The Real Horse Soldiers
Page 27
5J. B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary: At the Confederate States Capital, ed. James I. Robertson Jr., 2 vols. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2015), vol. 1, 266.
6Surby, Grierson Raids, 53; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863.
7“The Great Federal Raid,” Natchez Daily Courier, May 5, 1863; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863.
8OR 24, pt. 1, 525.
9Ibid.; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 127; 1860 Smith County, Mississippi, Population and Slave Schedules.
10Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 162.
11OR 24, pt. 1, 525; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 127; Smith County, Mississippi, and Its Families, 2 vols. (Raleigh, MS: Smith County Genealogical Society, 2006), vol. 2, 7, 235; W. D. Moss, Deed, Book 0524, Smith County Chancery Clerk, 631. McAdory’s story is worth retelling. He was a native of Alabama, where he graduated from the state university before moving north to study medicine at Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia. The young doctor then moved south in late 1860 to practice medicine and run a plantation along the Leaf River. When the war began, he joined the Confederate army and served as a lieutenant in the 37th Mississippi Infantry. He was severely wounded and captured at Corinth in October 1862, paroled, and spent much of the rest of the war recovering in central Mississippi (John W. DuBose, Jefferson County and Birmingham, Alabama [Birmingham: Caldwell Printing Works, 1887], 511).
12OR 24, pt. 1, 525.
13“Grierson’s Big Raid,” n.d., Thomas W. Lippincott Papers, ALPL; OR 24, pt. 1, 525.
14Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 160; OR 24, pt. 1, 525, 531-32.
15OR 24, pt. 1, 525; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 160; Dinges, “The Making of a Cavalryman,” 378n81. Grierson later stated the scout was George Steadman, but virtually all other sources say it was actually Nelson. While there is no way to know for sure, I have yielded to the weight of evidence.
16“Grierson’s Raid Recalled by Death,” Decatur Daily Review, September 9, 1911.
17OR 24, pt. 1, 525; pt. 3, 791; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 160-61; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 109.
18OR 24, pt. 1, 525; pt. 3, 791; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 160-61; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 109.
19OR 24, pt. 1, 525; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 161.
20OR 24, pt. 1, 525-26; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 687, 701.
21Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 108.
22OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 108.
23OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Surby, Grierson Raids, 61; “This Month in Smith County History: ‘Grierson’s Raid,’” Smith County Reformer, April 22, 1998.
24J. M. Quin to John J. Pettus, April 28, 1863, John J. Pettus Correspondence, MDAH; OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 161; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 703.
25“From One of Grierson’s Cavalry,” Union Monitor (Litchfield, IL), June 5, 1863.
26George A. Root to S. A. Forbes, November 30, 1908, in Stephen A. Forbes Papers, UI; OR 24, pt. 1, 526; “Federal Soldiers Marched in Westville,” Simpson County News, October 11, 1984; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Surby, Grierson Raids, 63; Daniel E. Robbins to Brother, May 7, 1863.
27George A. Root to S. A. Forbes, November 30, 1908; OR 24, pt. 1, 526; “Federal Soldiers Marched in Westville,” Simpson County News, October 11, 1984; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Surby, Grierson Raids, 63.
28Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 162; 1860 Simpson County, Mississippi, Population and Slave Schedules.
29“The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 113; George A. Root to S. A. Forbes, November 30, 1908.
30“The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Abbott, “Heroic Deeds of Heroic Men,” 277; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 705.
31“The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Abbott, “Heroic Deeds of Heroic Men,” 277; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 705.
32“The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Freyburger, Letters to Ann, 44.
33Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 162-63; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Surby, Grierson Raids, 64.
34Abbott, “Heroic Deeds of Heroic Men,” 277; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 163; David A. Powell, The Maps of Chickamauga (New York: Savas Beatie, 2009), 267.
35“The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 162; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 706.
36Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 163; Daniel E. Robbins to Brother, May 7, 1863.
37OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 163; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 703-4.
38Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 163.
39Ibid.
40OR 24, pt. 1, 528; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 165; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 22-23.
41Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 23; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 113.
42Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 24; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 113; Forbes Letters, 1863, in Stephen A. Forbes Papers, UI, 210.
43Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 113-14.
44Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 24-25; Forbes, “Grierson’s Cavalry Raid,” 114.
45Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 25-26; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 704.
46Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 26.
47OR 24, pt. 1, 528; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 165; “The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; Forbes, “Grierson’s Raid,” 22.
48OR 24, pt. 1, 526.
49Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 163.
50Ibid.
51Ibid.
52OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 164; Surby, Grierson Raids, 68.
53Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 164.
54OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Senate Report 772, 52nd Congress, 1st Session, 1-2; Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 165; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 708; Surby, Grierson Raids, 70; “Escape of a Train,” Jackson Daily Mississippian, April 30, 1863. Neal tried unsuccessfully to recoup his losses.
55Grierson, A Just and Righteous Cause, 165.
56OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Freyburger, Letters to Ann, 45.
57“The Raid at Hazlehurst—From Our Jackson Boys,” Jackson Daily Mississippian, April 30, 1863.
58“The Grierson Raid,” Weekly Register (Canton, IL), September 7, 1863; OR 24, pt. 1, 526; Woodward, “Grierson’s Raid,” 708-9; Daniel E. Robbins to Brother, May 7, 1863.
59Jackson, The History of Orange Jackson’s War Life, 9; Daniel E. Robbins to Parents, May 5, 1863.
60OR 24, pt. 1, 526; 1860 Copiah County, Mississippi, Population and Slave Schedules, NARA; Jesse Thompson Deed, Book R, Copiah County Chancery Clerk, 289-90.
61OR 24, pt. 1, 526; 1860 Copiah County, Mississippi, Population and Slave Schedules, NARA; Jesse Thompson Deed, Book R, Copiah County Chancery Clerk, 289-90.
62OR 24, pt. 1, 526.
CHAPTER NINE
The Failure
The tangible objective of Benjamin Grierson’s long trek through Mississippi was to break the Southern Railroad of Mississippi, Vicksburg’s lifeline to the outside Confederacy. His skillful and daring leadership had carried his troopers to the railroad almost unopposed. Once there, his men damaged the line as best they could with the little time and few tools they had in their possession. The extent of the damage he inflicted had yet to be determined.1
The second goal of his raid was less tangible and m
ore complicated. Grant intended for Grierson’s raid to divert focus away from his army’s crossing of the Mississippi River. On that score, Grierson had no idea whether this objective was being achieved. Yet every indication was that his ride was confusing the enemy and thus helping the Army of the Tennessee. The fact that messages were flying out of Pemberton’s headquarters in Jackson in an effort to catch and trap Grierson demonstrate the Confederate commander’s interest and focus on the Federal raider. Although he was completely unaware of Pemberton’s state of mind, Grierson would have been comforted to know his effort had knocked the Confederate gyroscope askew.2
Now that the road had been damaged, Grierson and his cavalry set off on the last leg of their historic ride in an effort to get out of the Magnolia State as quickly and as safely as possible. This final objective was even more complicated because the situation that would dictate how he would accomplish it remained in flux. Possibilities about how to escape from deep within the state had been tossed about even before the raid left Tennessee. Only Grierson could judge the best route to safety, and even he remained unsure, changing his mind on more than one occasion. He first considered taking a wide swing east and north through Alabama but then decided that continuing south was his best course. While a haven in Baton Rouge offered refuge from Confederate retribution, scouting reports suggested he should move west and break up more railroads in the process and join Grant once he crossed the Army of the Tennessee into Mississippi.3
Getting the timing right was the main concern. Grierson’s troopers would be exposed and vulnerable to capture or destruction if they reached the Grand Gulf area ahead of Grant’s crossing. If he arrived too late, his troopers would be unable to help Grant—if such help was needed—and still be vulnerable because Confederates (already alerted to Grant’s presence and likely intent) would be concentrating into the area. An approach to Grand Gulf also risked turning the important diversionary aspect of his raid on its head. If the cavalry brigade were corralled and captured, or just pinpointed, the game of cat and mouse across the Magnolia State would be over, and Pemberton and his generals could shift their focus back to the river and zero in on the real threat looming just across the water in Louisiana.4
Because of these timing issues, Grierson approached the Mississippi River counties cautiously and in something of a quandary during the period from April 28 to 30. Adjutant Woodward perhaps summed it up best when he wrote, “The march was resumed . . . without any definite objective, relying on information as to the movements of Grant’s army about Vicksburg.”5
***
While Grierson made his way west, the larger aspects of the diversionary operation were in full bloom, its various components having either recently concluded or having reached their final stages. Sooy Smith’s and Colonel Bryant’s forays into northwestern Mississippi were long over, but other efforts were ongoing and new ones just beginning. In Alabama, for example, Abel Streight’s raid was well underway, screened initially by Grenville Dodge’s expedition until he turned back on April 29 to return to Corinth. Streight, meanwhile, was now moving through the middle part of the state toward Georgia in the face of nothing more than light skirmishing.6
Federals in West Tennessee also restarted their efforts to aid Grierson should he decide to return north. After arriving back at La Grange on April 26, Edward Hatch refitted his Iowa regiment and, with fresh orders from Sooy Smith in hand, led a new brigade south three days later with the express purpose of attacking “the forces of the enemy concentrating at New Albany and Pontotoc, to intercept the supposed return of Colonel Grierson.” Hatch had with him his own 2nd Iowa Cavalry, the 4th Illinois Cavalry, and the mounted 6th Iowa Infantry, along with some local West Tennessee cavalry and a four-gun battery. The Iowa infantry boys, veterans of Shiloh and other actions, were as skeptical about being mounted on mules as some cavalrymen, with one Hawkeye describing it as “quite an odd looking sight.” The Iowan was soon a hearty supporter, writing, “I thought our regiment was good at jayhawking but they can’t hold a candle to the 6th.” In all, Hatch’s force numbered more than 1,200 men, larger than the column Grierson was now pushing toward Grand Gulf and with much more firepower. Worried about Grierson’s whereabouts and status, General Hurlbut was more than anxious to get Hatch’s command up and moving. On April 29, he informed General Halleck, “I have sent 1,200 men this morning from La Grange to take them in the rear and help Grierson. His orders are to return by Alabama. If accomplished as reported, it is a gallant thing.”7
Employing scouts in civilian dress or Confederate uniforms, much as Grierson had done, Hatch rode south through Ripley and flanked the Confederates at New Albany by crossing the Tallahatchie River farther to the east. Once over, he chased a small Confederate regiment south toward Okolona before discovering the main enemy body under General Chalmers had moved into his rear and crossed north of the Tallahatchie. Confident Grierson was nowhere in the area, Hatch rode back north and reached the cavalry depot at La Grange on May 5. Although Hatch had managed to avoid any serious fighting, he had not found Grierson or any indication that the raid had decided to return north. In fact, Grierson was more than 250 miles south, around Union Church on the morning Hatch left Tennessee to find and assist him. Hatch’s ride made little difference at that point, and neither did another cavalry foray under Dodge sent out from Corinth for the same purpose.8
Other actions closer to Grierson, however, did make a difference. Sherman, for example, was in the midst of his Haynes’ Bluff diversion. Grant made a formal request that he launch the feint on April 27. Sherman took one of his divisions up the Yazoo River and went ashore near where he had been bloodily repulsed the previous December. There, he bluffed and feinted, gathering as much attention as possible while resisting the temptation to avenge his earlier defeat. Historians have debated the operation’s effectiveness, but Sherman had no doubt about it. A staff officer, Sherman reported, explained “that our division has had perfect success, great activity being seen in Vicksburg, and troops pushing up this way.” He later concluded, “This diversion, made with so much pomp and display . . . completely fulfilled its purpose.”9
Part of the operation’s success came about because Sherman called his effort off as soon as he could. Grant was convinced that crossing the river south of Vicksburg was the only way to successfully attack the enemy bastion, and Sherman wanted to be with the army and his boss when that happened. Therefore, he stayed up the Yazoo River just long enough to buy Grant some additional time while attracting the enemy’s attention and no longer. Sherman turned his corps south as soon as he reached the Mississippi River. Even though he did not have much faith in Grant’s operation, he was intent on being part of it and would do what he could to make it a success.10
The most critical movement underway while Grierson was hovering just east of Grant’s potential crossing point was the crossing itself. General John McClernand’s failure to have his corps ready to lead the way across the Mississippi River on April 27 or 28 aggravated Grant, but the political general had his men and materiel in readiness on April 29. Admiral David Dixon Porter’s gunboats pummeled Grand Gulf mercilessly for hours that day, but his guns were unable to silence the Confederate batteries. A crossing at Grand Gulf was too risky and now out of the question. Undeterred, Grant moved his army downriver to seek out another crossing point the next day. He found what he was seeking at Bruinsburg, where the Union host crossed undetected and unopposed—in large part because of Grierson’s inland diversion, aided also by the other raids previously mentioned.11
By this time Grierson was within about 30 miles of the river and the Confederate bastion at Grand Gulf and the ultimate crossing point at Bruinsburg. A junction was entirely feasible with good timing and even better good fortune.
***
A new threat added another wrinkle of difficulty for Grierson and his men. According to the Jackson Daily Mississippian, Confederate leaders had pinpointed “Grierson and his jolly raiders” by April 28 and were
doing all they could to track them down and destroy or capture “these vile raiders who had created such havoc in the state.” The newspaper was sure the raiders who hit Hazlehurst were “no doubt the same party” that had sacked Newton Station four days earlier, and it printed a remarkably accurate order of battle of the Federal units involved and the names of their officers, down to the artillery’s two pounders. A courier who had escaped from Grierson aided the Confederate high command with many of the details.12
Pemberton was adamant about catching Grierson. The bold enemy raider had entered an area overflowing with Confederate troops, including almost the entire army defending Vicksburg as well as the troops stationed in and around nearby Port Hudson. The general area was smaller than the expansive interior through which the Federals had ridden, and a major railroad made it relatively easy for Pemberton to rapidly combine troops at a given point. By this time, the Confederate commander had almost exclusively focused his attention on catching Grierson. Pemberton had remained attuned to Grant’s activity up through April 23, but when Grierson hit Newton Station the next day, he swiveled his focus toward the raider. Although Pemberton’s division commanders were still watching and warning him about the threat posed by Grant’s army, Pemberton had his sights set on bagging Grierson. The long Federal ride south through Mississippi made it clear to many in and out of the army that Pemberton was not doing his job particularly well. One Smith County citizen went so far as to ask Governor Pettus, “Is Pemberton asleep?”13
Pemberton was not asleep, but he was woefully lacking in the cavalry he needed to stop Grierson. He complained loudly to anyone who would listen, especially his superior Joseph E. Johnston in Middle Tennessee. His messages betrayed his mind-set during the last days of April. Nearly every missive, including those discussing the basic threat posed by Grant’s army in Louisiana, dwelled to one degree or another on Grierson’s raid. “However necessary cavalry may be to Army of Tennessee, it is indispensable to me to keep my communications,” he lectured Johnston on April 27. “The enemy are to-day at Hazlehurst on New Orleans and Jackson Railroad. I cannot defend every station on the road with infantry. Am compelled to bring down cavalry from Northern Mississippi here,” he continued, “and the whole of that section is consequently left open. Further, these raids endanger my vital positions.” The cavalry he brought down was Colonel Barteau’s Tennessee troopers; Pemberton advised Barteau to mount the state troops in north Mississippi to replace his regiment. The Vicksburg commander also shifted infantry units under General Loring farther south now that the threat had moved into that part of the state. Pemberton wrote President Davis the next day, “A demonstration is now being made in large force at Hard Times.” He also pleaded, “It is indispensable that I have more cavalry. The approaches to Northern Mississippi are almost unprotected, and it is impossible to prevent these raids with infantry.”14