they were mowed down by the as yet unbombarded German machine-gunners.24 Those small groups who did get close enough to the German line to deploy for an attack ran into uncut wire and were killed, wounded, or forced back. One very small group actually captured a section of the first German line, but without support they too were forced to withdraw. In all, 2,000 casualties were suffered and no ground gained.25
At least some important lessons were drawn from this fiasco by the divisional staff. They insisted that before another attack approach trenches must be dug across no man's land to bring the attacking troops within striking distance of their objective. They also decreed that the next attack should take place in day-light to enable the troops to be ‘under cover of intense Artillery bombardment and smoke barrages’ and so that the state of the enemy wire could be clearly seen.26 Above all, they insisted that time be taken so that arrangements could be made thoroughly.
Time was certainly needed. The working parties engaged in digging trenches across no man's land had to carry out this hazardous work at night. Even then,
Work was delayed and hampered each night by severe hostile artillery bombardment and barrages and many casualties were incurred by the working parties – partly while getting up the communication trenches to the site of the work and partly while doing the work. Much of the work too was broken down by the enemy fire and had to be done again.27
The attack had to be postponed again and again while this work was completed.
Gough did not contemplate these delays with equanimity. He wrote to the corps commander (Birdwood) demanding an explanation. In the usual double-speak of the high command he insisted that he did not ‘wish to unduly hurry on any attack’, while at the same time inquiring if the delay could have been avoided ‘by greater energy and foresight on the part of the higher commanders’.28
The reply from Birdwood was surprisingly blunt. He informed the army commander that he had not passed on the note to the divisional commander (Legge) because he did not want him to be ‘disturbed during his operation’ and said that to retain the confidence of senior officers it was ‘essential to give them a fair trial’.29
So the attack was delayed until Legge was ready. It went in at dusk on 4 August and was a complete success. Most of the wire had been cut and the troops followed what seems to have been a creeping barrage into the OG lines. After their newly won positions were consolidated they were replaced by 4 Australian Division. The 2 Division had suffered 6,846 casualties, or half their infantry strength in a fortnight.30
II
Gough had now achieved the first of Haig's objectives – the capture of the high ground to the north of Pozières. Haig's second objective lay ahead – Mouquet Farm just 1,000 yards from Pozières. Gough now defined the purpose of capturing this objective as ‘cutting off Thiepval and getting observation over Courcelette and Grandcourt’.31 Later he amplified this order. The object of operations was to be the capture of Thiepval – by converging attacks by the Anzacs to the north-east and by the newly arrived II Corps to the south-west.32
The operation against Mouquet Farm was fraught with danger, both for the Australian troops and for those of II Corps. The advance they would be making would take place on an exceedingly narrow front. Moreover, the Australians on the right would attempt the advance along the very crest of the ridge. All their troop movements would be easily observable by German forces around Courcelette, who would be able to direct machine-gun and artillery fire against them. In addition the advance would create a salient which could be brought under fire from many directions – from Courcelette on the right, from Thiepval almost directly ahead, from Grandcourt to the north, and even from Martin-puich to the south-east. And most dangerous of all for the attackers, enemy artillery could not only fire in enfilade but directly along the trench lines which led to Mouquet Farm. Of all the tactical nightmares on the Somme this has some claim to be considered the worst.
There is also another issue to consider. It is extremely hard to see how such an operation could contribute to the ‘wise economy in men’ that Haig was trying to practise in order that he should have the ‘last reserves’ at the climax of the battle.33 Moreover, the further Gough's troops advanced, the more remote they would become from the scene of the main advance – which Haig had dictated would take place from Courcelette to Delville Wood. In short, while Gough would be advancing north-west, the remainder of the British armies would be advancing north-east.
So, from the first week in August to the second week of September, the men of the Anzac and II Corps battered their way towards Mouquet Farm. Because of their depressing similarity these operations need not be described in detail. They did however have some noteworthy features. Because of the confined front, all attacks were small in scale. In fact, because the Reserve Army showed the same chronic inability to co-ordinate their operations as the Fourth, the attacks were even smaller in scale than was necessary. So when the Australian troops were attempting to advance, those of II Corps were often quiescent, and when II Corps attacked the Anzacs did not. What this meant was that on most occasions the German artillery could concentrate all their fire on a very small front and as their fire was coming from all directions most attempts to advance were stopped dead. Such was the intensity of the fighting that exhausted divisions had to be relieved frequently, so for some periods no attacks at all could be made, thus allowing the German defence time to recover. To compound all these problems, the advance on Mouquet Farm was taking place at a time when the Fourth Army on their flank were making only sporadic attacks and this gave the Germans the opportunity to direct some of their batteries opposite Rawlin-son's troops on to the hapless men of the Reserve Army.
The Germans possessed yet another advantage. Early in August they had captured some British documents which revealed Mouquet Farm as the objective of their operations.34 They were consequently able to concentrate most of their artillery fire in the area to the south of the farm, dig further trench
lines to impede the enemy advance and thin out their own troops within British artillery range while keeping reserves on hand which could intervene if Gough's troops looked like breaking through.35
All this gave the advance on Mouquet Farm a grim aspect. When Gough's artillery fire was accurate, the British and Anzac forces might seize a trench line. And when casualties had not been excessive they might hold it against counter-attack. If the guns missed their targets, failure was certain.
In the event the guns often did fail to support the infantry. One reason for this can be gleaned from a report made by the officer commanding 1 Anzac Corps' artillery. After a singularly egregious failure by the guns he sent a staff officer forward to the batteries to seek an explanation. The first action this officer took was to check the synchronisation of the watches of adjoining batteries, He found that
in not one case were they right, and the time given to him differed as much as a quarter of an hour. It is useless to expect good results under these circumstances, and it should be impressed on all officers that the greatest care should be taken at all times to get the time accurately, even to seconds, and that at all times any fire which has been ordered for a particular time shall commence to the second at that time.36
To make matters even worse he found that
battery officers have said that they do not always fire exactly at the points ordered.37
Gough's lame response to this remarkable piece of information was that he ‘hoped and believed’ that there was ‘some mistake about this’.38
The flavour of the Mouquet Farm operations can be gauged by the experiences of some units involved. On the night of 12/13 August the 7 East Surreys (12 Division) were ordered to capture a section of the enemy front line. The attack was carried out by just two companies. The left company was brought to a halt by heavy machine-gun fire as they left their trenches. The right company advanced a small distance until machine-gun fire forced the survivors to shelter in some shell holes in no man's land. One of the officers in this group attempted to return to his own lines in order to summon reinforcements. After an hour of wandering around the featureless battlefield he found himself back in the shell hole from where he had started. And this when his own front line had been less than 100 yards away.39
Then there was the experience of the 1/8 Royal Warwickshires (48 Division) on 27 August. They were assembled for the assault around midnight. It was then discovered that there were no scaling ladders to allow them to exit the trench. A ten-hour search for ladders ensued. When some were located it was broad daylight and they were placed in position under the watch of German sentries in their own front line just 100 yards away. Their attack therefore ran into withering machine-gun fire, which was compounded by the fire from their own guns dropping short. Miraculously a few men reached their objective, but failed to recognise it and advanced beyond, only to run into their own barrage a second time. The remnants of the battalion were forced to withdraw. Losses constituted 50 per cent of the battalion's strength.40
If anything conditions were worse on the Australian section of the front because of their exposed position on the very crest of the ridge. On 14 August an ambitious plan was devised by 4 Australian Division to capture Mouquet Farm itself. The battalions which were to carry it out were (from right to left) the 50, 13, and 51. The 50 in particular was in a much reduced condition before the attack was ordered. Two days previously, as it had moved into the line, it had suffered heavy losses from incessant German shelling which fell on all its approach roads to the front. The battalion then took part in a combined operation with British troops which failed with heavy casualties. Another of the battalions earmarked for the operation, the 13th, had also suffered heavy casualties before zero.
The operation to capture Mouquet Farm was due to go in at 10 p.m. on the 14th. But some hours before this there was an indication that all was not well with 50 Battalion. One of the company commanders, Lt Rhodes, sent a message back to brigade headquarters indicating that they were running short of hand grenades. He then added: ‘Have had a hell of a time – enfiladed. Suffering from slight shell-shock.’41 Then at 7.55 p.m. an even more startling message was received from another company of the 50:
We cannot move. We have few tools, few bombs, no water, and the men are badly shaken. At present we are digging a number out .... After consulting the company commanders have decided to remain fast.42
The import of these messages was quite clear – 50 Battalion would not be taking part in the attack. Just as brigade staff were digesting this information, 13 Battalion reported that one of their companies was ‘rattled’ and down to just 38 men (from a nominal 200),43 which suggested that this unit was hardly in optimum shape for an attack either.
Two of the assault battalions had now announced that they were in a seriously depleted state. At this moment the third (51 Battalion), which had been in touch with the CO of 13 Battalion, sent the following message:
Both 13th CO thinks, and it is my genuine (not depressed) opinion that it would be a mistake to press the offensive further locally in this salient. We are heavily shelled from due E right round to N W and the communications are simply awful.... Our artillery are bombarding our own front trenches (heavies!!!).44
So by this time all three of the attacking battalions had revealed themselves as unfit for an assault and one of the three had announced that it would not attack.
Undeterred, brigade headquarters ignored all of this. They deemed the claim that one of the companies of 13 Battalion had been reduced to 38 men ‘ridiculous’ (it was in fact quite true) and sent their staff forward to organise the attack as planned.45 Thus on the morning of the 14th the three hapless battalions were forced over the top. The result was deplorable. The 50 was immediately hit by a German barrage and ‘broke in all directions’, the panic being stemmed only by the (unspecified) action of a number of officers. In short order they were back in their own trenches.46 On the other flank the 51 was detected assembling for the attack by the German defenders in a strongpoint called Fabeck Graben. Withering machine-gun fire opened on the troops as they endeavoured to cross no man's land and soon shouts of ‘retire’ could be heard up and down the line. In the understated words of the Official Historian, ‘there followed much confusion’, during which the survivors of the attack returned to their starting point.47
The centre battalion (13), out of touch with events on either flank, by good fortune advanced through a gap in the German defences past Mouquet Farm and was approaching Fabeck Graben when it became obvious that it had advanced alone. The commander, Colonel Murray, instituted a fighting withdrawal, ‘one of the most skilfully conducted fights in the history of the A.I.F.’, and returned his men to the start line.48 Much was made of this action by Australia's official military historian,but the fact remains that battles are not won by fighting withdrawals, however skilfully conducted. And the melancholy fact is that the three battalions which were in no shape to attack at all suffered some 1,100 casualties for precisely no gain of ground.49 The husks of the three battalions had been reduced to a state of rebellion by the incompetence of their superiors. In truth the operation should never have taken place. But then, as we shall see, that could be said about the whole Mouquet Farm episode.
III
By early September the Australian Corps was exhausted and the Canadians were brought in to complete their task. They too failed. The casualties incurred in attempting the capture of Mouquet Farm can be given with reasonable accuracy:
1 Australian Division 2,650
2 Australian Division 1,300
4 Australian Division 4,650
12 Division 1,450
25 Division 1,700
48 Division 3,650
Canadian Corps 2,800
Total 18,200
If other sundry units are added, the total casualties incurred in attempting to take the farm in the period 7 August to 12 September cannot have been much short of 20,000 – the better part of the infantry strength of two
divisions.
In the plainest sense this terrible toll was taken for no purpose. Some time in September Gough had abandoned the idea of capturing Thiepval by converging attacks and determined to assault it frontally. Exactly when this decision was made, and why, is not revealed by the documents. What can be said with some certainty is that the possession of Mouquet Farm had ceased to be regarded as the key to the capture of Thiepval (which, as it happened, fell before the farm had been taken).
Gough and Haig bear a heavy responsibility for the Mouquet Farm fiasco. Gough drove his troops into a narrowing salient, a circumstance which was bound to give the German artillery the maximum chance to inflict heavy losses. And at the same time he abandoned the idea of using Mouquet Farm as a staging point for the capture of Thiepval, yet persisted in operations as though he had not.
Haig has a wider responsibility. First, he played no co-ordinating role between the actions of the Fourth and Reserve Armies to the point of not seeming to notice how little support Rawlinson's men were providing for Gough. More importantly, while the struggle for Mouquet Farm was taking place, Haig was preparing what he considered to be a war-winning operation with the first tanks in another sector of the Somme front. And as a necessary precondition for success in this endeavour he had decreed back in early August that men and munitions must be conserved in order that he should have the last reserves with which to exploit the victory. Yet at the same time he was allowing Gough to cast away 20,000 of these reserves in an operation that was always tactically dubious and eventually became completely irrelevant.