Uri Dan50
[In this except, the author Uri Dan, reports to his embassy on his German colleague working at Stern]
Born and raised in Israel, I have not experienced the evils of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, but I know that the State of Israel was established so that this would never happen again. When German scientists began to work for Nasser to help produce missiles, scientists who had previously worked for the Third Reich, like any Jew living in Israel, I felt threatened. It was as if the Germans were going to destroy us again.
Vacek went pale. His pallor visibly changed when I addressed him directly:
‘Do you want the death of another Jew, Wolfang Lotz, to rest on your conscience as a German, and on that of your newspaper? Six million by Hitler and one by Stern' . I heard the clink of the silver spoon as it fell from his hands and struck the saucer of his coffee cup. He was furious:
‘You are going to play on the Holocaust as well? Listen to me carefully. I was just an adolescent at the time and feel no connection with what Hitler did. However, your argument is valid and I would not want a man to lose his life because of an article I wrote in my newspaper. I’ll see what can be done.’
Chapter 10
The Spy Who Hid Behind Another
This story has long been touted as one of the biggest espionage cases in France, when Georges Paques, a graduate of the Ecole normale superiure51 and senior NATO official, was accused of being a Soviet spy. Recruited during the Second World War, he spent two decades providing his KGB the Ecole normale superieure masters with a wealth of information. Arrested in 1963, Paques was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964 by the French court. However, in 1968 General de Gaulle commuted his sentence to twenty years; and two years later, the new French president, Georges Pompidou (a fellow graduate of the Ecole normale superiure), granted him a full pardon. This meant that the so-called French ‘spy of the century' actually only served seven years in prison.
This case raises many questions, some of which have yet to be resolved.Yet in order to understand the huge shockwave that the discovery of this Soviet mole caused, one must first take into account the context of the time. Thanks to a KGB agent's defection in the early 1960s, western intelligence agencies were now discovering how their departments had been infiltrated by their enemies in the East. In Britain, for example, the truth about the famous ‘Cambridge Five'52 came to light. Men such as Philby and the others who had been recruited by the Soviets before the war and had been patiently gaining access to positions of responsibility in the intelligence or diplomatic services. It was discoveries such as this that sent shockwaves throughout the British intelligence network.
For the time being, France appeared to be curiously out of the way. Had the French intelligence networks escaped being infiltrated? The brutal truth would come from Washington D.C., when President Kennedy revealed the extent of Soviet infiltration in a letter to Charles de Gaulle. Dozens of moles had been uncovered - some even in the French president's own entourage! De Gaulle was furious and demanded an investigation. Prominent names were mentioned in the press and mistrust spread through all levels of government. The sole result of this unrest was the arrest of George Paques, which clearly provided the necessary smokescreen.
In essence, the Paques case can be regarded as a set of Russian dolls: the more you dig, the more layers you uncover, all with increasingly Machiavellian goals. It is a game that begins with a key moment in espionage history: the appearance of Anatoliy Klimov at the US embassy in Helsinki, along with his wife and children, in December 1961, requesting political asylum in the United States. Klimov, whose real name was Anatoliy Golitsyn, was a high-ranking KGB officer and a prominent Soviet figure. Far from being a man of action, this defector was actually an analyst. He had a fabulous memory, and as a result of the high-ranking positions he had held in the KGB, also had a good knowledge of the USSR's activities in the West. His defection was therefore an important event, and the
Americans did not want to waste the opportunity. Golitsyn was quickly transferred to Washington, where the head of the CIA's counterintelligence service, James Angleton, conducted his interrogation.
The result was unexpected: Soviet KGB agents had infiltrated seamlessly into western intelligence agencies, as well as international organizations such as NATO and the UN. It provided definitive proof against Philby and his fellow Cambridge spies. Golitsyn's revelations corroborated with the information obtained through the Venona Project.53 The enormous mass of information contained in the messages, that had been intercepted over the years, could now be deciphered by the Americans, although they could never have imagined that the extent of the infiltration would be so extreme. The end result was cruel, as the revelations now meant their was mistrust between all western intelligence agencies. In the US, for example, the CIA director of intelligence for the Soviet bloc became a suspect, while in Britain, even the head of MI5, Sir Roger Hollis, found himself caught in the crossfire.
Consequently, the suspicion now entered the minds of some experts that Golitsyn could well be a ‘fake' defector, who had been guided by the KGB to create panic and confusion in the West. The Yourchenko case54, for example, which also concerned a fake defector, was a good illustration of this traditional Russian espionage tactic.
However, it would be proved that Golitsyn was without doubt a genuine defector; although while his accusations were credible, they were only so to some extent. Indeed, despite his knowledge of the Soviets' infiltration of western intelligence agencies, he was unable to name any agents in particular. He only knew that they existed - a very different thing entirely!
As he was an analyst, he was aware of secret documents that had been stolen from the West. In a pinch, he could describe the source of the leak, without actually being able to positively identify the agent . This meant that the intelligence agencies then had to crosscheck their records and gradually sort through the men and women who were likely to have access to sensitive information.
If any names were revealed, even indiscriminately, before questioning the credibility of the defector, one had to consider the general wave of paranoia that was taking over at the time. Angleton, in particular, was a man who saw potential spies everywhere and Golitsyn's revelations arrived just in time to feed the frenzy. On the other hand, Golitsyn was particularly well-informed about everything relating to the Anglo-Saxon world. Although as far as France was concerned; his information was not quite as accurate, which is why the CIA wanted to pass the information on to Paris. However, they had to wait for the right time to do so. They wanted to make sure that the French government, and General de Gaulle, would suffer the greatest embarrassment, as they suspected (not without some reason), that it was too much of a docile partner in the alliance of the western countries.
Marcel Chalet55
[The author is recalling Golitsyn's personality, having personally interrogated him in the United States.]
He was a brilliant case study of the KGB, and had undergone every stage of the initiation
process and the various levels of training that was typical of Soviet spies. Golitsyn was remarkably good at his job and given the variety of positions he had held, his powers of observation and excellent knowledge of what was happening in the West, made him an ideal informant. I think it really helped western intelligence agencies be aware of the real extent of the KGB’s reach and ambitions in the 1960s. This is certainly evident in France’s case: he helped us to understand how the KGB viewed our country as an important theatre of operations.
[Later, Chalet adds that:
He was a man of’dossiers’, not ‘the field’. It appeared from the outset that he was destined to become a first-rate informer, that is to say, someone who’s opinions would still be valid, even after he had given up all of his information. He certainly tried to maintain the image of being an expert without equal in certain areas, so as to remain as useful to the intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, for as long as possible.
[This last sentence is interesting: as a deserter, would he not be tempted to make up more secrets in order to remain useful?]
In spring 1962, John F. Kennedy sent a letter to Charles de Gaulle by special messenger - the US president wanted to make sure that the message was delivered by hand and that no one in de Gaulle's entourage would read it before the man himself. Kennedy wanted to send a signal to de Gaulle that he did have no confidence in even his closest counsellors.
Obviously, the general was not at all happy with this, even more so than with the contents of the letter itself. Yet the French President was furious : Kennedy had bluntly announced to de Gaulle that the US intelligence services had proof that France had been infiltrated right up to the highest levels by the KGB.
Even if de Gaulle thought that this might have been an effort by the Americans to sabotage his attempts at a rapprochement with Moscow, it was still difficult to treat the matter lightly. He therefore decided to send a secret emissary (an army general) to Washington. However it must be observed that neither the SDECE56 nor the DST were informed, or even the French Ambassador to the United States.
With the CIA's approval, the general met with Golitsyn and returned to Paris convinced that the defector really was in possession of very worrying information about France. Clearly troubled, de Gaulle eventually decided to send a joint team of intelligence specialists from the DST and SDECE to Washington.
This small group included a very interesting man who would later become the head of the DST, Marcel Chalet.57 He was an excellent police officer, who spoke perfect English and had a reputation for being very discerning. However, as with other counterintelligence agents, he was obsessed with the Russian infiltration that had resulted from the Resistance and even from before the Second World War, such as the Soviet spy networks similar to the Red Orchestra.58
Chalet was not the only one who believed that the men and women who made up these networks were Soviet agents before joining the Resistance or anti-fascist militants. He was also convinced that Moscow's intelligence agencies had benefitted from the
Resistance by using it to infiltrate political circles after the Liberation. Indeed, Chalet's views and beliefs often bordered on obsession.
The French ‘counterintelligence' delegation arrived in Washington and met with Golitsyn, but the DST and SDECE agents were never allowed to be alone with him. A CIA agent was always present to monitor the situation and no doubt to keep an eye on their mole.
The French talked at length with Golitsyn and obtained a very specific list of documents that were due to be delivered to the KGB by the French moles. However, Golitsyn did not give up any names. During their second trip, the French agents arrived with an impressive mass of suspicious files containing the names of numerous people who could possibly be working for the KGB. It was a far-reaching list, bringing together, for example, all public servants or politicians who had business contacts with the Soviets. It was even suggested that General de Gaulle's file was included!
By submitting these dossiers to Golitsyn, the French officials hoped to stir up memories or establish a connection or correlation with what he had told them. But Golitsyn still did not reveal any names. When the French returned to Paris, they were convinced that there were at least fifty top-level moles in France who had managed to not only infiltrate the intelligence services, but also the highest spheres of the state!
The SDECE and DST had long suspected that a number of foreign agents had managed to infiltrate themselves into the French government. But nothing had prepared them for Golitsyn's disturbing revelations.
Now the hunt began. It was orientated logically around the most anti-American circles but not in the Communist ones: it had long been known that the Soviets had stopped recruiting from circles close to their own ideologies; so it was a question of looking further to the right.
The best-placed suspects, mainly because they were anti-American in general, were the in-power Gaullists. Based on the information obtained in Washington, it was this power that had been infiltrated by Soviet moles.
The DST and the SDECE began their investigations. It was delicate work, and as the first results were rather disappointing, a few of the shrewder agents (no doubt spurred on by the CIA), began to drop a few names, starting with that of the man who was seen as the power behind the throne, General Jacques Foccart. Another name belonged to an important politician who was one of the general's chief ministers and who had been one of the negotiators behind the Evian accords, which had sealed the end of the war in Algeria.
One of the immediate consequences [of the investigations] was the increase in mistrust, and not only in the corridors of power: panic was also spreading in the intelligence services, too. According to Golitsyn, there was a network called ‘Sapphire'59 in the SDECE, which included several senior officers. This information spread insidiously and inevitably caused serious damage as suspicions continued to multiply. Agents were driven out of their jobs with relative discretion and often without much evidence against them. The simple fact that they were suspects was enough.
However, the investigations into finding the real moles resulted in little success and this lack of results badly affected France's image in the eyes of its allies. As the Americans would not budge, the country was riddles with Soviet spies! They had kindly informed the French that they existed, but it was the French authorities who were unable to discover them. The conclusion was that France must have been even more deeply infiltrated by the Soviets than previously thought, as it was the Soviet moles who had used their influence to help paralyse the investigations.
France had to react, and fast. Luckily it was the providential discovery of a spy, Georges Paques, that would help them to save face.
Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop60
The other investigations took place within the SDECE from information provided by Golitsyn, with no definitive proof of treason emerging that would lead to any indictments. The prevailing suspicions merely led to the sidelining of certain members in 1970.
Yet Angleton’s delusional paranoia, driven by anti-Gaullist feeling in the US intelligence community, rubbed off on some of the senior counterintelligence officials. This caused a real crisis in the SDECE, as the result of poor information and an indirect knowledge of Golitsyn’s French dossier. Based on this information, even those who were carrying out the investigation came under suspicion. This was the case with Colonel Georges Barazer de Lannurien, who had fought with the Slovak Underground during the Second World War and had afterwards become private secretary to the SDECE’s director, General Jacquier, who himself had visited the USA in 1963 to interrogate Golitsyn. However, de Lannurien had since been bugged by the DST who suspected him of being a Soviet agent, just as he had also suspected other SDECE officers, such as Colonels Beaumont, Hounau, Delseny and Saar-Demichel.
According to Golitsyn's information, an important NATO document was now in the hands of the KGB, which had then been passed on to the Soviet embassy in Paris. This meant that one could logically deduce that the mole was French or was at least operating in France.
Initial investigations showed that nearly 800 people had had access to the document, which was clearly not so secret as it had been claimed. Elimination followed elimination before the DST agents brought the tally down to four people: three senior officials and a senior French official, Georges Paques. This little group was subsequently followed and bugged, but to no avail. These discreet investigations did not wield enough evidence to warrant a full prosecution.
The suspects were not questioned directly, but were simply monitored so as not to cause any alarm. After the investigations had dragged on for some time, a DST agent suddenly discovered some vital information. Georges Paques, who had previously had the reputation for being right-wing, relatively private and Catholic, now seemed to be displaying more left-wing views behind closed doors. Chalet, who was leading the investigation, immediately suspected that a man who was capable of such duplicity was also capable of hid
ing something much more important. Consequently, he decided to step up the surveillance on Paques at the beginning of August 1963.
Georges Paques had been working at NATO for two years as the press office deputy director: a role that did not exactly allow him access to top secret documents. Paques had had rather a chaotic career, which had begun in Algiers during the war. He had worked for several ministerial offices under the Fourth Republic before becoming the director of the 1’Institut des hautes etudes de la Defense nationale (Institute of Advanced Studies in National Defence). Likewise, this was not a position that provided him with the opportunity to overhear secrets as the focus of the institution is mainly theoretical and has a relatively open policy. No doubt Paques had greater ambitions to higher offices, but life decided otherwise, not to mention the fact that his personality was rather quiet and he had a reputation for enjoying the good life.
Whatever the case, the DST monitored him closely. One Sunday in August, they followed him to a charming village in the Parisian suburbs. Once there, Paques attitude began to be a little strange, almost as if he seemed to be waiting for something, or someone. Suddenly, the police watched on as a car arrived that was easily identifiable as belonging to the Soviet Embassy. Inside, the recognised two men who were deemed to be KGB agents under diplomatic cover. However, it could just be a coincidence...
Then something strange happened: a police car drove into the village and the Soviets suddenly scarpered. If the KGB agents had been under diplomatic cover, they would have had nothing to fear from the presence of the police. In reality, the men must have known that they were under surveillance by fellow spies, not just by the ordinary police.
As for Paques, he continued to walk around the village streets, before later returning to his home in Paris. However, he was arrested the following evening by DST officers and taken to the rude des Saussaies, where for half an hour he denied having any connection with the Soviets. Then suddenly, he submitted a remarkable confessional dossier that ran to nearly a dozen pages.
Great Spies of the 20th Century Page 12