The Salafis chief element of religious capital is the simplicity and integrity of their doctrine. Salafi main activists and leaders not only know religion very well and have good education from prestigious Islamic universities, but also know how to present Islam in an attractive way. During a discussion I held with the girl from the shop I mentioned earlier, I suggested that following the Islamic religion must be a tough thing due to numerous rules and obligations. She disagreed and said that it is the other way round: “It is the most true and the simplest way to God.” The precision of norms makes a religious path easier. You follow the rules, and you get closer to God. No ambiguities, no shades. At Salafi mosques those people feel comfortable. They are convinced that Islam provides answers to any imaginable question. The rules, described precisely in numerous books available in Azeri and Russian, are easily understood and demanding at the same time. People feel that they have to invest an important part of their life, but they know what they can expect “in return”. The Salafi strategy of exclusivism additionally reinforces the conviction that they are following the right, “straight way.” A well-developed polemical discourse pointing to numerous “mistakes” found in all non-Salafi traditions is quickly internalized by new followers. A central point in the discourse is the mediation between God and the believers, which is unacceptable for any Sunni. Using this argument, they oppose pilgrimages to holy shrines and at the same time the hierarchy of the Shiite clergy. Another effective Salafi idea used in competition with others is the stress on the universalistic qualities of religion. A lot of my Salafi respondents were reluctant to answer the question whether they identify themselves as Shia or Sunni Muslims. Although their support for Salafism, as well as their opposition to the Shiite tradition, was clearly visible, Salafi Muslims were above all stressing that they are “just Muslims.” Their variant of religion is believed to transcend all Islamic sects and traditions.
Salafi preachers from the Gulf States first appeared in the early 1990s. The most popular was Gamet Suleymanov, who was appointed as a first imam of the Abu Bakr mosque in 1998. The mosque was financed by a Kuwaiti organization, The Revival of Islamic Heritage, but the mosque’s activities were to be covered by the visitors themselves, as the imam assured in a press interview (Gamet, 2008). Suleymanov’s main capital was a diploma of the World Islamic University of Medina. One of his supporters described him in the following way: “He is a respected and good scholar, intelligent enough to present arguments in a tangible and right way.” Moreover, he has been adapting the Salafi tradition to the secular context of Azerbaijan. Instead of struggling with the Muslim Board over Islamic radicalism, he admitted that the problem exists. Since that time his community is actively acting against it.
An important remark in the discussion over Salafism has been made by a careful observer of this phenomenon, Anar Valiyev (Valiyev, 2008). In his opinion, the presence of a mostly moderate Islamic group and a hostility to religious extremism among Azerbaijani people may influence the Salafi tradition. There are some signs suggesting that Salafi strategies have been changing towards the acceptance of some aspects of secular state with its law. Besides, instead of calls for the politicization of religion, Salafi leaders discourage their followers from engaging in politics. In order to prove that they are also fighting against radicalism, they even expelled from their community Salafi radicals ready to employ all kinds of methods in a struggle against infidels. This move was appreciated by many Salafi Muslims who fear religious extremism and are interested mostly in spiritual and moral aspects of Islamic religion. For many of them secular law is not only acceptable, but they see it as the only possible solution to governance.
Turkish Islam
Apart from Salafism, Sunni Islam is on the rise also due to the Turkish Islam. It benefits from the pro-Turkish sentiments in Azerbaijan. There was not a single day during my stay in Baku without media coverage of Turkey or Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan are widely recognized and respected, even in spite of Azerbaijani’s opposition to Turkish-Armenian endeavours to normalize their diplomatic and political relations. The recent decline of trust and confidence between Azeri and Turkish politicians has not changed the feeling in society that Turkey is brother country and the natural ally. They speak a similar language and Turkish literature, TV, and movies are easily understood. Turkish soap operas are extremely popular among Azerbaijanis. In the apartment I stayed in, the Turkish channel was on at least few times a week.41
The secular character of post-Soviet Azeris creates a demand for a brand of religion that takes into account the tradition of separation between religious and political spheres. Although orthodox Islam does not allow for such distinction, Muslims in many countries have been experiencing with secular governance. Turks, under the leadership of the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), set an example to follow. Turkish religious capital was thus built upon the social need for spiritual experience and for respect of secular habits at the same time. Another advantage they possessed in spreading their ideas was a political capital and a proactive attitude of the state authorities in the first phase of the transformation. Although the situation has changed, Turkish missionaries managed to make inroads into the Azerbaijani society.
One might expect that the Sunnism of Salafi and Turkish groups would be an obstacle in a predominantly Shia society. However, the low level of Sunni-Shia competition during communism enabled Sunni preachers to successfully target both groups. Lots of Azeri Shiites are not aware of the theological differences inside Islam. They do not know the history of religious sects. Haifza, who studies law at the Baku State University, comes from a family of secular Muslims. She could not say whether she is a Shia or Sunni, even though she had heard about these groups. When asked about her religious identity, she says she is “more Shia,” but could not give any reason for that. But her migration to Baku and subsequent university studies made her more knowledgeable in Islamic traditions. Although she is studying civil law and aspires to become a lawyer in a secular system, she is, indirectly, exposed to religious themes. During lectures and discussions in classes she gradually develops her religious identity. There was a Sunni teacher of law, who, during his course, was indirectly promoting his version of Islam. During one lesson, dealing with an issue irrelevant to Islam, he told students stories about the recent hajj, in which he had participated. In his coverage he was directly discrediting Shiites who took part in the pilgrimage. In his view, they behaved in a crazy way, determined to touch the Black Stone at the corner of the Kaʿba. Shiites, according to the teacher, do not pay attention to the people who fall down and die in the crowd. They behave as fanatics, obsessed with fulfilling a ritual. People without heart. People without human instincts. Hafiza was shocked. For her it as a grave sin not to help people because of a “stone.” She did not question his version. A professor’s version is more reliable than a simple story. The prestige of a university makes students more trustful towards what they hear during lectures. The teacher also pointed to some paradoxes that characterize Shia Muslims. For instance, they use muhur, on which they lay their forehead during namaz, because they regard it as a piece of sacred soil from Mecca (in fact, the soil for muhur should come from the regions where Shia Imams’ tombs are located, not from Mecca). If so, why to take muhur to the Holy Land, where everything is sacred—it is not logical, he said. During other lessons, the professor made students more familiar with the Sunni ideology, practice, and, above all, Sunni law. Hafiza and her friends treated the last aspect as a purely theoretical issue, since they are proud of the secular system of law in their country and cannot imagine having the religious law in Azerbaijan. The result of such hidden propaganda is that Hafiza is now convinced to follow the Sunni path in the future, but without forgetting some Shia beliefs, especially the belief in the Twelve Imams.
Turkish activists employ three kinds of capital useful in the intra-religious competition: religious (attractive religious outlook), materi
al (financial support of the Turkish state and independent Turkish businessmen) and political (support of the Azerbaijani government). The political capital turned out to be the least certain, as the Azerbaijani government has recently changed its stance on the issue of foreign religious preachers. Nevertheless, Turkey has taken advantage of initial favourable conditions and provided the funds for eight mosques in Azerbaijan, sent educated clergy that soon attracted a lot of people, and gave scholarships to the Azerbaijani youth for studying in their country. People working today at the Faculty of Theology at Baku State University have clear pro-Turkish inclinations, but not of all of them follow Hanafi rulings that are considered to be characteristic of Turkish Islam. One lecturer, who studied in Turkey for eight years, admitted that he had chosen a Shafii school for himself, but he is open to other schools as well. That was a conscious choice after years of readings and reflections. As in other modern pious traditions, Turkish Islam has been introducing new criteria for authority. High quality religious knowledge is a prerequisite for a religious leader. This scholar is often consulted by people, mostly students, about various practical aspects of Islam. They ask him, for instance, what is the proper way of conducting funeral. He presents answers of different schools, looks for examples, sometimes gives his opinions, which he calls fatwas. When he does not know the answer, he openly admits it. His knowledge and sincerity finds resonance among contemporary believers. The pious traditions must then compete with one another to have as educated and reasonable people as possible. Before the recent political actions that led to a closure of several popular mosques in the capital, the Salafi Abu Bakr mosque with its imams was most probable number one in regard to the number of believers, but Turkish Sunni mosques altogether might have had even more adherents.
Second channel of spreading of Turkish Islam is through some groups acting independently of Turkish authorities. The most distinct and strong one is the nurcu, or, in other words, fethullahci network. It does refrain from direct proselytism. Their Islamic missionary activities are more subtle and nuanced. Unlike Salafis, who have entered the public space and public debates, Gülen’s followers are discreet. The Nurcular community has a relatively large financial capital coming from businessmen supporting the movement’s ideas. The resources enable Gülen’s followers to spread his ideas in an unconventional way, mostly through a network of secular schools and universities that they established. They target future elites that are going to take up key positions in governance, military, business, etc. In Azerbaijan, they focus on the main cities and have proved capable of adapting to the urban lifestyle. Azeri students in Turkish schools socialize with Turkish people also outside educational structures. They are encouraged to visit Turkish restaurants, where they can have special discounts. The restaurants are adapted to religious orthodox requirements. There are special rooms with all necessary accessories, where Muslims may do their prayers. At one of the main educational centres of fethullahci, Baku Caucasus University, there are not many people wearing Muslim clothes, but their number is on the increase, as a professor from that university told me. This fact is attributed to two factors: first, that will be discussed later, is the unfavourable attitude of the state to religious expression in the public, second results from the movement’s strategy of Islam promotion. Fethullah Gülen encourages his followers to use the tactic of temsil, which means that a teacher invites to Islam not by speaking about it but merely by example. “There were teenagers in the school identified as elders who were doing namaz; we were supposed to consider them models and do everything that they were doing. That is how we all started to pray!” a former student at Fethullah Gülen School said (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 9).
The distinctive character of fethullahci, in regard to the types of capital and strategies, enables the community to pursue their activities without direct struggles with other groups. The target of Gülen’s disciples are intelligent young people, whose families can afford to invest a lot of money in their child’s education. Therefore, they accept people of different religious or secular backgrounds and shape their habitus during studies. To illustrate how temsil is put into practice, I will cite a story of a student of Caucasus University about one teacher that I already knew:
At that time I was not wearing a hijab. We expected a new teacher of economics. When we entered the class, he turned towards us and said: “Hi guys, I am your new teacher,” and he won our affections being so straightforward. We saw in his eyes his good personality. Do you know what “Nur” is? It means light. And there was such a light coming from him, a touch of spirituality.
People close to this tradition do not usually use the label nurchular outside their community. They prefer to call themselves simply “Muslims,” as Salafis do. They read and study Fethullah Gülen’s works and admire his activities in the field of religion and religious dialog. All in all, fethullahci’s strategies on the religious marketplace have proved successful. According to Goyushov (2008, p. 75), “thanks to their efforts, several thousand young urban Azeris of Shia origin began adopting Sunnism in the mid-1990s.”
Reformist Intellectuals
Azerbaijani Muslim intellectuals constitute another group that contributes to the process of Sunnitization. Although they do not act together, some of their propositions regarding redefinition of Islamic religion, which have already been mentioned, sound similar. The ideas of moderate Islam and a focus on faith and morality instead of orthodox rules and rituals might be appealing to many secular Azerbaijanis. However, apart from their religious capital and a special status in society, they do not possess tangible resources that their competitors have. Besides, the lack of material and social capital influences the weakness of their strategies in targeting the public.
Nevertheless, activists from other Muslim traditions respond to their liberal, reformist and anti-Islamist ideas, trying to prevent their spread in the very beginning. In 2005 a radical group called “Ahli-Beyt” related to the Haji Soltan Ali mosque in Baku declared jihad against Nariman Qasimoglu for his academic approach to convey the message of Islam. Jihad was announced during a sermon in the mosque. According to the scholar, his reformist ideas, placing the main emphasis on the Koran only were for some people inconsistent with Islam. There’s a lot of resistance to Qasimoglu’s ideas among Shiites, whose tradition he totally rejects. In an informal discussion after an interview at one Shia mosque, an akhund and his people strongly reacted to the scholar’s name, when I mentioned Qasimoglu’s translation of the Koran. The akhund called him “America’s secret agent.” One of men sitting around added that there are various forces in the world which help the “evil spread.” Then when I asked them whether Qasimoglu was a Muslim, an akhund answered: “Definitely not! He is an agent!” For orthodox pious Muslims reformist ideas rejecting the ritualistic side of Islam are not acceptable. Nevertheless, there is still a large target group that might be influenced by the local Muslim intellectuals. In public talks on the radio, TV, in essays in daily newspapers they show religion but without Shia accents. It is hard to evaluate now what influence their activities may have in the future, but if they are appreciated they will discourage people from following the Shia way. Thus, they may contribute to the rise of Sunnism among Azerbaijanis.
Figure 7.4 Nariman Qasimoglu delivering a lecture on Islam and environment; Baku, October 2009
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate the process of intra-religious competition between the main actors. In the case of religious suppliers most actively engaged in the struggle for the position on the market, competition leads to some changes in their strategies. Changes that follow involve not only social or structural aspects of religion, but also the content of religious teachings. It is especially clear in the official Shiite establishment which has to face various opponents representing pious traditions and gaining mass support. Also, the groups and missionaries from abroad have to find their target group and mobilize resources to develop strategies to
win as much as possible in the competition. The clear trend that has recently been emerging is the Sunnitization of Azerbaijani Muslims, who had always been strongly exposed to Iranian Shiism. In contrast to the official clerical hierarchy, Sunni suppliers do not possess an extensive institutional infrastructure, and that is why they have to develop other forms of capital, mostly religious (ideas, symbols, values) and social (building and strengthening of authority). It this way they are gradually overthrowing the existing symbolic order, which Bourdieu considers as a prerequisite to winning in the religious field.
Chapter 8
State control: Heretic-Hunting
Competition between religious groups is better understood when seen in a wider context. Competition requires religious traditions to adapt to the pluralistic conditions and to the needs of the faithful. In order to win or survive in a competitive surrounding, religious activists and institutions use their capital and develop new strategies. But there is also another crucial factor determining religion’s chances of success—the regulation of the religious sphere by the state apparatus. Religious organizations do not compete on an equal basis for the support of believers. Once there is an official, top-down control on religious tendencies, some groups are labelled as “legal,” or “orthodox,” while other as “illegal,” or “heretic.” The post-Soviet Muslim republics have been drafting and implementing religious policies that to various extent try to regulate this sphere according to the planned political scenario.
In Azerbaijan state activities are multifarious. On the one side, there have been attempts at creating an image of a tolerant, democratic, and secular Muslim-majority country. This image is to be spread outside the state’s border. It is to be spread among Western officials and politicians as well as among Muslim allies in the world. This image is upheld by the Muslim Board with its official Islamic leaders. In their view there is a unique “non-political and non-radical” religious model—a “special national Azerbaijani brand of Islam” (Bedford, Souleimanov, 2016, p. 1564). For the government this self-image is also a tool in increasing Azerbaijan’s soft power. The increasing international aspirations require positive ideas, values and concepts. On the other hand, in the post-1991 period, Azerbaijan has been experimenting with an old strategy of “heretic-hunting,”—it restricts and limits the activities of those religious preachers and their supporters who hold independent or oppositional ideas. Let us examine the evolution of the state religious policy and its consequences for the religious situation.
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