The Battle for Hong Kong 1941-1945

by Oliver Lindsay

  The wireless set was potentially of the utmost importance, for Dixon had constructed it so that it could transmit to report on, for example, Japanese troop movement, aircraft and shipping. Argyle Street was close to both Kai Tak airport and the harbour where we could see occasional activity, “I could never feel happy about the set,” wrote Craven “and I only hoped that we should not be betrayed.”5 The wireless was hidden in a biscuit box, which was usually buried.

  The blow fell on 21st September 1943. During an extended four-hour morning parade, the Japanese Military Police went without hesitation to the spot where the set was hidden.

  “At 7.00 p.m. Young was arrested, which confirmed in my mind that we had been given away. I was arrested at 10.00 p.m. and Dixon an hour later,” wrote Craven. Boxer was apprehended six days later, joining nine in all who were being held. Two of them had nothing to do with the wireless but had beds on each side of Dixon.

  The interrogators said they knew all about Colonel Newnham’s case and claimed that the wireless could transmit, which was vigorously denied. Each of the prisoners was beaten, starved and deprived of water for many hours. Craven described the constant questioning as “devastatingly unnerving”.

  “The Japanese system of justice is that all possible information is extracted from POWs; severe and intolerable torture is resorted to as necessary. Prisoners frequently die and are sometimes deliberately killed in a most brutal manner as a punishment for withholding the truth; the Gestapo treated their prisoners in a similar fashion.

  “When the information has been wrung out of all those implicated, it is pooled, and out of the pool are produced ‘statements’ alleged to have been made by each prisoner. Though this is instantly recognised as not being one’s own work, it contains the true picture. After this, the court martial which follows months later is mere formality. There is no question of pleading guilty or not guilty, and there is no defence; the prosecutor demands a specific sentence from the President of the Court, and the proceedings are closed,” recalls a POW.

  On 21st October Boxer, Young, Dixon and Craven were charged at the Military Police Headquarters with constructing a short-wave radio, using it to obtain enemy broadcasts and publishing this as news to POWs. “We all pleaded guilty and were then transferred to Stanley Prison,” wrote Craven. “I had developed beriberi, the vitamin deficiency disease, and become completely paralysed. I being helpless had to be carried. We anticipated a few weeks’ imprisonment, but we were told by an NCO that we were going to have our heads chopped off.”

  Boxer was able to conduct several whispered conversations with Colonel Newnham and Captain Ford during exercise periods at the prison. He learned how they had protected those of us who had planted and received the secret information from the ration trucks, despite the most strenuous efforts of the Japanese to get them to divulge our identities.

  Boxer in a cell nearby reported that “Ford gave nothing and nobody away, although subject to severe physical torture. Ford took all the responsibility on himself, and maintained that no senior officers were involved, thereby saving the lives of General Maltby and Colonel Price of the Royal Rifles of Canada. Ford gave an outstanding example of cheerful and courageous fortitude which was an inspiration to all those who were imprisoned with him and which aroused the respect and admiration even of the Japanese.”6

  The trial was presided over by Major General Ashidate. Evidence was given that Ford, Gray, Ruttledge and Hardy had received in Shamshuipo, over a period of three months, six messages from the British Army Aid Group operating in China, after which they had compiled several reports on conditions in Shamshuipo. The Court was told that Newnham and Haddock had received and sent out 15 messages from Argyle Street. The prosecution did not try to prove that the information was of any military significance.

  The Japanese were clearly unaware of our activities, which were much greater than the evidence suggested.

  In the evening, after the trial was completed, Commander Craven was “mortified to see Newnham, Gray and Ford put in the condemned cell. The remaining three were fortunate to receive 15 years’ imprisonment. Newnham and Gray were very sick, but behaved most gallantly during their 18 days under sentence of death. Ford was fit, and his good spirits were an example we shall never forget.”

  On the morning set for their execution, Lieutenant H C Dixon, the New Zealander, crept up the prison corridor while ostensibly washing the floor. When he was near their cell, he asked if there were any messages he could take. Newnham requested that his love should be sent to his family; Gray asked that his remains and silver watch should be sent home. A warder then hustled Dixon away. Ford later said that he hoped his remains could be re-buried one day in Edinburgh.

  On 18th December the three officers were removed from their cells. Neither Newnham nor Gray could walk unaided. Ford half carried them to a waiting truck. They were shot on the beach at Shek-o.

  Notes

  1. Reminiscences of Maj. J R Flynn, written for OL.

  2. Goodwin, Ralph, Passport to Eternity, London: Arthur Barker, 1956, p. 6.

  3. Garneau, G S, Royal Rifles of Canada, Bishop’s University, 1971, p. 297.

  4. Interview Bird with OL.

  5. Report to Admiralty, 1945, RN Historical Branch.

  6. Report by Maj. C R Boxer, 26.8.45.

  CHAPTER 20

  The British Army Aid Group

  and Fresh Disasters

  In Argyle Street POW Camp a few of us in late 1943 wondered what organisation in China had been responsible for sending us medicines, communications and encouraging us to escape, very much endangering us in the process. To what use had the British officers there put the intelligence we had sent them? We knew we had lost from Argyle Street alone Newnham, Haddock, Boxer, Dixon, Young and Craven, but we did not know what had happened to them. Nor did we appreciate the horrifying slaughter which had occurred in the Stanley Internment Camp. Rumours reached us that Ford and several others had been taken from Shamshuipo, as had an Indian officer named Captain M A Ansari from Mau Tau Chung POW Camp across the road from us. To what extent would they reveal, under torture, details about us? It was not until after the war that I discovered the horrifying answers to these questions: they certainly preyed on my mind.

  * * * * *

  In January 1942 Lieutenant Colonel L T Ride, who had commanded the Volunteer Field Ambulance so ably during the fighting, had escaped from Shamshuipo. He persuaded Major General L E Dennys, the British Military Attache in China, that an organisation be established to arrange the escape of POWs and internees from Hong Kong. Dennys was sympathetic, but said he could spare no vehicle, weapon or wireless set. As far as manpower was concerned, Ride could only use any escapers who reached him. As a cover, the organisation was to be called ‘The British Army Aid Group’; it should claim to be helping Chinese refugees. General Chiang Kai-shek agreed to the proposals and gave orders that the Chinese should support it.

  Ride’s first recruit was Captain R D Scriven, Indian Medical Service, who had escaped from Shamshuipo with Captain A G Hewitt. Scriven was an excellent choice for he knew Hong Kong well and spoke Cantonese fluently. “Ride told me I should do anything I could to find out what was happening in the Colony and to contact guerrillas who might be helpful in guiding further escapers,” recalls Scriven. “I was able to ingratiate myself with General Cheung who was commanding the forces in Waichow. And so I set off with a good supply of medical stores and a Chinese, Henry Chan, who had been a tour guide in Hong Kong. How long my mission would last, I had no idea. We reached Waichow hidden under sacks after passing Japanese patrols.”1

  At Waichow, Scriven, among the most charismatic and delightful of men, struck up a useful friendship with General Cheung over an alcoholic dinner. Cheung told him that three other escapers from Hong Kong were two days’ march away. They were the group led by Captain J D Clague Royal Artillery. Cheung accompanied Scriven back to the Italian Medical Mission for a nightcap. “The drinks finished, I bade a courteous
goodnight to the General and fell senseless to the floor, smashing an oil lamp and the table in my descent. An admirable Chinese priest, Father Ma, put me to bed and assured me I had acquired much face.”

  In June 1942 Clague replaced Scriven because the Indian Medical Service in New Delhi had become restless that one of their officers should be employed in duties other than medical.

  Clague, now promoted to Major and, like Hewitt and Scriven, wearing a Military Cross for their daring escape, established his advance post which consisted of five British officers and ten Chinese. “You are appointed M19 representative in China …” read his directive which told him he had to rescue any Allied POWs; he must confide in the Chinese military authorities; give all the credit for any success to the Chinese and gather intelligence. Permission was not given for him to use ciphers.

  The role of the BAAG was made most difficult owing to local politics, personalities, intrigue and the growing unwillingness of the Chinese nationalists and Communists to work together. BAAG never formed an integral part of any Chinese military body. Its existence was usually recognised by both the Americans and Chinese; its presence was tolerated and its help accepted; but officially it was ignored. Ride found that the biggest stumbling block was that Britain’s prestige in China had reached an all-time low. “If the defeated British were considered to be a world power, why not the undefeated Chinese?” was an occasional comment.

  China’s contribution to the total war effort has not been adequately recognised. When the Pacific War began in December 1941, China was engaging 22 Japanese divisions, plus 20 brigades, compared with ten divisions and three brigades which Japan used on its offensives in Malaya, Burma, Hong Kong and the Dutch East Indies. By August 1945 over a million Japanese troops were in China. Almost 400,000 of them were killed there, which belies the later charge that China did not really fight.2

  “A special reconnaissance for an escape operation on Argyle Street POW camp was carried out in August 1942,” read one of the first reports submitted by BAAG to the War Office.3 “The first step in our plans was to obtain a complete set of maps of the underground drainage system of Kowloon. These were stolen from the Japanese. Three British officers and two Chinese were sent into the New Territories to investigate the possibility of a large-scale rescue of prisoners through the underground drainage system.”

  According to the report, many interned Chinese soldiers had escaped from Argyle Street before the war through these drains, which passed under our camp into Kowloon Bay.

  To the best of my knowledge this part of the report may be misleading. There was certainly no escape from Argyle Street throughout the time we were there. Had we found underground nullahs or drains, there would have been escapes, as there were at Shamshuipo in early 1942.

  In September 1942, as already related, BAAG’s Chinese agents made contact with the Volunteer POWs from Shamshuipo who were working at Kai Tak, and escape equipment was smuggled to them. By 1st May 1943 BAAG had grown to 13 officers and four men. They were divided between the Headquarters at Kweilin and outposts at Chungking, Waichow, Macao and Dunming. A further 35 British and Chinese staff served at the HQ as clerks, accountants, medical staff and messengers.

  Ride’s and Clague’s plans for the mass breakout of POWs never materialised, but they were very successful in infiltrating BAAG agents into the commercial dockyards in Hong Kong. Allied submarines could be deployed to sink Japanese vessels when they left port, particularly if good intelligence was available. The Allies therefore tried to establish ‘coast watchers’ near ports in Burma, Singapore, Hong Kong and China. By 1944 the cumulative losses to Japanese merchant shipping were considerable. BAAG was also successful in persuading skilled labour in the Hong Kong dockyards to leave the Colony. They also helped escapers and those evading captivity.

  One outstanding success was achieved. The Japanese Governor held a military parade on the cricket field in Victoria near the Law Courts to read out the annual rescript from the Emperor. There was a stand for spectators and a high vertical railing around the cricket field to restrict entry. At 10.00 a.m. I heard the drone of planes. Without warning, through the scattered cloud covering the Peak, American aircraft dived upon the pitch machine-gunning the parade. There was no escape; the death toll must have been very high.

  We were kept short of rations for a week. Our undercover work was, I felt, achieving results.

  BAAG gained a good reputation with GHQ India for gathering naval intelligence. The organisation accurately tracked the arrival of the Lisbon Maru into Hong Kong, “but despite this early warning, one of the worst maritime tragedies of the Pacific war resulted from miscommunication on the part of the Americans after they had received knowledge of the ship’s whereabouts and function.” Selwyn-Clarke’s report to Macao on the Lisbon Maru’s POW role had also been tragically mishandled, as we have seen.

  Captain Flynn in Argyle Street and Ford in Shamshuipo meanwhile gathered intelligence via the Indian and Chinese Volunteer POWs respectively. The information was embodied into a weekly Waichow intelligence summary which went to the Military Attache in Chunking and the Director of Military Intelligence, India. By 1943 these reports were passed by wireless, taking four days.4 The Americans received copies of everything worthwhile.

  I have described how the spying organisation affecting the POWs collapsed in July 1943 with the arrest of Newnham and others, but not what happened at Stanley Internment Camp. There were resistance groups there, and among British bankers in Victoria who had not been interned because they were still useful to the Japanese.

  Dr Talbot, being returned to Stanley after undergoing an operation in Victoria, was thoroughly searched at a police post at the Wong Nei Chong Gap. The Japanese found beneath his bandages 4,000 Yen and messages. Sir Vandeleur Grayburn, head of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation, who had refused to escape when BAAG contacted him earlier, bravely went to the Japanese Chief of the Foreign Affairs Department. Grayburn told him that he had asked Talbot to take the money to Stanley as it was partly for the nursing staff at the camp’s hospital. He was arrested two weeks later and died of ill-treatment in prison.

  Tragically, many more arrests followed when the Japanese established a link between BAAG and the internees. A radio engineer was forced to dig in a bank where a wireless set was hidden. Another set was voluntarily surrendered. Those arrested were accused of spying or of inciting or assisting espionage, although most messages passed from Stanley concerned trivial matters such as the health of prisoners.

  On 19th October 1943 27 British internees were tried by five Japanese officers. In addition, a most courageous Indian Army officer was unexpectedly added to the civilian group.

  Captain M A Ansari 5/7 Rajputs had been a POW in the Mau Tau Chung POW camp. He was related to the ruler of a large Indian state and, thanks to his influence, the Japanese were determined to persuade him to support the extensive anti-British movement. Ansari was a strong character; before the war Wallis, then commanding the Rajput Battalion, had to discipline him frequently for fighting Royal Scots officers in the Hong Kong Hotel.5

  The Japanese had kept him in Stanley Prison between May and September 1942, so starving and ill-treating him that Ansari had become unable to walk. After some time in the camp hospital, he returned to the Indian other ranks POW camp, which contained no British officer. He was involved with BAAG in helping escapers but was entrapped by agents provocateurs and arrested again in May 1943 to be starved and brutally tortured for several months.

  The trial was presided over by Lieutenant Colonel Fujimoto, a tired, wizened old man. The Japanese regarded J A Fraser, the former Hong Kong Government Defence Secretary, as the ringleader. Major Kozi, the prosecutor, made a speech which lasted most of the morning. The Chinese interpreter translated so infrequently and so badly that the prisoners were scarcely aware of what was being said. Fujimoto at one stage put his arms on the table, rested his head on his arms and for half an hour seemed to be asleep. On awakening, he went
to the lavatory to smoke a cigarette while the trial continued. At 2.00 p.m. Kozi mopped his brow, bowed and sat down amidst much Japanese applause. The interpreter, after a confused discussion in Japanese, translated: “In the eyes of the law, you are all guilty of High Treason, and the prosecution has demanded the death penalty.” Fujimoto, after fumbling with a book, announced, “All are sentenced to death. The Court is adjourned.”

  On 29th October, after ten days in solitary confinement, 32 men and one woman were led out to be executed. A group of children from the internment camp who were passing the prison saw the van drive out. As it went by, English voices shouted out, “Goodbye, boys.”

  “I was in the prison garden when I saw the prisoners leave on their last earthly journey,” noted W J Anderson. “I was told that some had asked to be granted the services of a minister, but that this was refused. They were allowed to mix and talk to each other for five minutes before being tied up preparatory to their death march. Captain Ansari, I was told, gave them a ‘pep talk’ which greatly cheered them.

  “Warders who were present at the execution said that it was a cruel and bloody affair. All were decapitated, though the executions in their near final stage were said to be so bad that some lives were ended by shooting.”6 The dead were heaped together in a common grave making later identification impossible.

  * * * * *

  On 23rd December it was the turn of Boxer, Craven, Dixon and Young to be sentenced, following the finding of the wireless set in Argyle Street. After the execution of Newnham, Ford and Gray, and now Ansari with the 33 others, Boxer did not expect to survive. Moreover, his Japanese guards had three times taken him outside the barracks, telling him he would soon be executed. Boxer met Dixon in the latrine and warned him they were for the ‘high jump’. It was therefore to their considerable relief that the four were provisionally sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. They waited in an anti room for the sentence to be confirmed. Boxer warned them that a heavier penalty might be imposed. He was wrong; the sentence was reduced to five years.