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An Introduction to Madhva Vedan

Page 16

by Deepak Sarma


  Instead, they are activities that are followed by those who have obtained

  Viùõu- prasâda, aparokùa-jñâna and mokùa and who wish to increase their ânanda, bliss. Activity is thus a matter of choice and not duty. Jîvas are not bound to anything in mokùa or do they incur any pâpa when they choose not to act. 84

  Having been granted mokùa, the jîvas are able to bask in the glory and supremacy of Viùõu, fully aware of their location in the hierarchical

  universe.

  81 ... . caivottamottamâþ | nityânande ca bhoge ca jñanaiúvaryaguõeùu ca | sarve úataguõodriktâþ pûrvasmâduttarottaram | pûjyante câvaraiste tu sarvapûjyaúcaturmukhaþ |

  BSB 4.4.19.

  82 na câsamatvena virodho bhavati | brahmadhîtvâddoùâbhâvasâmyâduttamebhyo

  ‘nyeùâü bhâvâc ca | BSB 3.3.34.

  83 sa tatra paryeti jakùan krîóan ramamâõaþ strîbhirvâ yânairvâ jñâtibhirvâ ajñâtibhirvâ | VTV. etat sâmagâyannâste | çcâü tvaþ poùamâste pupuùvân | gâyatraü tvo gayati úakvarîùu | VTV.

  84 svecchyaivetyaõgîkartavyam | muktasya tîrõatvât | BSB 3.3.28 svecchyâ kurvanti na vâ | bandhapratyavâyayorabhâvât | BSB 3.3.29.

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  CHAPTER FIVE

  Saüvâda, discussion and debate

  Mâdhvas are well known for polemics against their rivals. In fact

  debate and argument with other schools is an integral part of being

  and becoming a proper citizen of the Mâdhva world, preparing for

  Viùõu- prasâda and eventually being graced with mokùa. In his AV,

  Madhvâcârya describes the activities of the ideal devotee: ‘Therefore,

  devotees who cherish the Lord, whose understanding [is] pure, [and]

  who understand the âgamas, they would always [strive to] destroy the

  darkness [of ignorance].’1

  Madhvâcârya, of course, was not the first to propose that discussion

  and debate was so important. Such an instruction is found in the Brahma

  Sûtras in the section known as Samayavirodha, The Contradictions [In Other] Doctrines. It contains arguments against the Nyâya, Vaiúeùika,

  Sâükhya, Yoga, Cârvâka, Buddhist, Jaina, Úaiva and the Úâkta schools.

  But why did Vyâsa include such materials in his BS anyway?

  Madhvâcârya explains: ‘Then, [Vyâsa, who is] the Lord of knowledge,

  composed refutations of [rival] doctrines for [his] own devotees in order

  to sharpen their intellect.’2 Sharpening the intellect helps devotees not only to learn their own tradition but also to defend it against others.

  Debate, then, is not an activity solely of the Mâdhva traditions. It also

  does not occur in a vacuum, but is the primary mode of interaction

  between scholars and adherents of the different schools of South Asian

  philosophy. In fact, Mâdhva disputations are part of a much larger

  institution that has its origins in the development of Buddhism and

  Jainism, the first traditions considered heretical by Hindus. What are

  these debates like?

  Inter-religious and intra-religious debates were formal events

  occurring in the presence or under the auspices of royalty. Such events

  were also governed by a sabhâpati, judge (lit. ‘Lord of the meeting’),

  who would objectively determine the validity or success of arguments.

  Madhvâcârya characterizes these prâúnikas, arbitrators of the dispute,

  as wise, all-knowing and with neither hate nor anger.3 The prâúnika’s

  1 tathâpi úuddhabuddhînâm îúânugrahayoginâm | suyuktayas tamo hanyur âgamânugatâþ sadâ | AV 2.2.8 . tamaþ ajñânam | Jayatîrtha, Nyâya Sudhâ, 2.2.8.

  2 iti vidyâpatiþ samyaksamayânâü nirâkçtim | cakâra nijabhaktânâü buddhiúâõatvasiddhaye | AV 2.2.9.

  3 râgadveùavihînâstu sarvavidyâviúâradâþ | prâúnikâ iti ... | KL 5.

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  knowledge would include the âgamas and tarka-doùas such as the ones described earlier in Chapter 2. When one participant was unable to respond to a criticism, then loss might be declared by the prâúnika.

  Defeat has several outcomes including censure and even conversion!

  Many of the South Asian traditions grew when rivals lost in debate and

  had to convert.

  Consequently, much time and effort was involved in constructing

  arguments against rival traditions and preparing students to partake in

  debates, between students in the confines of the mañha and eventually

  with other experts. Mañhas of each of the schools of Vedânta are still

  places where debating is encouraged and formal and informal debates

  take place. Viúveùa Tîrtha, the svâmiji of the Pejâvara mañha, for

  example, allocates some of his time to lively arguments with students

  and visitors. There, debates still occur today though less frequently than

  they did in medieval South Asia.

  Mâdhva Vedânta and its rivals

  As already mentioned, Madhvâcârya accounts for the existence of

  mohaúâstras, confusing texts, by attributing them to Viùõu. Madhvâcârya

  explains that, at Viùõu’s request, Rudra created them to ‘guide the

  asuras, demons, to Hell.’4 Madhvâcârya first states reasons as to why these doctrines exist:

  Those adhering to the belief that the world is false, [do so] out of

  ignorance, because of their lack of understanding, because of the

  abundance of those having little knowledge, [and] because of their

  ceaseless hatred for the Highest Reality [that is, Viùõu] and for the

  knowledge of the real [nature of things].5

  He next locates the upholders of these rival doctrines in his jîva-

  traividhya, three-fold classification of jîvas: ‘The doctrines are

  maintained as a result of the endless vâsanâs, karmic impressions, of many asuras due to their being caught [in the cycle of] foolishness.’6

  4 asurâõâü tamogataþ | yasmât kçtâni tânîha viùõunoktyaþ úivâdibhiþ | eùâü yan na virodhi syât tatroktaü tan na vâryate | MBhTN 1.34.

  5 daurlabhyâc cchuddhabudhînâm bâhulyâd alpavedinâm | AV 2.2.5. tâmasatvâc ca lokasya mithyâjñânaprasaktitaþ | vidveùâtprame tattve tattvavediùu câniúam | AV

  2.2.6.

  6 anâdivâsanâyogâdasurâõâü bahutvataþ | durâgrahagçhîtatvâd vartante samayâþ sadâ | AV 2.2.7.

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  The doctrines are kept alive by those who are predestined to keep them

  alive and whose vâsanâs, mental impressions formed by previous

  activities, dictate their behavior. Their existence as well as the effort of

  devotees to show their incoherence are both essential parts of the

  Mâdhva universe.

  Texts

  Madhvâcârya’s corpus is filled with polemics against rival schools.

  Before plunging directly into the arguments, I first examine

  Madhvâcârya’s Kathâlakùaõa, a handbook on rhetoric and the three

  kinds of debate. Though there are no arguments against other schools

  in this text, it offers an excellent description of the way that debates

  should be conducted. I then turn to three sets of arguments presented

  by Madhvâcârya in his dasaprakaraõa; the Upâdhikhaõóana,

  The Refutation of the Upâdhi Position, the Mâyâvâdakhaõóana, The Refutation of the Mâyâ Position, and the Viùõutattva(vi)nirõaya, The Complete Ascertainment of the Nature of Viùõu.

  Kathâlakùaõa , The Characterization of Dispute

&nbs
p; The Kathâlakùaõa, also known as the Vâdalakùaõa, is a brief text

  of thirty-five anuùñubhs in which Madhvâcârya defines the types of

  debates and the context within which they take place.7 Such manuals on rhetoric were not uncommon among the schools of South Asian

  philosophy and Mâdhva Vedânta is no exception. This treatise on

  polemics is useful as a dialectical handbook for adherents who wish to

  debate and wish to learn about the type of arguments that one can use.

  Madhvâcârya holds that there are three kinds of debate vâda, jalpa

  and vitaõóâ. Vâda is a debate whose purpose is the pursuit of truth.

  Jalpa is a debate whose purpose is to bring fame and glory to the

  competitive victor. The third kind of debate, vitaõóâ, is when one

  participant seeks only to destroy the position of the other, yet does not

  reveal any position whatsoever. This form of debate is a kind of reductio

  ad absurdum when victory is achieved only by showing the incoherence

  of the position of one’s opponent and neither presenting nor exposing

  one’s own position for judgment.

  What follows are directions on how to proceed in a debate. The

  debates that are described here are not about abstract philosophical

  7 An anuùñubh is a class of meter consisting of thirty-two syllables.

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  issues. Instead, debate is rooted entirely in the âgamas and concerns

  interpretations of particular passages. Debating means criticizing the

  interpretation or the evidence offered by one’s opponent and then

  offering one’s own interpretation or even better evidence. Each of the

  texts translated in this chapter, aside from the VTV, has a maïgala-úloka

  at the beginning and end. Not only are Madhvâcârya’s texts about the

  âgamas, but they are all in service of Viùõu.

  1 After bowing to Nçsiüha, who is [like] the warm sun which

  [removes] all of the darkness of ignorance, I accurately explain the

  definition of dispute.

  2–3 There are three varieties [of] scholarly dispute: vâda, jalpa and vitaõóâ. Vâda, is the discussion [between] the teacher and the student and also with other good people who only [seek to] ascertain the truth

  completely. Or [it is for] the benefit of a [public] assembly. It is said that

  jalpa, wrangling, is also a discussion with good people [who seek] fame

  and the like or [desire] competition.

  4 Vitaõóâ, captious objection, is with good people and others [who are

  not good]. [When the debate is] among these others [who are not good],

  then one’s own truth is hidden. In vâda one should decide the truth on

  one’s own or by means of a prâùnika, arbitrator.

  5 The prâúnikas, arbitrators [of the dispute], are said to be skilled in all systems of thought and to be without biases. There can be one [ prâúnika]

  or just an uneven number.

  6 If there is only one prâúnika, arbitrator, then he should be known as a

  remover of all doubts, should be without doubts [himself], noble minded

  and free of all the doùas, imperfections.

  7 Whether the arbitrator is [just] one or [there are] many he should

  always be engaged in the devotion of Viùõu. For the chief characteristic

  of all [people] whose qualities are good is devotion to Viùõu.

  8 In the beginning [of any debate], when questioned [by an opponent,]

  the [relevant passage from the] âgama is to be cited in order to establish

  what is to be proven. [This position is found in] the úruti [ Kañha

  Upaniùad 2.9]: ‘This knowledge can neither be obtained nor destroyed

  through tarka, argument.’ [In response], the opponent should offer

  another interpretation of that âgama.

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  9 The èg, Yajur, Sâma and Atharva Vedas, the [Mahâ]bhâratam, the Pañcarâtras and the Mûlarâmâyaõa are declared to be correct âgamas.

  10 Texts that agree [with the correct âgamas] are [also] said to be

  correct âgamas. Other [texts which conflict with the correct âgamas] are bad âgamas. [They are bad since] by them one cannot establish what is

  to be proven.

  11 The respondent should state his own view as well as the

  [supporting passage from the] âgamas. In order to establish his own

  position [and counter the opponent’s], the proponent should prove [that

  there is] another interpretation of that [same passage from the âgamas].

  12 The other interpretation of one’s own [ âgama] should be rejected in

  light of a definitive [interpretation] of the âgama. Here is an opportunity

  for reasoning to be admitted.

  13 When the meaning of the âgama of the proponent is determined

  then the [meaning of the âgama of the] opponent should be determined

  later with friends. After that [is done] the determination [of the

  respective meanings] will be complete.

  14 When, in the question, the meaning is established by pratyakùa,

  perception [such as via the eyes, ears, and the like], there is a need to

  state a perceptual authority and a direct knowledge [such as the sâkùî].

  One should not state an anumâna, inference, in the beginning [of the

  debate].

  15 If there are two people [each disputing] and both say something

  that pleases [that is, satisfies] one another, that alone is known as the

  âgama. Satisfaction for the opponent is the goal of that [debate].

  16 Thus, in the vâda many people are occupied for a long time with

  the conclusion. And in a jalpa it continues until there is a victory over

  the opponent.

  17 In vâda, opposition to the determination of the truth is a defect. In

  the dialogue [when there is opposition] there should be praise and

  respect given to the other [person] who won.

  18 Or [in a vâda] when the argument comes to a conclusion then there

  would be either censure or punishment of the loser. In the jalpa victory

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  one would be conquered by contradiction, incongruity, omission of

  evidence, superfluity and silence.

  19 The rule [for determining the victor] in vitaõóâ, the captious

  objection [type of a disputation], is said to be in the style of a jalpa.

  When there is a discussion [of the jalpa and vitaõóâ variety] there should be no punishment, only defeat.

  20 Or, otherwise there should be censure or punishment. In the jalpa,

  the lack of restatement is not considered a fault.

  21–22 If the vâdins, disputants, [show] the signs of having no

  knowledge, there will be an immediate failure. There are no other

  reasons for defeat other than the six [namely, contradiction, incongruity,

  omission of evidence, superfluity, silence and having no knowledge].

  There are no others [as all] are included in these [six]. In jalpa and

  vitaõóâ the activity is preceded by an investigation of the knowledge [of

  the disputants].

  23 If there is only a stumbling then there is no defect. This is the

  faultless characterization of the vâda, jalpa and vitaõóâ.

  24 In accordance with the Brahma Tarka, the Kathâlakùaõa, The

  Characterization of Disputation, by nandatîrtha is said to please Him,
r />   who is the possessor of the Úârïga [that is, Viùõu’s bow].

  25 Narasiüha, who is the most beloved [and] the Supreme Person,

  who drives any of the heart’s darkness with the flow of knowledge

  [which, like the sun,] is always arisen, let Him be pleased!

  The Mâyâvâdakhaõóana: The Refutation of the Mâyâ Position

  The MVK is part of Madhvâcârya’s Khaõóanatraya, A Trio of

  Refutations, which includes the Upâdhikhaõóana, The Refutation of the Upâdhi Position, and the Prapañcamithyâtvânumânakhaõóana, The

  Refutation of the Inference of the Illusoriness of Phenomenal Reality.

  These three texts are pointed criticisms of positions that are essential

  to Advaita epistemology. As already mentioned, the MVK is partly a

  reaction to arguments found in the 12th-century ce Advaita scholar

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  Úrîharùa’s Khaõóanakhaõóakhâdya. Given the scope of the present

  work, it is not necessary to present a summary of Úrîharùa’s arguments.8

  Not surprisingly, the arguments in the MVK cannot be removed

  from the fundamental component of the schools of Vedânta, namely

  the úâstra.9 Not only do arguments in Vedânta center around the interpretation of the âgamas but they are often attempts to show that the

  opponent is not acknowledging the centrality of those texts. To address

  this issue of centrality, the schools of Vedânta hold that úâstra has four

  elements, each of which must exit and be satisfied. If one can show

  that the position of the opponent does not include or excludes one of

  these four, then victory is guaranteed. If a school of Vedânta does not

  uphold the importance of the úâstra, then it is no longer a commentarial

  tradition! For each school, then, it follows that:

  1 adhikâri: there must be devotees who are eligible to study the úâstra

  and have a desire to study them.

  2 viùaya: there must be a defined subject matter of úâstra. Does úâstra teach that there is difference or identity? It cannot teach both and

  must be consistent.

  3 prayojana: there must be an aim or purpose for úâstra. It cannot

  stand apart from the practical concern of being granted mokùa.

  4 saübandha: there must be a relationship between the adhikâri,

 

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