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later, however, aft er incessant rains and the arrival of the armyworm, Metzner
saw the inherent risk with sharecropping. Many hands broke their contracts
and hired themselves out for wages to others. Nonetheless, he “tried . . . to make
them understand the foolishness of such a proceeding [working for wages].”
Joshua L. Randall argued “the more intelligent” contracted for shares. L. S.
Barnes at Crockett reported those who contracted for shares “are doing a fi ne
thing for themselves and their employers.”
Others encouraged monthly wages instead. In early 1867 A. H. Mayer observed
hands working for a share of the crop, “although (from experience) I have tried
to induce them to work for monthly wages.” According to him, those contract-
ing for wages “have done so at a fair rate and [I] am satisfi ed they will succeed
better.” Furthermore, if the crop failed, they would not be nearly as aff ected as
those who had contracted for a share of the crop. Lemuel K. Morton found it
was more diffi
cult to secure the freedpeople’s payment with shares. He recorded
fewer complaints “about the planters failing to pay their hands where they are
hired by the month, but some of them seame [sic] enclined [sic] to take the
advantage where they are working for part of the crop.” A. G. Malloy at Mar-
shall likewise argued the “system of working for a portion of the crop is not
advantageous” and “recommended them to work only for money wages.” With
little consensus about what system of payment to encourage, the Bureau’s
responsibility for the institution in Texas appears peripheral at best. It appears
to have developed because of the planters’ and freedpeople’s preferences rather
than from any specifi c policy handed down. By the time headquarters in
Galveston ordered subordinates to “encourage the renting and working of land,
for a share of the products” in early 1867, sharecropping was already by the
planters and hands for some time.
In Texas, agents were not the main reason for the development of sharecrop-
ping. Th
ey lacked unanimity as to which system was better for the freedpeople.
Similar to the situations in Florida and Louisiana, an agent’s personal preference
dictated whether he pushed wages or shares. Th
ey neither developed nor imposed
it, leaving it “to the option of the parties whether said contract be for a portion of
the crops or stipulated wages per month or year.” As it became the preferable
system in Texas, only then did the Bureau begin to encourage sharecropping.
Bureau offi
cials believed sharecropping had several benefi ts: fi rst, it was easier to
ensure the crop portion compared to monthly wages; second, it was hoped hands
would be more diligent and industrious, since their production now directly
aff ected their portion of the crop; and fi nally, since parties shared the risk of crop
failure, it was hoped contract violations would diminish.
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With the rise of sharecropping, some later historians asked how such a sys-
tem that “economically retarded” the South and “circumscribed” the freed-
people’s opportunities could develop. A number placed blame on the Freedmen’s
Bureau. Th
ese critics overlook the main aspect in sharecropping’s development:
neither employer nor employee were passive participants. Under instructions
from superiors, agents were to instruct the freedpeople and planters to the ben-
efi ts of the free- market system, but not to decide what they did with it. Head-
quarters, in fact, warned not to interfere in what they agreed to, but rather only
to ensure that both parties understood their obligations and the proceedings
were honest and fair. Th
e criticism for implanting sharecropping accompanies
the charge that subassistant commissioners also colluded with the planters to
bind the former bondsmen to the land. In a few cases this charge is valid, but as
a whole, it is not supported by the evidence. Th
e debate between revisionists and
post- revisionists, for many historians, has become history. But an examination
using several tenets from the school of thought can be quite useful and relevant,
if the post- revisionist theoretical framework is not. Criticism of agents for harm
against the freepeople continues (simply from diff erent angles and for diff erent
reasons). Highlighting the approach to claims of impropriety helps to under-
mine any such generalized indictments of the agency and its personnel. A. P.
Delano, Albert A. Metzner, J. Albert Saylor, Mahlon E. Davis, James A. Hogue,
Isaac Johnson, William H. Horton, Charles P. Russell, Alex B. Coggeshall, and
a few others were all accused, at one time or another, of being tools of the planter
elite. Some of these accusations proved accurate. Others did not. To be sure,
most accusations proved false. Only fi ve men were dismissed for abuse or collu-
sion: 5 out of 195 agents whose departure could be determined, or 2.5 percent.
White Unionists and freedpeople realized the agency’s sensitivity to such claims
and never hesitated to inform about collusion. Planters realized headquarters’
attitude about such cooperation, even using the allegation in hopes of ridding
themselves of eff ective, or what they called “troublesome,” agents.
For example, in late 1867 a few whites and several freedpersons accused
Albert A. Metzner of collusion in San Augustine. Metzner denied the allega-
tion, claiming it to be simply false and in a way “fl attering.” “I, almost a stranger,
should in so short a time be enabled to exercise such an infl uence as therein
stated,” he wrote, “and I am sure it will be a matter of astonishment to you, it is
simply ridiculous.” He admitted “in one or more instances” that he had ruled
against freedmen, “but it was because the fraud attempted to be practised [sic]
against the white man, was palpable and apparent.” He reminded superiors he
never compromised principle or character in the discharge of his duties, and “I
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The Bureau’s Highwater Mark
fl atter myself that I have by so doing, been [able] to accomplish more in execut-
ing the Orders of the Department than if I had held myself aloof from all
friendly and social intercourse with the [white] Community.” Metzner’s defense,
his job performance, several credible testimonials to the inaccuracy of the
charges, and the fact that the main accuser hoped to remove him in order to fi ll
his position all convinced superiors of the baseless charges. But months later, in
the summer of 1868, headquarters sent an inspector to investigate other charges,
like intemperance, which led to his remov
al from offi
ce.
Th
e drive to oust ineff ective, ineffi
cient, and detrimental agents frustrated
some. A few, in fact, were quite off ended. Consider the case of Mahlon E. Davis,
Samuel A. Craig’s successor at Brenham, who was accused of neglect in early
1867. William Howard, a freedman, asked the agent to protect his portion of the
cotton. Davis informed him he would do this, for it was his duty, but it would
only be done aft er the freedman fulfi lled his contractual obligations. Rather
than do this, Howard took “the whole of it and sold it,” which resulted in his
arrest by local authorities for theft of his employer’s portion of the cotton. Upon
his arrest, Howard contacted Daniel Leonidas McGary, the “noted Rebel [edi-
tor] . . . who does not hesitate to denounce the action of the U.S. Government
and the Bureau especially.” McGary, who Davis suspected to be the driving
force behind Howard’s actions and words, instructed the freedman to “report
the case to the Asst. Commissioner” and accuse the agent of theft of some of his
belongings, including his pistol, cart, and oxen.
Superiors wanted an explanation from Davis concerning accusations of
“neglecting his duties.” He was quite off ended by the rather insulting and accu-
satorial tone of the letter. Aft er giving his side of the story, which included many
things Howard failed to mention, Davis pointed out that according to the plain-
tiff ’s “statement the Bureau seems to have taken but little part in his, and the
other Freedpeoples [sic] troubles.” He continued:
Allow me to inform you that this offi
ce is situated in one of the most wealthy
counties in the state, that there are more Planters & more Freedpeople
employed than in any other. Also that I have devoted all my time night and
as well as day to the interest of the Freedpeople in my Dist. that I have worked
faithfully and I believe acted justly and that I do not think proper Justice is
done me, when a report like the one which called for this report—a report
coming from a man who devoted all his time to making trouble for Capt.
Craig when he was Agt. here & whom Capt. Craig was compelled to confi ne
in Jail is given credence to.
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Davis was eventually exonerated. He remained at Brenham for a short while
aft er the incident before being reassigned to Wharton County. Th
ere he had no
further problems until he left the agency in April 1867. In early summer 1868,
however, Davis returned to Bureau service in Harris County and remained
there until the organization ceased operations in late 1868.
Most certainly, accusations against some were clearly warranted. Consider
the examples of James H. Hogue and A. P. Delano. “Scalawag” agent James H.
Hogue shirked his responsibilities in Livingston. Th
e commander at the post,
Captain W. H. Redman, informed headquarters that he (Hogue) rarely called
upon him for assistance. Th
is the captain thought quite unusual. Captain Red-
man, who had doubts about civilian Bureau agents, further described how Hogue
dealt with the freedpeople’s complaints. Upon a complaint, he would allegedly
write a note to the planter urging the necessity to settle with his hands and
would state “to the employer that if the matter comes before him again that he
will refer it to [Bureau headquarters] for settlement.” Th
is, according to the post
commander, “answers the purpose intended.” Th
rough a ruse that involved the
“employer[’]s translation” of Hogue’s note and the freedpeople who believed the
agent had protected them, some “very persuaded” hands had entered “with a
settlement at the terms of the employer.” Captain Redman concluded that “an
understanding” between the agent and the planters existed “to use every means”
to keep the former masters in control. One white Unionist compared Hogue’s
collusion to a monster that had been slain. “Slavery is dead,” the Unionist
lamented, “but the tail of the dambed [sic] monster still moves.” Within a few
months, Hogue had been relieved.
While at Falls County in November 1866, A. P. Delano made the “condition
of the freedpeople worse than even slavery.” To please the planters, he made the
emancipated work “like dogs.” If they resisted, he hanged them by their thumbs
or threatened them with a loaded weapon. It was little wonder that planters in
the county expressed in a letter to Bureau offi
cials their satisfaction with “their”
Bureau agent. To ensure that Delano was doing his job, superiors sent an inspec-
tor to Falls County. What he found he likened to a “hungry wolf” and “a lamb.”
“All the diff erence between the condition of the freedpeople of Falls now and in
the time of slavery,” he concluded, “is that the County has 3 Overseers [Delano
had two co- conspirators] instead of one to each plantation.” Defending his per-
formance, Delano declared he had the “acknowledgement of the Freedmen as
their true friend and adviser,” and noted they “thought me rather hard,” but
with “intentions [of] good and meant them no harm.” Regardless, Delano was
relieved from service. Such actions show prompt investigation by superiors (and
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The Bureau’s Highwater Mark
dismissal if substantiated) whenever serious complaints developed against
personnel.
Th
e freedmen’s education and moral uplift were all ancillary to the agency’s
primary mission: the transition from slavery to free labor. Th
is mission, already
underway for a year, still had to work out many of the initial kinks. White vio-
lence, the ignorance of free labor, idleness, and many other things still bedeviled
those in the fi eld. Agents apprized superiors about problems caused by freed-
women leaving the fi elds for housework, while others experienced diffi
culties
with the crop’s division, settlement of accounts, and idleness. Not all, though,
had complaints, as they reported satisfactory labor conditions. Kiddoo was
concerned about the state’s labor situation, especially as harvest and contract
time approached. Before he acted, he needed specifi city, instead of a collection
of anecdotes. He ordered William H. Sinclair, the agency’s “eyes and ears” in
Texas, on an inspection tour. A natural staff offi
cer, Sinclair held nearly every
Bureau position during his time in Texas. Perhaps historian William L. Richter
overstates Sinclair’s infl uence as the agency’s “real head” in Texas. But his
importance cannot be denied. In late 1866 Kiddoo sent him throughout Central
Texas, the upper Brazos River Counties, and parts of south Texas. Greatly dis-
mayed by what he found, Sinclair noticed many still ignorant about their
responsibilities and authority. Th
is, of course, was because of the lack of neces-
sary orders and regulations from headquarters. “Th
is is partly owing to the fact
that agents . . . have very little to guide them in the performance of their duties,”
he believed. “It requires a man of no small amount of talent and a good supply
of common sense to make a good agent.” Sinclair criticized the agency’s reli-
ance on “scalawags.” He suspected they shared the Rebels’ racial attitudes. In
addition, he noted how a few men had entered the cotton business at the same
time they were Bureau agents, something “not at all advantageous to the public
interest. ”
Aft er his tour, which gave him “a good insight into the workings of the
Bureau,” Sinclair recommended improvements. He suggested contracts no lon-
ger be drawn in a way that assumed all parties understood it. Sinclair noticed
the “indefi nite manner in which they are gotten up” and “too many things
which should be in are left out or said to be understood.” Th
ey oft en lacked
specifi cs, like the number of workdays and hours, the amount of rations pro-
vided by employers, or the payment (specie or paper). Bureau agents, Sinclair
warned, “cannot be too careful in having the contracts fully understood.”
Unnecessary disputes arose when planters attempted to sell the crop, only to
have their hands complain about being swindled. “By far,” he believed, “the best
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way is to give them [freedmen] their share of the crop and let them dispose of it
as they choose.” In short, printed contracts were needed with “the obligations of
both parties.” Sinclair further recommended, and offi
cials agreed a short time
later, agents send monthly reports detailing their work and the conditions in
their subdistrict.
With his recommendations, Sinclair placed responsibility for the problems
on headquarters. Kiddoo, with the contracting season soon approaching,
implemented all the recommendations: Circular No. 25 (and a subsequent cir-
cular letter) reiterated the need for diligence in observing contracts. Whether
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