History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy

by Niccolo Machiavelli

ambassadors and those of the Milanese arranged for him to command the

  forces of the new republic, with the same remuneration he had received

  from the duke at the time of his decease. To this they added the

  possession of Brescia, until Verona was recovered, when he should have

  that city and restore Brescia to the Milanese.

  Before the duke's death, Pope Nicholas, after his assumption of the

  pontificate, sought to restore peace among the princes of Italy, and

  with this object endeavored, in conjunction with the ambassadors sent

  by the Florentines to congratulate him on his accession, to appoint a

  diet at Ferrara to attempt either the arrangement of a long truce, or

  the establishment of peace. A congress was accordingly held in that

  city, of the pope's legate and the Venetian, ducal, and Florentine

  representatives. King Alfonso had no envoy there. He was at Tivoli

  with a great body of horse and foot, and favorable to the duke; both

  having resolved, that having gained the count over to their side, they

  would openly attack the Florentines and Venetians, and till the

  arrival of the count in Lombardy, take part in the treaty for peace at

  Ferrara, at which, though the king did not appear, he engaged to

  concur in whatever course the duke should adopt. The conference lasted

  several days, and after many debates, resolved on either a truce for

  five years, or a permanent peace, whichsoever the duke should approve;

  and the ducal ambassadors, having returned to Milan to learn his

  decision, found him dead. Notwithstanding this, the Milanese were

  disposed to adopt the resolutions of the assembly, but the Venetians

  refused, indulging great hopes of becoming masters of Lombardy,

  particularly as Lodi and Piacenza, immediately after the duke's death,

  had submitted to them. They trusted that either by force or by treaty

  they could strip Milan of her power; and then so press her, as to

  compel her also to surrender before any assistance could arrive; and

  they were the more confident of this from seeing the Florentines

  involved in war with King Alfonso.

  The king being at Tivoli, and designing to pursue his enterprise

  against Tuscany, as had been arranged between himself and Filippo,

  judging that the war now commenced in Lombardy would give him both

  time and opportunity, and wishing to have a footing in the Florentine

  state before he openly commenced hostilities, opened a secret

  understanding with the fortress of Cennina, in the Val d'Arno

  Superiore, and took possession of it. The Florentines, surprised with

  this unexpected event, perceiving the king already in action, and

  resolved to do them all the injury in his power, hired forces, created

  a council of ten for management of the war, and prepared for the

  conflict in their usual manner. The king was already in the Siennese,

  and used his utmost endeavors to reduce the city, but the inhabitants

  of Sienna were firm in their attachment to the Florentines, and

  refused to receive him within their walls or into any of their

  territories. They furnished him with provisions, alleging in excuse,

  the enemy's power and their inability to resist. The king, finding he

  could not enter by the Val d'Arno, as he had first intended, both

  because Cennina had been already retaken, and because the Florentines

  were now in some measure prepared for their defense, turned toward

  Volterra, and occupied many fortresses in that territory. Thence he

  proceeded toward Pisa, and with the assistance of Fazio and Arrigo de'

  Conti, of the Gherardesca, took some castles, and issuing from them,

  assailed Campiglia, but could not take it, the place being defended by

  the Florentines, and it being now in the depth of winter. Upon this

  the king, leaving garrisons in the places he had taken to harass the

  surrounding country, withdrew with the remainder of his army to

  quarters in the Siennese. The Florentines, aided by the season, used

  the most active exertions to provide themselves troops, whose captains

  were Federigo, lord of Urbino, and Gismondo Malatesti da Rimino, who,

  though mutual foes, were kept so united by the prudence of the

  commissaries, Neri di Gino and Bernardetto de' Medici, that they broke

  up their quarters while the weather was still very severe and

  recovered not only the places that had been taken in the territory of

  Pisa, but also the Pomerancie in the neighborhood of Volterra, and so

  checked the king's troops, which at first had overrun the Maremma,

  that they could scarcely retain the places they had been left to

  garrison.

  Upon the return of the spring the commissaries halted with their whole

  force, consisting of five thousand horse and two thousand foot, at the

  Spedaletto. The king approached with his army, amounting to fifteen

  thousand men, within three miles of Campiglia, but when it was

  expected he would attack the place he fell upon Piombino, hoping, as

  it was insufficiently provided, to take it with very little trouble,

  and thus acquire a very important position, the loss of which would be

  severely felt by the Florentines; for from it he would be able to

  exhaust them with a long war, obtain his own provision by sea, and

  harass the whole territory of Pisa. They were greatly alarmed at this

  attack, and, considering that if they could remain with their army

  among the woods of Campiglia, the king would be compelled to retire

  either in defeat or disgrace. With this view they equipped four

  galleys at Livorno, and having succeeded in throwing three hundred

  infantry into Piombino, took up their own position at the Caldane, a

  place where it would be difficult to attack them; and they thought it

  would be dangerous to encamp among the thickets of the plain.

  The Florentine army depended for provisions on the surrounding places,

  which, being poor and thinly inhabited, had difficulty in supplying

  them. Consequently the troops suffered, particularly from want of

  wine, for none being produced in that vicinity, and unable to procure

  it from more distant places, it was impossible to obtain a sufficient

  quantity. But the king, though closely pressed by the Florentines, was

  well provided except in forage, for he obtained everything else by

  sea. The Florentines, desirous to supply themselves in the same

  manner, loaded four vessels with provisions, but, upon their approach,

  they were attacked by seven of the king's galleys, which took two of

  them and put the rest to flight. This disaster made them despair of

  procuring provisions, so that two hundred men of a foraging party,

  principally for want of wine, deserted to the king, and the rest

  complained that they could not live without it, in a situation where

  the heat was so excessive and the water bad. The commissaries

  therefore determined to quit the place, and endeavor to recover those

  castles which still remained in the enemy's power; who, on his part,

  though not suffering from want of provisions, and greatly superior in

  numbers, found his enterprise a failure, from the ravages made in his

  army by those diseases which the hot season produces in marshy
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br />   localities; and which prevailed to such an extent that many died

  daily, and nearly all were affected. These circumstances occasioned

  overtures of peace. The king demanded fifty thousand florins, and the

  possession of Piombino. When the terms were under consideration, many

  citizens, desirous of peace, would have accepted them, declaring there

  was no hope of bringing to a favorable conclusion a war which required

  so much money to carry it on. But Neri Capponi going to Florence,

  placed the matter in a more correct light, and it was then unanimously

  determined to reject the proposal, and take the lord of Piombino under

  their protection, with an alliance offensive and defensive, provided

  he did not abandon them, but assist in their defense as hitherto. The

  king being informed of this resolution, saw that, with his reduced

  army, he could not gain the place, and withdrew in the same condition

  as if completely routed, leaving behind him two thousand dead. With

  the remainder of his sick troops he retired to the Siennese territory,

  and thence to his kingdom, incensed against the Florentines, and

  threatening them with new wars upon the return of spring.

  While these events were proceeding in Tuscany the Count Sforza, having

  become leader of the Milanese forces, strenuously endeavored to secure

  the friendship of Francesco Piccinino, who was also in their service,

  that he might support him in his enterprises, or be less disposed to

  do him injury. He then took the field with his army, upon which the

  people of Pavia, conscious of their inability to resist him, and

  unwilling to obey the Milanese, offered to submit themselves to his

  authority, on condition that he should not subject them to the power

  of Milan. The count desired the possession of Pavia, and considered

  the circumstance a happy omen, as it would enable him to give a color

  to his designs. He was not restrained from treachery either by fear or

  shame; for great men consider failure disgraceful,--a fraudulent

  success the contrary. But he was apprehensive that his possession of

  the city would excite the animosity of the Milanese, and perhaps

  induce them to throw themselves under the power of the Venetians. If

  he refused to accept the offer, he would have occasion to fear the

  duke of Savoy, to whom many citizens were inclined to submit

  themselves; and either alternative would deprive him of the

  sovereignty of Lombardy. Concluding there was less danger in taking

  possession of the city than in allowing another to have it, he

  determined to accept the proposal of the people of Pavia, trusting he

  would be able to satisfy the Milanese, to whom he pointed out the

  danger they must have incurred had he not complied with it; for her

  citizens would have surrendered themselves to the Venetians or to the

  duke of Savoy; so that in either case they would have been deprived of

  the government, and therefore they ought to be more willing to have

  himself as their neighbor and friend, than a hostile power such as

  either of the others, and their enemy. The Milanese were upon this

  occasion greatly perplexed, imagining they had discovered the count's

  ambition, and the end he had in view; but they thought it desirable to

  conceal their fears, for they did not know, if the count were to

  desert them, to whom they could have recourse except the Venetians,

  whose pride and tyranny they naturally dreaded. They therefore

  resolved not to break with the count, but by his assistance remedy the

  evils with which they were threatened, hoping that when freed from

  them they might rescue themselves from him also; for at that time they

  were assailed not only by the Venetians but by the Genoese and the

  duke of Savoy, in the name of Charles of Orleans, the son of a sister

  of Filippo, but whom the count easily vanquished. Thus their only

  remaining enemies were the Venetians, who, with a powerful army,

  determined to occupy their territories, and had already taken

  possession of Lodi and Piacenza, before which latter place the count

  encamped; and, after a long siege, took and pillaged the city. Winter

  being set in, he led his forces into quarters, and then withdrew to

  Cremona, where, during the cold season, he remained in repose with his

  wife.

  In the spring, the Venetian and Milanese armies again took the field.

  It was the design of the Milanese, first to recover Lodi and then to

  come to terms with the Venetians; for the expenses of the war had

  become very great, and they were doubtful of their general's

  sincerity, so that they were anxious alike for the repose of peace,

  and for security against the count. They therefore resolved that the

  army should march to the siege of Carravaggio, hoping that Lodi would

  surrender, on that fortress being wrested from the enemy's hands. The

  count obeyed, though he would have preferred crossing the Adda and

  attacking the Brescian territory. Having encamped before Caravaggio,

  he so strongly entrenched himself, that if the enemy attempted to

  relieve the place, they would have to attack him at a great

  disadvantage. The Venetian army, led by Micheletto, approached within

  two bowshots of the enemy's camp, and many skirmishes ensued. The

  count continued to press the fortress, and reduced it to the very last

  extremity, which greatly distressed the Venetians, since they knew the

  loss of it would involve the total failure of their expedition. Very

  different views were entertained by their military officers respecting

  the best mode of relieving the place, but they saw no course open

  except to attack the enemy in his trenches, in spite of all obstacles.

  The castle was, however, considered of such paramount importance, that

  the Venetian senate, though naturally timid, and averse to all

  hazardous undertakings, chose rather to risk everything than allow it

  to fall into the hands of the enemy.

  They therefore resolved to attack the count at all events, and early

  the next morning commenced their assault upon a point which was least

  defended. At the first charge, as commonly happens in a surprise,

  Francesco's whole army was thrown into dismay. Order, however, was

  soon so completely restored by the count, that the enemy, after

  various efforts to gain the outworks, were repulsed and put to flight;

  and so entirely routed, that of twelve thousand horse only one

  thousand escaped the hands of the Milanese, who took possession of all

  the carriages and military stores; nor had the Venetians ever before

  suffered such a thorough rout and overthrow. Among the plunder and

  prisoners, crouching down, as if to escape observation, was found a

  Venetian commissary, who, in the course of the war and before the

  fight, had spoken contemptuously of the count, calling him "bastard,"

  and "base-born." Being made prisoner, he remembered his faults, and

  fearing punishment, being taken before the count, was agonized with

  terror; and, as is usual with mean minds (in prosperity insolent, in

  adversity abject and cringing), prostrated himself, weeping and

  begging pardon for the offenses he had commit
ted. The count, taking

  him by the arm, raised him up, and encouraged him to hope for the

  best. He then said he wondered how a man so prudent and respectable as

  himself, could so far err as to speak disparagingly of those who did

  not merit it; and as regarded the insinuations which he had made

  against him, he really did not know how Sforza his father, and Madonna

  Lucia his mother, had proceeded together, not having been there, and

  having no opportunity of interfering in the matter, so that he was not

  liable either to blame or praise. However, he knew very well, that in

  regard to his own actions he had conducted himself so that no one

  could blame him; and in proof of this he would refer both the Venetian

  senate and himself to what had happened that day. He then advised him

  in future to be more respectful in speaking of others, and more

  cautious in regard to his own proceedings.

  CHAPTER IV

  The count's successes--The Venetians come to terms with him--Views

  of the Venetians--Indignation of the Milanese against the count--

  Their ambassador's address to him--The count's moderation and

  reply--The count and the Milanese prepare for war--Milanese

  ambassadors at Venice--League of the Venetians and Milanese--The

  count dupes the Venetians and Milanese--He applies for assistance

  to the Florentines--Diversity of opinions in Florence on the

  subject--Neri di Gino Capponi averse to assisting the count--Cosmo

  de' Medici disposed to do so--The Florentines sent ambassadors to

  the count.

  After this victory, the count marched into the Brescian territory,

  occupied the whole country, and then pitched his camp within two miles

  of the city. The Venetians, having well-grounded fears that Brescia

  would be next attacked, provided the best defense in their power. They

  then collected the relics of their army, and, by virtue of the treaty,

  demanded assistance of the Florentines; who, being relieved from the

  war with Alfonso, sent them one thousand foot and two thousand horse,

  by whose aid the Venetians were in a condition to treat for peace. At

  one time it seemed the fate of their republic to lose by war and win

  by negotiation; for what was taken from them in battle was frequently

  restored twofold on the restoration of peace. They knew the Milanese

  were jealous of the count, and that he wished to be not their captain

  merely, but their sovereign; and as it was in their power to make

  peace with either of the two (the one desiring it from ambition, the

  other from fear), they determined to make choice of the count, and

  offer him assistance to effect his design; persuading themselves, that

  as the Milanese would perceive they had been duped by him, they would

  in revenge place themselves in the power of any one rather than in

  his; and that, becoming unable either to defend themselves or trust

  the count, they would be compelled, having no other resource, to fall

  into their hands. Having taken this resolution, they sounded the

  count, and found him quite disposed for peace, evidently desirous that

  the honor and advantage of the victory at Caravaggio should be his

  own, and not accrue to the Milanese. The parties therefore entered

  into an agreement, in which the Venetians undertook to pay the count

  thirteen thousand florins per month, till he should obtain Milan, and

  to furnish him, during the continuance of the war, four thousand horse

  and two thousand foot. The count engaged to restore to the Venetians

  the towns, prisoners, and whatever else had been taken by him during

  the late campaigns, and content himself with those territories which

  the duke possessed at the time of his death.

  When this treaty became known at Milan, it grieved the citizens more

  than the victory at Caravaggio had exhilarated them. The rulers of the

  city mourned, the people complained, women and children wept, and all

  exclaimed against the count as false and perfidious. Although they

  could not hope that either prayers or promises would divert him from