Great Spies of the 20th Century

by Patrick Pesnot

  As Mayor of Berlin, Brandt refused to have any contact with any Soviets who might remember him fondly. He knew that the KGB had hold of the famous receipt that he had foolishly signed, however, he did not seem to fear being blackmailed as a result of his wartime activities - another argument in favour of his not being an agent. However, Moscow was not willing to give up such a big fish so easily, especially one who undoubtedly had a bright international future.

  Having failed thus far, the KGB now changed their tactics. With help from the Stasi and the collaboration of Markus Wolf's HVA, they launched a veritable smear campaign against Willy Brandt, which was helped largely by the German right. After unsuccessfully spreading the rumour that he had been a US intelligence agent during the war, they highlighted his suspected communist convictions by recalling his commitment to the Marxist group that joined with the SPD. This was certainly a juicy rumour if it really did come from eastern intelligence agencies.

  They also questioned his patriotism: had he not spent the war in exile while his fellow Germans had suffered at home? The primary aim was to try and make him as uncomfortable as possible so it would be easier for the KGB to trap him in their net. The smear campaign certainly made Brandt vulnerable, and it could not have occurred at a worse time: the party had just appointed him as opposition candidate for chancellor against Konrad Adenauer. He consequently lost the 1961 election and would not become chancellor until 1969. 1961 was also the year the Berlin Wall was erected and Brandt came into his own during this period. He took an international stance and fought hard against its construction, even appealing to Kennedy and the West. At one point he compared the building of the wall to Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, although as we know, it was all in vain. In this instance, however, Brandt had shown himself to be a true opponent of Moscow and the Kremlin was once more keen to try and get around him.

  In late 1961 or early 1962, Moscow sent a KGB agent (probably a journalist or diplomat) to blackmail him. He suggested that if Brandt returned to the excellent relationship he had had with the NKVD during the war, then it would be possible to begin serious negotiations with Moscow regarding the status of Berlin. Once again, Brandt refused and the blackmail had failed. The KGB agent tried to speak to him about the infamous receipt, but he was bluffing: the receipt had disappeared from the ‘Poliarnik' file. As unbelievable as it may seem, after the first blackmail attempt had failed, someone in the KGB had decided to destroy what was then deemed to be a useless document. Such an act would prove irreparable and Brandt would never become a KGB agent. In any intelligence service, any document that might be used to blackmail an agent should never be destroyed. However, Moscow was still not quite finished with Willy Brandt.

  Before proceeding further, it is perhaps useful to look at Brandt's politics towards the East, which are a key factor in this story.

  As Chancellor, Brandt remained deeply influenced by the Berlin Crisis and the construction of the Wall in 1961. It had all happened during the time when he was the mayor of the former Third Reich capital and so he had experienced everything first-hand. Despite all the good words and speeches in support of the people of Berlin, the West had proved powerless to prevent the Wall's construction. Even Kennedy's famous visit did nothing: ‘Ich bin ein Berliner!’ (‘I am a Berliner!') were only words, not actions. At the time, the future chancellor believed that nothing could be done in Berlin, or the rest of Germany, to combat the USSR. Consequently, as soon as he came to power in 1969, he strongly asserted his intentions to open political negotiations with the East: he believed that the only way forward was through dialogue, but not only with East Germany, but with the entire Soviet Bloc, beginning first, of course, with Moscow. Intentions such as these could not fail to worry the West. However, at the same time the German Chancellor ensured that he remained firmly anchored in the western camp and was committed to European integration.

  It is true that by choosing ‘Ostpolitik', Brandt was breaking a taboo. Since the creation of West Germany, Bonn did not consider East Germany to be a ‘Soviet Occupied Zone'. However, Brandt was ready to discuss this allegedly occupied zone with West German leaders. Once more, the right-wing began to speak up and again reminded everyone of Brandt's suspected communist leanings. The chancellor did not care and had the support of most of the population: the majority of Germans also wanted reconciliation and peace.

  Brandt wanted to move fast and so established contacts with the Kremlin and its counterpart in East Germany, Willy Stoph. The Moscow Treaty was signed in 1970 and was later followed by the Treaty of Warsaw (1970). Federal Germany recognised the post-war frontiers, such as the famous Oder-Neisse line between Germany and Poland, but even more spectacularly, the border between the two Germanys! Willy Brandt accepted the partition, the existence of which West Germany had previously refused to acknowledge. Brandt believed that this was the only way to achieve reunification eventually and that it was important to be realistic by admitting that it existed in the first place. He therefore opted for reconciliation rather than permanent hostility. Furthermore, he stated that even if there were two states, there was still only one Germany and so both the GDR (East Germany) and the DDR (West Germany) entered into the UN at the same time. There were now many more official and private contacts, as well as exchanges of representatives, but not ambassadors. Brandt essentially believed that in the West, as in the East, it was important to keep a sense of belonging to a community and any official formal diplomatic relations would have soured that feeling. This does beg the question as to whether or not Brandt was naive in the hope that the GDR would be able to evolve in any way. Above everything else, had he not now satisfied the USSR? Recognising the post-war borders had long been Moscow's wish. Once again there was little Brandt could do against the USSR. Rather, it was better to hold back and then move forward step by step, such as improving the situation for West Berliners, who were now finally allowed to visit their families over in East Berlin. Yet the wall itself remained. However, West Berlin was also involved in this mutual recognition and so Moscow finally accepted that the city was part of the DDR, considering it a form of western bridgehead beyond the Iron Curtain.

  In fact, the Kremlin could only welcome the German Chancellor's decision. However, he who sups with the devil should have a long spoon and unfortunately, Willy Brandt's might not have been long enough, as the Guillaume Affair would prove.

  Henri de Bresson91

  Fiercely resisted in his own country by the Right, who were locked in systematic opposition, no one was indifferent to Ostpolitik.Abroad, where some, like Henry Kissinger, did not hide their distrust, we are grateful to the Chancellor for having the political courage to admit the post-war realities. He knew what he needed to do to prove his sincerity and overcome suspicions, so that the rapprochement between Bonn and the East would be reflected in other western capital cities. During his visit to Warsaw to sign the treaty, he silently knelt before the memorial to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto: an act which made considerable impact throughout the world. In November 1971 he received the Nobel Peace Prize, which was very important for Germany, occurring only twenty-six years after its surrender. In his speech, the Chancellor stated that no international interest could be separated today from overall responsibility for peace.

  Gunther Guillaume, who died in 1995, had a French surname. If his name really was

  Guillaume (William), then he must have been descended from French Huguenots who had fled to Germany after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. But his true nationality is of little importance. Only his story matters. A lot of what we do know of him is shrouded in mystery: his father, for example, was a Berlin doctor and a man of communist sympathies, who would have looked after Brandt during the time when he was being hunted by the Gestapo. Others, however, claim that Guillaume’s father was a cellist and a Nazi. What is fairly certain though is that the young Gunther Guillaume was born in 1920 and a was a member of the Hitler Youth. At the end of the war he was to be found serving in
the Wehrmacht and although captured by British soldiers, he managed to escape and return home to Berlin, where he was told that his father had been taken prisoner by the Russians. Despite the fact that he lived in the Soviet zone, Guillaume was not worried about his Nazi past.These were confusing times and many people who were at risk of being compromised changed their identity or went into hiding.

  Guillaume tried to earn a living by working as a photographer, but his past soon caught up with him. By this time, the East German secret police were beginning to mobilize and work their way through the Third Reich's archives, assisted by the KGB. Consequently, Guillaume was indentified and so joined the many other former Nazis who had been recruited by the East German intelligence agencies. It was impossible to refuse: his hands were tied by a bond that could not be broken at any price.

  Nevertheless, Guillaume joined the Communist Party with the same zeal he had previously shown when joining the Nazi ranks. So much so that much later, when he was denounced and arrested, Guillaume would proudly assert that he was an officer of East Germany. Even so, he was first hired as a photographer in a publishing company that was known for being a hotbed of communist agents. He then spent a long time at an intelligence officer training school in Kiev. Guillaume certainly had many talents and already seemed to have a promising career as a spy: the results he achieved exceeded the expectations of his leaders, including the enigmatic Markus Wolf.

  After his long training, Guillaume was ready to become operational. In the mean time, however, he got married - no doubt on the instructions of his superiors. His wife, Christa (or Christel) was also a HVA agent, the secret service of East Germany. To outsiders, a couple attracted far less attention than a single man, however, that is not to say that there was no genuine affection between the two agents: they always seemed very attached to each other, even if Guillaume had no qualms about lying to his wife.

  Their mission was to go to the West. They began by completing missions in West-Berlin, which were successful as they were granted permits to travel to West Germany in 1955 or 1956. At the time, the border was not as tightly controlled, which was why the two spies had no difficulty slipping though as they joined a band of refugees who were heading west for ‘freedom'. After spending time in a refugee camp they were questioned by counterintelligence agents, but were experienced enough to undergo such an examination with ease. They were now West German citizens and settled in Frankfurt, an SPD stronghold, and began by running a news kiosk. Their mission was to infiltrate the SPD and so both Gunther and Christa enrolled in a local party. They soon became model militants, ready to protest, hand out leaflets, or participate in endless meetings. They were so successful and made so much money that they were asked to take over permanently. It is true that they were not yet able to send any vital information to East Berlin, but any undercover mission takes time. Besides, back in Berlin, Markus Wolf was very patient: he was waiting for the SPD to come to power, a fact that was looking increasingly likely from the mid-1960s.

  The SPD was made up of various trends: Guillaume, cleverly, joined the most rightwing group of the party, and thus the most anti-communist. The majority of other communist spies who had infiltrated the West would have done the same. Guillaume became the right-hand man of Georg Leer, a party deputy and a future minister of Willy Brandt. In the mean time, Christa climbed the ranks in the party administration. Their mission seemed to be progressing perfectly.

  Always eager to progress further, Guillaume applied to be a technical advisor to the new chancellor, following the victory of Willy Brandt's Social Democrats during the 1969 elections. He came highly recommended by his current boss, Georg Leber, but first had to undergo a background check. He would certainly have already had one of these before entering West Germany, but it was still a matter of routine. The only difference this time was that Guillaume was applying for a very important position. Yet his CV hid a secret: after going through his records, the West German counterintelligence unit discovered a witness who claimed that Guillaume had previously travelled to West Germany while working for a publishing company that was known to be a nest of eastern spies. His superiors consequently ordered a more detailed investigation and advised the chancellery against his employment.

  Guillaume quickly collected himself and showed great composure: when summoned before Willy Brandt's cabinet, he asked to confront the witness who had accused him. The Chief of Staff informed him that the person in question had died, so any confrontation was impossible. Consequently, Guillaume appeared to be exonerated, with the intelligence agency responsible for the case, the BfV, seeming to forget all about it - even though such agencies never really forget.

  Yet in stopping their investigation, the German authorities were guilty of gross negligence. Apparently, the French had information on Gunther Guillaume and intelligence networks in Paris had long indentified him as someone who made regular visits to France. Admittedly, this was not enough to make someone a suspect, but the SDECE had recently discovered a mole in Willy Brandt's entourage and as a possible candidate, Guillaume was put under surveillance. The DST, who had now taken over from the SDECE, were almost certain that Guillaume was not visiting France as a tourist, but instead was going there to meet with his case officer or to send messages using the famous ‘dead letterbox' system. However, they had no evidence to prove this and so had to be content with keeping a watchful eye.

  Markus Wolf's HVA network soon benefited from an extraordinary stroke of luck. Until 1972, Gunther Guillaume had only been one of many technical advisors to the German Chancellor, although it did allow him access to information regarding the GDR. This was the era of Ostpolitik: the East Germans and their Soviet big brother were on the alert and wanted to ensure that any negotiations were as beneficial to them as possible. But it never hurts to know in advance the intentions of one's opponents. In 1972, Willy Brandt's personal aide, who was responsible for his agenda and accompanied him everywhere, even on holiday, decided to enter into politics. The position was now open for Guillaume, who was encouraged by other members of Brandt's entourage to take the role. Although there were plenty of spies around Brandt, this was an unexpected coup for Markus Wolf, who now had one of his own men at the heart of the West German government.

  Guillaume very quickly proved himself to be an excellent employee, a man who could be trusted and who showed the greatest discretion. However, just as he had been appointed Brandt's personal aide, a Soviet defector allowed the French authorities to confirm their suspicions. When shown a series of photographs of West German figures, the defector recognised Gunther Guillaume as a former classmate from the military training school in Kiev. The French immediately alerted their German counterparts, but Guillaume would not be arrested until a year later. Was the German intelligence agency negligent? Or did they knowingly dismiss the French information provided by the defector? If this was indeed the case, then what was the reasoning behind such a disastrous scheme?

  Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer92

  Born in Berlin in 1937, this civil servant entered into the BfV (the West German counterintelligence unit) at the age of twenty-nine. His new duties allowed him to monitor developments in the Guillaume Affair between l973-74.Impeccable and appreciated by his superiors, Tiedge was appointed head of the service in 1979. His speciality was operations in East Germany. However, he mysteriously disappeared on 22 August 1985 before finding refuge in the GDR, leading to the resignation of Heribert Hellenbroich, the head of the BND (the German intelligence agency), on 27 August.

  Was it this Tiedge who had hampered the investigations concerning Guillaume? Or should we put it down to the incompetence or negligence of an agency, which, at the time, had been infiltrated at the very highest levels?

  Nevertheless, the BfV, the German intelligence agency who had long distrusted Guillaume, continued to lead their own investigations.They did so in the upmost secrecy as they were worried that they would be forced to stop their enquiries, just as they had been told to do in 1969
. After all, attacking the German Chancellor's personal aide was hardly nothing! Furthermore, the intelligence officers suspected that there was someone at the head of the organisation that did not want the investigation into Guillaume to succeed. One of the officers had the idea of digging up the archives of intercepted coded shortwave messages sent by the East German services. There were certainly thousands of messages, but they had never really been exploited as the spies who had sent them so were so hard to identify. However, as soon as one could identify a suspect it was then possible to cross-reference everything else. It was important to remember though that the East German services, like those of other eastern countries, had a particular habit: they never forgot to wish their agents, and even members of their family, a happy birthday! Markus Wolf had wanted to establish a friendly relationship with the men and women living in exile in a hostile environment: wishing them a happy birthday meant that they had not been forgotten.

  As a result, a zealous BfV official began looking through the old files, although the most recent were unusable as the HVA had learned, through its spies, that its message were being decoded and so had changed its encryption methods. After a painstaking search, the official noticed that a number of birthday messages matched the birthdays of the Guillaume family exactly. From this moment on, the official was convinced that Guillaume was a communist agent and the head of the BfV, Gunther Nollau, was officially informed.