Hindu Terror

by RVS Mani

  But was there a mole in the Indian team? We do not know. However, the buildup to the talks can throw some light, especially the inclusion of the Additional Secretary (BM) as a member of the delegation. This was done at the behest of some political command. The said officer was of higher rank than all the other delegates except for the Home Secretary, who was the leader. May I underline that in government working, when two officers have to present different views before the leader, the senior of the two has higher chance of prevailing. This has been borne out by experience in this case.

  It was later revealed that two officers in the team, who were Joint Secretaries representing the two intel agencies, had some detailed inputs of a potential attack on India but they could not prevail upon the Secretary vis-à-vis the Additional Secretary about not staying the extra day.

  One JS, the person who had more details of inputs on a possible attack returned to Delhi early, citing some urgent work on the morning of 26th November.

  It is now clear that the Home Secretary and the leader of delegation had succumbed to bureaucratic hierarchy and listened to his Number Two instead of to the persons with relevant inputs and had put the nation in a quandary. His presence and his team’s presence would have enabled a better calibration of response to 26/11 and may be, with lesser casualties and damages. In hindsight, one can also say, for any HSLT, why do all the important people have to be in Pakistan in this age of technology? The entire Home department was in Pakistan during the 1.6.2006 attack on the RSS headquarters in Nagpur, which could have been something big. It was the same on 26/11.

  Although we were prepared for a terror attack any time, I never had any premonition of the things to come that evening. Again, there are certain questions that beg for answers.

  Why was the Additional Secretary (Border Management), who is conventionally not a member of the Indian delegation, included?

  Who lobbied for inclusion of the Additional Secretary in the delegation?

  Why did the delegation not stick to the predetermined time schedule?

  Why did the leader of delegation not pay heed to his two vital assets, instead of overwhelmingly going by the suggestion of his Number Two?

  Was there any hidden agenda in the orchestrations of the Number Two of the delegation?

  Night of 26/11 to Afternoon of 27/11

  IT WAS COLD on the night of 26.11.2008 in Delhi. Since it was a very light day at work, I left the office somewhat early. It was a mild winter night, and I was reclining on the bed and just surfing the channels on my television set as I knew that my control over the remote would be shortlived. My wife was cleaning up after dinner, she would join me, as was the routine. While surfing the channels (mostly news and sports), I noticed that some law and order disturbance were being reported from Mumbai in some channels. I called up the MHA Control Room to ascertain what was happening. I was informed initially that it was some gang war going on. This was at about 9.00 pm.

  Within 15 minutes, I received a call from the Control Room. I was informed by one of the staffers, ‘Sahib, Mumbai mein pataka baj gaya’. There had been terrorist attacks in two hotels and other prominent locations. The entire top management of the Home Ministry dealing with Internal Security was in Pakistan. They had gone there for the Home Secretary-level talks with Pakistan. Farcically, the theme of the talks was Counter Terrorism and Combating Drug Trafficking.

  Both the themes, in my personal opinion, bespoke of Pakistan’s hypocrisy. Firstly, any sensible initiatives proposed/ led by any Indian delegation relating to combating terrorism in the region is always deflected by Pakistan. They find ways and means to not accept the Indian proposals. Also, they suggest such modifications which will render the entire instrument futile.

  In the 2007 innings of HSLT, held in Le Meridian Hotel in New Delhi, I had seen this happen and I hold no illusions about the HSLTs. In 2007 in India, Pakistan raised the issue of some Lal Masjid attacks in Islamabad and the Pakistani Secretary (Interior), their leader of the delegation, walked away from the meeting after the first day, rendering the entire second day’s proceeding infructuous.

  Similar was the predicament of cooperation on combating drug trafficking in the region. A Memorandum of Understanding was to have been signed between the Narcotics Control Bureau of India and the Anti-Narcotics Force of Pakistan. The framework had been finalised in the first HSLT in 2005 and this was the 4th innings and the Pakistan team always came up with some objections or modifications or the other which would have the effect of annulling the entire MOU. These can be corroborated from the Joint Statement issued after the conclusion of every such talks. I would advise readers to access the Joint Statement of 3rd or 4th July 2007.

  Having received the message about the terror attacks in Mumbai at about 9.30 pm, I asked the Control Room if my presence would help. I knew well that the MHA Control Room was manned by personnel from the armed forces and the duty officers were generally Deputy or Assistant Commandants. At that juncture, I remember, the duty officer was a CRPF man who was also a very affable guy. I asked him if he could find me transportation to get to the MHA Control Room? He sent a vehicle and I reached the Control Room at about 10.30 pm. Upon reaching the Control Room, I took over the job of obtaining information and assessing the updated status.

  I would like to state two things. Firstly, we generally knew with experience, the information that is required to be collected in the event of such attacks. After all, so far 2008 had been one of the bloodiest years for terror attacks in the hinterlands of the country. We had started the year with a terror attack on 1.1.2008 on the CRPF Camp at Rampur.

  When I reached the MHA, there was mayhem in the Control Room. Those manning the Control Room were flooded with calls from the PMO, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Cabinet Secretariat, Embassies and all and sundry.

  By 11 pm, two joint secretaries had also joined the team. One was the Joint Secretary in charge of Police Deployment and he had spoken to DG, NSG for immediate movement of troops to Mumbai. Another Joint Secretary was handling the dissemination of information to the PMO, Cabinet Secretariat et al. I was relatively undisturbed, focusing on getting the updates from a Senior Inspector in the ATS. This man was Dinesh Agarwal, the only surviving ATS Mumbai staffer, who was my only source of information at that point in time. Hassan Gafoor, Mumbai’s Commissioner of Police was reportedly at the Taj Mahal Hotel. His 2nd in command, K L Prasad was at Trident, overseeing the rescue operations there.

  Locally-stationed forces

  The government had called in the National Security Guards and NSG movement to Mumbai had begun. Minister of Home, Shivraj Patil wanted to accompany the NSG team. He had suggested this and then went incommunicado.

  In the meanwhile, from the ATS reports available, we became aware that the Mumbai ATS had lost a few officers and policemen and the terrorists were still wreaking havoc in both these hotels.

  Calls were made to the Home Minister’s residence seeking permission to deploy locally-available resources so that the damage could be controlled to whatever extent. But clearance from the Home Minister’s residence was not forthcoming.

  Other than the NSG, Mumbai itself always has several experienced forces stationed in the city and its periphery. We have the Central Paramilitary Forces in operation in Mumbai. The Central Industrial Security Force, which is a specialised force competent in securing vital installations like these hotels, could have salvaged the situation before the arrival of the NSG. They are deployed at Mumbai Airport, Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers etc. Further, there was a battalion of the CRPF at Navi Mumbai, which could have been moved quickly as immediate reinforcement and some sort of first aid. But with no clearance coming forth from the Home Minister, timely action could not be taken and these specialised forces remained immobile and unused even as terrorists wreaked havoc on the nation’s financial hub.

  I was in the Home Ministry. I don’t want to comment on the deployment of MARCOS or why an Army Unit from J&K— redeployed in Mumb
ai very close to the location at that time—was not deployed as they are under the domain of Ministry of Defence, yet the question did cross my mind.

  The NSG team reached the Delhi Airport by about 1.30 am, but the Home Minister was not ready. The entire sequence of events have been well captured by a leading journalist, Sandeep Unnithan, very aptly and accurately in his work. A lot of lives could have been saved but for the lackadaisical attitude of the then Home Minister.

  Those in the thick of things knew that damage could have been reduced to a great extent if locally-stationed special forces had been immediately deployed, but they were helpless, bound by the tyranny of hierarchy that bureaucracies are plagued with at such times of crisis. The Home Minister appeared unconcerned during the entire episode.

  After the NSG landed in Mumbai and events subsequent to that, we kept a close watch on the progress of the counter measures, while at the same time collected information on the casualties of civilian persons, security force personnel etc so that the same could be included in the brief to be handed over to the Home Secretary as soon as he landed in Delhi.

  We were informed that the Home Secretary and his team were expected to land in Delhi at about 3.00 pm on 27.11.2008. We were also told that the Cabinet Secretary had scheduled a meeting which was expected to commence immediately after the Home Secretary landed in Delhi. Hence, he was to report to the Cabinet Secretary’s office directly from the airport. One of the Private Secretaries was to go and receive the Home Secretary at the airport to convey the instructions to him from different authorities like the Cabinet Secretary, the PMO etc. I had prepared the paper on the entire sequence of the Mumbai events, as had been obtained from ATS Senior Inspector Agarwal and handed my report over to this Private Secretary, who also happened to be a good friend. I had told him that I was going home as I had been in the North Block since the previous night. Generally, I was known in the MHA as a man with relentless capacity to work, but I must confess, that afternoon I really felt exhausted.

  That day, after a much-deserved bath and prayers, I went to sleep early in the evening, knowing fully well that the coming few days would be quite hectic, given the gravity and magnitude of the attacks and also given the fact, Parliament was in session and this incident would trigger a host of Parliament questions, calling attention notices etc.

  The porous coastline

  Secondly, we had this input about a possible attack through the coastal route and had shared the input with the concerned State governments with coastlines. About a week before the 26/11 attack, the Indian coastal security forces had sighted a ship in Pakistani waters, which had later moved into the margins of the Indian waters, but we could not take any action against this errant vessel. However, the sighting had reaffirmed that any time, an attack through the sea route was possible.

  During the course of collection and collation of information about the terrorist attacks, two intriguing facts that I came to know agitated me. They still agitate me.

  Firstly, it has been said that the terrorists were dropped a few kilometers from the Colaba coastal area. From there, they swam ashore and then walked through the fishermen’s habitation (a basti) and entered into Mumbai city from the Badhwar Park.

  One has to know the cultural sensitivities of the fishermen community. They do not tolerate any stranger or intruder walking through their colony. Here, we are told to believe that there were ten strange men, all armed to the teeth with some of the most potent arms and ammunitions, and walking through the colony.

  It is stupid to believe that they passed through unnoticed. The assumed transit time of these terrorists must have been between 7-7.30 pm in the evening. This is a time when it is almost impossible to go through this colony unnoticed. Were there people from within the community who helped these strangers pass through the place? If so who were they? I have my suspicion about one political leader who was at that time wearing the mantel of being leader of this community.

  Subsequently, Union Minister A R Antulay’s statements in the media generated a lot of debate in Parliament. The extracts of the debate dated 19.12.2008 in the Rajya Sabha, says: Death of ATS Chief Hemant Karkare in Terrorist Attach In Mumbai

  �ी एस. एस. अहलुवािलया (झारखंड): उपसभापित महोदय, अभी 26 तारीख से लेकर 29 तारीख तक मुंबई म� जो घटना घटी है, उसको इस सदन म� बड़ी गंभीरता से िलया गया, िजसके कारण हमने कल National Investigative Agency Bill और Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill पास िकया और सवर्स�मित से पास िकया।

  महोदय , जब हम उनको ��ांजिल देते ह�, तो हम लोग गुनगुनाते ह� या बोलते ह� िक "शहीद� की िचताओं पर लग�गे हर बरस मेले, वतन पर मरने वाल� का बाकी यही िनशान होगा" और हम अपनी ��ा के सुमन उनके चरण� म� चढ़ाते ह�। मुंबई के ताज होटल म� जब यह घटना घट रही थी, उसी समय पािक�तान के एक चैनल न्यूज वन ने पािक�तान म� तरह-तरह का कु �चार शुरू िकया। उसने यह कह कर कु �चार शुरू िकया िक ये जो दस आदमी ह�, वे पािक�तानी नहीं ह�, ब��क वे िहन्दू आतंकवादी ह� और Raw और IB िमल कर यह सब कर रही है, चूिंक ��ा िंसह और कनर्ल पुरोिहत को िगर�तार िकया गया है, इसिलए यह सारा चकर्ांत हो रहा है। यह पूरा �ो�ाम पािक�तान टी.वी. पर िदखाया गया है। मुझे आ�चयर् होता है िक उसने जो बात कही और उसकी बात का जो अक्स है, जो merit है या जो demerit है, जो issue है, उसी बात की जांच, उसी बात की मांग आज के न्दर्ीय मंतर्ालय का एक मंतर्ी कर रहा है। पािक�तान का जो website है, कल उसने कहा और आज अखबार म� headline छपा है िक "Mr. Antulay, why are you helping Pakistan?" यह Mail Today का headline है और ऊपर से कहा गया, "Remarks casting doubts on circumstances of Karkare's death fuel Pak propaganda while opportunists are eying for votes." यह तो है ही और साथ ही यह भी है, "Has Union Minority Affairs Minister played into Pakistan's hands by saying that there is more than what meets the eye, and that Maharashtra ATS Chief, Hemant Karkare, was killed by terrorism plus something?" A big question mark! And, then, Sir, a Pakistani news website has picked up Antulay's statement and said on Thursday, "Antulay seems to have borrowed a leaf from Pakistani TV host who has claimed that Mumbai terrorist attacks were the handiwork of "Hindu Zionists" िक आज जब यह मैसेज, एक क� दर्ीय मंतर्ी अगर िपछले तीन िदन से ...(समयकीघंटी)... कं �लीट कर रहा हूं सर। िपछले तीन िदन से वे यह बात उठा रहे ह� तो अभी तक ��ान मंतर्ी ने, सरकार ने उनसे यह सवाल क्य� नहीं पूछा? अगर आपको इतना ही िव�वास है उनकी बात पर और उनकी आवाज पर, तो आप इनक्वायरी करा लीिजए। अगर इनक्वायरी नहीं करा रहे �
���, तोपूरे रा�� को �म म� डालकर क्य� रख रहे ह�? ...(�यव�ान)...और पािक�तान का जो tirade चल रहा है भारत के िखलाफ, इसको बल िमल रहा है, इसको शि� िमल रही है। तो ये िकनके हाथ� म� खेल रहे ह�? दाऊद इ�ािहम के हाथ� म� खेल रहे ह� या पािक�तानी आई.एस.आई. के हाथ� म� खेल रहे ह�, यह जानने की जरूरत है और इस पर सख्त कायर्वाही करने की जरूरत है। ये अपनी जबान बंद कर�, नहीं तो जनता इनकी जबान बंद करेगी।

  �ी मनोहर जोशी (महारा��): सर, यह जो िवषय अहलुवािलया जी ने उठाया है, बहुत महत्वपूणर् िवषय है, बहुत गंभीर िवषय है और इस िवषय पर म� अपने िवचार आपके सामने रख रहा हूं।

  सर , यह बात तो म� जानता हूं, पूरी दुिनया जानती है िक तीन� अफसर जो मारे गए करकरे, कामते और साल�कर - तीन� को आतंकवािदय� ने मारा है। जो आतंकवादी पकड़ा गया है, िजसका नाम कसाब है, उसका जवाबभी आया है िक ये हत्याएं उसने की ह�। के वल इतना ही नहीं सर, महारा�� के गृह मंतर्ी ने भी िनवेदन िकया है और वह िनवेदन यही है िक हत्या करने वाले आतंकवादी ह�। इतनी बात होने पर भी मुझे बड़ा अचरज लगता है िक महारा�� से आने वाले एक मंतर्ी ए.आर. अंतुले क्य� कहते ह� िक ऐसा नहीं हुआ है, दूसरी कु छ बात इसके पीछे है!