However, nothing encourages soldiers more than success, and the Poles, far from being incapable of further effort, threw themselves into their new tasks. Cairo was cleared by two reconnaissance regiments acting as infantry, the Carpathian and the 15th Poznan Lancers. Piedimonte fell on May 25 after much hard fighting by a battle-group composed of the 6th Armoured Regiment, the 18th Lwow and the 5th Carpathian Rifle Battalions and the 12th Lancers supported by intense artillery fire. The total Polish casualties between the 12th and 25th were 281 officers and 3,503 NCOs and rank and file, of which 72 and 788 respectively were killed. Bearing in mind that Anders’ divisions had only two regular brigades of infantry each, and that the heaviest casualties are always in the rifle companies, a total at full strength of say 3,600 men, these are awe-inspiring figures.
We must now return to events in the valley below, where the two corps had been regrouped with a view to rushing the Hitler Line before resistance had hardened. Keightley had to surrender the 26th Armoured Brigade to conform with Kirkman’s original plans to have the 6th Armoured Division re-formed and intact ready to follow through after any success. Instead he was given two of Murphy’s armoured regiments, leaving Vokes The Three Rivers, the place of the Ontario and Calgary Regiments being taken by the British 25th Tank Brigade, equipped with Churchills. (An “armoured” brigade contained a motorised rifle battalion and often a self-propelled artillery regiment, a “tank” brigade, three “battalions” of tanks, usually manned by the Royal Tank Regiment and specialising in tank-infantry cooperation.) Each corps had room to operate with only one reinforced division forward, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division followed hopefully by the 5th Canadian Armoured Division on the left, and the 78th followed by the 6th Armoured, joined later by part of the 8th Indian Infantry Division, put in to bring the talents of the Indian infantry in hill-fighting on to the shoulders of the heights.
The problem that faced both Keightley and Vokes was that the Liri valley, so promising a line of advance on the map, looked very different on the ground when examined with the eye of an infantryman trying to spot a sniper or a Spandau, or the commander of a tank scanning the nearby bushes or trees for a lurking infantryman waiting to set his tank on fire with a Faustpatronen or an Ofenrohr. (Hand-held and deadly to the tanks of those days. One was a grenade-thrower, the other resembled a US “bazooka”.) The country was close with thickets of oak and tall crops, and the going difficult as the neighbourhood of irrigation ditches was muddy enough to bog a tank, and the Spalla Bassa and the Formio d’Aquino, tributaries of the Liri, had steep sides and required to be bridged by engineers before tanks could cross. The only first-class road running the length of the valley was the Via Casilina. Elsewhere there were only farm tracks until the engineers had bulldozed roads, and in places in the Canadian sector not even battalion tactical vehicles could move forward without engineer assistance, and the infantry had to carry forward their heavy weapons and the ponderous rear-link radios and their batteries.
Feuerstein had also reorganised his dispositions on the Liri front after the 16th, a difficult process as his forward troops were under continual pressure; part of the 361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, for instance, was at one stage encircled by the 78th Division and had to fight its way out. The 44th Division’s HQ was relieved and the Liri sector divided between the 1st Parachute Division and the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division. The intended line-up once back in the Hitler Line was as follows. KG Schultz occupied Piedimonte. Next came KG Heilmann, basically the 3rd Parachute Regiment, whose junction point with the 90th Division was about 1,000 yards south of Aquino. The left of Baade’s Division was held by KG Fabian, and the detail of the hotch-potch of units should be noted as it is evidence of the straits to which the 51st Corps, like the 14th Corps, was being reduced by constant attrition. The commander was Captain Fabian, the 2nd/361st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the troops such remnants of that unit as had escaped from the trap, a variety of engineers acting as infantry, part of the 44th Ersatz Battalion, two anti-tank gun companies detached from mountain units up in the hills, and a company of tanks from the 26th Panzer Division. Between KG Fabian’s left to the ruins of Pontecorvo on the left bank of the Liri the front was manned by SG Bode, by then composed of the remnants of the 576th Regiment, the rest of the 44th Ersatz Battalion, an equivalent battalion of engineers and a company of anti-tank guns, together with KG Strafner, three and a half companies of mountain troops with some engineers and assault guns, which was under the command of Colonel Bode.
It is difficult to assess the strength in infantry of the garrison of the Hitler Line, because it varied. Units were wasted by operations so that ordinary designations bore no relation to strength, and driblets of reinforcements scratched up from everywhere arrived from the rear or from quiet fronts. In the German records a “regiment” of only 300 is spoken of as being in relatively good condition, and others are below 100 all ranks. The Canadians estimated that they were faced by no more than 800 when Vokes made his final attack. Perhaps an estimate over the whole Eighth Army front of 1,500–2,000 is on the high side, but many of these were low-grade troops, not “regular” infantry, or artillerymen in the indirect fire role, and all had suffered severe wastage at the level of junior leader.
It was not this that counted, however, as long as morale held up. The strength of the defence lay in its fortifications, which multiplied the value of its man-power. (Fortifications had become very unfashionable after the First World War and the fate of the Maginot Line in the Second, but the Germans knew better. It is obviously better to fight a defensive battle protected from enemy fire than not.) Furthermore modern defensive tactics demand a very high ratio of fire-power to man-power; an example, theorists might argue, of the old principle of “economy of force”. What made the northern sector of the Hitler Line a tough nut to crack was the as yet undetected Panther turrets, backed by an arrowhead formation of ordinary wheeled anti-tank guns and assault guns, and covered in front by a web of enfilading machine-gun fire. Fire-power had to be met with fire-power.
On the 18th Kirkman, encouraged by intelligence that the opposition in front of him was dwindling, urged Keightley on, but that officer refused to be hustled. That may be the case, he argued, but the country was close and infested with snipers, his infantry very tired and he had to proceed methodically from one firm foothold to another for, as had been seen so far, the enemy was still prone to counter-attack. Kirkman could only acquiesce, but later, in the evening, Keightley came on the telephone “… a very different Charles …” Keightley had for the time retained under his command the Derbyshire Yeomanry, the reconnaissance regiment of the 6th Armoured Division, and a motor rifle battalion, which he had sent ahead to probe, and at last light its commander had reported that he had found an unguarded stretch of the Hitler fortifications and his tanks were shooting into the outskirts of Aquino. This was great news, but it was too late to exploit it, so Keightley intended to attack at first light the next morning, with “a brigade and 100 tanks”. This proved a fiasco. The Derbyshire Yeomanry was an efficient regiment, but on this occasion its commander had made a gross error in map-reading or was not clear of the exact location of the Hitler Line, which in fact still lay ahead. He had also failed to reconnoitre the ground, for a steep ravine, sufficiently deep to stop a tank, looped round the front and flanks of Aquino. In the morning the attackers were first helped and then betrayed by the treacherous early-morning fog. The infantry came up against uncut wire and machine-gun fire. The commanding officers of both leading battalions were hit, one killed, and the mist then lifted to reveal to the German anti-tank gunners the Ontario tanks spread out in the open. The whole area was subjected to a torrent of artillery fire. Nine tanks were lost, but fortunately the rest of the forward troops, covered by the British and Canadian artillery firing a smoke screen which used up every smoke-shell in the limbers and wagons, were able to extricate themselves from a most unpleasant situation. Keightley ordered a pause and prepared to resume the attack
after dark.
The 1st Canadian Infantry Division greatly distinguished itself on the 17th and 18th in what their official historian said “included nearly the heaviest fighting of any day of the Liri valley campaign”. Vokes may have been rather nettled by a message from Leese that reached him via Burns saying that the army commander was dissatisfied with the rate of progress so far, for he sent his infantry off at a cracking pace. “It was a thrill to see the battle-wise Van Doos [the Royal 22nd] march straight forward half crouching,” said an admiring observer in a tank of The Three Rivers Regiment. The 3rd Brigade reached the Formio d’Aquino three miles further on by nightfall, and the brigade commander pushed the 22nd over during the night to establish a good bridgehead. The 1st Brigade was opposed by bits of the 576th Regiment and the fresh 190th Reconnaissance Battalion of the 90th Division. The Hastings and Prince Edwards forced their way across the Spalla Bassa after a day-long fight, and by nightfall the division was up to the Formio d’Aquino all along its front. The tanks came along as best they could but had to wait for the engineers before they could cross the Spalla Bassa and most of the day’s fighting was by infantry using their own weapons to get forward.
Two outstanding feats were the capture of a battery of field guns by Lieutenant N. A. Ballard, leading his platoon who, his supply of grenades being exhausted, forced the surrender of the gun-position officer by clouting him with his fists, and the repulse of a counter-attack made by night on the 48th Highlanders of Canada by infantry and assault guns of the 190th Battalion. Sergeant R. J. Shaw, commanding the anti-tank platoon, destroyed two assault guns, asking for the battalion mortars to fire illuminating shell and laying and firing a 6-pounder gun himself. After this the courageous but much-battered German battle-groups were allowed to fall back directly to their Hitler positions, while Vokes prepared to see whether it was possible to “bounce” it – to go through before the defences could be coordinated.
It was not until 6.30 a.m. on the 19th that the 3rd Infantry Brigade supported by the 51st Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment, attacked KG Fabian, but the infantry were stopped by a hot machine-gun fire and an 88-mm gun (possibly a “hornet” assault gun) which knocked out several tanks. It was hoped to resume the attack with full artillery support, but for the moment all the army artillery was concentrated on targets on the 13 th Corps front and Vokes called off the attack. At this stage Leese intervened. He cancelled the night attack planned by the 78th Division and decided that the Hitler Line had to be breached by deliberate attack, and that this had to be made in the Pontecorvo sector by the Canadians with the full weight of the Eighth Army’s fire-power on May 23. This was to be a crucial date, for the indications across the whole front were that the turning point of DIADEM had arrived. On Alexander’s orders the break-out from Anzio was to be synchronised on that date with operation CHESTERFIELD, the breakthrough attack by the 1st Canadian Corps.
This was preceded, somewhat to Leese’s anxiety, by yet another opportunistic attack by the Canadians. Vokes had detected a weakness in the manning if not the weapon strength of the Hitler positions, and he also felt that the progress of the French 1st Division across the river could be exploited when he learnt that General Brosset’s troops had entered the part of Pontecorvo south of Liri. He wondered whether it would be possible to turn the Hitler Line by an assault crossing from the French-held bank, but this on inspection proved too dangerous as the 90th Division had refused its right flank and the steep opposite bank of the river was lined with machine-gun posts. Nevertheless, Vokes obtained permission to attack Pontecorvo with one brigade. This rather rash adventure failed, though not because of any lack of determination. It advanced 400 yards and captured 60 prisoners, but to have pressed it would have incurred severe casualties so it was called off after a warning to Burns from Leese that it might interfere with and delay the arrangements for CHESTERFIELD.
The staff of the 51st Corps was fully aware of the storm that was about to break on its right flank. Intense air activity prevented an orderly transfer of units to the threatened front, masses of tanks could be seen moving up the Via Casilina and there was constant patrolling. The only misapprehension was that the probing attacks of the 19th were seen as the main assault, and Kesselring and von Vietinghoff were premature in congratulating Baade and Heidrich on successfully repelling it. The situation on the 14th Corps front, where the French had defeated the 26th Panzer Division’s attempts to stabilise the situation, worried them far more. No directions were given to Feuerstein to make provisional orders for a withdrawal. The next warning was the preliminary counter-battery programme, followed at three minutes before 6 a.m. on the 23rd by a barrage by 682 guns on an opening line 3,200 yards wide behind which the assaulting infantry lined up to cross the start line precisely at 6 o’clock, H-hour.
The course of one “set-piece” battle does not differ essentially from another. There are the same successes, the same reverses, desperate moments when, as happened on the 23rd, the significance of the uninterpreted dark dots on the air photographs of the Hitler Line defences was revealed as the Panther tank turrets unmasked and the front was lit up by scores of burning British and Canadian tanks. Later the infantry were separated by accident from their own anti-tank guns and overrun, and yet again, numbers of prisoners were captured by the Panzer Grenadiers who, marching them off to a rear area, found it in Canadian hands and captors and captives exchanged roles. Baade’s division fought with all the tenacity of which the German soldier was famous but the chief of staff of the 51st Corps realised the game was up. He rang up the operations officer at HQ Tenth Army in the morning and again in the afternoon, urgently requesting “directives for a withdrawal so that the Corps could make preparations that would prevent the loss of arms and equipment”. The second call was recorded in those words under the heading “Official note of Fact”, a staff procedure only used when there was likely to be a subsequent search for a scapegoat. (Responsibility for failure was always deemed to be shared by the General Staff officer whose duty it was to give correct advice to his commander.) It was repeated when at 11.30 p.m. the chief of staff rang up General Wentzell himself, informing him that “KG Strafner must be considered as destroyed” and that “the Corps commander therefore orders the withdrawal from Pontecorvo …” Vokes had broken through the Hitler Line in a single day’s fighting. It had cost the Canadians 47 officers and 832 NCOs and rank and file, and 7 officers and 70 men of the attached Royal Tank Regiment units. Subsequently the Canadian staff made a thorough and self-critical analysis of the whole operation, but the historian patiently following the course of events in the Liri valley between May 16 and May 23 need say no more than that it established the 1st Canadian Division as the equal of any of the formations in the armies of Italy.
* The 78th Infantry and 6th Armoured Divisions were founder members of the short-lived First Army and there was a strong sense of divisional identity in both and an admirable rapport between them strengthened by an exchange of brigades, the 1st Guards going to the armoured division and the all-Irish 38th mechanised Infantry Brigade joining the 78th as infantry of the line, which paid off when their old friends in the 26th Armoured Brigade came to support them jn the Liri valley. The 78th did not succumb to Montgomery’s charm, and were scornful when he told them they had been promoted, in effect, by their membership of his Eighth Army. For a time the units displayed notices in bivouacs and elsewhere announcing that they had “no connection with the Eighth Army”, to the amusement or annoyance of senior officers, depending on their previous loyalties.
VII
France Wins the Diadem
19
GENERAL JUIN’S PLAN
Le rythme de manoeuvre sera adapté aux circonstances, ce qui nécessitera de tous ardeur, compréhension et souplesse.
Le Maréchal de France Alphonse Juin
We left the French relieving the British 10th Corps in the Garigliano bridgehead. By the middle of April the whole CEF was assembled there under General Juin, a total of four
regular infantry divisions, one of which was held back east of the river, and a large force of irregular Moroccan levies. The CEF had been equipped by the United States and was organised along US Army Unes, and in view of this and of the historic bond between the two nations the CEF was appropriately placed under Clark’s command. With one specialised mountain division and the whole corps being adapted to mountain warfare it was correctly placed in the mountain region where McCreery’s over-mechanised troops had been decisively checked. Nevertheless, for the moment Clark planned to allot Juin only a modest role in his part of the DIADEM operation. The fact was that neither he nor his staff, nor the staff of AAI had at that time any idea of the spirit and fighting-power of the French, nor an inkling of Juin’s ability as a commander.
Their underlying feeling was that though the French were more than welcome as reinforcements after the departure of so many seasoned US and British troops in preparation for OVERLORD, the reason for their presence was political as well as military; they had to be seen playing a part. Neither the British, in the person of Alexander, nor Clark rated them very highly. In England the French Army had been somewhat oversold by some senior British officers, and also by Liddell Hart. Inevitably, after the terrible catastrophe of 1940 the British had written off the French Army as useless and reverted to their habitual if mild Francophobia. (This was ungrateful, for a sacrificial defence by some French troops had helped to make the “miracle” of Dunkirk possible.) By the end of 1943 this attitude had softened a little, by virtue of French cooperation with the Eighth Army, especially the courageous stand of a French brigade at Bir Hacheim in 1942, and the performance of their ill-equipped divisions in Tunisia. The French, they felt, after all, had proved themselves sportsmen, still game for a fight after a bad beating.* The American attitude was rather different. Cultural and historic ties apart, Americans only valued success and had no time for losers. In any case, US officers as a class hardly shared the cultural interests of their Francophile countrymen: they were as insular as their British opposite numbers. Like them they tended to look down on coloured troops, or any that were not white Americans, very much as British service officers looked down on the Indians. The strongest bond between American and Frenchman was a common dislike of the “limeys” and “les Anglo-Saxes”. (The French had neither forgotten nor forgiven the British attacks at Mers-el-Kebir, on their forces in Syria and the invasion of Madagascar, dictated though they may have been by the harsh necessities of war.) All this was an added incentive for the French to prove themselves, and as it turned out, their performance in Italy was to astonish Americans and British alike.
Tug of War Page 35