Mastering Modern World History
Page 33
(a) Organization of the Communist bloc
Stalin set about making all the states into carbon copies of the USSR, with the same political, economic and educational systems, and the same Five Year Plans. All had to carry out the bulk of their trade with Russia, and their foreign policies and armed forces were controlled from Moscow.
1 The Molotov Plan
This was the first Russian-sponsored step towards an economically united Eastern bloc. The idea of the Russian foreign minister, Molotov, it was a response to the American offer of Marshall Aid (see Section 7.2(e)). Since the Russians refused to allow any of their satellites to accept American aid, Molotov felt they had to be offered an alternative. The Plan was basically a set of trade agreements between the USSR and its satellites, negotiated during the summer of 1947; it was designed to boost the trade of eastern Europe.
2 The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)
This was set up by the USSR at the same time as the Molotov Plan. All the communist states had to become members and its aim was political: to make sure that all the governments followed the same line as the government of the USSR in Moscow. To be communist was not enough; it had to be Russian-style communism.
3 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
COMECON was set up by the USSR in 1949. The aim was to help plan the economies of the individual states. All industry was nationalized (taken over by the state), and agriculture was collectivized (organized into a system of large, state-owned farms). Later, Nikita Khrushchev (Russian leader 1956–64) tried to use COMECON to organize the Communist bloc into a single, integrated economy; he wanted East Germany and Czechoslovakia to develop as the main industrial areas, and Hungary and Romania to concentrate on agriculture. However, this provoked hostile reactions in many of the states and Khrushchev had to change his plans to allow more variations within the economies of the different countries. The Eastern bloc enjoyed some success economically, with steadily increasing production. However, their average GDP (see Section 10.4(e) for an explanation of GDP) and general efficiency were below those of the EC. Albania had the doubtful distinction of being the most backward country in Europe. In the 1980s the economies of the Eastern bloc states experienced difficulties, with shortages, inflation and a fall in the standard of living.
Even so, the Communist bloc had a good record in social services; in some eastern European countries, health services were as good as, if not better than those in some EC countries. For example, in Britain in 1980 there was, on average, one doctor for every 618 people; in the USSR there was one doctor for every 258 people, and in Czechoslovakia the figure was 293. Only Albania, Yugoslavia and Romania had a worse ratio than Britain’s.
4 The Warsaw Pact (1955)
The Warsaw Pact was signed by the USSR and all the satellite states except Yugoslavia. They promised to defend each other against any attack from outside; the armies of the member states came under overall Russian control from Moscow. Ironically, the only time Warsaw Pact troops took part in joint action was against one of their own members – Czechoslovakia – when the USSR disapproved of Czech internal policies (1968).
(b) Tensions in the Eastern bloc
Although there were some disagreements in the EC about problems like the Common Agricultural Policy and the sovereignty of the individual states, these were not as serious as the tensions which occurred between the USSR and some of her satellite states. In the early years of the Cominform, Moscow felt it had to clamp down on any leader or movement which seemed to threaten the solidarity of the Communist bloc. Sometimes the Russians did not hesitate to use force.
1 Yugoslavia defies Moscow
Yugoslavia was the first state to stand up against Moscow. Here, the communist leader, Tito, owed much of his popularity to his successful resistance against the Nazi forces occupying Yugoslavia during the Second World War. In 1945 he was legally elected as leader of the new Yugoslav Republic and so he did not owe his position to the Russians. By 1948 he had fallen out with Stalin. He was determined to follow his own brand of communism, not Stalin’s. He was against over-centralization (everything being controlled and organized from the centre by the government). He objected to Stalin’s plan for the Yugoslav economy and to the constant Russian attempts to interfere in Yugoslavia’s affairs. He wanted to be free to trade with the west as well as with the USSR. Stalin therefore expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform and cut off economic aid, expecting that the country would soon be ruined economically and that Tito would be forced to resign. However, Stalin had miscalculated: Tito was much too popular to be toppled by outside pressures, and so Stalin decided it would be too risky to invade Yugoslavia. Tito was able to remain in power and he continued to operate communism in his own way. This included full contact and trade with the west and acceptance of aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The Yugoslavs began to reverse the process of centralization: industries were denationalized, and instead of being state-owned, they became public property, managed by workers’ representatives through councils and assemblies. The same applied in agriculture: the communes were the most important unit in the state. These were groups of families, each group containing between 5000 and 100 000 people. The elected Commune Assembly organized matters to do with the economy, education, health, culture and welfare. The system was a remarkable example of ordinary people playing a part in making the decisions which closely affected their own lives, both at work and in the community. It achieved much because workers had a personal stake in the success of their firm and their commune. Many Marxists thought this was the way a genuine communist state should be run, rather than the over-centralization of the USSR.
There were some weaknesses, however. One was workers’ unwillingness to sack colleagues; another was a tendency to pay themselves too much. These led to over-employment and high costs and prices. Nevertheless, with its capitalist elements (like wage differentials and a free market), this was an alternative Marxist system which many developing African states, especially Tanzania, found attractive.
Khrushchev decided that his wisest course of action was to improve relations with Tito. In 1955 he visited Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, and apologized for Stalin’s actions. The breach was fully healed the following year when Khrushchev gave his formal approval to Tito’s successful brand of communism.
2 Stalin acts against other leaders
As the rift with Yugoslavia widened, Stalin arranged for the arrest of any communist leaders in the other states who attempted to follow independent policies. He was able to do this because most of these other leaders lacked Tito’s popularity and owed their positions to Russian support in the first place. This did not make the way they were treated any less outrageous.
In Hungary, the Foreign Minister László Rajk and Interior Minister János Kádár, both anti-Stalin communists, were arrested. Rajk was hanged, Kádár was put in jail and tortured, and about 200 000 people were expelled from the Party (1949).
In Bulgaria, the prime minister, Traichko Koslov, was arrested and executed (1949).
In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party general secretary, Rudolf Slánský, and ten other cabinet ministers were executed (1952).
In Poland, Communist Party leader and Vice-President Władysław Gomułka was imprisoned because he had spoken out in support of Tito.
In Albania, communist premier Koçi Xoxe was removed and executed because he sympathized with Tito.
3 Khrushchev: ‘different roads to socialism’
After Stalin’s death in 1953 there were signs that the satellite states might be given more freedom. In 1956 Khrushchev made a remarkable speech at the Twentieth Communist Party Congress. The speech soon became famous, since Khrushchev used it to criticize many of Stalin’s policies and seemed prepared to concede that there were ‘different roads to socialism’ (see Section 18.1(a)). He healed the rift with Yugoslavia and in April 1956 he abolished the Cominform, which had been annoying Russia’s partners ever sin
ce it was set up in 1947. However, events in Poland and Hungary soon showed that there were sharp limits to Khrushchev’s new toleration …
(c) Crisis in Poland
There was a general strike and a massive anti-government and anti-Soviet demonstration in Posen (Poznán) in June 1956. The banners demanded ‘bread and freedom’ and the workers were protesting against poor living standards, wage reductions and high taxes. Although they were dispersed by Polish troops, tension remained high throughout the summer. In October, Russian tanks surrounded Warsaw, the Polish capital, though as yet they took no action. In the end the Russians decided to compromise: Gomułka, who had earlier been imprisoned on Stalin’s orders, was allowed to be reap-pointed as First Secretary of the Communist Party. It was accepted that Polish communism could develop in its own way provided that the Poles went along with Russia in foreign affairs. The Russians obviously felt that Gomułka could be trusted not to stray too far. Relations between the two states continued reasonably smoothly, although the Polish version of communism would definitely not have been acceptable to Stalin. For example, the collectivization of agriculture was introduced very slowly, and probably only about 10 per cent of farmland was ever collectivized. Poland also traded with countries outside the communist bloc. Gomułka remained in power until he resigned in 1970.
(d) The Hungarian Revolution (1956)
The situation in Hungary ended very differently from the one in Poland. After Stalin’s death (1953), the pro-Stalin leader, Rákosi, was replaced by a more moderate communist, Imry Nagy. However, Rákosi continued to interfere and overthrew Nagy (1955). From then on resentment steadily built up against the government until it exploded in a full-scale rising (October 1956). Its causes were many:
There was hatred of Rákosi’s brutal regime, under which at least 2000 people had been executed and 200 000 others had been put in prisons and concentration camps.
Living standards of ordinary people were getting worse while hated Communist Party leaders were living comfortable lives.
There was intense anti-Russian feeling.
Khrushchev’s speech at the Twentieth Congress and Gomułka’s return to power in Poland encouraged the Hungarians to resist their government.
Rákosi was overthrown, Nagy became prime minister, and the popular Roman Catholic Cardinal Mindszenty, who had been in prison for six years for anti-communist views, was released.
Until this point the Russians seemed prepared to compromise as they had done in Poland. But then Nagy went too far: he announced plans for a government including members of other political parties and talked of withdrawing Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. The Russians would not allow this: if Nagy had his way, Hungary might become a non-communist state and cease to be an ally of the USSR. It would encourage people in other eastern bloc states to do the same. Russian tanks moved in, surrounded Budapest, the Hungarian capital, and opened fire (3 November). The Hungarians resisted bravely and fighting lasted two weeks before the Russians brought the country under control. About 20 000 people were killed and another 20 000 imprisoned. Nagy was executed, although he had been promised a safe-conduct, and perhaps as many as 200 000 fled the country for the West. The Russians installed János Kádár as the new Hungarian leader. Although he had once been imprisoned on Stalin’s orders, he was now a reliable ally of Moscow, and he stayed in power until 1988.
(e) The crisis in Czechoslovakia (1968)
After their military intervention in Hungary, the Russians did not interfere so directly anywhere until 1968, when they felt that the Czechs were straying too far from the accepted communist line. In the meantime they had allowed considerable variations within the states, and sometimes did not press unpopular plans. For example, Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania continued with their own versions of communism. In 1962, when Khrushchev suggested that each satellite state should concentrate on producing one particular product, the Hungarians, Romanians and Poles, who wanted to develop an all-round economy, protested strongly and the idea was quietly dropped. Provided no policies were introduced which threatened Communist Party domination, the Russians seemed reluctant to interfere. In the mid-1960s it was the turn of the Czechs to see how far they could go before the Russians called a halt. Their government was run by a pro-Moscow communist, Antonin Novotny, and opposition gradually escalated, for several reasons.
The Czechs were industrially and culturally the most advanced of the Eastern bloc peoples, and they objected to the over-centralized Russian control of their economy. It seemed senseless, for example, that they should have to put up with poor quality iron ore from Siberia when they could have been using high-grade ore from Sweden.
Between 1918 and 1938, when Czechoslovakia was an independent state, the Czechs had enjoyed great freedom, but now they resented all the restrictions on personal liberty; newspapers, books and magazines were heavily censored (that is, they could only print what the government allowed), and there was no freedom of speech; anybody who criticized the government could be arrested.
When people tried to hold protest marches, they were dispersed by the police, whose methods were violent and brutal.
Matters came to a head in January 1968 when Novotny was forced to resign and Alexander Dubček became First Secretary of the Communist Party. He and his supporters had a completely new programme.
The Communist Party would no longer dictate policy.
Industry would be decentralized; this means that factories would be run by works councils instead of being controlled from the capital by party officials.
Instead of farms being collectivized (owned and run by the state), they would become independent co-operatives.
There should be wider powers for trade unions.
More trade would take place with the west and there would be freedom to travel abroad; the frontier with West Germany, which had been closed since 1948, was immediately thrown open.
There was to be freedom of speech and freedom for the press; criticism of the government was encouraged. Dubček believed that although the country would remain communist, the government should earn the right to be in power by responding to people’s wishes. He called it ‘socialism with a human face’.
He was very careful to assure the Russians that Czechoslovakia would stay in the Warsaw Pact and remain a reliable ally.
During the spring and summer of 1968 this programme was carried into operation. The Russians became more and more worried by it, and in August there was a massive invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russian, Polish, Bulgarian, Hungarian and East German troops. The Czech government decided not to resist so as to avoid the sort of bloodshed which had occurred in Hungary in 1956. The Czech people tried to resist passively for a time by going on strike and holding peaceful anti-Russian demonstrations, but in the end the government was forced to abandon its new programme. The following year Dubček was replaced by Gustáv Husák, a communist leader who did as Moscow told him and so managed to stay in power until 1987.
The Russians intervened because Dubček was going to allow freedom of speech and freedom for the press, which was bound to lead to similar demands throughout the Soviet bloc. The Russians dared not risk this happening in case it led to mass protests and uprisings in the USSR itself. There was pressure for Russian action from some other communist leaders, especially those in East Germany, who were afraid that protests might spread over the frontier into Germany from Czechoslovakia. Soon afterwards, Leonid Brezhnev, the Russian leader who had ordered the invasion, announced what he called the Brezhnev Doctrine: this said that intervention in the internal affairs of any communist country was justified if socialism (by which he meant communism) was threatened. However, there had been some disturbing signs for the Soviet leadership: the Romanian government had been impressed by Dubček’s policies and was looking forward to closer relations with Prague; consequently they refused to take part in the invasion. Yugoslavia and China also condemned the invasion.
(f) The communist bloc moves towards collapse
&
nbsp; Although the states of eastern Europe seemed on the surface to be firmly under Russian control, resentment against Moscow’s hard line simmered on, especially in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
In Poland, Gomułka was forced to resign after a series of riots (1970), and his replacement, Gierek, also resigned (1980) following industrial unrest, food shortages and strikes in the port of Gdansk and other cities. The new government was forced to allow the formation of an independent trade union movement, known as Solidarity. The Russians moved troops up to the Polish frontier, but no invasion took place this time, perhaps because they had just sent troops into Afghanistan and were unwilling to risk another military involvement so soon.
The Helsinki Agreements (1975) caused problems in the communist bloc. These agreements were signed at a conference in Helsinki (the capital of Finland) by every nation in Europe (except Albania and Andorra) and also by Canada, the USA and Cyprus. They promised to work for increased co-operation in economic affairs and peacekeeping, and to protect human rights. Before very long, people in the USSR and other communist states were accusing their governments of failing to allow basic human rights.
In Czechoslovakia a human rights group calling itself Charter 77 was formed (in 1977), and during the 1980s it became more outspoken in its criticisms of the Husák government. In December 1986 a spokesman for the group said: ‘while Husák lives, political stagnation will reign supreme; once he has gone, the party will explode’.
By this time all the communist states were suffering serious economic problems, much worse than those in the EC. Although not many people in the west realized it at the time, communism and the Communist bloc were fast approaching collapse and disintegration.
10.6 WHY AND HOW DID COMMUNISM COLLAPSE IN EASTERN EUROPE?