It is so far discussable to what extent can this approach be applied to less institutionalised religions or forms of religion. Ekelund and his team frequently underline that their preoccupation is with organizations and their behavior. Their theory relates directly to organized religion, so potential extension of all its propositions to analysing other religions, such as Islam, may not be an easy task. Some similarities between religions exist nevertheless and also the Islamic world experienced episodes when the Muslim religion enjoyed government favours and religious officials supported the state structures. Such symbiosis of religion and a state can be analysed as a monopoly case when other forms of religions were discriminated against, persecuted or made illegal. Also, the competition process bears similarities in many aspects, although in Islam it is not always between organizations.
Unclear Correlation Between Pluralism and Religiosity
[R]eligious diversity increases religious mobilization (Finke, Stark, 1989, p. 1054).
It appears that North Americans are religious in spite of, not because of, religious pluralism (Olson, 1998, p. 761).
These two contradictory claims made by the prominent actors in the debate on religion and pluralism reflect the disagreement on the question whether people tend to be more active in a surrounding that offers them choices or not. An economic perspective posits that pluralism is positively associated with participation or level of religiousness. The main proponents of this hypothesis are Laurence R. Iannaccone (1991) and Rodney Stark (1994). Other equally important initiators of the debate are Roger Finke and William Sims Bainbridge (Rational Choice, 1997). The theory of religious mobilization, as the scholars call it, consists of several theoretical hypotheses intended to explain the main processes in religious economies. According to its proponents, the chief thesis that pluralism in the social field of religion does not undermine the vitality religion, as some secularization theorists had argued, is supported by quantitative and historical data. The first publications showing data confirming the positive effects of diversity and competition appeared in the late 1980s (Finke, Stark, 1998). The analysis was conducted on the basis of data for 150 cities in America. Similar conclusions were drawn from many different statistical research. Finke, Guest, and Stark (1996) researched church attendance rates in New York towns in 1855 and 1865 and found that more people attended churches in towns with greater pluralism.
Regulation and Competition as Key Mechanisms
Having clarified our meaning of the very basic terms used in the religious market theory, let us turn attention to the problem posed at the beginning of this section: What kind of mechanisms link pluralism (activity of various religious firms) with the level of religious involvement? The market approach, which argues for a positive relationship between those two variables, points to two main factors affecting the impact of pluralism on religion, namely the regulation of religious economy and competition.
The hypothesis proposing an explanation of the relationship between regulation, competition and religious engagement is as follows:
To the degree that religious economies are unregulated and competitive, overall levels of religious commitment will be high. (Conversely, lacking competition, the dominant firm [s] will be too inefficient to sustain vigorous marketing efforts, and the results will be a low overall level of religious commitment, with the average person minimizing and delaying payment of religious costs.) (Stark, Finke, 2000, p. 201).
The argument of the market approach says that when religious affiliation is a matter of choice and there are no limitations imposed on religions (such as law restrictions, monopolisation of one religion supported by the state, privileges for some denominations or branches of religion(s)), religious institutions will compete for believers. Competition is perceived as a natural mechanism in the religious field, similarly to its commercial counterpart. The results of competition will be based on the “invisible hand” of the religious marketplace. Religious organizations have a chance for victory only when they are effective enough or, at least, more effective than competitors (Finke, Stark, 1994).
The affirmative impact of competition on religious vitality has been shown, among others, by Stark and McCann (1993). They analysed fluctuations in religious practice among Catholic groups from various regions. It turned out that when the number of Catholics within a district falls, overall Catholic religious activity rises, as the market theory predicts. When a religion does not have a dominant or a stable position on the market it will be exposed to more challenges. Its survival depends then on its capacity to respond to competitors’ activities.
The above-stated correlation is explained in this paradigm by suggesting the causal relationship: in a pluralistic environment there is a wider choice for people who have diverse religious needs and preferences (Finke, Iannaccone, 1993; Finke, Stark, 1994; Iannaccone, 1991; Stark, Bainbridge, 1996). In that way, a greater part of the society can find offers suitable for them. Firms taking part in competition will specialize, as the theory proposes. They will have to cater to various tastes of their target groups. A single religious organization would be unable to incorporate often contradictory ideologies existing in society, e. g., strictness and permissiveness, exclusivism and inclusivism, liberalism and conservatism. Competition also involves a great deal of activity necessary to develop and implement effective strategies to deal in an uncertain and changing environment. Competing strategies vary; they can include a set of religious ideas and beliefs or a diversification of religious practices and experience. To succeed in a pluralistic world, religious leaders must make an effort and transform or promote their religious tradition so that they look more attractive than others. Quite often, such actions involve adjusting some religious products to meet the public’s needs or proposing some innovations.
Competition between religious firms leads to several observable changes in the marketplace. One of the main transformation is the rise in a proportion of religiously affiliated population. Moreover, rivalry on the marketplace may lead to changes in the rankings between particular religious traditions. Thus, the popularity of religions depends on the economic laws of supply and demand. This process can to some degree account for successes of some religious traditions, such as the unprecedented worldwide growth of Pentecostalism or Mormonism, which, as Peter Berger (2006) suggests, may be the fastest growing denomination in the world. In Islam, the global success of neo-orthodoxy is especially striking. Islamist movements which identify themselves with Salafism gain popularity and attract new supporters in many Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. Salafism has managed to take a strong position in the Islamic market, in which political, social as well as theological struggles are very dynamic.
The emergence of pluralism in the religious sphere incites “entrepreneurial religious organizations to mobilize resources” (Smith, 2008, p. 1578). If religious firms are not supported by the state, as is the case in ideal market situation, then to get necessary means for survival and development they need to undertake marketing activity. This aspect makes these competitive firms more efficient in comparison to state-supported monopolistic or oligopolistic religious companies (Stark, Iannaccone, 1994). This argument is well illustrated in the study of Protestant Reformation (Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison, 2006).
What happens when the market is controlled by one or two firms supported by the state? Legally privileged institutions do not risk any sanctions for doing a routine job. Their right to an existence and resources are for some time ensured and they do not face any challenge from competitors. There is, therefore, no need for them to rely on followers for resources. Consequently, religious organizations are not obliged to undertake marketing actions, nor are they forced to spend more on improving their product. They will fail to keep peoples’ attachment. The lack of “zeal” in monopolistic church activity has been noticed in social sciences already in the eighteenth century by Adam Smith (1776, after Stark, Iannaccone, 1994, p. 233) who wrote:
[T]he clergy,
reposing themselves upon their benefices, had neglected to keep up with the fervour of faith and devotion of the great body of people; and having given themselves up to indolence, were incapable of making vigorous exertion in defence even of their own establishment.
As the theory further argues, when competition is missing the overall degree of participation in religious practices will tend to be low. The resulting change does not, however mean that the society is secularising, in the sense of a decline of belief and practice. Religious life can operate also underground and people get used to expressing their religious life in an unofficial, alternative way. In regard to empirically observable secularization in many European societies, proponents of the economic market model attempt at explaining it by arguing that it is the weakness on the side of suppliers. It is not a change in demand for religion that is responsible for low church attendance. The high degree of regulation of particular religious economies and low levels of intra- and inter-religious competition have been found as lying behind the “decline of religion” on European continent (Stark, Iannaccone, 1994), which is an interesting explanation of the secularization process. The opposite trend was analysed for the United States. In The Churching of America (1994), Finke and Stark presented their surprising findings from the research on religious history in America. The aim was simple—to account for the dramatic rise in church membership over the past two hundred years. The conclusion was straightforward; it was the “free market religious environment that exposed religious organizations to relentless competition” (Finke, Stark, 1994, p. 2). The growth of a market religious economy promoted active, aggressive organizations that turned out to be winners in the struggle and mobilized an impressive number of supporters. Thus, an increase in vigorous religious suppliers was a decisive factor in the rise of American religiousness.
Problems with Market Theory
The popularity of the market approach to religion made it a subject of many critical evaluations. One of the objections of its opponents is the very basic idea that explicitly economic concepts may relate to such a sphere as religion: How can the mysteries and irrationality of religion be reduced to simple models accounting for economic behavior? How can we assume that rational choice can refer to religious goods?
Whereas these doubts, assuming an extraordinary status of religious sphere might be justified, the fact is that social research on religion does not focus on religion per se; conversely—the subject of analysis are actions of human beings. If we assumed that people’s behavior varies substantially in different spheres of life, little generalizations about social life could be made. Besides, although “at first glance the regulation of the religious market seems far removed from individual” (Finke, 1990, p. 614), the increasing number of research has shown the usefulness of the predictions implied by the economic perspective. Another argument for employing this concept is that, like in economics, market implies a largely independent sphere, which may be studied separately from other spheres. A lot of research has been conducted on political or environmental impact on the market, but the emphasis in economics is placed on the inner mechanisms and processes that take place largely independently. By analogy, the term “market” suggests that it is a distinct religious field with its structure and inner dynamics that will be a primary subject of research. This approach is a decisive severance from the Marxist reductionist explanations, in which religion is seen as being subordinated to economy. Religious market approach postulates that religious phenomena, such as religious martyrdom (see Iannaccone, 2006), can be understood by analysing the supply and demand factors inside a religious field.
Another aspect of criticism deals with the very basic assumptions of the supply-side theory. Steve Bruce (2011) pays our attention to the problematic nature of religion in comparison to the strictly economic sphere. The first issue is utility, which is considered in the supply-side model to drive human actions in general. If we want to maximize utility we must be able to compare products or services. There are precise criteria to evaluate which goods are best for our needs. Comparing the value of Catholicism versus Sikhism or Protestantism is impossible during our life in this world, as the truth shall be revealed after our death. Further he argues that there is no justification for analysing religious groups as economic enterprises, because religious goods cannot be changed. Religious institutions, having more restrictions, do not resemble secular businesses. Moreover, believers cannot be treated as consumers, since people’s choices are often restricted by cultural and social constraints. Being brought up in a given place and in a given time embeds people in social networks. A Muslim in Islamabad or a Buddhist born in Phnom Penh acquire religious affiliation together with ethnic and cultural identities. Changing religious beliefs in many cases leads to ostracism or other, more or less severe, sanctions. There are no comparable prices in case of switching material goods, such as cars or houses. In more mobile societies, such as the American one, switching religion requires less effort and costs than in strong communities with family, ethnic or tribal bonds. However even in the U.S. the religious market is not as flexible as it seems at the first glance. Race and ethnicity are powerful segregation factors, which is visible in a high percentage of racially homogenous churches. Religion, after all, is not a matter of private independent choice and, in that respect, it differs fundamentally from the economic market and business activity.
Equally serious arguments against the theory stem from works proving the opposite to what the market model predicts. The quotation included at the onset of this section from Daniel Olson’s (1998) conclusion to his review of Finke and Stark’s results is an exemplary one. On the whole, numerous tests of supply-side model are inconclusive. It is especially surprising, because the empirical data and high level of statistical methodology were supposed to enable a straightforward and definite test for the theory. Variable analysis employed to the problem gave hope to sociologists with positivists inclinations that the basic questions can be dealt with without all this ambiguity that is characteristic of qualitative research. In the end, the work was supposed to present more general laws regarding religion (Smith, 2008). The failure of such expectations, at least for the present moment, was clearly visible when in 2001 a review article was published (Chaves, Gorski, 2001). It assessed the relevant empirical evidence (large-N quantitative studies including historical and comparative data) presented by both advocates and critics of the market model. An analysis of 193 of the most crucial empirical works engaged in the debate led to a conclusion that, for the time being, the major hypothesis of the supply-side model can neither be supported nor rejected. The problem still waits for more decisive solutions. For that reason, I would suggest that more attention has to be turned towards qualitative research, which has almost been absent in this subject.
Anthropological perspective can shed new light on competing interactions from the actors’ points of view. An investigation into various interpretations and activities of believers and religious leaders may, hopefully, lead researchers to propose additional mechanisms mediating between pluralism and religiousness.
A positive relationship between pluralism and religious activity has been proven mainly in Western settings. It results from the fact that the majority of research in this field has been conducted on the basis of North American and Western European data. According to Chaves and Gorski (ibidem), market concepts are problematic in an application to non-modern societies. In my opinion, however, the validity of this claim depends on the understanding of the term “nonmodern.” If it did not apply to any non-Western world, then it would be easy to find empirical counterarguments. Religious pluralism is globalising at an increasing rate, and its consequences worldwide are not well-known. Looking through lenses of the globalization paradigm, a serious weakness of the supply-side theory emerges. In the search for universal laws in religious activity, an inappropriate generalization from the American context is made. There is an evident overrepresentation of research on the Western case,
which can be partly explained by, first of all, a familiarity of context to Western researchers and, secondly, by the lack of adequate statistical data from other continents. With few exceptions (see e. g. Froese, 2004) there are no influential studies employing the economic model to religion in the post-Soviet area, where the dynamics in religious pluralism and participation are widely acknowledged. This region should be of interest to sociologists also because it experiences dramatic increases in religious life and because, unlike in the United States, post-Soviet governments strongly interfere in the religious market. My project, although limited in scope to one Muslim country, indicates some problems with economic expectations concerning regulation and competition in religion.
Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan Page 5