Hitler's Revenge Weapons
Page 14
A day later, and with only three weeks to go before the end of the rocket attacks, Central London also had its most serious V2 incident. London’s Smithfield Meat Market and Farrington Street railway station took a direct hit at 11.30, in the middle of a busy market day, the rocket smashing through the massive concrete and steel structure onto the railway loading bays below, killing 110 people and leaving countless more injured. A large number of women and children were said to have been within that number, it having been rumoured that rabbits might be on sale there that day.
The last rocket came down at Orpington on 27 March, killing Mrs Ivy Millichamp, the last person to die from the V-weapons and, early on the following morning, the last flying bomb landed at Claverhambury, near Waltham Holy Cross, Ted Carter again being among the first to find the crater, but with very little surrounding damage and no injuries. It was over.
All those who endured the sleepless nights and disruption of the Luftwaffe’s flying-bomb offensive will remember the ominous sound of their arrival, and that they were relatively safe while the noise continued. Some, particularly those who had survived a near miss, took to their shelters, conscious of the danger that one ton of high explosives could cause with blast, cratering and fragmentation. Others, and there were many of them, became a little blasé, unwisely tending to play a game of ‘cat and mouse’ with Hitler’s new killing machines as they proliferated – and perhaps paying the ultimate penalty. It was different with the V2 rockets, which gave no warning, and the majority in the land became fatalistic, accepting that there was nothing practical they could do to avoid the cruelty they inflicted, and rising to every occasion with strenuous rescue, recovery and rehabilitation efforts. As with the London blitz, each found their own way of dealing with the onslaught. While the people of Cheshunt and Waltham Holy Cross suffered far less than many in other districts in and around Greater London, they saw, heard and were able to sense what others had been going through but, even for them, this final intrusion on their lives had been too close for comfort.
The author and his wife inspect the work done to make a fishing lake at Galley Hill, Waltham Abbey, from the crater caused by the last V1 to land in their area on 12 July 1944. (Author)
Chapter 8
Codename ‘Crossbow’
The UK active and passive defences did their best to protect the British homeland against the flying bombs and to mitigate their effects, but they could never do enough – and they were impotent against the rockets. Fortunately, wise heads had realised that, in accordance with the time-honoured adage, that ‘offence is (often) the best means of defence’, action had to be taken against the enemy’s design, development and testing installations in their heartland, together with any production and logistics centres and launching sites, there and in enemy-occupied countries. The purely air defence assets have been outlined in the previous chapter, but in the context of a campaign against the V-weapons, the offensive assets would include heavy and medium bombers, fighter-bombers, all air reconnaissance forces and, later in the war, the tactical air power of the Allied Air Expeditionary Force (AAEF).
In 1943 the clear need for a central body to co-ordinate all matters pertaining to Germany’s long-range weapons led to the formation of a committee initially comprising politicians, appropriate scientists, military and associated specialists, chaired by the controversial Duncan Sandys (Chapter Four), working under the code name ‘Bodyline’. Inevitably, with main players such as Sandys, Lord Cherwell, R.V. Jones, the intelligence community, particularly Bletchley Park and ‘Bimbo’ Norman, and the Air Ministry operational staffs, there were tensions from the start, leading to several changes at the helm, representation and access to highly classified information.
On 15 November 1943 Bodyline gave way to a new codename, Crossbow, their activities coming later under the popular heading of Operation CROSSBOW (best known for the film of that name). The Crossbow Committee would be a sub-committee of the JIC, with its own directorate in the Air Ministry. Carrying on the work of Bodyline, the Crossbow Committee set about re-evaluating all the intelligence available, and demanding further contributions to it, for a continuing assessment by experts to determine the exact nature of these weapons, the threats they posed and when they might be used in anger, thereafter to consider further offensive and defensive countermeasures against them. Typically, throughout its evolution, Bodyline and Crossbow would take inputs from or involve the Foreign Office, the War Office through MI 10 (Weapons and Technical Analysis), the Military Intelligence Germany (Technical) Branch, and the Directorate of Prisoners of War (PoW).
For all who wished to see it, there was an abundance of evidence, from multiple sources (Chapter Four), that Germany was well advanced in the development of at least two long-range missiles, the V1 flying bomb and the V2 rocket, the like of which had not been seen before on a battlefield. Moreover, it was becoming clear that London, and perhaps the invasion ports in southern England, were primary targets. So it was that the Peenemünde research and development complex and the huge construction programme underway in north-west France, clearly designated as the main launch area for both missiles targeting London, were of particular interest.
By mid-1943 it had become clear that Peenemünde was at the very roots of the burgeoning threat from long-range rockets and flying bombs and the War Cabinet Defence Committee directed that key elements of a huge and rapidly developing facility should be destroyed by RAF Bomber Command in a maximum effort at the earliest opportunity. The Commander-in- Chief (C-in-C) RAF Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, was not happy; he saw this as a major distraction from his preference for ‘carpet-bombing’ German cities, in which he aimed to create as much destruction and panic as possible, disrupting industrial facilities and the associated infrastructure, but he was also concerned about the practicalities of the task. His bombers would be operating at extreme ranges, where their new navigation aid, Oboe, could also be unreliable, while the bombing aid H2S would not be sufficiently accurate for the precision required. This would be the first time that Bomber Command had carried out a mass attack of this nature against relatively small target nodes, in which precise navigation and bomb-aiming would be essential, so the raid would have to be carried out on a clear, moonlight night, sadly when they would be at their most vulnerable to the Luftwaffe’s fighters.
Bomber Command assigned all its suitable assets to the task in the hope of achieving the aim in one blow, and to reduce the risk of interference by enemy fighters, high speed Mosquito bombers would carry out a diversionary raid, dropping Window to confuse the radar by simulating a major raid on Berlin. Also, because this would be the first, major precision raid at night, Pathfinder bombers and a Master Bomber would mark crucial aiming points and then remain in the local area to give directions and corrections. The Peenemünde raid was scheduled for the night of 17/18 August 1943 under a full moon in a cloudless sky. This wholly British effort would involve a mixed force of 596 bombers from fifty-four Bomber Command squadrons, led by a Stirling of No.90 Squadron based at West Wickham, flown by Flight Lieutenant George Crew. They would seek to unload 1,650 tons of high explosive bombs and 274 tons of incendiaries on Peenemünde East, specifically the experimental station, the rocket factory and the specialist workers’ quarters, as recommended by Duncan Sandys. Interestingly, the massive, very visible coal-fired power station, which served the whole complex, was not on the target list and remains intact to this day. Neither was the Luftwaffe airfield, the V1 test site nor the Me163 rocket fighter and Me262 jet fighter development facility at Peenemünde West – no doubt a matter of regret to those bomber crews who were to suffer from these innovative aircraft later in the war. R.V. Jones had not been consulted on aiming points and was not happy with the selection.
Group Captain John Searby, CO of No.83 Squadron, would lead the Pathfinders, acting as the Master Bomber and, for the first time, a number of ‘shifters’ were employed, their purpose being to re-direct the marker flares, if r
equired, as the raid progressed. There would be three waves of bombers, the last employing the ‘time and distance’ procedure for finding their target from a clearly visible run-in point. Four Mosquito bomber squadrons would provide the diversionary force, approaching Berlin via Denmark, in an attempt to draw away the Luftwaffe fighters.
Initially, the raid was proclaimed a success. Twenty-five buildings were said to have been destroyed within the experimental works, including the drawing office, while the V2 assembly shop had received a direct hit which destroyed valuable documents and records, and caused the death of Dr Walter Thiel, the chief rocket propulsion engineer. Production was said to have been delayed by two to six months, depending on the source of these estimates. However, some 600 foreign workers were also killed, including several invaluable informants, while many of the German specialists who had been targeted survived, and heroic action among the German survivors saved volumes of vital documents. With HYDRA having been only partially successful, it was clear that further raids on Peenemünde would be necessary.
Forty-one bombers were lost in the raid, and to this day part of the fuselage of one remains visible in the lake close to Peenemünde village; the third wave suffered most, the Mosquito diversion having played itself out in time for the fighters to re-muster over Usedom and catch their adversaries as they departed for home. The fighters included Bf110s converted to fire twin Schrage Musik, angled-upward-firing cannon, into the bombers’ bellies, and it is they who might have accounted for six of the last wave.
As with Peenemünde, the potential missile launch sites in France had, for some months in 1943, been under continuous surveillance from the air, enabling the Central Interpretation Unit (CIU) at Medmenham to confirm connections between the two. Moreover, the photographic imagery did much to support information from Allied agents on the ground in France that the Germans were building installations which could only have been destined for the rocket and or flying bombs. These included eight big hardened facilities and an increasing number of storage and ski sites for launching V1s, whose launching ramps were all pointing towards London. Where photo cover was lacking, the PRU was tasked to fill in the gaps.
Then began a debate on the best time and means of attacking each target array. It was agreed that, in general, the sites should be struck just before their completion, that the accuracy expected from medium-level bombing would not be good enough, that ‘area bombing’ from high level (weather permitting) might be profitable, but that the preferred solution was pinpoint attacks by fighter-bombers.
The RAF’s No.2 Group, Second Tactical Air Force (2TAF), commanded by Air Vice Marshal Basil Embry, had already been hard at it. At the end of October 1943, No.2 Group had struck eighty-eight known ski sites, and was ready to attack another fifty, yet to be confirmed. In the next six months the group’s Typhoons, Spitfires, Marauders, Bostons and Mitchells contributed to the total of 4,710 sorties flown by all Allied units against V-weapon targets, usually carrying out their attacks in fair weather only, for fear of collateral damage in the occupied countries. They faced little opposition from enemy fighters, but a vast array of mixed AA took its toll, or at least distracted the bomber and fighter-bomber pilots from their aim as they ran into their targets. Attempts to delay construction work at the launch sites included attacks on the Todt Administration Building in Audinghen on 25 November, 2 Group Spitfires leaving only a few buildings standing before they themselves were attacked by Bf109s. On the afternoon of 26 November, 2 Group medium bombers flew 119 sorties over Martinvast, losing three Mitchells to AA, while Typhoons and Spitfires, flying top cover, accounted for a number of Fw190s. Many BODYLINE/CROSSBOW targets survived the end of 1943 because of poor weather, but in that final month small raids were still possible against Drionville, Heuringham, Puchervin, St Pierre des Jonquières, le Mesnil Alard, Pommereval, la Glacerie, Bois de Capelle, Crecy, Yvrenche and Ligescourt. Again, AA of all calibres was particularly heavy at all heights, and on 21 December Spitfires jousted with forty Fw190s, shooting down three of the enemy for the loss of one of their own. Two days later an experimental raid by thirty-six Bostons of 2 Group was carried out at low level, for which the crews were not trained; it was not a success and was not repeated.
The higher performance Mosquitos from RAF Sculthorpe which had also joined the BODYLINE force in November proved more successful at low level, and could operate in poorer weather without the fighter protection needed by the medium bombers. To further minimise their losses, they would fly over the sea at the lowest practical level, climb to 4,000 feet over the coastal defences and then dive back to low level, albeit with the difficulty of acquiring their targets at the last moment, or carried out dive attacks from 1,500 feet. Alternatively, they would approach at 11,000 feet, in order to acquire their targets early, then dive down to 6,000 feet to deliver their bombs, achieving very good errors errors of only 150 feet, but this tactic was possible only in good weather and it meant risking greater exposure to air defence and gun radars. So it was that ultra-low level attacks remained the preferred option.
While CROSSBOW continued to be a major priority in 1944, it would compete with the needs of the forthcoming invasion of the continent, and this brought about a re-organisation of the wing structures at the 2 Group airfields of Lasham, Hunsdon, Hertford Bridge and Dunsfold, these wings being designated for early deployment to the continent.
The Americans now deplored what they believed to be wasted effort on CROSSBOW targets, tensions between the two nations increasing, with the Americans now demanding more access to intelligence on the suspected missiles which they believed they were being denied, making this a precondition for any further material help in CROSSBOW. There was also a suspicion that some ski sites were now no more than a cunning deception, to lure Allied aircraft into ‘flak-traps’, and they could have been right; the Germans had left some abandoned sites fully exposed, even occupying them with skeleton staff to draw off the bombers from the new ‘modified’ sites they were developing. So it was that, from January 1944, the British passed on to the Americans their perceived threats to the UK from flying bombs and rockets, with details on some of the ski sites in France, whereupon the USAAF carried out a raid by 1,300 heavy bombers, with a fighter escort, dropping 1,700 tons of bombs on twenty-three ski sites (now known as ‘Noball’ targets), and destroying three. In the more constructive bi-lateral talks which followed there was general agreement that the missiles might threaten the forthcoming invasion of the continent, not sufficient to postpone the operation but enough to justify the joint effort against CROSSBOW targets to continue. The Americans then asked why the Germans would spend so much energy and scarce resources on a (V2) rocket, if it contained only a small, high-explosive warhead; could it be that the beleaguered nation had a low yield atomic or, more likely, a bacteriological warhead in mind, such as the Americans themselves had been considering? They were certainly aware of bacteria yeast. With such questions unanswered, the case for continuing to target the V2s prevailed.
Having been convinced that their invasion forces might be attacked by the V-weapons, the Americans went one step further, arranging for a professor from Princeton University, Bob Robertson, to meet R.V. Jones in London to learn more about the threats and discuss a joint approach against them. The meeting went well, Robertson returning to the USA to make the case for all-out American support for CROSSBOW. Their first contribution was to examine the best way of dealing with the ‘bunker sites’, such as le Blockhaus d’Éperlecques at Watten, in the Pas de Calais. General Grandison Gardner, commander of the Army Air Force Proving Ground at Eglin Field, Florida, was ordered to build an accurate mock-up of a site ‘within days’. This he did, and in the following month Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley and Air Vice Marshal Frank Inglis, representing the RAF’s operational and intelligence interests respectively, were invited to Eglin to discuss the best means of attacking such a target, the seismic effects of the British 12,000lb Tallboy bomb coming into the discussion. The VIPs then
witnessed an impressive demonstration of a TV guided bomb, dropped from high level by a Flying Fortress, striking its target – but no such weapon would be ready for operational use in the war. Following additional trials at Eglin, General Gardner recommended that the low-level approach by fighter-bombers was the most effective means of attacking the V1 ski sites and modified sites – and so it would prove. While the debate continued, heavy and medium bombers kept up their assault on the bunker sites, fighter-bombers the redundant ski and elusive modified sites. On 4 March General Eisenhower approved a plan which served both Operation OVERLORD and the continued campaign against the flying-bomb sites, with the flexibility to switch forces rapidly from one priority to the other. In April 1944 the Allies effort against CROSSBOW targets got more than its share, peaking at 4,100 sorties to deliver 7,500 tons of conventional ordnance, and detailed plans were drawn up for the use of chemical stores, should retaliation in kind be necessary. The USAAF was also contributing more to the reconnaissance programme, looking especially for the modified sites, the aircrew and PIs no longer so easily taken in by the deception measures being adopted by the Germans.
While it had little new to go on, the Air Ministry predicted that an offensive by flying bombs against England might now begin at the end of March 1944, and that, in the first fifteen days of such an attack, 160 tons of high explosives might be spread across Greater London in 10 to 12 hours, recurring after 48 hr intervals. In that this would equate to separate raids carried out by twenty Lancasters, it was relatively good news – and it could be even better depending on the effectiveness of England’s defensive screen and on the success of attacks against the launch sites. The bad news was that Bletchley Park was reporting general improvements in the accuracy of the bombs on trials in the Baltic, Jones estimating that some 40 per cent of those launched might reach London, and intelligence sources had yet to be fully aware of the potential of the modified sites springing up, largely unobserved, within reach of London. The SIS and Bletchley Park were also busy keeping a watching brief on Wachtel’s Flakgruppe Creil, the elusive Wachtel himself (alias Wolf) plying continuously between Zempin, Paris, and his units throughout northern France.