by Robin Prior
This last point did not, as it had done hitherto, refer to the Somme's supposed capacity to take pressure off Romania – a proposition now beyond belief. It referred to the promised potential of the Somme campaign to accomplish, even now, great things in its own right. As Robertson proclaimed, he agreed with Haig that if they pursued vigorously the offensive on the Western Front, ‘we might achieve something really substantial’. That is, as the Somme campaign ceased to have the potential to achieve anything at all of substance – or, at the very least, anything more of substance – its principal advocates' promises became ever more grandiose, and ever less credible.7
Lloyd George spoke next. He did not even comment on the supposed attractions offered by persistence on the Somme. Instead, he directed himself to the looming Allied disaster in the Balkans. Hindenburg, he argued, was rejecting the policy of seeking victory on the Western Front, where the Germans could well retreat some five to fifteen miles without relinquishing anything of importance. The German commander wanted a great victory in the Balkans. Britain in this struggle had never supported any of the small nations in Eastern Europe, and its prestige would disappear if Romania was wiped out. So: ‘a Conference should be assembled at once’ representing the general staffs of the French, Italian, and British armies, ‘to go thoroughly into the Romanian situation and to devise some measures which would enable our honour to be saved.’8
The War Committee resolved to place on hold Lloyd George's proposed conference, but only while it secured from the British commander at Salonika the answer to three questions: would a vigorous advance from Salonika be of real aid to Romania; how soon could such an advance be accomplished; and – should the Western Allies send to Salonika an extra eight divisions – what would this achieve?
The clear divergence concerning the principal orientation of British strategy evident at this meeting generated – as Asquith related to Hankey in ‘a full and most amusing account’ – ‘a frightful row between Ll. George and Robertson’. The ‘row’ took the form of an ‘acrimonious correspondence’.9
Robertson set the ball rolling.10 He was basing his protest on the fact that, when first appointed CIGS under Kitchener, the latter's reputation had been at a severe discount. So Robertson had been able to secure recognition as the War Committee's sole spokesman on military matters. When Kitchener was drowned and Lloyd George took his place, this arrangement (despite Lloyd George's unblemished reputation) had not officially been abrogated. This gave Robertson his opportunity.
On 11 October, in the letter opening the ‘acrimonious correspondence’, Robertson reminded Lloyd George that a month earlier, responding to the pending German assault on Romania, he had told the War Committee that ‘our best assistance would be the prosecution of the offensive on the Western Front combined with vigorous action by the [existing] Salonika forces.’ The War Committee had agreed. On 9 October he had repeated this advice, stressing that the dispatch of additional forces to Salonika ‘would be unsound and probably useless’. But this time the matter had not gone well. The cause was Lloyd George:
You felt it your duty to disagree with this advice and recommended certain action being taken by the Committee with the object of inducing France and Italy to combine with us in sending to Salonika a reinforcement of some 8 additional divisions.
Worse, the War Committee had directed Robertson to ask Joffre for his opinion ‘on certain points regarding which I had already given my opinion’. That is (in Robertson's view):
(a) A plan of campaign was contemplated entirely contrary to the conclusions of the War Committee a month ago.
(b) My advice was set aside and the advice of a foreign general sought.
This ‘want of confidence in my advice’, Robertson protested, was causing him ‘grave concern’. He expected, in his position as CIGS, to be ‘able to count upon the support of the Secretary of State for War in regard to the military plans which he puts forward for the consideration of the War Committee’. If the War Committee decided to embark on a military operation which he had made it clear he considered unsound, then:
I could not be responsible for conducting this very difficult war under these conditions.
This was a strong rebuke. But if Robertson thought that a powerful protest and implied threat of resignation would bring Lloyd George to heel, he was quickly disillusioned.
Lloyd George replied the same day. He noted that in conversations between them since the 9 October meeting, ‘you made no protest against my taking a line of my own on Romania’. He went on:
Tonight's letter would therefore have caused me some surprise had not a leading newspaper proprietor [obviously Northcliffe] given me the pith of its contents [some] hours before it was dispatched to me ... This great journalist even threatened publication unless I withdrew immediately from the position I had taken up.
With his tongue firmly in his cheek, Lloyd George added:
Of course you could not have authorised such a breach of confidence & discipline. But unfortunately this kind of thing is of frequent occurrence in the service & must be stopped in the best interests of the Army ... this state of things is an outrage on all the best traditions of the service.
There were, Lloyd George went on, two points that must be settled immediately. ‘One is the point of discipline I have raised. The present position is intolerable.’ The other was the matter Robertson had raised. He did not doubt Robertson's ‘supreme responsibility in all matters affecting strategy & the direction of military operations – subject of course to the War Council [i.e. War Committee]’. But he questioned whether this meant that, as War Secretary, he himself had only the right to ‘choose between the position of a dummy or a pure advocate of all opinions expressed by my military advisers’ – not the right to express an independent view on the war.
I am perhaps overanxious that our prestige and honour should be saved in the East ... I know what will be said here if after bringing Roumania to aid us we look on whilst she is being butchered before our eyes without taking the most serious risks to rescue her.
Lloyd George closed with the conventional expression of admiration for Robertson's ‘great gifts’ and of his desire to co-operate with him, but then produced the sting in the tail:
You must not ask me to play the part of a mere dummy. I am not in the least suited for the part.
This sharp exchange would not greatly affect the course of events. As October proceeded, Lloyd George became ever more dismayed at the impending conquest of Romania: ‘the biggest blow of the war’ and an event which, by handing to Germany the Romanian harvest and oilfields, would ‘probably prolong the war for another two years’. But he was aware that nothing could be done. By the time any reinforcements could get there, he conceded, the Romanians would already have made peace. Had extra British and French divisions been dispatched two months ago (i.e. at the time he had been seized by his ‘Servian fit’), Lloyd George claimed on 24 October, they would have had a real influence, but not now.11
What makes these matters of note, especially in terms of outcome on the battlefield, was not the issue that generated so powerful a dispute. It was the issue which the War Committee – including Lloyd George – chose to disregard so that it could get on with agonising about the Balkans.
The 9 October meeting, it will be recalled, began with Robertson presenting, and supporting, a document by Haig pleading for the continuance of the campaign on the Somme. Haig was not, be it noted, commenting on possible action at Salonika (which, anyway, was strictly not his business). Nor was he discussing the relative merits of action on the Somme as against action in the Balkans. He was expounding the considerable (if notably unspecified) array of beneficial results which, even this late in the year, would spring from a continued British offensive in France: ‘very far reaching success ... in the near future’ ‘affording full compensation for all that had been done to attain it’.12
So improbable, it may be speculated, did the War Committee find these flights of fancy
that it simply disregarded them. The conclusions recorded for its meeting of 9 October make interesting reading, but principally for what is not there. An extensive account is given of the decisions taken concerning the crisis in the Balkans. But regarding proposed events on the Western Front, all that is offered is evasion: namely a statement that Haig had sent a document urging the continuation of the Somme offensive ‘without intermission’. This was in no sense a ‘conclusion’: merely a repetition of something already contained in the body of the minutes.
The silence of the War Committee on this matter amounted, however bizarrely, to large action on its part – much larger, in terms of consequences, than anything which resulted from the protracted wranglings about Salonika and Romania. The British military command, with winter fast approaching, and with no justification for its foreshadowed action apart from unargued forecasting of improbable achievements, was proposing to embark upon several further weeks of life-consuming endeavours on the Somme. It might be assumed that such operations could only proceed after the War Committee, with due consideration, accepted the promises and gave its authorisation. If it did not accept the promises, it would presumably withhold authorisation.
Nothing of the sort proved to be the case.
Haig made his bid for authorisation. The War Committee thought so little of his promises that it did not care even to discuss them. So no authorisation was given. Yet the operations went ahead anyway, and the War Committee made no objection. Clearly, this was what it had expected to happen. Long ago, when the sun was shining and hopes were high, it had endorsed the proposal to launch a great attack on the Somme. Now, with hopes vanished and the sun well and truly set, its endorsement remained and it chose not to comment.
This exercise in passing by on the other side could not fail to have consequences. The War Committee, by saying nothing in response to Haig's message, had done a momentous thing. It had opened the way to the dismal last weeks of the Somme campaign.
26 The Political Battle: Beaumont Hamel, 13–19 November
I
When we last left the Reserve Army, Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts were still partially in German hands and a third attempt to capture Regina Trench by the Canadians had failed. While this was happening Haig and Gough had decided on a major operation north of the Ancre to capture Beaumont Hamel. In the meantime, however, to assist that operation by obtaining observation over the Ancre on the right of the attack, it was decided that II Corps should attack south of the river. The purpose was to seize the high ground, the path to which was blocked by the German hold on Schwaben, Stuff, and Regina.
Stuff Redoubt was easily captured. On 9 October a battalion from 25 Division following close behind a creeping barrage drove the Germans from its north face.1 But in one aspect the result was disappointing. The redoubt gave no observation in the direction of Beaumont Hamel. To obtain that an area just to the north of the redoubt, known as the Mounds, would have to be captured.2 Another operation was prepared.
The Schwaben Redoubt proved more formidable and the Reserve Army planning methods left much to be desired. At the same time that the attack on Stuff Redoubt was being mounted, the 39 Division attacked Schwaben. But it did so with just three companies, with no preliminary bombardment and at night so there was no creeping bbarrage. The results were predictable. The alert defenders cut down most of the companies in no man's land and the few who managed to penetrate the north face of the redoubt were soon driven out by counter-attack. The brigade commander was moved to point out the inadequacies of the plan – no bombardment of the redoubt in order to destroy the dug-outs, no creeping barrage, no weight in the attack.3
On this occasion his strictures received attention. On the 14th, after a two-day bombardment, three battalions of 118 Brigade attacked Schwaben behind a creeping barrage. Even then the results hung in the balance. The wire had not been cut in all places, enemy shelling was heavy, and some troops lost direction.4 However, along most of the front the troops stuck close to the creeping barrage and moved into the German line before the enemy had fully realised that an assault was imminent.5 So at last the Schwaben Redoubt fell to the British. And while this was happening the 25 Division captured the Mounds.6 Observation to the immediate right of the great attack had been secured.
Beaumont Hamel, 13–19 November
Regina Trench remained. This obstacle, awkwardly sited on the reverse slope of the heights above the Ancre, had resisted almost constant attack since 26 September. In this operation too the Reserve Army planners had absorbed some valuable lessons. In particular there would be no narrow-front, small-scale attack. Regina Trench (and its extension to the west, Stuff Trench) would be assailed by four divisions (39, 25, 18, 4 Canadian). The attack went in at 12.06 a.m. At 12.35 a.m. it was over, all objectives having been captured. The 25 Division report admirably summarises the reasons for success along the entire front:
(a) very careful previous preparation;
(b) the fact that the battalions engaged were kept comparatively fresh in spite of bad weather and much work;
(c) the excellent artillery preparation which had evidently demoralised the enemy greatly;
(d) the complete surprise effected. In this connection...[it] completely covered the assembly of our troops;
(e) the confidence with which our men advanced close up to the artillery barrage, and the excellence of the barrage;
(f) the feeble German counter artillery work.7
So now, with the Ancre heights in his hands, Gough could finally contemplate the northern operation first suggested by Haig some two months before.
II
It will be recalled that as a part of the great battle of 15 September, Haig intended the Reserve Army to sweep north to cover the inward flank of the Fourth Army as it advanced on Cambrai–Arras. Since then much had changed. The advance had not occurred and operations in October had become bogged down. Yet the idea of an advance by Gough's army had not been abandoned, merely scaled down.
The first of these less ambitious plans reached Gough on 29 September. The Reserve Army, in combination with the Fourth Army on its right, was to launch a two-pronged attack. From Thiepval it would advance northward to a line Loupart Wood–Irles–Miraumont. At the same time it would advance eastward, capture Beaumont Hamel and also advance on Miraumont, attempting to cut off the German forces retreating in front of the British forces advancing from Thiepval. Simultaneously, the Third Army would capture Gommecourt.
If this was less ambitious than Haig's plan before 15 September, it was still ambitious enough. It was proposing a five mile advance by the Reserve Army which if successful would capture in one operation more ground than it had accomplished in three months of campaigning. In the event, of course, this plan had to be abandoned because of the repeated failure of Gough's men to secure the desired start line of the Ancre heights.
The almost continual rainfall in the first two weeks of October soon forced a second reappraisal. Gough cancelled existing orders and limited his converging attack to the line Pys–Irles.8 Optimistically, 45 tanks were assigned to the operation.9
But despite three more days of continuous rain and after watching the total failure of Rawlinson's effort on 18 October, Haig began to slip back into his old ways. ‘Success,’ he told Gough, ‘will be exploited at once in an easterly and north-easterly direction, under the orders of G.O.C. Reserve Army to such extent as in his judgement the forces at his disposal renders possible.’10
Continuing bad weather and Gough's need to capture the Ancre Heights put the northern operation on hold. But then the relatively easy victory of 21 October quickly revived optimism at Reserve Army headquarters. Gough now announced that after he had captured the line Pys–Irles, he would push on to Miraumont and then unleash the cavalry to secure the high ground between Loupart Wood and Achiet-le-Petit. A follow-up formation of infantry would then secure the final objective some two miles to the north-east of this position.11
In the rainy days that followed
, confidence among the command perversely increased. On the 24th Haig informed Gough that if there was an initial success he would place a second cavalry division at his disposal and a third if more successes followed that.12
All this was completely divorced from reality. Conditions at the front were so bad that even minor infantry operations were having to be cancelled because of the bog. The idea of three divisions of cavalry (about 18,000 horses) operating in such mud beggars imagination. Yet that is exactly what Haig and Gough were contemplating.
Nevertheless, the rain which had been continuous from 24 October to 3 November did impose some more cautious appraisals on the British command.13 The Fifth Army (as the Reserve Army had become on 1 November) was now authorised to postpone any operation until the weather improved.14 In any case the attack was now only to be ‘limited’, the final objectives being St-Pierre Divion, Beaucourt, and Serre.15
There the matter rested until 8 November.
Then Gough received a surprise visit from Kiggell, Haig's Chief of Staff. So startling was the information conveyed to the Fifth Army Commander, and so potentially dangerous to his command were its consequences, that Gough took the precaution of having a full record of this and subsequent visits made for his protection. In part Kiggell said the following:
He explained that there was to be a conference of the Allied Commanders on the 15th, and that the British position would be somewhat strengthened if it should be possible for the Fifth Army to win some success before that date. There was no desire to pressure Gough into an action where the prospect of success was not sufficiently good to justify the risk, but on the other hand a tactical success would very probably have far reaching results.16
This was placing Gough in an uncomfortable situation. If an operation would strengthen Haig's position at an inter-Allied conference, and even a tactical success would have ‘far-reaching’ results, the claim that the command did not wish to pressure Gough into action was spurious. He had received an offer that no army commander could refuse.