The second layer of Turkish Islam has less-official and more diverse forms. Turkey-based religious groups, such as nurchular or Topbas are very active, although their finances do not come from the Turkish state. Osman Topbas founded the Azerbaijani Youth Aid Foundation, which provides help to refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh and was also involved in the construction of a branch of Baku Islamic University (International Crisis Group, 2008). The most prominent Turkish movement that found supporters among Azerbaijanis and Central Asian Muslims is known as nurcular, which is rooted in the Said Nursi’s (1873–1960) teachings. Currently they are spread mostly in the interpretation of his student, a charismatic preacher from the city of Izmir, Fethullah Gülen (b. 1938)33. Followers of that intellectual tradition, known also as fethullahci or as the Hizmet movement34, form very active social networks and constitute a highly influential religious segment in Turkey and abroad. Although the Hizmet is active since 1960s, it was not until 1990s that is gained transnational character and began exporting its ideology and establishing various initiatives in hundreds of countries outside Turkey. Unlike the mystic cult of Sufi brotherhoods, or more ritualistic and strict Salafism, Turkish Islam, including its nurchu version, puts more emphasis on the ethical side of religion. Craving for spiritual and ethical development has a high priority. Such focus does not mean that rituals are considered to be unnecessary. Turkish pious interpretation of Islam is rather a combination of ethics, religious orthodoxy and modernity. Political topics are generally avoided, at least in the public discourse, in line with the example of Said Nursi, who in spite of being a fierce critic of Kemal Atatüre’s secularization policies, never directly got involved in politics. It shall be however remembered that large social movements can hardly be homogeneous, so it is almost impossible to present their concepts and activities in a very comprehensive and systematic way. Gülen’s supporters often underline that the ideas they present are their interpretations of the leader. There are some arguments against fethullahci that the group has a hidden agenda of planning a coup d’état or that it’s building a state inside the state, but no evidence is presented. Those who publicly speak in favour of Gülen’s teachings stress their distance from politicised Islam. A Board Member of the Gülen Institute and a scientist—Dr. Y. Alp Aslandogan (2012)—advocates the need for a truly democratic state that allows a peaceful coexistence of various cultures and religions. Religion shall not interfere with politics, since such a relationship is harmful to both sides. However, strictly secular ideology is also unacceptable. As a result of kemalism that renounced any aspect of religion and treated religion as an opposition to rationality and progress, observant Muslims suffered discrimination.
By employing the term “modern orthodoxy” to Turkish Islam I wanted to point to a parallel, but more well-researched phenomenon—an identifiable trend among contemporary Orthodox movements in Judaism (which function alongside Conservative and Reform traditions), namely so-called “Modern Orthodox Judaism.” Although all Orthodox Jews claim that halakhah (Jewish religious law) is crucial to Judaism, they differ in their dress codes, attitudes to secular environment, and interpretations of some rulings of law. In Europe, modern orthodox model of Judaism was articulated by a rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808–1888) already in the 19th century. A basic dogma, which was developed in a discussion with other Jewish traditions, opened a possibility for an observing Jew to study secular sciences. Hirsch did not only approve of the coexistence of religion and modern science. He claimed much more—that the real message of the Torah could be found through secular studies. There is also another crucial theme in Hirsch’s teachings: “a distinction between what the modern Jew needed to render unto Caesar and what he or she needed to render unto God” (Levenson, 2006, p. 42). In other words, he supported the idea of “cultural, political, and intellectual assimilation and strict observance of the mitzvot” (commandments) (ibidem). Finally, a liberal approach towards living in a secular democratic country and tolerance to other faiths and denominations are characteristic of modern orthodox Jews. The similarity of habitus between this Jewish model and Islam of Nursi’s followers whom I met in Baku was striking to me. Even though many people are not directly accustomed with Nursi or Gülen’s writings, they share this Jewish openness to secularity, modernity and science with a rigorous observance of religious law, rules, and rituals. Their ideology is progressive and futureoriented, but at the same time rooted in tradition. For Gülen tradition, in his interpretation, is crucial in forging the Muslim identity and in undertaking intercultural or inter religious dialogues. Muslims that engage in the global world shall be self-conscious Muslims with a good knowledge of their roots. A knowledgeable and confident attitude is a pre-requisite for dialogue. This aspect of linking past heritage with globalization is a feature that distinguishes Gülen from many contemporary Muslim intellectuals living in the West that look for a Muslim identity that fully encompasses Western world views.
Sometimes referred to as neo-Sufism, Nursi’s teachings are rooted in the ideas of Nakşibendi and Kadiri Sufi orders. Nursi’s students and followers belonged to Nur Talebeleri (followers of light)—an organizational hierarchical structure that bore a resemblance to a Sufi order. Soon they became known as the “Nurcu movement.” The most well-known of his books, the opus magnum known as the “Risale-i Nur” (The Epistles of Light) has 6000 pages. In this Islamic exegesis, Nursi presents his ideas, suggesting they had been sent to him from God. In his publications Nursi aimed to accomplish his socio-political vision for the post-Ottoman Turkey. He endeavoured to increase the Muslim identity and religious consciousness, to revitalize the faith among people. This call to Muslims to search for a religious dimension in everyday life was in stark contrast with the dominant secular ideology of the Turkish state. Nursi also contested the content of education, which he perceived as too atheistic and positivistic, leaving no place for religious outlook. In the search for an optimal educational model, he was arguing in favour of reconciling scientific achievements with broad Islamic principles. The teachings of the Koran were, in his view, multi-layered enough to leave ample room for various interpretations. He saw no contradiction between personal freedom and religion, as well as between tradition and modernity. Nursi’s achievement lies in adapting Islamic concepts to the changes in contemporary world, particularly in aligning Islam with the human rights discourse, science, inter religious dialogue and the acceptance of state institutions with the rule of law. An ideal Muslim was someone who was pious and at the same time not fanatical, someone accepting progress, but not forgetting about religious reality permeating all aspects of reality (Yavuz, 2000, p. 7). As Dale F. Eickelman argues (2007): “The life of Said Nursi and the Risale-i Nur thoroughly exemplify modernity (…), not least because by personal example Nursi stimulated individual critical thought and reflection on how to think about justice, morality, and personal responsibility. (….) Nursi’s writings and life suggest by example how religion and reason are compatible, although this compatibility requires struggle and pragmatism.”
Table 5.2Turkish High Schools, their staff and students in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Source: Yavuz (2008).
a)Baskurtistan, Siberia, Russia, Cuvasia, Crimea, Karacay.
The contemporary Turkish tradition in Azerbaijan is to a large extent the religion of urban, educated, and mostly young people. The channels enabling the diffusion of the Turkish model are diverse: educational institutions, business circles, sermons at Turkish mosques, religious literature, mass media, and social networks. In Azerbaijan, religious figures occasionally appear on TV. There was, for example, an operating TV channel “Samanyolu,” and a newspaper “Zaman” which are regarded as close to the Gülen Movement (Hasanov, 2003). However, the main channel of diffusion and the main priority of the movement is education. Educational networks of the fethullahci function in every major Azerbaijani city. However, the institutions are often loosely connected with each other. There is no a single uniform model that such initiatives shall
follow.
Educational institutions related to Turkey in Central Asia and Azerbaijan have mushroomed in the last decade. The Turkish Ministry of Education has established eighteen high schools in the whole region, whereas people close to Fethullah Gülen founded 129 high schools and several universities (Yavuz, 2000, p. 126). Muhammed Çeton (2008) warns against using the term “Gülen schools,” which suggests a similarity in terms of organizational structure and methodology employed, as it is, for instance, in the case of a network of Montessori schools. It’s more proper to speak of Gülen-inspired schools and other initiatives, which again reminds one of the lack of rigid form of this movement. Table 5.2 shows the number of schools, teachers, and administrators from Turkey, as well as the number of students in those republics of the former USSR where this phenomenon is most advanced. Success of these schools is not related to religion, because the curriculum is strictly secular and the emphasis is put on empowering young people to take leadership positions in various fields: as teachers, judges, engineers, lawyers, doctors, etc. Programs offered in Turkish schools have much higher quality than in an average public school and much stronger emphasis is placed on physical sciences than it is in average school. Another advantage is that the language of instruction is English. The Caucasus University, which is supported by the fethullahci movement, is one of the best universities in Azerbaijan. Altogether, these factors account for the exceptionally good position of graduates on local and international market places and prepare them to leadership functions in public life. In this process, a new kind of elite is being formed which may, in the future, delegitimize the existing status quo, as it is already visible in Turkey, with “an intra-class battle between old and new elites” (Hendrick, 2009, p. 345). Later I will try to explain how these educational networks influence youth’s religiosity and worldview.
5.3Reformism
Another contemporary interpretation of Islam and its role in society is developed by reform-oriented Muslims. They have been making a conscious effort to redefine religious ideology and practice. An example of this approach has already been mentioned in regard to the Shiite Juma mosque community led by Imam Ibrahimoglu. Proponents of reformism believe it is an imperative to rethink Islamic heritage and adapt Islamic religion to the new conditions of the modern and globalizing world. In their efforts to change some elements of Islam and Islamic culture, the actors indirectly refer to the global tendency of Islamic modernism, which originated in the 19th century, when the Muslim world was confronted with more developed Western societies. Moreover, this tradition, as being opposed to “Modern Orthodoxy,” bears resemblance to the Reform Jewish Movement, known also as Liberal or Progressive. In Judaism, the basic defining feature of reformism is the rejection of the binding nature of law. Since its conception, representatives of this trend have tried to bring its societal norms and values into greater conformity with those of the non-Jewish majority of society (see Steinberg, 1965).
This reformist-modernist approach to Islam originated in Azerbaijan during the Russian colonization and was subsequently reworked under communist rule. This tradition is still noticeable nowadays and receives quite a lot of public attention, albeit it’s influence on society at the moment is rather limited. For modernists, it is not the piety that receives a lot of attention. Their approach to religion is more intellectual and ethical. There are two distinct groups that represent this reformist understanding of Islam in Azerbaijan. One of them is a group of clergy centred around the Caucasus Muslim Board and the sheikh-ul-islam. Already in Soviet times these institutions undertook a program of modernization of Islam. At that time it meant struggling with folk “impure” aspects of religion (this aspect is today typical of the Salafi ideology), the backwardness of mullas, and the cruelty of public celebration of ʿĀšūrāʾ. At present, the idea of change is visible among some members of the official religious hierarchy. The Muslim Board and the Islamic University have seriously undertaken work to lessen the Shia-Sunni divisions. This way of redefining Islamic sectarianism has a long tradition in Azerbaijan, and would probably lead to success if it weren’t for the revivalist movements that raise awareness of conflictual issues between Islamic traditions.
The clearest example of reforming the Shiite tradition and bringing it closer to Sunnism is the official clergy’s stance toward ʿĀšūrāʾ commemoration of Imam Husayn’s martyrdom. Attempts at changing forms and meanings of Shiite rituals were made repeatedly in the past under the slogan of modernizing religion. In recent years, the Kadee Council of the Caucasian Muslim Board issued official fatwas before the month of Muḥarram. These statements, announced publicly in national newspapers and Internet, confirm the sacred, solemn, and tragic character of that month. The fatwas remind believers about some basic duties, obligations and restrictions derived from religion (for example, that it is forbidden to hold battles, organize weddings or parties during Muḥarram). Fatwas have several layers. One of these is the educational project. There is always a short information reminding the faithful about the meaning of ʿĀšūrāʾ (that the Imam Husayn and supporters of ahl al-bayt were killed on that day). Another function of the fatwas is strictly political and concerns strengthening the Azerbaijani identity. There is usually a call to commemorate at this occasion the martyrs who died for the liberation of Azerbaijan. Finally, the aspect that is crucial for our topic—Islamic reform. Fatwas issued by the official clergy are directed against the “essence” of traditional Shiite ceremonial life, which was revived after 1991 and gained significant support in some segments of the society.35 Every year, dozens of people gather on the day of ʿĀšūrāʾ, chanting the name of Huseyn. some of them whip themselves with sharp chains or cut themselves with knives. The popular ritualistic flogging, so often observed in Shiite communities all over the world, is considered to be haram by the Azerbaijani official clergy. Sheikh-ul-islam frequently underlines that the martyrdom of Imam Huseyn should be understood in another, “right” manner. In order to pay respect to those killed at Karbala, the scholars invite Muslims to participate in actions of blood donation, which are held during the month of Muḥarram. Thus, blood can serve humanitarian purposes. Such actions are organized annually at the Taza Pir—the central mosque in Baku. As this redefinition of ʿĀšūrāʾ is a recommendation of the official Muslim hierarchy, akhunds at mosques should “increase consciousness” of believers to make them aware of what is “proper,” and what is not. Such actions constitute powerful tools in reinterpreting the Shia ideology as well as changing the ritualistic sphere. Let us take a look at one example of an implementation of the reform—a few sentences from a public speech of a Shiite imam from Baku:
It is haram and sin to feast during Muḥarram. The religious figures must summon the people to avoid celebrations on these days. (…) Muslims all over the world are commemorating these days in a special manner. We also have to behave worthy in accordance with our national-spiritual values (Old City, 2009).
Apart from the official religious hierarchy, other actors are engaged in modernizing the traditional flagellation ritual. Some religious communities independently organize blood donation actions as an alternative to the “useless” shedding of blood during Muḥarram rituals. A prominent Shiite reformist, Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, is one of the supporters of the change in the character of popular Shiite tradition. As the “Juma community” website states, this group, together with an organization “Islam Ittihad,” has organized a program of blood donations for the child victims of thalassemia and hemophilia. A series of seminars on this topic were held with doctors, journalists and parents of sick children to promote volunteer principles and to encourage people to participate in the program. Such initiatives can be seen as the signs of civil society. But this example shows another interesting process. Ibrahimoglu’s activities are politically opposing the actions of the sheikh-ul-islam and his people. Tense relations between the Juma community and the official Shia hierarchy are manifested in many ways. However, somehow indirectly their actions sha
re some similarities. People’s practices are always embedded in the context, in local problems, discourses, flows of ideas. They develop in interactions with the political and socio-cultural environment and cannot be judged independently.
The creative process of redefinition of Islam involves an adaptation of its public manifestations to the needs of a modern state. Thus, a religious official strategy is to shape a base for the national model of Islamic religion and culture (Motika, 2001). This process is increasingly evident as strong nationalist feelings are on the increase in the post-Soviet states. In order to forge national Islam, Azerbaijani clergy oppose foreign missionaries and religious leaders educated abroad. The hierarchy wants to control and influence the ideas that are disseminated among Azeri people, which in the context of globalization and the Internet is a very tough task. As the sheikh-ul-islam has, at least in theory, control over the nomination of imams and akhunds of local mosques, he promotes people who strictly support his point of view. National Islam is supposed to have a definitely moderate and non-radical character. An idyllic image that the sheikh and his people promote stresses religious tolerance and a peaceful life of Muslims in a secular, democratic country. This perspective is shared by the state authorities. Islam, in a national form, is understood as a part of heritage, that has positively contributed to the development of Azerbaijani nation and culture (Atayev, 2002). Presidents publicly show their attachment to Islam. Heydar Aliyev, for instance, went on the hajj and used to visit mosques during religious holidays. His son, who is in power since his father’s death in 2003, continues such policy. Generally, common interests in shaping the Azerbaijani version of Islamic culture between official spiritual leaders and the state representatives predominate.
Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan Page 19