Data Versus Democracy

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Data Versus Democracy Page 12

by Kris Shaffer


  Va.—were just a forwarded email away from Bannon and others who worked

  at the highest levels of the Trump White House.

  More important for our considerations, though, is that the tactics of

  GamerGate continued into the alt-right. In an article for Politico, “World War

  Meme,” Ben Schreckinger writes about how the culture of 4chan and the

  tactics of GamerGate made their way into the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 50

  In fact, in many ways, we can see Hillary Clinton as simply the highest profile

  GamerGate victim.

  48Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, “Why Steve Bannon Wants You to Believe in the

  Deep State,” Politico Magazine, published March 21, 2017, www.politico.com/magazine/

  story/2017/03/steve-bannon-deep-state-214935.

  49“Alt-White: How the Breitbart Machine Laundered Racist Hate.”

  50“World War Meme.”

  Data versus Democracy

  63

  Schreckinger writes that “the white nationalist alt-right was forged in the

  crucible of 4chan,” a community that was “preoccupied with gender politics.”

  Some 4chan members saw themselves at war with the left. Others saw

  electing someone like Donald Trump to the presidency as a massive prank, or

  “cosmic joke.” For the lulz, indeed.

  Just like GamerGate, these 4chan vets used 4chan’s “/pol/” board (short for

  “politically incorrect”) as a “staging ground.” Like in GamerGate, their fluency

  with a platform that was originally an image board and which requires constant

  engagement to keep a thread from getting deleted meant that they knew a

  thing or two about creating and propagating viral media. They used this to

  their advantage.

  Much of what was workshopped in 4chan was seeded or market tested on

  Reddit. Even in most of the less savory subreddits, users tend to be more

  mainstream than those on 4chan. The cream of the crop on 4chan often

  crossed over to Reddit, where the system of up- and downvotes helped filter

  for the most viral-ready content. (Though Schreckinger claims that alt-righters

  “juiced the rules” to promote some of their content, anyway. 51)

  The content that proved the most successful on 4chan and Reddit—the most

  accessible to “normies”—was then seeded on Twitter and Facebook, where

  it was easy for them to spin up the same kinds of automated (bot) and

  sockpuppet accounts that they did during GamerGate.

  But there was one more wrinkle. The alt-right wasn’t entirely a grassroots

  movement of like-minded individuals who found each other and organized

  online. There were also well-funded political operatives who had observed

  the power of this community during GamerGate and were willing to put

  them to work in electoral politics. According to Schreckinger, early on in

  the election, the Trump campaign was monitoring Reddit, in particular one

  subreddit named The_Donald. Schreckinger describes The_Donald as “a

  conduit between 4chan and the mainstream web,” and numerous memes

  and videos that originated on 4chan made it through The_Donald into the

  mainstream—including some that were shared by Trump campaign staffers

  and even Donald Trump himself. And this conduit was allegedly the

  strongest during the time that Steve Bannon was in charge of Trump’s

  campaign.

  51Ibid.

  64

  Chapter 4 | Domestic Disturbance

  The Mob Rules -or- Who Decides What Stories

  Get Told? [redux]

  Ultimately, we’ll never know the full impact that social platforms had on

  these domestic U.S. social issues in 2014 and beyond. We won’t know how

  many lives were saved (or lost) by the increased public awareness and

  mobilization around police violence and racial discord. We’ll never know

  how the lives of the victims of GamerGate would have been different if the

  social web hadn’t provided their attackers the platforms for finding each

  other and microtargeting their messages of hate and violence. We’ll never

  know how many votes were changed or suppressed by influence operations

  leading up to the 2016 election.

  Of course, there are some things we do know. We know that police violence

  and racial tension did not begin, or end, in Ferguson. We know that

  prominent women—especially those who rock the boat or speak out about

  injustices—have always been targeted more than men in the same position,

  especially in the world of tech. We know that the influence operations

  perpetrated by alt-right meme warriors (as well as some on the left, and—

  as we’ll explore in the next chapter—foreign agents seeking to interfere in

  U.S. politics) changed the tone of the election and influenced the topics we

  were debating.

  And we know that social media played a significant role in shaping how all of

  these events turned out. As DeRay McKesson said, those of us outside the St.

  Louis area might not have ever known about Ferguson—let alone joined in or

  raised our collective voices—were it not for Twitter. On the other hand, the

  same openness that allowed activists to organize in Ferguson allowed attackers

  to organize and perpetrate their attacks against women and their allies during

  GamerGate. But from yet another perspective, that openness is what gave

  voice, reach, and new business opportunity to independent game developers

  like Quinn and Wu and critics like Sarkeesian. And for better or for worse,

  the affordances of forums like 4chan, with its disappearing threads, and Reddit,

  with its upvotes and downvotes, honed the skills of those who sought to

  create and propagate viral media beyond those platforms.

  To some extent, we will always have to take the good with the bad when it

  comes to technology. But that doesn’t mean that the tools—or the people

  and companies who create and maintain those tools—are neutral. And it

  certainly doesn’t mean that they don’t bear at least some responsibility for

  what happens on their platforms, even if in some cases that responsibility is

  moral and ethical rather than explicitly legal.

  When a judge tells an independent online game developer to stay off the

  internet and find a new career if she wants to avoid harassment and abuse,

  that’s akin to telling someone to avoid the mall or the grocery store.

  Data versus Democracy

  65

  The internet is a core part of our lives in the twenty-first century, and social

  media is a “mediated public space,” where those who own and run the

  “private” platforms have a responsibility to at least do their due diligence

  toward providing safe access for those they invite to make use of those

  platforms. But we don’t need to wait for them to do it. Like during many

  technological revolutions in past centuries, it will take the will and the work

  of the people at large to shape the evolution of these “mediated public

  spaces” and to advocate for legislative change where necessary to ensure

  fair, safe access for all.

  To that end, I leave you with two inspirational quotes from two prominent

  women in tech.

  People believe they are powerless and alone, but the only thing

  that keeps people powerless and alone is that
same belief. People,

  working together, are immensely and terrifyingly powerful.

  —Quinn Norton52

  Although what was done to me wavs heinous, those responsible

  for obliterating my old life have overlooked one important thing:

  I’m better at games than they are.

  —Zoë Quinn53

  Summary

  In this chapter, we explored three distinct but related historical events where

  the affordances and limitations of social media platforms had a significant

  impact on the way those events played out: the protests following the shooting

  of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the GamerGate attacks on prominent

  women in the video game industry, and the mobilization of the alt-right during

  the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In each case, the affordances of platforms

  like Twitter, 4chan, and Reddit—combined with the ideology and customs of

  the communities that inhabited them—led to particular kinds of novel

  “operations.” Social media is a powerful tool for community organizing and for

  recruiting new members to a movement. But it is not always used for social

  good, and the limitations of these platforms and the online space in general

  52Quinn Norton, “Everything Is Broken,” The Message, published May 20, 2014, https://

  medium.com/message/everything-is-broken-81e5f33a24e1.

  53 Crash Override, p. 7

  66

  Chapter 4 | Domestic Disturbance

  can pose challenges to law enforcement, and on the grander scale to legislators

  and platform administrators, as they seek to balance the rights of free speech

  and free assembly with the rights to life, liberty, and safety.

  In many ways, 2014 was a beginning, or at least a point of major acceleration,

  when it comes to social media’s impact on society. And it wasn’t just in the

  United States. In the chapters that follow, we’ll unpack operations outside

  those borders, including operations that cross borders. Operations that

  involve far more than serendipitous community organizing.

  C H A P T E R

  5

  Democracy

  Hacked, Part 1

  Russian Interference and the New Cold War

  Social media empowers communities of activists, as well as groups of

  extremists and abusers, to discover each other and coordinate their activity.

  The same tools can be used to spread political messages, both by legitimate

  communities and by disingenuous actors—even foreign states seeking to

  interfere in the electoral process of another country. That’s the environment

  we find ourselves in today, as the United States, NATO, the EU, and their

  (potential) allies are under attack from a Russian campaign of information

  warfare. In this chapter, we’ll unpack some of their operations, culminating in

  the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and conclude with a view toward future

  threats and defenses.

  What Happened?

  November 8, 2018. Hundreds of millions of Americans—and many others

  throughout the world—watched the results of the U.S. presidential election

  roll in. The odds and the polls all pointed to a Hillary Clinton victory. The

  question was simply how big a victory, and whether her party would control

  Congress as well.

  © Kris Shaffer 2019

  K. Shaf fer, Data versus Democracy,

  https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4842-4540-8_5

  68

  Chapter 5 | Democracy Hacked, Part 1

  Of course, that’s not how things turned out. Even though Clinton won the

  popular vote, Donald Trump won victories in key swing states, giving him

  the edge in the Electoral College to become the 45th president of the

  United States.

  Almost immediately after he was declared the presumptive winner by the

  major news networks, pundits and scholars began to ask, “What

  happened?” Even some who supported Trump over Clinton were surprised

  at his victory. Fingers quickly pointed at pollsters and their methods,

  which are still being updated for the age of the internet and smartphones

  (as opposed to one-per-family landlines). They also pointed to perceived

  biases in the mainstream media, reporting from one perspective and blind

  to others. Many voters disaffected with the two-party system and the

  major parties’ nominees stayed home or voted for a third-party candidate,

  winning them the ire of some Democrats. And, as is frequently the case

  when the winning candidate loses the popular vote, there were calls for

  the abolition of the Electoral College.

  But to many, the blame lay primarily at the feet of Hillary Clinton herself. Not

  only would old scandals simply not go away—Benghazi, her response to

  allegations of sexual impropriety against her husband Bill when he was

  president, her “socialist” tendencies as a past supporter of universal health

  care—but new ones kept popping up. Her use of a private email server for

  official State Department business suggested that she was a security risk. The

  missing emails from that server surely must have contained classified

  information (which would be illegal) or reference to other nefarious activities.

  Private communications revealed that the Democratic National Committee

  took steps to ensure that the more moderate Clinton won the party’s

  nomination over democratic socialist Bernie Sanders. Three weeks before the

  election, then FBI Director James Comey announced that the Department of

  Justice was reopening the case of Clinton’s private email server. And that’s to

  say nothing of the more fringe rumors that Clinton had ordered murders be

  committed on her behalf,1 was involved in “spirit cooking, ”2 or sat at the center of a massive child sex trafficking ring3—the latter of which, though

  baseless, led a man to bring a gun to a D.C. pizza parlor to “investigate.”

  (None of these conspiracy theories have completely gone away.) As a result,

  1“FBI Agent Suspected in Hillary Email Leaks Found Dead in Apparent Murder-Suicide,”

  David Mikkelson, Snopes, accessed January 3, 2019, www.snopes.com/fact-check/

  fbi-agent-murder-suicide/.

  2“Was Clinton Campaign Chairman John Podesta Involved in Satanic ‘Spirit Cooking’?,”

  Dan Evon, Snopes, published November 4, 2016, www.snopes.com/fact-check/john-

  podesta-spirit-cooking/.

  3“Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal,” Amanda Robb, Rolling Stone, published November 16,

  2017, www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/anatomy-of-a-fake-news-

  scandal-125877/.

  Data versus Democracy

  69

  many moderates and Sanders supporters who otherwise would have

  supported Clinton over Trump voted third party or abstained in protest, at

  least partially contributing to Trump’s victory.

  While some of these scandals had at least a kernel of truth to them and most

  had been shared in earnest by many Americans, it became clearer and clearer

  throughout 2017 that there were other forces at work. Yes, Clinton appeared

  mired in scandal, and yes Trump seemed to represent people and ideas that

  many “mainstream” journalists and political operatives paid too little attention

  to. But, we now know, not all of that was organic. Someone had hacked the

  DNC server, stolen t
he emails of Clinton’s campaign chair, John Podesta, and

  boosted both the scandals they contained and the pro-Trump movements on

  social media. Many of the conspiracy theories were circulated and amplified, if

  not created, by disingenuous operatives running fake accounts on a variety of

  social media platforms. As researchers and the American intelligence

  community now agree, all signs point to one primary culprit: Russia.

  Unfortunately, the same lack of nuance that led many to fall prey to Russia’s

  activities—and to other influence operations that took place at the same

  time—has led many to either make Russia a boogeyman, responsible for all

  narratives and political victories they dislike, or to cheapen the propaganda

  problem as “Russian [Twitter] bots” and laugh it off. The former causes us to

  overlook both other foreign actors and the role that domestic bad actors and

  regular citizens play in the spread of disinformation. The latter causes us to

  overlook both the breadth and the gravity of the problem altogether.

  Meet the New War, Same as the (C)old War

  The reality is that Russia describes itself as being in a state of “information

  warfare against the United States of America” as well as our NATO allies.4 For

  years, Russia has been using web sites, blogs, and social media as the latest

  tools in their information arsenal against the United States, the United

  Kingdom, the EU, NATO, Ukraine, and Syrian rebels. Their goals are to enlarge

  their “empire, ”5 enrich Putin’s “inner circle,” weaken the EU and NATO,

  discredit Western democracy, and—at least in the immediate regions

  surrounding Russia—promote an illiberal faux democracy, where a few

  corrupt oligarchs can manage a state economy in their own favor.6

  4Martin Kragh and Sebastian Åsberg, “Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplo-

  macy and active measures: the Swedish case,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40/6 (2017), DOI:

  10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830, p. 6.

  5Stephen Blank, “Moscow’s Competitive Strategy,” American Foreign Policy Council, pub-

  lished July 2018, p. 2.

  6Heather A. Conley, James Mina, Ruslan Stefanov, and Martin Vladimirov, The Kremlin

  Playbook (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), p. 1ff.

 

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