How does “cultural Islam” manifest itself in contemporary Azerbaijan? The first striking observation is that after seven decades of communist rule, atheism is hardly present in this country. An average Azeri Muslims believes in God and seems to have no doubts regarding the existence of spiritual life. The very few atheists I have met were members of urban intelligentsia. Many more atheists live in neighbouring Russia. Indeed, religious consciousness did not perish in the Soviet era. It found its soil in a variety of places, usually out of a mosque and madrasa, which had almost totally been damaged by communists. In this transformation, not only the forms, but also the content of religious beliefs and knowledge changed significantly. Cultural Muslims can be characterized principally by irregular, and rather rare religious engagement with mosque or religious readings. Its main features are a general belief in God, observation of some religious rites, and a lack of knowledge about religious basic tenets. At the same time, their worldview contains religious aspects and images.
Religious holidays are widely observed but, as religious leaders claim, they are mostly celebrated in a superficial way. Some of them—Eid al-Adha (Festival of the Sacrifice), which is known in Azeri as Kurban Bayram, were so popular that even the Soviets did not manage to eradicate it. This holiday falls on the 10th day of the month known in the Islamic tradition as Dul al-Hijjah. It is the month of the hajj, when Muslim pilgrims flock to Mecca in their thousands. People who can afford are expected to sacrifice animals according to Muslim rules. Nowadays in Azerbaijan, as well as in Turkey, it is also a secular holiday, which in practice means a chance for free days and a chance to spend some more time with relatives, neighbours and friends. Students in Baku who come from various smaller cities or villages usually can’t wait for holidays to be back at home. Most of the holiday non-practicing Muslims spend on preparing food, inviting guests or paying Bayram visits. They treat Kurban Bayram as a set of rituals without paying attention to the religious or philosophical significance. A common theme is the slaughtering of sheep. Islamic activists organize educational campaigns to appeal to people to, at least, help the poor and marginalized people on this occasion. Ilgar Ibrahimoglu (2009) points to Western Europe where more charitable activities are organized during the holiday than in Azerbaijan. In Brussels, he witnessed how the local Muslim community reminds all its members to support the poor. Islamic institutions and shops have special Gurban Bayram posters with educational aims. He wishes that similar activities take part in his own country, as an average level of religious awareness is low. The mass media only add to this superficiality, as they do no show religious holidays in their traditional context. The mainstream news is short, they attest to the event, but do not invite people to reflect upon the significance of religious aspects.
Socialization into a Muslim society
Even though my research focused mainly on pious traditions constituting the contemporary Islamic revival, the fact that the majority of Azerbaijanis follow, to a greater or lesser extent, this approach to religion enabled me to observe secular Muslims in their daily lives. I happened to share an apartment in Baku with two students (I will them call Hafiza and Sughra) who were representing this tradition and became my first informants. When I asked about their religion, when we first met, both girls did not hesitate to say that they were obviously Muslims and that their religion was Islam.
The girls have been socialized into this tradition since their childhood during some collective religious rituals, which were underlined by Durkheim and his followers as the main mechanisms for inter-generational transmission of tradition. Their parent neither attend mosques nor make namaz but they continue to observe ritual rites that were popular already during communist time. Islamic celebration of funerals and circumcision of boys (sunnat) are almost universal among ethnic Muslims. Once I visited my colleague’s family and was told that her four-year-old nephew had just been circumcised and would have his sunnat ceremony, known as svad’ba (wedding), in a few weeks. The boy’s parents deliberately postponed the sunnat until he grew up a little, so that he could remember this important event for the rest of his life. The operation was carried out under anaesthetic in a hospital. My colleague, the only one in this family who wears hijab, explained that the act of circumcising is a Jewish and Muslim religious rite. Afterwards, I discussed with the girls this ritual. Sughra shouted that she had witnessed her younger brother being circumcised, and, deeply moved by her memories, she began to tell me about it. This boy had his sunnat when he was one year old. In this case no mulla nor any other Islamic figure was present, and Sughra did not link this event to Islam; for her it was just a national custom. A special doctor was invited and performed the surgery at home. All the family gathered around and watched. The child received no anaesthetic, and the injury hurt for a few days. For Hafiza the story was so shocking that, for the first time, she said she was happy to be a girl.
Apart from religious rituals, Muslim socialization is focused on morality. Older generations seek to preserve the established system of social norms and values. Ethical principles passed on to children in families and schools are presented as “traditional,” “Islamic,” or, increasingly, as an element of national culture. In practice, these cultural and religious roots of morality largely overlap with each other and it seems impossible to separate them into discrete categories. It can be illustrated by gender relations and the concept of namus (honour). This multidimensional term, often associated with women’s virginity before marriage and modesty in behavior and dress, is widespread in the Muslim umma. As Nayereh Tohidi (2000) notes, in Shia Azerbaijan as well in Shia Iran it’s one of main men’s responsibility to protect the namus of women in their clans. Any behavior that may raise suspicion towards a woman’s “purity” brings shame also on her male closest relatives. The higher a clan has position in society the more it is afraid of “scars” on its reputation. This deep-rooted cultural norm that guides relations between sexes is strongly internalized by teenage girls and boys. In Tohidi’s research on gender issues among Azeris, that was a recurrent topic raised by her respondents. They admitted that the cult of honour was the most crucial aspect in their early upbringing. This norm regulating men and women mutual relationships is a vital element of a social structure that favours patriarchalism in families. Tohidi (2000: 27) cites an Azeri saying: “A man to a household is like a gem to a ring.” Many Azeri girls accept it as a part of their tradition, and some claim that such norms stem from the Islamic religion. Nonetheless, similar patterns are observed in other parts of the Caucasus. In Georgia they were evident among Christians and the Muslim minority of Chechen origin. They are also widespread in Armenia. Ethnographers tend to explain it in terms of clan system and patriarchal rules. Religion may strengthen this concept, but nevertheless it is not unique to Islam.
Table 4.1 11Least Religious Countries. Source: Crabtree, Pelham (2009).
Is religion an important part of your daily life?
Country Yes (%)
Estonia 14
Sweden 17
Denmark 18
Norway 20
Czech Republic 21
Azerbaijan 21
Hong Kong 22
Japan 25
France 25
Mongolia 27
Belarus 27
4.2Secularized Muslims
For the vast majority of Muslims of the post-communist region secular state and society is a norm to which they are well adapted. It is evident from everyday observation as well as from social surveys. According to a Gallup poll from 2009 (Table 4.1), Azerbaijan is one of the top eleven least religious countries in the world, after Estonia, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and equally with the Czech Republic.21 Thus, this post-Soviet state turns out to be the most secular in the whole Muslim world and thus has been called the “bridgehead of secularism” (Shaffer, 2002). This fact makes Azerbaijan even more interesting for everybody interested in the changes in religious trends. It is a living laboratory for social scientists. The secular out
look and lifestyle enjoy great popularity among Azeris and only 21% of the them considers religion to be important in their daily affairs. The same survey for Egypt, for example, shows that religiosity matters to most citizens, at least in subjective terms.
For most Muslims in contemporary Azerbaijan Islam plays only a limited role in their everyday life. As in Central Asia, people who follow this tradition regard it as a part of national heritage and culture. Therefore, the term “Muslim” refers to a variety of practices, some of which contradict orthodox Islamic teachings. Their engagement with religious institutions is relatively rare. Data collected by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) shed more light on the details of socio-religious phenomena in a wider context of transformation. CRRC consists of research networks which has been conducting nationally representative surveys in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan since 2004. At the beginning they were known as the “Data Initiative,” and then since 2010 as “Caucasus Barometer.” Data they collect enable researchers to analyse various aspects of recent trends and developments in the sphere of politics, social moods, economic activities and the “lived religion.” One of the questions on religious matters asked to people refers to the subjective significance of religion. Here the possible scope of answers was wider than in the case of Gallup’s poll. There were four options to choose: (1) “Not at all important,” (2) “Not very important,” (3) “Rather important,” (4) “Very important.” In the whole Caucasus this question was posed only to people who had chosen a religious identity (Muslim, Christian, Jewish, etc.). In the case of Azerbaijan, it was the vast majority, so the distribution of answers is rather representative for the population. With the wider set of options, the issue of religious engagement is much more nuanced. According to the 2010 data, Muslims, for whom religion is very important indeed constitute a minority, slightly over one fourth of the population. This seems to confirm the Gallup’s findings. However, there is a significant group of Azerbaijani Muslims that regard religion as “rather important” in their lives (43 %). That is a lot and this group needs a closer attention in the future. Then, for 22% religion is “less important,” but not “unimportant at all.” These both groups, who are neither too engaged nor too indifferent, are those Muslims who do not (yet?) follow the new religious movements and religious preachers, but lead a life in which religion is from time to time interwoven with daily affairs. Table 4.2 shows the results of the same survey conducted only two years later. The rise in subjective religiosity is evident. Religion has become more and more important, it is more publicly debated. This trend of an increase in religious identification is making Azerbaijan more similar to the other Caucasian states. As the CRRC reports (2013), in Georgia and in Armenia, both Christian countries, self-declared religiosity is much higher than in Azerbaijan, but the figures are constant. No significant change in religiosity among those mostly Christian countries has been noticed between 2010 and 2012. Azerbaijan seems to be catching up with them.
Table 4.2Importance Azeris attach to religion. Source: CRRC, “Caucasus Barometer” (2012)
How important is religion in your daily life?
People who regard religion as very important 33%
People who regard religion as rather important 47%
People who regard religion as less important 16%
People who do not regard religion as important 2%
People whose answers was “do not know” 1%
Religious Attendance
Although religiosity is a dynamic process, the general trend of secular attitudes among Azeri Muslims is still dominant. It is evident from the level of religious attendance. Azerbaijani mosques are generally empty. Apart from Fridays and religious holidays, it’s uncommon to spot more than a few or a dozen believers praying inside. Praying times are obeyed by a silent minority. It’s a striking contrast to, for instance, Arab countries. The high level of religious attendance in Azerbaijan does not imply religious engagement with religious institutions.
Only a handful of Azeris acknowledged that they practice religion on a regular, weekly or daily, basis. CRRC asks a question “Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?” According to the 2011 data, which are presented in Table 4.3 only 4% of respondents gave an answer: “once a week or more often.” A little more, but still a minority, said that they practice religion in public institutions at least once a month. An average Azeri Muslim goes to mosques and shrines only occasionally, predominantly during Islamic holidays.
Table 4.3Attendance of religious services, 2011. Source: CRRC, “Religiosity in South Caucasus” (2013)
How often do you attend religious services nowadays?
Once a week or more often 4%
At least once a month 10%
Only on special holidays 30%
Never 26%
Survey data collected by the CRRC show also the extent of secularization another interesting point. Survey findings summarized in Table 4.4, which describe religious practices, show ambiguity in the patterns of religiosity. It turned out that even if people obey some of the basic orthodox religious requirements they do not necessarily fulfil other duties. Let us focus on one activity—visiting holy places. As the data indicate, fewer people admit to attending mosques on a regular basis than to praying or fasting. So, if we relied only on this one indicator of religiosity, we could conclude that the level of religious engagement is indeed very low. Is Azerbaijan, in that respect, similar to Western countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands or Switzerland, as the data from World Values Survey show? Some comments are necessary here. First of all, religious practices should not unconditionally be compared with one another. In orthodox Islam there are five duties—the so-called Five Pillars of Islam—that are said to be obligatory for believing Muslims. Apart from confessing their faith (shahada), and making a pilgrimage (hajj), Muslims are required to observe ritual fasting (sawm), to give alms to the poor (zakat), and to perform ritual prayer (known as salat or namaz).
Unlike in Christianity, attending religious ceremonies at formal institutions is not so much underlined in Islam. Visiting mosques for prayer is not a duty of a religious Muslim—salat must be performed at a convenient place five times per day (according to Sunni tradition) or three (in Shiite tradition). Mosque prayer is only recommended by imams and other Muslim clerics, who refer to the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad to come to mosque as often as possible and to gather there especially for the Friday communal prayer. However, this recommendation is valid only for grown-up men; women and children are generally neither encouraged to nor discouraged from taking part in Friday ceremonies. This factor can partially account for the low level of religious attendance. An exception—important in our case—is the current political activity in Azerbaijan against the most active Sunni communities, which has resulted in the closing of some of the most popular mosques in the capital and elsewhere. For Salafi Muslims, the few Sunni mosques in Baku are too small to accommodate everybody. For that reason, women are now directly discouraged from attending. At the Lezghi mosque in the Old City the women’s section has been taken over by men.
Table 4.4The percentage of people in Azerbaijan following religious practices. The data are classified according to the frequency of a given practice. Source: Data Initiative CRRC (2007–2008).
How often do you attend holy places?
Every day 5.0%
More than once a week 2.3%
Once a week 3.5%
At least once a month 7.0%
Only on special holidays 35.6%
Less often 19.8%
Never 26.9%
How often do you fast?
Always 15.2%
Often 9.0%
Sometimes 23.2%
Rarely 20.8%
Never 31.2%
Fasting is not required by my religion 0.6%
How often do you pray?
More than once a week 16.9%
Once a week 1
.5%
At least once a month 4.9%
Only on special holidays or less often 51.6%
Never 25.2%
Another crucial issue in the whole post-Soviet context is the phenomenon known as the privatization of religion. It is rooted in the context of the atheistic communist era, when an open struggle with religious institutions and religious expression took place. For that reason, religion “went underground.” States’ campaigns against Islam have made a huge impact on some social groups. They still continue to carry out religious rituals as they used to do in the past, when the number of mosques was extremely limited and visiting them was strongly discouraged. The communists did not manage to eradicate religious sentiments, but, as a result of their actions, fasting, praying and performing religious rites, such as circumcision and weddings, were often held secret.
Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan Page 14