Mastering Modern World History

by Norman Lowe

  Not everybody accepted this interpretation. A. J. P. Taylor, in his book The Origins of the Second World War (1961), came up with the most controversial theory about the outbreak of the war. He believed that Hitler did not intend to cause a major war, and expected at the most, a short war with Poland. According to Taylor, Hitler’s aims were similar to those of previous German rulers – Hitler was simply continuing the policies of leaders like Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Stresemann; the only difference was that Hitler’s methods were more ruthless. Hitler was a brilliant opportunist taking advantage of the mistakes of the appeasers and of events such as the crisis in Czechoslovakia in February 1939. Taylor thought the German occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 was not the result of a sinister long-term plan; ‘it was the unforeseen by-product of events in Slovakia’ (the Slovak demand for more independence from the Prague government). Whereas Chamberlain miscalculated when he thought he could make Hitler respectable and civilized, Hitler misread the minds of Chamberlain and the British. How could Hitler foresee that the British and French would be so inconsistent as to support Poland (where his claim to land was more reasonable) after giving way to him over Czechoslovakia (where his case was much less valid)?

  Thus, for Taylor, Hitler was lured into the war almost by accident, after the Poles had called his bluff. ‘The war of 1939, far from being premeditated, was a mistake, the result on both sides of diplomatic blunders.’ Many people in Britain were outraged at Taylor because they thought he was trying to ‘whitewash’ Hitler. But Taylor was not defending Hitler; just the opposite, in fact – Hitler was still to blame, and so were the German people, for being aggressive. ‘Hitler was the creation of German history and of the German present. He would have counted for nothing without the support and cooperation of the German people. … Many hundred thousand Germans carried out his evil orders without qualm or question.’

  Most recent interpretations have tended to play down Taylor’s ‘continuity’ theory and highlight the differences in aims between earlier German rulers on the one hand, and Hitler and the Nazis on the other. Until 1937, Nazi foreign policy could be seen as typically conservative and nationalistic. It was only when all the wrongs of Versailles had been put right – the main aim of the conservatives and nationalists – that the crucial differences began to be revealed. The Hossbach memorandum shows that Hitler was preparing to go much further and embark on an ambitious expansionist policy. But there was more to it even than that. As Neil Gregor points out (2003), what Hitler had in mind was ‘a racial war of destruction quite unlike that experienced in 1914–18’. It began with the dismemberment of Poland, continued with the attack on the USSR, and culminated in an horrific genocidal war – the destruction of the Jews and other groups which the Nazis considered inferior to the German master race; and the destruction of communism. ‘Nazism was a destructive new force whose vision of imperial domination was radically different’ from anything that had gone before.

  Another explanation of why Hitler decided to risk war in September 1939 was put forward by Adam Tooze in his book The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (2006). His theory is that Hitler was afraid that the longer he delayed the inevitable war, the greater the danger that Britain and France would overtake German rearmament. According to Tooze, ‘Hitler knew that he would eventually have to confront the Western powers. And in the autumn of 1939 he attacked Poland because he had decided that he was willing to risk that wider war sooner rather than later. … The military advantage that Germany currently enjoyed over its enemies was fleeting.’ Germany had been steadily rearming, even before Hitler came to power. From 1936, when the Four Year Plan was introduced, until 1939, no less than two thirds of all investment in industry was for producing war materials. Richard Overy points out that in 1939 about a quarter of the industrial workforce was employed on military orders, ‘a figure unmatched by any other state in Europe’. The problem was that the German armaments industry was running short of raw materials, mainly because Germany’s shortage of foreign exchange made it impossible to import sufficient quantities of iron and copper ore. Throughout the interwar period the Reichsmark was chronically overvalued, making exports uncompetitive. Hitler complained that Germany’s enemies, egged on by their Jewish backers, had closed their borders to German exports. To make matters worse, in response to the German occupation of Prague, in March 1939 President Roosevelt of the USA placed punitive tariffs on imports from Germany. As Tooze explains:

  Hitler might have wished to fight the big war against Britain and France at a moment of his choosing at some point in the early 1940s, but by early 1939 the pace of events had rendered such long-term plans impractical. With America, France and Britain appearing to grow ever closer together, there was no time to lose. If Hitler’s sworn enemies were improvising, so would he. It was time to wager everything. Otherwise, faced by a global coalition animated by its implacable Jewish enemies, Germany would face certain ruin.

  What conclusion are we to reach? Today, over forty years after Taylor published his famous book, very few historians accept his theory that Hitler had no long-term plans for war. Some recent writers believe that Taylor ignored much evidence which did not fit in with his own theory. It is true that some of Hitler’s successes came through clever opportunism, but there was much more behind it than that. Although he probably did not have a long-term, detailed step-by-step plan worked out, he clearly had a basic vision, which he was working towards at every opportunity. That vision was a Europe dominated by Germany, and it could only be achieved by war. This is why there was so much emphasis on rearmament from 1936 onwards. Clearly Hitler intended much more than self-defence.

  There can be little doubt, then, that Hitler was largely responsible for the war. The German historian Eberhard Jäckel, writing in 1984, claimed that

  Hitler set himself two goals: a war of conquest and the elimination of the Jews. … [his] ultimate goal was the establishment of a greater Germany than had ever existed before in history. The way to this greater Germany was a war of conquest fought mainly at the expense of Soviet Russia … where the German nation was to gain living space for generations to come. … Militarily the war would be easy because Germany would be opposed only by a disorganized country of Jewish Bolsheviks and incompetent Slavs.

  So it was probably not a world war that Hitler had in mind. Alan Bullock believed that he did not want a war with Britain; all he asked was that the British should not interfere with his expansion in Europe and should allow him to defeat Poland and the USSR in separate campaigns. Richard Overy agrees, pointing out that there is no evidence that Hitler ever thought of declaring war on Britain and France. He hoped to keep the war with Poland localized and then turn to the main campaign – the destruction of the USSR. Hitler was responsible for the war because he failed to realise that as far as Britain and France were concerned, the attack on Poland was one step too far.

  Hitler’s most recent biographer, Ian Kershaw, sees no reason to change the general conclusion that Hitler must take the blame:

  Hitler had never doubted, and had said so on innumerable occasions, that Germany’s future could only be determined through war. … War – the essence of the Nazi system which had developed under his leadership – was for Hitler inevitable. Only the timing and direction were at issue. And there was no time to wait.

  FURTHER READING

  Bell, P. M. H., The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (Longman, 3rd edition, 2007).

  Broszat, M., The Hitler State (Longman, 1983).

  Bullock, A., Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (Penguin, new edition, 1990).

  Charmley, J., Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (Hodder & Stoughton, 1989).

  Doig, R., Co-operation and Conflict: International Affairs, 1990–1962 (Hodder & Stoughton, 1995).

  Fewster, S., Japan, 1850–1985 (Longman, 1988).

  Gregor, N. (ed.), Nazism: A Reader (Oxford University Press, 2000).

  Gregor, N., ‘H
itler’s Aggression: Opportunistic or Planned?’, Modern History Review,15:1 (September 2003).

  Henig, R., Versailles and After (Routledge, 2nd edition, 2005).

  Henig, R., The Origins of the Second World War (Routledge, 2nd edition, 2005).

  Jackel, E., Hitler in History (University Press of New England, 1984).

  Kershaw. I., Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris (Allen Lane/Penguin, new edition, 2001).

  Kershaw, I., Hitler, 1936-1945: Nemesis (Allen Lane/Penguin, new edition, 2010).

  Martel, G. (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: The A.J.P. Taylor Debate after 25 Years (Routledge, 2nd edition, 1999).

  Mazower, M., Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (Allen Lane/Penguin, 2008).

  McDonough, F., The Origins of the Second World War: An International Perspective (Continuum, 2011).

  Overy, R. J., 1939: Countdown to War (Allen Lane, 2009).

  Steiner, Z., The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939 (Oxford University Press, 2010).

  Taylor, A. J. P., The Origins of the Second World War (Penguin, new edition, 2011).

  Tooze, A., The Wages of Destruction: the Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (Penguin, 2007).

  Watt, D. C., How War Came (Heinemann, 1990).

  QUESTIONS

  ‘Hitler alone caused the Second World War in 1939’. How far do you agree?

  ‘Hitler’s foreign policy successes between 1935 and 1939 were the result of his own tactical skills and his ability to exploit the weaknesses of his opponents.’ How far would you agree with this view?

  Examine the evidence for and against the view that Hitler had no clear long-term plans for war.

  ‘Hitler had one simple over-riding aim in foreign policy – expansion in the East.’ Explain why you agree or disagree with this statement.

  How far was appeasement to blame for the outbreak of the Second World War?

  There is a document question about Hitler’s aims in foreign policy on the website.

  Chapter 6

  The Second World War, 1939–45

  SUMMARY OF EVENTS

  Unlike the 1914–18 war, the Second World War was a war of rapid movement; it was a much more complex affair, with major campaigns taking place in the Pacific and the Far East, in North Africa and deep in the heart of Russia, as well as in central and western Europe and the Atlantic. The war falls into four fairly clearly defined phases:

  1 Opening moves: September 1939 to December 1940

  By the end of September the Germans and Russians had occupied Poland. After a five-month pause (known as the ‘phoney war’), German forces occupied Denmark and Norway (April 1940). In May, attacks were made on Holland, Belgium and France, who were soon defeated, leaving Britain alone to face the dictators (Mussolini had declared war in June, just before the fall of France). Hitler’s attempt to bomb Britain into submission was thwarted in the Battle of Britain (July to September 1940), but Mussolini’s armies invaded Egypt and Greece.

  2 The Axis offensive widens: 1941 to the summer of 1942

  The war now began to develop into a worldwide conflict. First Hitler, confident of a quick victory over Britain, launched an invasion of Russia (June 1941), breaking the non-aggression pact signed less than two years earlier. Then the Japanese forced the USA into the war by attacking the American naval base at Pearl Harbor (December 1941), and they followed this up by occupying territories such as the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore and Burma, scattered over a wide area. At this stage of the war there seemed to be no way of stopping the Germans and Japanese, though the Italians were less successful.

  3 The offensives held in check: summer 1942 to summer 1943

  This phase of the war saw three important battles in which Axis forces were defeated.

  In June 1942, the Americans drove off a Japanese attack on Midway Island, inflicting heavy losses.

  In October, the Germans under Rommel, advancing towards Egypt, were halted at El Alamein and later driven out of North Africa.

  The third battle was in Russia, where by September 1942, the Germans had penetrated as far as Stalingrad on the river Volga. Here the Russians put up such fierce resistance that in the following February the German army was surrounded and forced to surrender.

  Meanwhile the war in the air continued, with both sides bombing enemy cities, while at sea, as in the First World War, the British and Americans gradually got the better of the German submarine menace.

  4 The Axis powers defeated: July 1943 to August 1945

  The enormous power and resources of the USA and the USSR, combined with an all-out effort from Britain and her Empire, slowly but surely wore the Axis powers down. Italy was eliminated first, and this was followed by an Anglo-American invasion of Normandy (June 1944) which liberated France, Belgium and Holland. Later, Allied troops crossed the Rhine and captured Cologne. In the east, the Russians drove the Germans out and advanced on Berlin via Poland. Germany surrendered in May 1945 and Japan in August, after the Americans had dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and one on Nagasaki.

  6.1 OPENING MOVES: SEPTEMBER 1939 TO DECEMBER 1940

  (a) Poland defeated

  The Poles were defeated swiftly by the German Blitzkrieg (lightning war), which they were ill-equipped to deal with. It consisted of rapid thrusts by motorized divisions and tanks (Panzers) supported by air power. The Luftwaffe (the German air force) put the Polish railway system out of action and destroyed the Polish air force. Polish resistance was heroic but hopeless: they had no motorized divisions and they tried to stop advancing German tanks by massed cavalry charges. Britain and France did little to help their ally directly because French mobilization procedure was slow and out-of-date, and it was difficult to transport sufficient troops to Poland to be effective. When the Russians invaded eastern Poland, resistance collapsed. On 29 September Poland was divided up between Germany and the USSR (as agreed in the pact of August 1939).

  (b) The ‘phoney war’

  Very little happened in the west for the next five months. In the east the Russians took over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and invaded Finland (November 1939), forcing her to hand over frontier territories which would enable the Russians to defend themselves better against any attack from the west. Meanwhile the French and Germans manned their respective defences – the Maginot and Siegfried Lines. Hitler seems to have hoped that the pause would weaken the resolve of Britain and France and encourage them to negotiate peace. This lack of action pleased Hitler’s generals, who were not convinced that the German army was strong enough to attack in the west. It was the American press which described this period as the ‘phoney war’.

  (c) Denmark and Norway invaded, April 1940

  Hitler’s troops occupied Denmark and landed at the main Norwegian ports in April 1940, rudely shattering the apparent calm of the ‘phoney war’. Control of Norway was important for the Germans because Narvik was the main outlet for Swedish iron-ore, which was vital for the German armaments industry. The British were interfering with this trade by laying mines in Norwegian coastal waters, and the Germans were afraid that they might try to take over some of Norway’s ports, which they were in fact planning to do. Admiral Raeder, the German navy chief, realized that the fjords would be excellent naval bases from which to attack Britain’s transatlantic supply lines. When a British destroyer chased the German vessel Altmark into a Norwegian fjord and rescued the 300 British prisoners aboard, Hitler decided it was time to act. On 9 April, German troops landed at Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim; although British and French troops arrived a few days later, they were unable to dislodge the Germans, who were already well established. After a temporary success at Narvik, all Allied troops were withdrawn by early June because of the growing threat to France itself. The Germans were successful because the Norwegians had been taken by surprise and their troops were not even mobilized; local Nazis, under their leader Vidkun Quisling, gave the invaders every assistance. The British
had no air support, whereas the German air force constantly harassed the Allies. This Norwegian campaign had important results:

  Germany was assured of her bases and her iron-ore supplies, but had lost three cruisers and ten destroyers. This made the German navy less effective at Dunkirk than it might have been (see (d) below).

  It showed the incompetence of Chamberlain’s government. He was forced to resign and Winston Churchill became British prime minister. Although there has been criticism of Churchill’s mistakes, there is no doubt that he supplied what was needed at the time – drive, a sense of urgency, and the ability to make his coalition cabinet work well together.

  (d) Hitler attacks Holland, Belgium and France

  The attacks on Holland, Belgium and France were launched simultaneously on 10 May, and again Blitzkrieg methods brought swift victories. The Dutch, shaken by the bombing of Rotterdam, which killed almost a thousand people, surrendered after only four days. Belgium held out for longer, but her surrender at the end of May left the British and French troops in Belgium perilously exposed as German motorized divisions swept across northern France; only Dunkirk remained in Allied hands. The British navy played the vital role in evacuating over 338 000 troops – two-thirds of them British – from Dunkirk between 27 May and 4 June. This was a remarkable achievement in the face of constant Luftwaffe attacks on the beaches. It would perhaps have been impossible if Hitler had not ordered the German advance towards Dunkirk to halt (24 May), probably because the marshy terrain and numerous canals were unsuitable for tanks.

  The events at Dunkirk were important: a third of a million Allied troops were rescued to fight again, and Churchill used it for propaganda purposes to boost British morale with the ‘Dunkirk spirit’. In fact it was a serious blow for the Allies: the troops at Dunkirk had lost all their arms and equipment, so that it became impossible for Britain to help France.