ethical standpoint may be there is a very basic form of
   ethical action that is independent of this content: a person
   can act ethical y only if that person is an agency that is responsible for the action in question. If a person is no more responsible
   than a rolling rock, it is utterly senseless for anyone to judge that
   a person has acted ethical y or ought to be held responsible for
   acting unethical y. The guilty conscience would also be an absurd
   experience. When an avalanche happens due to natural causes and
   one rock rolling down the mountain impacts another, sending
   it on a trajectory other than the one that was its heading before
   being hit, that is a radical y different kind of action or interaction than an “ethical” one. Hopeful y, we can all agree on this simple but
   important observation.
   The problem is that the contemporary view held by the scientific
   establishment is that the kind of action at play when one rock
   impacts another is basical y the only kind that there is. Together
   with Metaphysics, Epistemology, Politics, and Aesthetics, Ethics has
   been a major concern of Philosophy since its origin 2,500 years ago
   in Greece. Ethics is concerned with the question of “the good life.”
   Metaphysics asks about the ultimate nature of reality. Epistemology
   is concerned with the theory of knowledge or how it is that we can
   know what we claim to have knowledge of. Politics is concerned
   with the art of statecraft and the applied understanding of the
   16
   jason reza jorjani
   concept of Justice. Aesthetics is a study of the nature of the beautiful, for example, as contrasted with the merely pleasant in judgments
   of taste. Until about 250 years ago all of what we now study and
   practice as the various empirical sciences were considered types
   of natural Philosophy, falling within the domain of Metaphysics
   or Epistemology. Science or Scientia simply means “knowledge”,
   which is part of what philosophers sought in their “love of wisdom.”
   Beginning with Physics in the mid-1700s, then Chemistry and
   Biology in the 1800s, and final y Psychology in the early 1900s,
   the various sciences attempted to distinguish themselves from
   Philosophy. Yet, in fact, what had happened was that a certain type
   of metaphysics had become dominant in Physics and ever since
   most other scientists have tacitly deferred to it.
   This dominant metaphysics grew out of a reductive and materialist
   interpretation of the mechanistic approach to understanding Rene
   Descartes (1596–1650), whose Latin name was Cartesius, and so it is
   often referred to as the Cartesian paradigm or conceptual frame of
   reference. A paradigm is broader than any given theories and is the
   context of background assumptions without which theories cannot
   be formed in the first place. The assumptions are cultural and
   historical in character and they condition what counts for empirical
   or “experiential” data regarding natural phenomena and the proper
   method of obtaining it. (I’ll come back to this.)
   Until very recently, scientists did not realize that they work
   within a paradigm and that theories generated by one paradigm are
   incommensurate with those of another paradigm. Most still refuse to
   acknowledge this. Consequently, even biologists and psychologists
   who deal with natural phenomena that are very different from
   loose rocks hitting each other on a mountainside want to claim that
   everything in Nature happens either by chance or is determined in
   a mechanical way. From the perspective of Ethics, this amounts to
   the same thing. In either case, a person cannot be held responsible
   for having done anything. What we think of as a “person” in a
   psychological sense is actual y an organism that biologists are willing to concede can further be reductively analyzed (or “broken down”)
   17
   lovers of sophia
   as certain elementary particles or quantum wave-functions whose
   interactions are either determined in a chain-link of causality going
   back to the initial expansion of the universe or they are somewhat
   probabilistic, but not in a way that allows anyone a chance to
   influence or affect the probabilities. In the 17th century, when this
   view of Nature was developed the fairly explicit model for it was the
   machinery then being invented and implemented in industry. Julien
   Offray de La Mettrie, a reductionist reader of Descartes, captures
   this zeitgeist best in Man a Machine (1748).
   For the last couple of centuries there has been an almost universal
   marginalization and exclusion of work in the sciences that does not
   suit the metaphysical doctrine that there is only matter and that the
   smallest or most elementary constituents of matter interact with
   each other in a mechanical way. Yet this dominant metaphysics of
   the scientific establishment makes nonsense out of Ethics. This is
   true even if many have tried to worm their way out of recognizing it.
   Some establishment scientists try to speak as if from out of the grey
   matter of the brain and the various mechanical processes that make it
   function there is an “emergence” of mind, including its ability to make choices that are free enough so that the individual making them can
   be held responsible for the actions that embody those choices. Yet
   mind as an “emergent property” is completely empty and superfluous
   rhetoric unless the mind that emerges can do things not reducible to
   the elementary particles or waves – or, these days, superstrings – that have none of the agency that is attributed to persons.
   So one of the first things I am going to try to get you to realize in
   this course is that the sciences, as you learned them from your High
   School textbooks, do not allow for Ethics – any Ethics, at al . This does not mean that Science precludes Ethics, simply that the dominant
   worldview and methodologies in the modern scientific establishment
   would have to change to allow for Ethics. You cannot believe both in
   the reductively materialistic and mechanistic worldview prevalent in
   the sciences and also think that people can be ethical or unethical.
   If in the back of your mind you have been mistakenly hearing
   this as an underhanded defense of religion, then it is high time to
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   jason reza jorjani
   disabuse you of that impression. The dominant form of religious
   belief in the Western world, and for that matter also in the Islamic
   world, is just as incompatible with Ethics as the mechanistic
   worldview of the scientific establishment. In Judeo-Christianity, just as in Islam, the overwhelmingly accepted and established doctrine
   concerning the Creator is that God is both omniscient or “all-
   knowing” and omnipotent or “all-powerful.” Whatever else a Judeo-
   Christian or Muslim believes, this is part of it.
   There is a long-standing theological debate over something
   known as “the problem of evil”, namely if God is omniscient and
   omnipotent then why does God allow for all of the evil in the world?
   This classic formulation misses the point as far as the problem
   that God’s omniscience and omnipotence poses fo
r Ethics. The
   real question is this: If God always knows everything that can and
   will happen, then the entire domain of possible events is already
   scoped-out and defined in detail so that it can be accessible to God’s mind. Moreover, if God is also all-powerful then God is real y the
   motive force behind the actualization of each of these predefined
   possibilities. These possibilities that are predefined for God’s mind
   and actualized by God’s power include all of the actions that we
   mistakenly attribute to our agency. The problem is not simply that
   God is acting when we take ourselves to be acting, but that we never
   choose anything if God already knows everything, because to choose
   is – at least on some minimal scale – to create. A world of predefined possibilities accessible to an eternal mind outside of time is a world that is already completed and cannot be added to. No finite agency
   exists in such a world as an agent capable of transforming that world
   in ways that she or he is responsible for. The world of the Almighty
   Creator leaves no place for any creative act on our part.
   Granted both Judeo-Christianity and Islam are full of rules to
   follow. These have been “revealed” by the Creator and they are to
   be “obeyed.” In fact, the fundamental presupposition of religious
   revelation as such is that the Law needs to be given by authority and
   accepted on faith. From the perspective of the revealed religions,
   to think one’s own contemplation and exercise of conscience
   19
   lovers of sophia
   could suffice for living a good life is the worst kind of sin. But
   unquestioning obedience to a prescribed code of conduct is not
   Ethics. It is certainly Law and you can call it Morality if you wish,
   but Ethics derives from the Greek word ethos. This means the
   dynamic “character” or vital “constitution” of a person or group of
   people. The very concept of Ethics presupposes choice, introspective
   assessment, creative interpretation, consideration of context, and,
   above al , personal responsibility. The major difference between
   the two can be seen when one reflects on religious law from the
   perspective of the omnipotence and omniscience of the Creator.
   All reward and punishment – as well as gracious divine forgiveness
   – is purely at the discretion of the Creator and the individual has no responsibility whatsoever for the actions that, from the perspective
   of chronological time, appear to have preceded it. This moral begins
   to become apparent in the book of Job and its fatalism ultimately
   becomes most explicit in Islam.
   However many times and in whatever ways Judeo-Christians
   and Muslims claim that their scriptures enjoin individuals to act
   responsibly and that each will be held responsible for their own
   deeds, all that such insistences can do is entangle the one making
   them in absurd contradictions. Remember, God is omnipotent and
   omniscient. We do nothing at al . The heavenly reward of the faithful
   and hellish retribution of sinners is a farcical puppet show.
   So looking at it from the perspective of our cultural-historical
   conditioning, we are between a rock and a hard place as far as Ethics
   is concerned. The first unit, on free will as a precondition of ethics, is going to be aimed at getting you to realize that the very idea of
   Ethics is incompatible with both Modern scientific materialism and
   Abrahamic religious revelation. Until you sort that out for yourself,
   anything else you do in this course is real y pointless.
   It is not true that Ethics does not make claims about the way the
   world is. A world in which ethical or unethical action makes sense
   cannot be a world wherein there is nothing other than mechanistic
   causality acting on microscopic material structures that make up
   everything in nature without an irreducible remainder. Nor can
   20
   jason reza jorjani
   it be a world wherein everything that we might do – or rather that
   we might misperceive ourselves as initiating – is already an event
   mapped out in a completed logical space accessible to the eternal
   mind of God, a mind capable of now surveying every possible future.
   Either these possible futures col apse into a single predefined future, in which case we have no free wil , or there are an infinity of parallel universes in which doppelgangers of ourselves live lives in many
   cases nearly identical to our own and in other cases somewhat more
   different, in which case none of these parallel selves are any more
   unique or uniquely responsible for the minutely different iterations of their actions than we are for ours in this one of many possible worlds.
   In the first unit, together with William James, I am going to
   be making the case that a world where Ethics has any meaning at
   all must be a finite world where no one has an infinite or eternal
   perspective let alone unlimited power. So Ethics – in its very form
   and irrespective of its content – makes claims that explicitly conflict with those of certain widely accepted scientific theories and religious doctrines. It is rootless idiocy to teach Ethics as if it could be applied in business or medicine or whatever field without recognizing this,
   and making it seem as if it had nothing to do with one’s scientific
   outlook or religious standpoint. Ethics as such implicitly endorses a
   scientific and religious orientation different from the ones dominant
   in our place and time. That orientation is very open to question as
   far as its details are concerned, but we can know enough about it to
   realize that it makes a different demand of us than the one made by
   reductionist scientists or God Almighty.
   Just as Ethics is often uprooted from metaphysical considerations
   about the nature of reality that it presupposes, it is also artificial y abstracted from the socio-political context that it needs to be
   meaningful. A person is not ethical or unethical in a vacuum. Ethics
   is concerned with one’s relationship to others in a society, and
   whether or not this society is a just one – in a political sense – has everything to do with whether and to what extent it is possible for
   those who constitute it to cultivate virtuous conduct. Also, societies general y feature internal differentiation, so there is a question about 21
   lovers of sophia
   whether it is possible for everyone in a society to be virtuous in the same ways and to the same degree.
   First of al , consider how many of the virtues cannot be practiced
   in isolation. For example, generosity requires someone to be
   generous to and courage presupposes a situation of shared danger
   within the context of which to be courageous. This social context
   also helps us to determine whether someone is generous or simply
   squanders his wealth, or whether a supposedly courageous person
   is actual y rash. There is a great difference between righteous anger
   and an expression of sheer wrath, but discerning the distinction
   between them in any given case would involve a consideration of
   the status and character of the offending and offended parties, their
   respective histories and values.
   In a certain context killing is murder, in another it is just
   retribution, in another an act of valor in th
e defense of one’s country.
   To be ethical is to tell the difference, for example, between enlisting in a just war and being party to mass murder. “I was just following
   orders” is the excuse of a slave. Depending on context, might it not
   also sometimes be ethical to do other things that under different
   circumstances would be considered unethical? For example, is it
   sometimes justified to lie? If the Nazis come banging on your door
   looking for some innocent people of Jewish descent who are hiding
   in your attic, is it ethical to tell a lie and say you’ve never seen them?
   What about lying to an entire nation in order to protect it from an
   enemy or even from its own worst impulses?
   In light of these fine distinctions, it is certainly fair to say that
   a person raised by wild animals would not be virtuous and we
   would even have to wonder whether he were a “person.” Practice
   of the virtues probably requires some degree of habituation from
   childhood, and one of the things we are going to look at in the
   second unit is to what degree this is the case. In addition to proper
   upbringing, the development and sustenance of a virtuous ethos
   requires continual practice. As we will see, Aristotle suggests that
   the mirror of friendship is indispensable to maintaining virtue as an
   active disposition and gaining insight into one’s own character.
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   jason reza jorjani
   There are, however, all kinds of “friendships.” Some are
   associations for the sake of successful business and others are based
   on commonly enjoying certain pleasures, like participation in a
   sport or a hobby. There might even be friendships predicated on the
   common pursuit of a vice. Consider this: Even in the case of what
   seem to be the best friendships grounded on the virtuous character
   of those in the relationship, how many people would wish that their
   best friends become god-like in their degree of virtue or excellence?
   It is virtuous to wish the best for one’s friends, but who would wish
   such excellence for their friends that it opened a chasm between
   them and their friends as great as that between mere mortals and
   gods?
   What would such god-like virtue look like? What if it were
   possible to get away with anything whatsoever in stealth – to steal
   
 
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