The Real Horse Soldiers
Page 13
It was dark by the time the brigade moved out of Pontotoc. Five miles farther south the head of the column reached a sprawling plantation along Chiwapa Creek, owned by 62-year-old Stephen Daggett, that afforded ample space to camp and the chance to stock up on supplies. Although Daggett had been born in Connecticut, he had made a fortune in land and slaves in Mississippi. According to the 1860 census, he owned 48 slaves, $18,000 in plantation real estate, and boasted a net worth of $62,000—a substantial sum at that time. Some troopers also camped at the adjacent Weatherall plantation, owned by the brother of the Confederate commander whose papers had been discovered in Pontotoc.51
The various side raids dispatched to confuse and disrupt the enemy, coupled with the rain and muddy roads, made it impossible for Grierson to cover as much ground as he had hoped that day. His main body put 15 to 16 miles behind them, about half of what he had covered on each of the two previous days. Whether the side raids, which traded time for diversion, were worth the slowed pace of the raid or would reduce his chances of reaching the Southern Railroad was a question no one could answer.52
***
Grierson had now ridden three full days into Mississippi. Two interconnected events had significantly enhanced his early success. The first was the triumph of the other Union raids designed to draw the enemy’s attention away from his larger expedition, which itself was a diversion to focus attention away from Grant’s objective of crossing the Mississippi River with the Army of the Tennessee. “Those movements, of course, aided materially in giving me a better opportunity of getting a good start within the rebel lines,” Grierson admitted, “and assisted in giving the enemy the impression that my command would, like all others, return again to Tennessee, and had a tendency to hold a larger force of the enemy in northern Mississippi than would have otherwise remained there if not held by the timely advance of troops of XVI Army Corps then under General Hurlbut’s command.”53
The second factor was the tepid Confederate response. The enemy had made little effort to defend northeastern Mississippi, as illustrated by Grierson’s easy penetration of the Confederate defensive lines around New Albany and Pontotoc. Most of the Confederate cavalry was either in the northwest part of the state, confronting Memphis, or farther south in Gen. Daniel Ruggles’s district under Samuel Gholson, who was locked in a custody battle with General Chalmers over the use of state forces in northwestern Mississippi. “General Gholson,” complained an outraged Chalmers, “came into my district, and without notice to me, without any communication of any sort whatsoever with me, and without my knowledge or consent, ordered six companies outside the limits of my district, and the first information I ever had of any such order was in the refusal of some of these companies to obey my orders previously issued.” Ruggles, who was on an inspection trip during the early days of the raid, was as ill-informed as Chalmers, and his subordinates were corresponding directly with Pemberton at Vicksburg rather than through Ruggles, as military protocol dictated. The defensive lethargy was not surprising. Pemberton himself had yet to demonstrate any real concern about the threat of this raid because his attention was still fixed firmly on Grant’s larger southward movement west of the Mississippi River.54
The Pennsylvania-born Pemberton had built a solid résumé of service with the U.S. Army that included action during the Seminole and Mexican Wars. In 1848, the artillerist married a woman from Norfolk, Virginia, and her influence on him, together with years of service in the southern states, convinced him to resign his commission at the start of the war and offer himself to the Confederacy. Early service as the commander of the Department of South Carolina and Georgia revealed deficiencies for responsibilities at that level. Instead of finding a position that suited Pemberton’s skill set, President Jefferson Davis promoted him to lieutenant general in October 1862 and transferred him west to oversee a new department in Mississippi and defend the fortress of Vicksburg. It was a poor choice for such an important command, and Davis would come to regret his decision.55
John C. Pemberton. As the Confederate commander in the area raided by Grierson, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton found himself more interested in the raid than Grant’s major threat across the Mississippi River in Louisiana. For five critical days Pemberton was so focused on Grierson that he let Grant slip across the river almost unmolested and move inland. Library of Congress
By April 19 Pemberton found himself awash in activity that was difficult to understand and even harder to follow. In addition to Steele’s Federals, who had just returned from the raid around Greenville, he had to worry about Adm. David Dixon Porter, who ran a few ships past the Vicksburg batteries the night before Grierson departed La Grange. Several Union gunboats and transports were now south of the city—a clear indication that operations were likely to shift in that direction. Pemberton’s concern increased when Federals began to arrive and operate out of New Carthage, Louisiana, which was below Vicksburg. “The enemy,” he warned theater commander Joseph E. Johnston in Tullahoma, Tennessee, on April 17, “has nine boats between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. He has landed forces at New Carthage from Grant’s army, and can re-enforce them to any extent. He can use his nine boats to cross his troops to this side.” And now Grierson was moving steadily south during the first three days of his raid. Although Pemberton possessed little knowledge about this cavalry thrust, his emphasis, and rightly so, focused on the most serious threat to Vicksburg. The best he could do, however, was order reinforcements south to John S. Bowen, who was guarding a major crossing point at Grand Gulf.56
Additional Federal raids consumed Pemberton’s time, energy, and attention, especially Abel Streight’s move into the deep rear of the Confederate army in Tennessee. Streight had left Nashville on April 7, riding west to Fort Henry and then due south into the northeast corner of Mississippi and east into Alabama. Under normal circumstances, Pemberton would not have paid as much attention to events unfolding so far away, but General Johnston had ordered him to do so. At that time, Johnston’s headquarters were in Middle Tennessee with Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee, and he was better situated to ascertain the potential danger posed by Streight’s raid. He did not hesitate to order help from Pemberton’s command in Mississippi, especially since the threat had emanated from his area of command.57
Johnston informed Pemberton on April 18 that a Union force (Streight’s) was moving east from Corinth, Mississippi, and, “If you can send troops from Columbus [Ruggles’s command] or elsewhere, to aid Colonel [Phillip D.] Roddey, they may do a great service to the two departments. Colonel Roddey and your nearest officer must cooperate against the enemy’s raids from Corinth.” Johnston followed up that message two days later on April 20: “It is necessary that your northeastern troops and Roddey’s force should always act together against raids from Corinth, either south or east. Please instruct your commanding officer. Let him help Roddey now, or as soon as possible. This co-operation will prevent or defeat serious raids.” Pemberton, however, had already ordered Ruggles on April 19 to “send all mounted troops, both state and Confederate, toward Corinth.” The pace of events, coupled with the micromanagement of his command by a superior hundreds of miles away from Mississippi, exasperated the lieutenant general. “I have not sufficient force to give any efficient assistance to Colonel Roddy,” Pemberton explained on April 20 before detailing the various raids into Mississippi, including Grierson’s, which he misidentified as moving “from Corinth, via New Albany.” He cautioned Johnston, “You are aware I have but feeble cavalry force, but I shall certainly give you all the assistance I can. I have virtually no cavalry from Grand Gulf to Yazoo City,” he continued, “while the enemy is threatening to cross the river between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf, having twelve vessels below Vicksburg.”58
Similar events were unfolding in northwest Mississippi, where Colonel Bryant’s and Gen. Sooy Smith’s raids attracted his attention. General Chalmers urged Pemberton that “all available cavalry be sent here and one or two sections of artille
ry.” Believing the threat in northwestern Mississippi to be serious, Pemberton sent reinforcements on April 19.59
Sifting through all the various intelligence reports, which by their nature were outdated by the time he read them, Pemberton was only slowly learning about the various raids, Grierson’s included. It was not until April 20, however, that Pemberton even acknowledged Grierson’s raid, once to Joe Johnston and again to Gen. Samuel Cooper in Richmond, both as indirect references. The enemy, he telegraphed Cooper, was “also making strong raids from three points on [the] Memphis and Charleston railroad between Memphis and Corinth. I shall look to them.”60
Most of whatever he learned about Grierson’s activity came from lower-level officers. “I hear from several sources, but not your headquarters, that the enemy is approaching Pontotoc,” he reprimanded Ruggles on April 20. “This is a mere raid, but should not be unmolested by you.” Grierson had been riding south for three days, but Pemberton had yet to grasp the importance of what was transpiring. That same day he telegraphed Johnston, “Can you not make a heavy demonstration with cavalry on the Tallahatchee toward Abbeville, if only for 50 miles? The enemy are endeavoring to compel a diversion of my troops to Northern Mississippi.”61
Grierson’s main objective was not to draw troops from Pemberton’s command at Vicksburg (although that would be a welcomed reaction) but to attract and maintain Pemberton’s attention toward north Mississippi. By April 20 the strategy was beginning to bear fruit. Pemberton’s primary focus was still on Grant’s movement west of the Mississippi River, but his eyes were casting furtive glances in the opposite direction.
Benjamin Grierson, meanwhile, continued to drive deeper into the state toward the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, Pemberton’s one and only link to the outside world.
1John Grierson to Alice, April 17, 1863; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 146; Daniel E. Robbins to Parents, May 5, 1863.
2Surby, Grierson Raids, 21; John S. C. Abbott, “Heroic Deeds of Heroic Men,” Harper’s New Monthly Magazine (February 1865), vol. 30, Issue 77, 273; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 146; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 685.
3Henry C. Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” in Henry C. Forbes Papers, CHM, 5-6, copy in Henry C. Forbes Papers, UI.
4OR 24, pt. 1, 501.
5Ibid., pt. 3, 200-201; OR 24 pt. 1, 140-41.
6OR 24, pt. 3, 231, 240.
7“Army Correspondence,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), May 4, 1863; OR 24, pt. 3, 202.
8OR 24, pt. 3, 203; OR 24, pt. 1, 557; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 101.
9OR 23, pt. 1, 246, 286; OR 24, pt. 3, 777; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 101. Confederate scouts reported “a large number of pack-mules” in the area, but they had no idea what it meant.
10Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 102.
11Ibid., 7; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 146-47; Surby, Grierson Raids, 23.
12Surby, Grierson Raids, 23.
13Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 688.
14OR 24, pt. 3, 197.
15Ibid., pt. 1, 522.
16Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 147; OR 24, pt. 1, 522, 529; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 688; Dinges, “The Making of a Cavalryman,” 370n48.
17Smith, The Mississippi Secession Convention: Delegates and Deliberations in Politics and War, 1861-1865 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2014), 35, 79; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 688.
18Smith, Mississippi in the Civil War: The Home Front (Mississippi Heritage Series), 114.
19Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 103.
20Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 148; Surby, Grierson Raids, 28; Andrew Brown, Story of Tippah County, Mississippi: The First Century (Ripley, MS: Tippah County Historical and Genealogical Society, 1998), 42-43; 1850 Tippah County Population Census, NARA; Land Deed Index, Ripley Public Library; James B. Ellis Deeds, Tippah County Chancery Clerk Index.
21D. T. Herndon, ed., Centennial History of Arkansas, 3 vols. (Little Rock: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1922), vol. 3, 533; Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 7.
22Surby, Grierson Raids, 29; Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 7-8.
23Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 7-8.
24Ibid., 8-9.
25Ibid.
26OR 24, pt. 1, 522.
27Surby, Grierson Raids, 23; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 688; Orlando Davis, diary, April 18, 1863, http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~mscivilw/davis.htm.
28Smith, “Victory At Any Cost: The Yazoo Pass Expedition.” Journal of Mississippi History, vol. 67, no. 2 (Summer 2007), 147-66.
29OR 24, pt. 1, 522, 529; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 147; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 688.
30OR 24, pt. 1, 522; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Curtiss, diary, April 18, 1863.
31OR 24, pt. 1, 522-23, 529; Pierce, History of the Second Iowa Cavalry, 49.
32Surby, Grierson Raids, 24; OR 24, pt. 1, 522; Abbott, “Heroic Deeds of Heroic Men,” 273.
33OR 24, pt. 1, 522; Daniel E. Robbins to Brother, May 7, 1863, Daniel E. Robbins Letters, HC.
34OR 24, pt. 1, 522; Curtiss, diary, April 18, 1863.
351860 Pontotoc County Population and Slave Schedules; William D. Sloan, Deed, Book 3, Pontotoc County Chancery Clerk; William D. Sloan, Deed, Book 17, Pontotoc County Chancery Clerk.
36Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 688; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 148-49.
37Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 149; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 688-89.
38“Ben Grierson,” n.d., in Henry C. Forbes Papers, CHM; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 149; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 689.
39Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 149.
40Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 149-50.
41Field Manual 3-0: Operations, 6-19; Leckie and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 312n15; Dinges, “The Making of a Cavalryman,” 54-55n32.
42OR 24, pt. 1, 522.
43Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 147; OR 24, pt. 1, 522.
44OR 24, pt. 1, 522-23, 530.
45Ibid., 522.
46Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 147; OR 24, pt. 1, 522.
47Surby, Grierson Raids, 25; OR 24, pt. 1, 522-23, 530; Curtiss, diary, April 19, 1863; “Grierson’s Big Raid,” n.d., in Thomas W. Lippincott Papers, ALPL.
48Surby, Grierson Raids, 25.
49Ibid., 26; OR 24, pt. 1, 523; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 150; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 690; Bearss, The Vicksburg Campaign, vol. 2, 190; E. T. Winston, “The Story of Pontotoc,” April 7, 1932, Pontotoc Progress, copy in Grierson’s Raid Subject File, MDAH; Daniel E. Robbins to Brother, May 7, 1863; Michael Freyburger, Letters to Ann (Shelbyville, IL: Shelby County Historical Society, 1986), 46.
50Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 690; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 150; Forrest T. Tutor, Gordons of Lochinvar (n.p.: n.p., 2008), 60-61, 81; Mrs. N. D. Deupree, “Some Historic Homes of Mississippi,” in Franklin L. Riley, ed., Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society (Oxford: Mississippi Historical Society, 1902), vol. 6, 248 (245-64).
51OR 24, pt. 1, 523; 1860 Pontotoc County Population and Slave Schedules; Surby, Grierson Raids, 26; Stephen Daggett, Deed, Pontotoc County Chancery Clerk.
52Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 691.
53Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 146.
54OR 24, pt. 3, 758; Grabau, Ninety-Eight Days, 117; Bearss, The Vicksburg Campaign, vol. 2, 192.
55Michael B. Ballard, Pemberton: The General Who Lost Vicksburg (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991).
56OR 24, pt. 3, 751-53, 755, 762.
57Ibid., 760, 767, 769.
58Ibid.
59Ibid., 766-67.
60Ibid., 768.
61Ibid., 769-73.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Detachments
If Benjamin Grierson learned anything during the first f
ew days of the raid, it was how to manage his forces. He had tried marching south in a single column, which necessitated a long line of cavalry, wagons, and artillery, delayed the rear’s advance, and extended its march at the end of the day. When that formation became unwieldy, he separated his command, most notably at the crossing of the Tallahatchie River, which provided some useful feedback and proved more flexible and effective. Now that he was deeper into Mississippi, some 60 miles southeast of La Grange and nearly that far inside the state, he had to decide how to array his brigade, manage it on the march, and satisfy his objectives. These major decisions occupied Grierson during the night of April 19 at Daggett’s plantation south of Pontotoc.1
Grierson weighed his options as he prepared to move south the next morning. On the one hand, he had made 30 miles in one day, his best march thus far, when the brigade utilized the same road together. Sending detachments in various directions, as he had done the previous day, consumed significant time but garnered some worthwhile results that were perhaps more important at that stage of the raid than moving south quickly. Still, these time-consuming sideshows netted little real long-term gain. Were the smaller side raids within a raid worthwhile?2
Other factors weighed on Grierson. This deep into Mississippi, some of his men and mounts were beginning to show signs of fatigue and breakdown. His troopers evinced illness and exhaustion, some of which was attributable to their exposure to the elements during the severe rainstorm the night before. His horses showed obvious signs of fatigue and needed proper rest and care after three days of riding, which was a major drawback for any cavalry operation. The growing number of prisoners taken during the minor skirmishing around Pontotoc and New Albany also had to be guarded, fed, and transported on good mounts. Should he take them with him, let them go, or parole them? Letting them go while he was still on the move was a potentially dangerous option, because they could provide valuable information that would pinpoint the Union cavalry brigade for potential pursuers to find and destroy.3