Another argument places an emphasis on the gradual development of monotheistic religion, which resulted in the appearance of Islam. Judaism and Christianity are viewed as intermediary phases of the religious development. “Islam is not the perfect religion just because we think so. People themselves cannot judge such issues. It is because Allah said that Islam is the last and full Revelation. The Koran contains everything that the Creator wanted us to know,” a haji explained. According to this idea, earlier religions were supposed to prepare the faithful to embrace the final words of God that came with the Koran. One of my interlocutors compared this process to school education; to enter the university one has to pass several classes in lower institutions and gradually get prepared. Similarly, people had to experience Judaism and then Christianity to be able to understand and adopt Islam.
The conviction that Islam is true is also based on the belief that “the logic of the Koran should be obvious for every person, especially the educated ones,” as I was told. Once non-Muslims get unbiased information about Islam, they will undoubtedly accept it. To make this statement more reliable, Muslims give examples of famous Christians from Western countries who converted to Islam. Converts do not only find the real truth, but, additionally, as a kind of reward, have half of their sins automatically forgiven. Some Muslims believe that Michael Jackson, who committed a grave sin of plastic surgery, had, after his conversion, a chance to go to Heaven. I have also been told many times of the massive turn to Islam in Russia. Allegedly every day Christians visit mosques to change their faith. One discussion I held with a group of Muslims on this topic ended with a suggestion that the reason I have not accepted Islam so far is that I did not read the Koran carefully enough.
Another argument used in the polemics with Christians is as follows: Islam is considered to be superior to other religions because of its humanitarianism. One friend of mine explored the topic:
Islam takes into account everything that can happen to a human being. Life events are very complex sometimes, and Islam knows the psychology of people and takes it into consideration. There are strict rules in our religion, but in extreme situations they become flexible. For example, pork is forbidden for us, but when a person is facing starvation and he has only a pig, he can eat it without committing a sin. Similarly, if a woman cannot have a child, her husband, instead of divorcing her, can marry a second woman for the sake of the family.
This argument that Islam takes care of human weaknesses and is applicable to all life situations was mentioned quite often in regard to the Islamic law. When I pointed to some aspects raising controversies in Europe I was usually given an answer that some regulations have only one purpose—to guide people in extreme or unusual situations. These are not everyday solutions.
Finally, Muslims have to deal with the question of the lower level of socio-economic development of Islamic societies. In order to account for this situation, many religious Muslims point to the ignorance of Islamic religion among believers. The myth of the Golden Age of Islam in its first centuries, when Muslims societies were thriving, is evoked. The Muslim world should undertake reforms to be able to excel once again in science and cultural achievements. The reasons for contemporary difficulties lie not in Islam but in the lack of faith and knowledge among believers. The revival of Islam will open another Golden Era for Muslims and humanity.
These claims are used by Azerbaijani Muslims to legitimize the superiority of Islam over other faiths. People use some variants of those arguments to get rid of possible doubts that arise in the encounter with other religions. However, as I have already remarked, the intra-religious discourse, concerning especially the differences between Shiism and Sunnis, is less frequently called forth.
Exclusivist and Inclusivist Approaches
The common practice among Azerbaijani Muslims of justifying their religious decision by a reference to the freedom of choice can be understood as representing the model of religious inclusiveness opposed to exclusiveness. These are the two basic forms of response to the challenge of diversity and uncertainty in a social environment. Inclusivist strategies involve at least a certain degree of social interaction between people representing different religious groups. They take two forms. One is based on a conviction that all religions and religious forms are acceptable but Islam has some advantages; the second does not assume any kind of superiority. The first strategy can be illustrated by the following quotation from a young Muslim’s narrative about Islam:
In reality, religion is only one. Jewish, Christian and Muslim religions is the same. God is the same, rules are the same. What makes Islam different from Christianity is only the form. It is not the most crucial thing, but here lies the difference. It is like with a computer and a software. If somebody uses Windows and regards it as a good system, then he will be attached to it. But, when an updated version appears, some people will eagerly install it. In religion, a new version means an easier way towards God. It does not mean that previous “editions” were wrong. Updates give us new opportunities. What’s more, the choice of a new version seems to be obvious—it is a question of common sense and rational judgment of a situation.
All monotheistic religions are perceived to be true, the only difference is that Islam offers something more to believers. There is, thus, a kind of superiority of Islamic religion. Those who follow other religions are tolerated, but frowned upon a little as lacking the proper level of rationality. But there is a space for socializing and discussions.
The other inclusivist model was usually expressed in the form of arguments such as those of my informants: “God is one, but there are many paths to Him,” “Catholics, Baptists, Muslims, Jews pray to the same God but in different languages.” In this approach it is believed that all truly religious people, regardless of their specific religion, have a chance to reach heaven. When people talk about Sunnism and Shiism they frequently point to the long tradition of co-existence and tolerance of both groups and underline the common features, e. g., a Shia girl told me that the most important for her is being a Muslim. Concerning the division in Islam she compared it to two “models or schools” that have the same source—the Koran. As with many other Muslims I talked to about this issue, she noted that the most important is what unites all Muslims, i. e., the belief in God. An implication of such an inclusivist attitude is the lack of the need of a missionary strategy.
How do the inclusivist strategies influence the religious situation? Many Muslims admit to being interested in the opinions of Muslims holding different convictions. They engage in dialogs and debates which enable them to increase their knowledge about religion. The problem is mainly with one group—Salafi. Some Shiite communities used to invite them, as the main opponents, to public debates, but Salafis refused. They were not ready for confrontations on Shiites’ conditions. From time to time some organizations manage to gather both Sunni and Shia Muslims, who act, pray, and discuss religious issues with each other. Some members of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia attend congresses and seminars where they discuss problematic issues. But there are also meetings in a more private space, especially at homes or tea houses. Once I was invited to have a discussion with a group of Muslim men who hold active debates in the religious section of an Azeri Internet forum. All of those who came were Sunnis, including one “moderate Salafi” (as others called him), and one follower of Sufism. Even though they disagreed on some issues, such as the missionary activities in Azerbaijan or an attitude to non-Muslim religions, they had a chance to get to know each other’s point of view and to refine their arguments used in the competition. When I was asking people a question about the effects of such discussions, they used to say that they enabled the search for common points in various approaches to Islam. Such debates or just simple conversations demand from people that they learn more about religion to be able to justify their opinions. Some believers changed their opinions in religious matters under the influence of more convincing arguments. Others have managed to convince th
eir interlocutors to their version.
In case when a Muslim group isolates itself from the rest of the society, the increase in religiosity takes place differently. In Azerbaijan, an exclusivist approach and strategies are characteristic of the Salafi community. Although a few Salafis agreed to meet with me, the general impression in the society is that this group rejects any confrontations. Their basic assumption is that only their tradition possesses the final truth from God. A professor told me that in the past he used to meet with Salafis and endeavoured to hold debates. But soon he realized that there was no point in it, since they reject all other understandings of Islam and “blindly believe in their truth and ideas.” At the beginning of their activity in the country Salafis were much more ready to meet. As political and public pressure around them grew, they soon changed their strategy. Instead of engaging in pointless, from their point of view, discussions, they create an image of the most pious Muslims who are closer to God than other Muslims by following the behavior of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. They have chosen a strict faith accompanied by pious behavior, which they express by doing namaz (allegedly 5 times a day) and wearing “proper Islamic clothes.” In the face of competition from other religious groups, Salafis have to prove their uniqueness by showing an above average level of religiosity.
There are also people who accept both approaches, inclusivist and exclusivist, at the same time. In a conversation about prospects of salvation for non-Muslims an akhund of a Shia mosque made a distinction on the basis of options available to a person. He said:
If an old woman lives in a remote part of Siberia, or in a Polish village, and has no chance of getting information about the true Islamic religion, she will not go to hell. But when a person is educated, as you are, knows what Islam is, and consciously rejects it, there will be no hope for her or him.
Chapter 7
Religious Competition
There is an intense competition for the minds and souls of Muslims going on in the vast areas of the post-socialist lands. This struggle is unequal. Groups and movements have various resources, various amounts and forms of capitals. Some have the support of a political power, some operate illegally. Some belong to international networks, some are independent products of the local situation. Some produce religious teachings that more persuasive to the masses, apply to their sensibilities, respond to the mentalities and world views. Some are attractive only to few intellectuals. Let us take a closer look at the mechanism of this struggle in contemporary Azerbaijan, where the multiple pious movements present an attractive alternative to secular worldviews and where the historical dominance of Shiism and its culture is now being challenged by the Sunni interpretation of Islam.
7.1Official and Unofficial Islam
Until the end of the Soviet rule contacts with the supernatural sphere in Muslim Central Asia and the Caucasus were shared between two groups of local religious specialists representing the so-called “official” (mainly Shiite) and “unofficial” (both Shia and Sunni) Islam characterized earlier. For a long time, they were the only competitors for spiritual influence among believers. In the post-Soviet era the struggle between them is less intense, as new circumstances emerged. The Shiite establishment directed its attention against new and more serious opponents. Moreover, the descendants of saints do not play an active part in this competition.
The arrival of foreign Islamic proselytizers radically changed the situation of the official hierarchy. Although the clergy managed to maintain their position even after the independence of Azerbaijan, they were forced to adapt their strategies to respond to the popularity of pious, less official religious groups and movements from such countries as Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Turkey. Before focusing on the methods employed in this competition, a short background on the organizational aspect of Islam is necessary. The formal administration structures consist of the Caucasus Muslim Board, which has survived the political transformation and, since 1980, is continuously headed by the same person—Islamic scholar and cleric, sheikh-ul-islam Allahshukur Pashazade. The Board controls a significant part of religious institutions, especially the majority of active mosques and educational institutions.
Haji Surhay Mamedov, an officially appointed akhund of the Juma mosque in Icheri Sheher, eagerly explained to me an institutional aspect of religion in this country. There are three crucial positions in Islam in Azerbaijan nowadays: a mulla, an akhund, and the sheikh-ul-islam. A mulla is traditionally occupied with leading life rituals, such as a birth of a child, marriage ceremonies, or funerals. But titles are context-dependent: their meanings change, he added. Outside Azerbaijan, a mulla means also a teacher or a scholar. In this country, the term akhund is a title of a person who graduated from an Islamic academy or university and specializes in Islamic theology and law. Such a scholar is then a candidate for the head of one of mosques operating under the jurisdiction of the Muslim Board. Sheikh-ul-islam is the highest title in the hierarchy of the Azerbaijani clergy. This term denotes a religious leader but in the Azerbaijani context—a person who represents all Muslims of the Caucasus. According to haji Mamedov, the title “sheikh-ul-islam” also means the highest religious authority. When an akhund cannot find an answer to a religious question, he addresses the sheikh, who issues fatwas and explains all ambiguities. He has a lot of autonomy and even the president cannot dismiss him. The only possibility to change a person in charge of the Board is the general consent of all akhunds in the country, which is hardly an imaginable option. The title “sheikh-ul-islam” in an equivalent to “ayatollah,” with the difference that in Azerbaijan there is only one sheikh and in Iran there are numerous ayatollahs. The akhund explained this by pointing to the religious nature of an Iranian state and an increased demand for religious scholars. If Azeris were as religious as Iranians then many more religious teachers would be needed. It is worth noting that Mamedov’s account of the situation in the Caucasus omits the Sunni religious institutions, as well as the religious figures acting outside of the official network. He did not mention dervishes, who actively participate in some wedding rituals and continue the long tradition of the Azerbaijani classical music known as mugham (Naroditskaya, 2004). As if the only reality that exists was the official reality organized and managed by the sheikh-ul-islam and his clerics.
Shiite akhunds are the only people who hold the sheikh-ul-islam as the highest religious authority in the country. All other people I met, both Shia and Sunni, were more or less critical of him, as well as of people holding other positions (of a mulla or an akhund). Religious people regard local mullas as uneducated, regressive, and ignorant people. The mullas in Azerbaijan too often lack even the basic skills required to lead a religious community or do their tasks such as conducting a funeral ceremony in a proper way. The following story from my interview with a journalist illustrates this point very well:
Figure 7.1 Taza Pir mosque in Baku Maybe you have noticed a nearby large cemetery. Inside you can find our mullas, “specialists” in Islamic rituals. Once I was there with my father, who pointed to one mulla walking among graves and said: “10 years ago he was a drunkard.” Then my father noticed another mulla and remarked: “And that one was in prison.” Those allegedly religious people have no education. They have no idea of Arabic language nor of the Koran. They only manage to learn a few prayers by heart and recite them during ceremonies.
A Persian proverb likewise expresses the sentiments surrounding mullas nowadays (Fisher, Michael, 2003, p. 136):
How easy to become a mullah [learned],
How hard to become Adam [a man].
Faxri Xiyəbani Cemetery—Cemetery of the Honoured Ones—resembles a quiet, peaceful park offering a welcome rest from the noisy and fast life of a metropolis. Here many prominent Azeri public figures, artists, scholars, sportsmen and politicians are buried. The shapes of the monuments commemorating the deceased are among the most extraordinary I have ever seen. The monuments and drawings are realistic and depict the appearance and job of th
e person in the grave in detail. The most famous is the gravestone of the late president Heydar Alieyev, constantly attracting official visits. And indeed, there are few mullahs in religious attire strolling around the cemetery. One can ask them to say a prayer for a dead relative or friend.
The official religious structures are widely considered to be the remnants of the Soviet structure. The common accusation that believers raise is the communist past of people in charge of Islamic institutions and their links with secret services. Allahshukur Pashazade, a Talysh born in Lenkoran in 1949, is considered to be a pragmatist and opportunist who has always been too close to the political power that is willing to support his religious presidency. His loyalist attitude began already in the Soviet era. The Caucasus Muslim Board is widely regarded as an organization controlled in the past by the KGB, and nowadays the clerical establishment is accused of having collaborated with the Soviets. People generally do not trust them and therefore do not ask them for help or advice. During my visit to the Juma mosque, the akhund answered several phone calls, but the questions were pragmatic and simple. They asked about the time of prayer on that particular day, as the timing changes every day, and nothing more serious. During my research I encountered only two women that expressed a more nuanced attitude to the sheikh. They admitted that he is a “real Shia and a wise person; he knows how to talk in a diplomatic fashion and knows how to take care of his personal interest—it is incredible that he managed to maintain his position despite of the change of the regime and of subsequent presidents.”
Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan Page 25