The Somme

  The redoubts were perhaps even more difficult to subdue. Unlike Mouquet Farm they were some thousand yards beyond the British line. Thus the creeping barrage would have to be followed (and be fired accurately) for a much greater distance. And this generally meant that the progress of the troops would have to be as steady as the barrage (timed at 100 yards every three minutes in this case). Any delay and the troops would lose its protection and be exposed to fire from the redoubts. Moreover, the redoubts were extensive with deep dugouts impervious to the heaviest shells and with warrens of tunnels. So even if a part of the defences fell, a garrison reinforced via these tunnels might mount strong counter-attacks. Further, if the attacking troops got into a redoubt no artillery fire could assist them. The encounter would descend into close combat, a relatively rare phenomenon on the Western Front.

  Thiepval had its own difficulties. Above ground hardly one stone stood on another. Below there were an estimated 144 cellars, any of which could house machine-gunners. A creeping barrage thus might carry an attacking force into the village but the occupants might emerge after the barrage had passed and fire on the assault troops from the rear as they moved on to other objectives.

  What artillery arrangements were made to deal with these difficulties? As with so many battles at this time, the Reserve Army seems merely to have assembled as many guns as possible and hoped that they would prove sufficient, rather than calculating what might be necessary to subdue the German defence. In all they had 570 field guns and 270 howitzers for the operation on a 6,000-yard front. This gave them about the same artillery concentration as the Fourth Army on 15 September. That is, they would have twice the number of shells per yard of trench attacked as on 1 July but less than half that for the successful attack on 14 July.3

  There were some positive aspects to the artillery plan. Those guns in the area of V Corps which were located west of the River Ancre would be able to fire on Thiepval in enfilade, thus enabling the fortress ruin to be attacked from three sides.

  The second aspect was the weight of artillery with which Thiepval was to be deluged – approximately 100,000 shells, 40,000 of them from the heavy guns, an unprecedented weight of attack. Thiepval was also to be drenched with gas just before zero in order to incapacitate some of the dug-out dwellers.4

  The preliminary bombardment commenced on 23 September. On the first day the weather was poor, making ground and aerial observation extremely difficult. After that it improved but autumn mists shrouded much of the low ground around Thiepval for some hours in the mornings and evenings, confining observation to a few hours a day. Nevertheless, from the 24th the spotting planes were able to report considerable destruction in many areas.

  IV

  It is unnecessary to describe every aspect of this battle. Gough's operations from 26 to 30 September really revolved around the capture of Regina Trench in the Canadian sector and the five redoubts in II Corps sector so our narrative will concentrate on these intense struggles.

  The Canadian experience can be briefly told. On the right, away from the strongpoints, the early objectives were taken with moderate losses.5 On the left, units ran into strong enfilade fire from Mouquet Farm, Zollern, and Stuff Redoubts.6 On subsequent days various attempts were made to advance on Regina Trench. All failed, the reverse slope again protecting an objective from British artillery fire. By the 30th, although some ground had been gained, Regina Trench was still securely in German hands.

  Mouquet Farm, the first of the German strongpoints to be encountered, lay in the area of the rightward brigade of 11 Division (34 Brigade). Just before zero a special bombing party from the 9 Lancashire Fusiliers was to rush the farm and block its exits before the main attack went in. This was only partially successful. As the men were picking their way around the rubble heaps in an attempt to locate the exits, a machine-gun opened fire on them from a mound of rubble to the north.7 It was undoubtedly this gun which took such a toll on the Canadian advance on the right and the other assault formations of 11 Division. By late afternoon the 11 Manchesters had been drawn into the fight but several enemy machine-guns were now in operation and causing heavy casualties.8 Two tanks sent forward to help had ditched close by the farm. However, this was turned to advantage. Parties from the 11 Manchesters, the 5 Dorsets, and the 6 East Yorkshire Pioneers dismantled two of the machine-guns from the tanks and opened fire on the German defenders. Under this cover, bombing parties ran forward and threw explosive and smoke grenades down the entrances. At last (5.30 in the afternoon) the garrison, comprising one officer and 55 men, surrendered. No fewer than four battalions (the equivalent of a brigade of troops) had been involved in the five-hour struggle against this tiny force. But at last the farm which had been the target of Australian and Canadian operations for eight weeks fell to the veterans of Suvla Bay.9

  Despite this considerable diversion of strength the main task of the 34 Brigade was the capture of Zollern and then Stuff Redoubt. Zollern was some 750 yards from the British front line and consisted of the usual cluster of allround trench defences and dug-outs. Before zero the divisional commander had received reports that the strongpoint had been ‘obliterated’ by the heavy artillery.10 The troops soon found that this was far from the case. Machine-guns from Zollern opened on them as soon as they left their trench.11 What happened next remains obscure. Men from the 8 Northumberland certainly reached the redoubt. But by this time the barrage had been lost and those detailed to ‘mop up’ the dug-outs of the redoubt were dead,12 and cohesion had been lost. Patrols sent forward to ascertain the position described the ground in front of the redoubt as ‘an empty battlefield’, perhaps the first time that expression had been used.13 What they were observing was to become common in modern war – a battlefield so swept by hostile fire from concealed machine-guns that nothing could move on it. By nightfall in fact there was only one officer and 59 men from the Northumberland clinging to the southern face of Zollern. More battalions were prepared for the assault on the 27th but in the early morning officer patrols found the redoubt empty, evacuated during the night because of the successful advance of 33 Brigade on the left of 34.14 Two redoubts had now fallen to 11 Division.

  Stuff Redoubt was in the original German second line some 500 yards north-west of Zollern. It was, if anything, a more difficult prospect because it was obscured from observation from the British front. At the end of fighting on the 26th the closest troops to it were the remnants of the 34 Brigade close to Zollern. The fall of that strongpoint opened up the possibility of an advance on Stuff but the 34 Brigade was a spent force and the reserve brigade of the division (32) was moved forward.

  The attack was to take place at 3 p.m. on the 27th by two battalions of the brigade. This was later postponed to 4 p.m. to give all units time to assemble but the orders to delay did not reach the 9 West Yorkshire. Perhaps because of the unusual spectacle of an attack by a lone battalion the Germans holding the south face were taken by surprise and the Yorkshires were able to establish a precarious grip on it.15 Then one hour later the other battalion (6 Yorkshire) advanced, this time without any artillery support, as it had been fired at the original start time. This singular phenomenon also caught the Germans unawares and by just after 4 p.m. there were strong units of two battalions holding on to the southern section of Stuff Redoubt.16 The fighting now degenerated into hand-to-hand combat in most confused conditions. Artillery support for an attack on the remainder of Stuff was almost impossible to arrange because the location of the troops was unknown and indeed some were in the underground tunnels of the redoubt. Several attempts to capture the north face of the redoubt were made over the next two days. All failed and by the end of the battle the northern section of Stuff Redoubt remained in German hands.17

  The Schwaben Redoute, October

  Meanwhile the 18 Division had the daunting tasks of capturing Thiepval and the Schwaben Redoubt. Three reinforced battalions were to be used against Thiepval, 10 Essex from the 53 Brigade, and 12 Middlesex and 11 Fusiliers f
rom 54 Brigade.18 The Essex, which were only to capture the eastern tip of Thiepval, had the less difficult task. They advanced close behind the barrage at zero only to find that ‘the enemy's machine guns and snipers had been completely dominated by our artillery’.19 Casualties were ‘negligible’.20 Then the units found themselves under heavy enfilade fire from the north-west of the ruins and were forced to halt.21

  Much thought had been given to the capture of Thiepval by the commander of the brigade, General Shoubridge. Each of the attack battalions was reinforced by a company of ‘moppers-up’ from other units who were to clear the large number of dug-outs known to honeycomb the ruins of the village. A third battalion was placed in close support either to assist the two lead battalions in getting forward or to supply additional parties to clear dug-outs. Two tanks were detailed to supplement the assault.22

  The assault was grim from the start. The trenches and dug-outs in this area were too numerous for the bombardment to have dealt with them all effectively. Nor did the creeping barrage do much to assist except in the initial phase, because progress was far slower than its rate of creep. As the fighting progressed across the ruins the battle developed into an incoherent welter of hand-to-hand combat. Gradually, however, the British advanced. In the centre of Thiepval the artillery had been most effective and within an hour the Middle-sex were approaching the ruins of Thiepval château until checked on the right by extremely deadly fire from that point. At this time the leading tank opportunely arrived and effectively dealt with the enemy's machine-guns around the château.23 It seems that the intervention of this tank was crucial, the brigade narrative being doubtful if the attack could have proceeded beyond that point had not the château defences been eliminated.24

  Even after the ruins of the château were occupied, progress was glacial. Snipers were encountered ‘in every other shell hole’, machine-gun fire was continuous, and every inch of ground had to be fought for. By 3.35 p.m. the north-eastern section of Thiepval was still holding out yet the leading battalion (12 Middlesex) ‘had been practically expended’ and the 11 Fusiliers ‘were all splitup, in dug-out clearing parties and individual fights for points still holding out’.25 Any hope of further advances now lay with the reserve battalion. That unit had in fact already been ordered forward. But it immediately ran into a very heavy barrage and many officers became cut off from their companies. With all recognisable landmarks now obliterated by the shelling, most remaining units lost direction. Just one company (without any officers) arrived at the front to reinforce the hard-pressed troops. As their numbers were insufficient to add any significant weight to the attack, it was decided to consolidate the line already held.26

  Before an advance on the final objective, the Schwaben Redoubt, could be undertaken it was imperative that all of Thiepval be captured. So on the 27th, C Company of the 7 Bedfords, the only unit in position, was ordered to take it. The company narrative takes up the story:

  2nd Lt. Adlam ... went across the open under extremely heavy rifle & machine-gun fire from shell hole to shell hole [and] organised an assaulting party .... He collected a large quantity of German bombs and placing himself at the head of his party, commenced a whirlwind attack on the strong point. He personally out threw the enemy despite the fact they were using only egg bombs, and by the resolution and furiousness of his attack forced the enemy ... [back]. Realising this 2nd Lt. Adlam ... led a final attack on the strongpoint despite the fact that he had been wounded in the leg. This work was extremely successful and 40 dead Germans were carried in the trenches later on – This heavy loss being due to 2nd Lt. Adlam's wonderful throwing.27

  Thus did the remainder of Thiepval fall. Adlam was awarded the VC.

  The attack on Schwaben could now proceed. As Maxse undoubtedly knew from accounts of 1 July, this was not something to be taken lightly. Of all the redoubts built into the German second line, it was without question the most formidable. Underneath the all-round trench defences lay a complex of tunnels, large enough for hospital facilities and a telephone exchange. Never-theless, as Maxse also knew, the Ulstermen had briefly held sections of the redoubt for a short period. More methodical methods might produce a more permanent success.

  Maxse erred on the side of prudence. As dawn broke on the 27th he contemplated the fact that most battalions of the 53 and 54 Brigades were shattered. The price for Thiepval had been high – 1,456 casualties,28 something approaching 40 per cent of the attacking force. On the other hand Shoubridge of the 54 and the redoubtable Higginson of the 53 had done well and were familiar with the local situation. Maxse therefore halted all operations on the 27th and sent Shoubridge and Higginson battalions of the 55 Brigade as reinforcements, with orders to attack on the 28th.

  The attempt by the 18 Division to capture the redoubt would last from 28 September to 6 October, by which time the Germans would still be in possession of the north-western corner. As many as eight battalions from the division (7 Queen's, 8 Suffolk, 8 East Surrey, 8 Norfolk, 7 Bedfords, 5 West Yorkshire, 6 Berkshire, 7 Buffs) took part in the fighting which occurred largely in the trenches, dug-outs, and tunnels of the redoubt. Once more, artillery support could protect the troops until they entered the maze of the redoubt but then was useless. The fighting was terribly confused and often degenerated into hand-to-hand combat which ebbed and flowed around the strongpoints (see map, ‘The Schwaben Redoubt, October 1916’, p. 254). The struggle for points 45 and 65 may serve as illustrations of the type of combat involved.

  Both of these strongpoints were in the double trench system which formed the southern face of the redoubt. They were first attacked from the south-east on the morning of the 28th by the 7 Queen's and the 8 Suffolk. The going was very slippery due to overnight rain and the barrage was soon lost. The troops found themselves under heavy machine-gun fire from point 65. An hour later the fire was still so heavy that both battalions remained pinned down.29 Then Captain Longbourne of the Queen's decided to take matters into his own hands:

  He took a bag of grenades and ran from shell hole to shell hole till he got within 25 yards of this strongpoint in which two machine guns were in action. From a shell hole he bombed the enemy and knocked out one machine gun. His bombs were then exhausted. It then became a duel between him and the Germans manning the second machine gun .... He beckoned to Private Waldron to bring him another bag of bombs. The fight was resumed, Captain Longbourne throwing the bombs and Private Waldron sniping any Germans who showed above the parapet. This went on for 45 minutes whilst the Germans were also throwing bombs but could not hit Captain Longbourne in his shell hole. Sergeant Parker then joined him and assisted by sniping. Finally Captain Longbourne had only two bombs left. He threw them into the enemy and simultaneously charged with Sergt. Parker and Private Waldon. Then these brave men found the crew of the gun had all been killed and they thus captured the strongpoint and subsequently received the surrender of 46 unwounded German prisoners who were hiding in dug-outs close by. Fifteen dead Germans were lying around the two machine-guns.30

  By this means the British forced their way into the southern face of Schwaben Redoubt. And the fall of point 65 soon led to the capture of 45 as the Queen's bombed their way down the connecting trench.31 This was not the end of the affair, however. At 6 a.m. on the 30th the Germans barraged point 45, now held by the 8 East Surrey. According to their account: ‘Our men were attacked from two sides and outranged, especially by the small egg bomb and were driven back, with elements of 7th Queens, about 200 yards.’32

  Later this position was retaken as part of a larger operation to capture the north face of the redoubt.33 But the enemy guns had the range of this point and the British occupying troops were forced to evacuate it under heavy shell fire.34 The point was reoccupied on 2 October and this time remained in British hands.35 By the time the 18 Division was withdrawn it had taken all but the north-western face of Schwaben Redoubt. The cost of its capture was approximately 2,000 men.36

  V

  So by the end of the
Battle of Thiepval Ridge the British had advanced between 1,000 and 2,000 yards on a 6,000-yard front – gaining just over 5 square miles of territory. However, they were not yet securely on the ridge line. Regina Trench and sections of Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts were still in enemy hands. Casualties had also been heavy – 4,500 in 11 Division, 4,000 in 18 Division, and about 4,000 Canadians: a total of 12,500 men. German casualties are unknown but, given the fierce fighting around the redoubts, they cannot have been light.

  The fighting for the Thiepval Ridge does reveal one of the myriad faces of war not so far conspicuous at the Battle of the Somme. More than once we have made the point that without adequate fire support (especially from the artillery) the endeavours of the infantry, however brave they might be, and however advanced their training and sophisticated their battle formations, usually came to naught. That factor is not absent here. Without the protection of the creeping barrage Canadian troops could hardly have got within 1,000 yards of Regina Trench or the British to the vicinity of Mouquet Farm, Zollern, Stuff, and the Schwaben Redoubt. If Thiepval had not been ‘softened up’ (that is, many of the defenders killed, wounded, or stunned) by the bombardment it would have resisted attack as it had on 1 July. But fighting for the redoubts themselves was largely a matter of individual or small group endeavour. A creeping barrage could not penetrate into a tunnel. Neither, except in the most fortunate (for the attackers) of circumstances, could the heavy shells of the preliminary bombardment. In these conditions, once the barrage had delivered the troops to the edge of the redoubts, they were on their own. What is worthy of note is that in this grim, intense, close-quarter fighting, the troops from the British New Army and the Dominions were quite capable of outfighting the German defenders. This scenario runs counter to a popular and tenacious view of the First World War – that man for man the Germans could outfight any other soldiers and that it was only the materiel superiority of the Allies that enabled them to prevail. But what we have just seen shows that given circumstances where training and individual courage could be brought to bear, men who in 1914 had been civilians around Grantham and Colchester outfought the German defenders who in some cases had occupied the defensive redoubts for months or even years.