He admitted to being in contact with the Russians and that it was them who had happened to give him the information. However, none of the information related to secrets concerning national defence or the higher interests of the country. In his own way, Paques was an idealist: by collaborating with the KGB he always believed that he was working for peace. He claimed that he had acted no differently to General de Gaulle, who had always defied the Americans, and had consequently decided to approach the Russians. He even claimed that during the Berlin Crisis, he had played an essential role in safe-guarding peace by informing Moscow that the Americans were prepared to use nuclear weapons if Khrushchev did not back down.
He explained that he had been recruited during the war while he was in Algiers. It was true that while many Free French could be found in that country at the time, some had become agents for the Soviets or other organisations. In any case, Paques declared that it was he who had taken the initiative to approach them, underlining the fact that they were our allies. He informed them of the USA's aggressive intentions, who according to him, intended to attack the USSR after Hitler had been defeated.
In short, Paques maintained that he had never intended to go against France and had never given the Soviets any information that might cause any damage, just trifles such as information on politicians etc. If this is true, why was the case blown out of all proportion? Was it because they were finally happy to have uncovered the mole? Even if, to most intelligent people, it was only a really small one? In reality, Georges Paques merely served as a scapegoat who had been arrested instead of another person, who was clearly the real spy.
There are two facts that support this theory. Firstly, Golitsyn had defected before Georges Paques joined NATO. In which case, how could Golitsyn have known about the handing over of the NATO documents, when Paques was not even there at the time. When one closely examines the circumstances in which Paques was discovered and arrested, it becomes clear that it was cleverly organised plot by the Soviets.
The story that Paques had apparently left-wing views is a fabrication. This great servant of the state had always been right-wing, even if he was not indifferent to more progressive views. Such stories were merely spread around so that the DST would investigate him. The story of his ‘appointment' in the village also does not appear to be a genuine operation. In fact the idea of meeting in a near-deserted village where any movement could attract attention is strange, especially when there are so many places in a busy city where one could meet discreetly. As for the car from the Soviet Embassy, this was merely to compromise Paques and alert the police officers from the DST.
It is almost certain therefore that the Soviets were the ones who gave up Paques. The discovery of his small dealings with the East allowed them to create a smokescreen around the real traitor, the one who was actually spying on NATO.
The real spy was actually a Canadian named Hambleton, who was discovered and arrested much later, in England. The French had been exploited, or at least it seemed that they had been. The Russians, however, were not the only masters of such a game: the Americans controlled all of Golitsyn's statements, never allowing him to be left alone with the French agents. It is not unlikely that his friends at the CIA persuaded Golitsyn to feed them false information. This was no doubt in order to disrupt the French intelligence services by creating an atmosphere of distrust, but also to embarrass General de Gaulle, whose foreign policy was seriously beginning to worry Washington.
In any case, Georges Paque's speedy and rather sloppy trial, which was often held behind closed doors, did not reveal any convincing proof of his guilt - an additional argument for all those who believed the senior official should be excused.
Andre Frossard61
As for the political documents that the accused is alleged to have supplied to the Russian government, the best way to keep them safe from prying eyes was certainly not to entrust them to the deputy head of the press office, whose role would not have been enough to prevent them from being reported. If there were secret documents, then they are not secret to the Russians anymore, so why the closed doors? And if it was just worthless bit of paper, then why have a trial?
Chapter 11
Cohen: the Damascus Hanging
For the Israelis he was a national hero. A true legend. A man who died in service to his country during a particularly dangerous and daring mission. That man was Eli Cohen. One night in May 1965, handcuffed and under guard, he mounted the scaffold that had been erected in Martyr's Square, in Damascus. Despite the late hour, thousands of Syrians thronged around the gallows as the scene was broadcast live on local television.
At the foot of the scaffold, an old rabbi began to mumble a prayer. Above, the executioner, a giant named Abbu-Salim, tried to place a hood over the condemned man's head. But Cohen refused. Seconds later, the rope was placed around his neck and after two minutes, Eli Cohen was declared dead. One of the most famous spies had died.
Israel has never forgotten him: the anniversary of his disappearance was officially celebrated in 2000 and a commemorative stamp was produced. That same year, Prime Minister Ehud Barak formally requested that his remains be returned to Israel to be buried. Syria refused, just as it had done so on numerous occasions beforehand, despite the urgings of various Israeli governments.
Eli Cohen had notably been compared to Richard Sorge, the famous Soviet spy who was able to warn the USSR of Hitler's plans to attack, in June 1941. However, the circumstances in which this Israeli spy, who had infiltrated Damascus to the heart of the Syrian ruling classes, was unmasked has never been quite clear.
In intelligence parlance, Eli Cohen was called an ‘illegal', meaning that he enjoyed no protective status, such as a diplomat, for example. As an ‘illegal', he instilled himself inside a foreign land using a false identity and then waited to be activated by his governing bosses. Such a process can often take a long time and very few intelligence agencies use ‘illegals', because the preparation is so long and costly. However, it is a system that was often used by the Soviets and the Israelis too.
An ‘illegal' must be a person of exceptional character: someone with nerves of steel who could operate in a hostile environment, and who had to be constantly vigilant not to stray from the back story that had been created for him.
This back story, or ‘legend' in intelligence jargon, meant the agent's false personality: his new identity, fake past, everything, in short, that characterises someone. An ‘illegal' is an individual with two lives, but they must be careful not to forget too much of their first!
Eli Cohen was born in the early 1920s in Alexandria, where there was a strong Jewish community. He received a traditional education as the Jews of Alexandria were very attached to Hebrew orthodox beliefs. The young Eli, the offspring of a modest Syrian family, was also well-educated. He was good at languages and besides Hebrew and Arabic, also spoke excellent French. He was a clever boy who was passionate about maths and dreamed of becoming an engineer, after narrowly failing the rabbinate. However, circumstances would decide otherwise. During the Second World War, the young man quickly took up with the Zionist circles to which he adhered. Still in Alexandria at the time, he was involved in covert actions to enable Egyptian Jews to reach Palestine. He dreamed of going there himself, although his leaders felt that he was more useful to the cause in Egypt and it was 1957 before he went to Israel. He had previously spent several months in prison, as he had been working closely with an Israeli spy network based in Egypt, some members of which had been sentenced to death. Luckily for Cohen, he managed to slip though the nets.
Cohen therefore already had intelligence experience when he arrived in Israel to join his family, who had emigrated there years before. He first worked as a translator at the Ministry of Defence, putting his excellent gift for languages to good use: in Egypt he had also learnt English, Italian, Spanish and German. It is hardly an accident that he was recruited by the Ministry, who were aware of the services he had performed in Egypt.
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He should really have been recruited by the secret service, but in the world of intelligence, prudence is the key. At first, Mossad simply observed the young man from a distance so as to know him better. After a difficult adjustment period, Cohen was soon well-integrated into Israeli society, changing his employer and even getting married. One day, he announced to his wife, Nadia, that he had been hired as an executive in a big commercial company, which would often require him to travel abroad. In fact, he had been hired by Mossad. Now deemed capable, he was taken in hand by a man nicknamed ‘the Dervish', whose real name was Yitzhak Shamir, the future Prime Minister.
This former member of the formidable terrorist group, Stern, had entered the secret service in the mid 1950s. A small man with a big moustache, ‘the Dervish' was experienced and spent many months training his protege. He taught him how to know when someone was tailing him, and then how to lose them, not to mention working under a false identity or engaging him in visual memory exercises.
Cohen did not yet know the mission he was being trained for. At the time, he was concentrating on becoming the perfect agent, or a katsa, as it was called by Mossad. However, when ‘the Dervish' started showing him examples of weapons used in the Arab countries, he understood where he was to be sent. It was fairly obvious, especially since Cohen also had another advantage: as well as speaking fluent Arabic, he also had brown hair and a tanned complexion, allowing him to pass easily for a native Muslim in the Middle East.
He had now been in Israel for nearly three years, but his training was not yet complete. He still needed to study Islam and go to the local mosques. Finally, at the end of I960, his instructor revealed his destination, Syria, and his new identity, or ‘legend'. From now on, Eli Cohen would be known as Kamel Amin Thaabet, a typical Syrian name. He was given the name of his ‘alleged' father, as well as a false family and all the details needed to enable him to forge a new identity. He also forced himself to study Syria's history, culture and politics.
However, before leaving for Syria, he first had to learn the Syrian accent, which was very different from the Egyptian one. At the same time he undertook more technical training and learned how to use miniature transmitters and micro photographic devices. In short, the A-Z of how to be the perfect spy.
Israel and Syria had been at war ever since the creation of the Jewish state, with trouble regularly breaking out on the borders between the two countries. At the time, the Golan (a plateau overlooking Galilee) was still under Syrian control and they would sporadically open fire on the fisherman or the farmers of the northern villages. Each time, the Israelis would retaliate and fire rockets. Israel also continued to monitor Syrian armed forces, who were receiving increasingly sophisticated equipment from their Soviet allies. There was a general fear in Israel that sooner or later, Syria would mount an offensive on its northern border.
There was another issue that was equally important: water, an essential factor that still exists in the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians today. Syria, which controlled the Galan, could easily divert the rivers that feed into the Sea of Galilee. The Israelis used this water to irrigate their crops in the south and in the Negev Desert, in particular.
Eli Cohen was now ready to fulfil his first mission. However, as he prepared to travel to Syria, he was surprised to find that Mossad were to send him to Argentina instead!
Gordon Thomas62
Cohen was one of the Jews that were expelled from Egypt after the Suez Crisis in 1957.
He arrived in Haifa and felt a stranger in his new country. In 1957 he was recruited by the Israeli military counterintelligence unit, where his work as an analyst soon bored him.
He enquired about the entry pathway into Mossad, but his candidacy was rejected. ‘Our refusal hurt him deeply’, Meir Amit (the head of Mossad) told me. Cohen left the army and married an Iraqi woman named Nadia. For two years, Cohen led a quiet life working as a clerk at an insurance office in Tel Aviv. Unbeknownst to him, his application was reassessed by Mossad during a review of rejected applications. Meir Amit had been looking for a particular type of agent for a very special mission. Having found no one suitable in his current files, he began to go through the rejected ones. Cohen seemed to offer the best possibility and was quietly put under surveillance. Weekly reports sent back to Mossad spoke of his monotonous routine and his love for his wife and children. Eli Cohen was a hard worker and gave evidence of his ability to work under pressure. Finally, he was told that Mossad regarded him as fit for service.
Mossad sent Cohen to Argentina where there was actually a strong Arab community of at least 500,000 exiles from the Near and Middle East. Eli needed to hone his legend: his new surname was Thaabet and he had been born in Beirut. However, is family were of Syrian origin and had long ago emigrated to Argentina. Another anecdotal detail lies in the fact that Cohen's real Jewish origins actually did originate in Syria! Mossad wanted to fully prepare his legend and for his cover as an exile to be credible, he must first be familiar with Argentina and the way of life out there in the Arab colony.
Naturally, Cohen did not travel directly from Tel Aviv to Buenos Aires: he had a stopover in Zurich, where he was looked after by local Mossad correspondents. Cohen took this opportunity to rid himself of anything that still attached him to Israel, such as his clothes, papers and photographs of his family. As he boarded the plane for Argentina, he was now a businessman specialising in imports and exports, with a beautiful South American passport bearing the name of Thaabet and a big wad of dollars in his pocket.
A cruel reality was that his family knew nothing of his new life. When Cohen wanted to send news to his wife, he had to send it along with his reports to Zurich, where a Mossad agent would then change the envelope before sending it on to Tel Aviv. Great care was taken to change the point of origin so as to imply that Cohen was continuously on the move. Cohen had to lie to his wife: a genuine ordeal for a man who was very attached to his family. Over the years, he became increasingly resentful of the separation and the double life that forced him to lie to those to whom he held most dear.
He spent several months in Argentina and used his time to test the extent of his spying abilities. He immediately sank into the skin of his ‘character'; frequenting places where he could meet other Syrian and Lebanese exiles and make friends with some of them. He soon realised that his cover was credible, but he still had to be on his guard, having been warned before his departure that the Arab secret services were very active in Argentina. In any case, he soon had a decisive encounter with the Syrian editor of an Arab newspaper and the two men talked a lot about politics. In the 1960s Nasser had been able to unite the destinies of Egypt and Syria by forming the famous United Arab Republic. But a growing number of Syrians had criticised the unification, which was increasingly turning into an outright annexation of Syria by Egypt. The hostility was crystallised by the Ba'ath Party, in particular, and it seemed that they would seize power in Damascus sooner or later.
Cohen professed his support for Ba'ath, and in conversation with the journalist (who was also a Ba'ath supporter), implied that his one aim was to end his life in exile and return to Damascus, where he could be of use to his country by helping the Ba'ath Party and ending Egyptian authority. The journalist fully agreed with him and even offered to provide him with contacts in Damascus. What is more, he introduced him to a man who would later play a big role in Syrian politics (and who again was a Ba'ath supporter): General Amin al-Hafiz, a Syrian military attache in Buenos Aires and the future President of Syria. Not to be confused with Hafez al-Hassad, who would not seize power until 1970.
Hafiz, who knew about Cohen's intentions, asked him: ‘what are you waiting for?', thus providing him with a direct invitation to Damascus. First, however, Mossad made Cohen take a detour to Tel Aviv, where he was allowed to see his wife as well as undergo further training. He now had to perfect the task of operating the miniature radios that he was to use in Syria, which transmitted encrypted messages in Mors
e Code. This was very important as each ‘pianist', as the radio operators used to be called, had their own way of typing a message; a personal touch, or signature, that was unlike anyone else's. This meant that if another ‘pianist' tried to send a message on the same machine, they would be easily identified as an imposter. On the other hand, if the user suddenly changed his signature, it would be clear that he was under some form of duress. This meant that Cohen, along with his handlers, had to learn to how to send and recognise his ‘signature'.
Once his training was complete, he once more flew to Zurich where he transformed into Kamel Amin Thaabet. He then headed for Beirut, before travelling to Damascus by road. Before leaving Israel, he had learned that a military coup in Syria had meanwhile led to the Ba'ath Party taking power and calling the county's unity with Egypt into question. This was a favourable situation for Cohen, as his contacts were all within the influential circles of this party.
He crossed over the border without difficulty; his transmitter carefully hidden inside some household equipment. Upon his arrival in Damascus, he began to look for an apartment. He could not possibly stay in a hotel as the transmitter and other equipment would likely attract attention. He found a place in a small building opposite the barracks that housed the Syrian Army. This location allowed him to glean certain nuggets of information: on nights when the barrack lights were on very late, Cohen could easily deduce that they were preparing themselves for something. What is more, the biggest advantage of his beautiful new apartment was that it was on the top floor, thus allowing him to install a discreet antenna on the roof for his transmitter.
Great Spies of the 20th Century Page 13