David McCullough Library E-book Box Set

by David McCullough

  Yet the courts-martial were themselves proof that such conduct was no laughing matter to the British command, and in fact those convicted faced punishment far more severe than what was customarily dispensed in the American army.

  Writing earlier to the Earl of Huntingdon, the handsome Lord Rawdon had expressed the hope that “we shall soon have done with these [American] scoundrels, for one only dirties one’s fingers by meddling with them. I do not imagine they can possibly last out beyond this campaign, if you give us the necessary means of carrying on the war with vigor.” Now, with “the necessary means” gathering in such heartening numbers on Staten Island, he eagerly anticipated the moment when the “Yankee psalm-singers,” as he loved to call them, crossed paths with the likes of the newly arrived Scottish Highlanders armed with their murderous broadswords.

  Through telescopes a dozen or more distant rebel camps could be distinctly seen, and the enemy appeared “very numerous.” From what could be learned from Loyalists and deserters, rebel strength in New York and on Long Island was overestimated to be between 30,000 and 35,000. But few if any of the British doubted that the conflict ahead would prove fatal to the rebel army, or that it would be exceedingly bloody.

  Among many officers the chief worry was that the Americans might not fight. As one wrote anonymously in a letter published in London’s Morning Chronicle, “Our only fear is that the rebels will not choose to hazard a general action…. If…they are determined to act upon the defensive only…our work will never be done.”

  Even before the successful dash of the Phoenix and the Rose up the Hudson, it had been assumed by many British officers that the assault on New York would be made to the north, and thus the army would advance on the city from the undefended rear, while the Royal Navy let loose with a heavy bombardment from the rivers and harbor. But General Howe was saying little of his plans, except that the wait would continue until full reinforcements had arrived. The general, too, was enjoying the comparative comforts of Staten Island, as well as the company of the comely Mrs. Loring, and characteristically he appeared to be in no hurry.

  To what extent his brother the admiral would influence or even determine strategy henceforth was an open question, and important, since both the admiral and the general had been lately assigned by the King to serve in the oddly ambiguous, potentially conflicting, role of peace commissioners.

  The general was known to want a “decisive action” as the surest way to wind things up quickly—which was also the adamant view of George Lord Germain, from whom he took his orders—and unlike some of his officers, he was certain the Americans would fight. In a letter written before sailing for New York from Halifax, he had said they were undoubtedly spoiling for a fight, that “flushed with the idea of superiority after the evacuation of Boston, [they] may be readier brought to a decisive action,” and that nothing was “more to be desired or sought for” as the most effective means “to terminate this expensive war.”

  Whether the admiral carried an olive branch or a sword was unclear. But his presence on the Eagle and the prospect of more men-of-war and transports arriving had a huge effect. The admiral was a renowned fighting sailor, and as the older, less self-indulgent of the brothers—and with an even darker, gloomier cast to his expression—“Black Dick,” as he was known affectionately, was thought to be the wiser of the two.

  The fact that they were of like mind on most matters military and political, and got along well, seemed to preclude the friction and jealousies between the Royal Navy and the army frequently endemic to such joint operations. Whatever strategy was resolved, the assumption was that the sea and land forces would work in close cooperation and harmony.

  ON SATURDAY, JULY 13, General Howe and his staff, joined by Royal Governor Tryon, dined with the admiral in his cabin on board the Eagle. The discussion “turned upon military affairs, upon the country, and upon the rebels,” and lasted well into the evening.

  The next day came another surprise move when Lord Howe sent a picked officer from the Eagle, Lieutenant Philip Brown, across the bay to New York under a flag of truce carrying a letter addressed to “George Washington, Esq.” Brown was met by Joseph Reed, who on Washington’s orders had hurried to the waterfront accompanied by Henry Knox and Samuel Webb.

  “I have a letter, sir, from Lord Howe to Mr. Washington,” Lieutenant Brown began.

  “Sir,” replied Reed, “we have no person in our army with that address.”

  When Brown asked by what title Mr. Washington chose to be addressed, Reed replied, “You are sensible, sir, of the rank of General Washington in our army.”

  “Yes, sir, we are,” answered Brown. “I am sure Lord Howe will lament exceedingly this affair, as the letter is quite of a civil nature and not a military one.”

  Lord Howe also lamented “exceedingly that he was not here sooner,” Brown added, implying that the admiral regretted not arriving in New York before the Declaration of Independence.

  Brown returned to the Eagle to report the response of the Americans. (“So high is the vanity and the insolence of these men!” huffed Ambrose Serle in his journal.) But the admiral persisted. Three days later, Brown departed again under a white flag, the letter now addressed to “George Washington, Esq., etc., etc.” But again it was declined.

  The day after the admiral made a third try, this time sending a different messenger, a captain named Nisbet Balfour, to inquire whether General Washington would receive the adjutant general to General Howe, Colonel James Paterson. This time the answer was yes.

  Thus exactly at noon, Saturday, July 20, Colonel Paterson arrived at New York and was escorted directly to No. 1 Broadway, where he met Washington with all due formality, with Reed, Knox, and others in attendance.

  Washington’s guard stood at attention at the entrance. Washington, as Knox wrote, was “very handsomely dressed and made a most elegant appearance,” while Paterson conducted himself with what Reed considered “the greatest politeness and attention.”

  Seated across a table from Washington, Paterson assured him that Lord Howe did not mean to “derogate from the respect or rank of General Washington.” Both Lord and General Howe held the “person and character” of General Washington “in highest esteem,” Paterson said. But when he took from his pocket the same letter—addressed still to “George Washington, Esq., etc., etc.”—and placed it on the table between them, Washington let it lie, pointedly refusing to touch it.

  The use of “etc., etc.” implied everything that ought to follow, Paterson offered by way of explanation. “It so does,” said Washington, “and anything.” A letter addressed to a person in a position of public responsibility ought to indicate that station, Washington said, otherwise it would appear mere private correspondence. He would not accept such a letter.

  Paterson talked of the “goodness” and “benevolence” of the King, who had appointed Lord and General Howe as commissioners to “accommodate this unhappy dispute.” As Reed would write in a report to Congress—a report soon published in the Pennsylvania Journal—Washington replied simply that he was “not vested with any powers on this subject by those from whom he derived his authority and power.”

  It was his understanding, Washington continued, that Lord Howe had come out from London with authority only to grant pardons. If that was so, he had come to the wrong place.

  “Those who have committed no fault want no pardon,” Washington said plainly. “We are only defending what we deem our indisputable rights.”

  According to Henry Knox, the English officer appeared as “awestruck as if before something super-natural.”

  Paterson said he lamented that an “adherence to forms” might “obstruct business of the greatest moment and concern.”

  The meeting over, as Paterson himself would write, the general “with a great deal of marked attention and civility permitted me to take my leave.”

  It had been a scene that those in the room would long remember. Washington had performed his role to perfec
tion. It was not enough that a leader look the part; by Washington’s rules, he must know how to act it with self-command and precision. John Adams would later describe Washington approvingly as one of the great actors of the age.

  To Washington it had been an obligatory farce. He had no faith, no trust whatever in any peace overtures by the British, however properly rendered. He had agreed to take part in such an “interview,” one senses, partly to show the British—and his own staff—that he could go through the motions quite as well as any officer and gentleman, but more importantly to send a message to the British command absent any ambiguity. And in this he was unmistakably successful.

  As Lord Howe would report to Lord Germain on the prospect of an accommodation acceptable to the King, the “interview…induced me to change my subscription for the attainment of an end so desirable.”

  BRITISH SHIPS KEPT ARRIVING, their sails at first tiny glints on the eastern horizon, then growing steadily larger by the hour as they came up through the Narrows. Samuel Webb counted five ships on July 25, eight on July 26. On July 29 another twenty arrived.

  A midsummer drought had set in; the heat was fierce. Just as the winter of 1776 had been one of extreme cold, so the summer was one of extreme heat. “No air, and the thermometer at 94 degrees,” recorded Ambrose Serle on board the Eagle.

  Henry Knox, writing to Lucy at his desk at No. 1 Broadway, said he had never worked so hard or felt so done in by the heat.

  I generally rise with or a little before the sun and immediately, with part of the regiment attend prayers, sing a psalm or read a chapter [of the Bible]. I dispatch a considerable deal of business before breakfast. From breakfast to dinner I am boiling in a sun hot enough to roast an egg. Indeed, my dear Lucy, I never suffered so much from fatigue in my life.

  On August 1, a swarm of forty-five ships carrying Generals Henry Clinton and Charles Cornwallis and some 3,000 troops were sighted off Sandy Hook, newly returned from South Carolina and making “a very fine appearance,” in the eyes of the exultant British.

  To the Americans the ships and Clinton’s army were as unexpected as “if they had dropped from the clouds.”

  And still ships kept coming.

  On August 4, Nathanael Greene reported that another twenty-one had been counted on the horizon, the whole of Lord Howe’s fleet. And as if to underscore the ambiguity of the admiral’s mission, transports loaded with troops bore such names as Good Intent, Friendship, Amity’s Admonition, and Father’s Good Will.

  “We have had so many arrivals of late,” wrote a nearly giddy Ambrose Serle, “that the rebel commanders, we learn, give out to their people that we send ships down in the night, which come up in the course of the next day, as a maneuver to intimidate them.”

  Joseph Reed, writing to a friend, said that no fewer than a hundred ships had arrived within ten days, and as yet only part of the “foreign” (Hessian) troops had come in. Reed, it appears, was indeed intimidated. For the first time he expressed great misgivings over the wisdom of even trying to defend New York against such a force. “It is a mere point of honor that keeps us here now.” He had a different strategy in mind.

  “My opinion is,” he wrote, “we should make it a war of posts, prolong, procrastinate, avoid any general action, or indeed any action, unless we have great advantages.”

  As things were, he saw no advantages. To what degree he was pressing such views on his commander by this time is not known.

  Even stalwart, optimistic Henry Knox suffered his own private anguish. “I shrink and tremble at the importance of our present conduct—the weight absolute without alleviation of perhaps posterity on the shoulders of the present army, an army, I am sorry to say, [that] is not sufficiently numerous to resist the formidable attacks which will probably be made,” he told his brother in a letter of August 5.

  Washington remained determined to make a stand, convinced still that the city must be defended.

  On August 12 the sea beyond the Narrows was filled with yet another one hundred ships or more bearing down on New York, a fleet so large that it took all day for them to come up the harbor under full canvas, colors flying, guns saluting, sailors and soldiers on the ships and on shore cheering themselves hoarse.

  In addition, another 3,000 British troops and more than 8,000 Hessians had arrived after an arduous three months at sea.

  Nothing like it had ever been seen in New York. Housetops were covered with “gazers”; all wharves that offered a view were jammed with people. The total British armada now at anchor in a “long, thick cluster” off Staten Island numbered nearly four hundred ships large and small, seventy-three warships, including eight ships of the line, each mounting 50 guns or more. As British officers happily reminded one another, it was the largest fleet ever seen in American waters. In fact, it was the largest expeditionary force of the eighteenth century, the largest, most powerful force ever sent forth from Britain or any nation.

  But it was also true that as big as the biggest ships were—and to Americans who had never seen anything like them, they were colossal—they could have been bigger still. Even the Asia and Eagle were small compared to other ships in the British fleet. HMS Victory, for example, mounted fully 98 guns. Concerned about the difficulties of clearing the shallows of Sandy Hook and negotiating the East River and the Hudson, Admiral Lord Howe had wisely chosen speed and maneuverability over size and more massive firepower.

  Still, by the scale of things in the American colonies of 1776, it was a display of military might past imagining. All told, 32,000 troops had landed on Staten Island, a well-armed, well-equipped, trained force more numerous than the entire population of New York or even Philadelphia, which, with a population of about 30,000, was the largest city in America.

  Joseph Reed, writing to his wife, expressed what many felt:

  When I look down and see the prodigious fleet they have collected, the preparations they have made, and consider the vast expenses incurred, I cannot help being astonished that a people should come 3,000 miles at such risk, trouble and expense to rob, plunder and destroy another people because they will not lay their lives and fortunes at their feet.

  IN THE TENT ENCAMPMENTS dotting Staten Island the redcoats were in holiday spirits. But so it was, also, on the American side, among such veterans of the Boston campaign as Jabez Fitch in camp in New York, and Joseph Hodgkins, on Long Island, who had no doubt the troops would give a good account of themselves, whatever was to come.

  Their confidence was bolstered in large degree by distorted notions of their own strength. It was true enough that the enemy was “coming in almost every day,” wrote Hodgkins to his wife, and they might number as many as 25,000. Yet she need not worry, “for we have 42,000 men now and they are coming in every day.” One newspaper said the American army numbered 70,000.

  Many of the new arrivals looked the way soldiers were supposed to, in smart uniforms and well armed, and they marched into town full of pride. Delaware, the smallest colony, had sent the largest battalion in the army, “the Delaware Blues,” a force of 800 turned out in handsome red-trimmed blue coats, white waistcoats, buckskin breeches, white woolen stockings, and carrying fine, “lately imported” English muskets. The proud Maryland battalion commanded by General William Smallwood was composed of “men of honor, family, and fortune,” and, if anything, they were even better armed and more dazzling in scarlet coats lined with buff. Colonel John Glover’s tough Massachusetts fishermen wore the blue jackets of sailors, white shirts, white breeches and caps, while their short, stocky, red-haired commander had silver lace trim on his blue broadcloth coat and carried a brace of silver pistols.

  But while the incoming stream of reinforcements had become a daily spectacle, desertions were increasing by the day, and signing up new recruits was proving ever more difficult, in part because that summer of 1776 was a bumper year on American farms and men could rightly claim to be needed at home. “Their complaints are without number,” the colonel of a Connecticut regimen
t wrote.

  Some have got ten or twelve loads of hay cut, and not a man left to take it up. Some have got a great quantity of grass to cut. Some have not finished hoeing corn. Some, if not all, have got their ploughing to do, for sowing their winter grain. Some have all their families sick, and not a person left to take care of them.

  In the oppressive summer heat in New York and on Long Island, camp fever had become epidemic. When Lieutenant Hodgkins allowed to his wife Sarah that “a good many of our people are poorly,” that was hardly the half of it. (Hodgkins was worried sick over his youngest child, a two-year-old son and namesake, who, he had learned, was deathly ill at home, and he was no doubt trying to spare her still more worry.) In the regiment in which Jabez Fitch served, 180 men, nearly two-thirds of the regiment, including the commanding officer, Colonel Jedediah Huntington, were too sick for duty. “Sickness prevails greatly in camp,” recorded a regimental surgeon, Albigence Waldo, adding that in other camps conditions were worse.

  “The vile water here sickens us all,” wrote the New Jersey chaplain Philip Fithian, who was himself ill.

  One died this morning in our hospital of a dysentery…. Two died yesterday in the New England hospital of a dysentery, and thirty more are confined with it and other putrid disorders.

  Many also through the camp are much unwell but will not go to [the] hospital. Poor Mr. Donaldson, my old neighbor, is among these. Yesterday he went to the hospital, but crawled back to his tent this morning, and resolves there to die rather than return.

  As they had so often at Boston, Washington and his generals insisted on all possible cleanliness. Nathanael Greene, in particular, gave repeated orders that the camp be kept clean, that the vaults—as latrines were known—were covered with fresh earth daily, and new vaults dug weekly.