If therefore “Free-will” without grace, when it has lost its liberty, is compelled to serve sin and cannot will good, I should be glad to know, what that desire is, what that endeavour is, which that first ‘probable opinion’ leaves it. It cannot be a good desire or a good endeavour, because it cannot will good, as the opinion affirms, and as you grant. Therefore, it is an evil desire and an evil endeavour that is left, which, when the liberty is lost, is compelled to serve sin. - But above all, what, I pray, is the meaning of this saying: ‘this opinion leaves the desire and the endeavour, but does not leave what is to be ascribed to its own power.’ Who can possibly conceive in his mind what this means? If the desire and the endeavour be left to the power of “Free-will,” how are they not ascribed to the same? If they be not ascribed to it, how can they be left to it? Are then that desire and that endeavour before grace, left to grace itself that comes after, and not to “Free-will” so as to be at the same time left, and not left, to the same “Free-will?” If these things be not paradoxes, or rather enormities, then pray what are enormities?
Sect. XLIX. - BUT perhaps the Diatribe is dreaming this, that between these two ‘can will good’ and ‘cannot will good’ there may be a medium; seeing that, to will is absolute, both in respect of good, and evil. So that thus, by a certain logical subtlety, we may steer clear of the rocks, and say, in the will of man there is a certain willing, which cannot indeed will good without grace, but which, nevertheless, being without grace, does not immediately will nothing but evil, but is a sort of mere abstracted willing, vertible, upwards unto good by grace, and downwards unto evil by sin. But then, what will become of that which you have said, that, ‘when it has lost its liberty it is compelled to serve sin?’ What will become of that desire and endeavour which are left? Where will be that power of ‘applying itself to those things which pertain unto eternal salvation?’ For that power of applying itself unto salvation, cannot be a mere willing, unless the salvation itself be said to be a nothing. Nor, again, can that desire and endeavour be a mere willing; for desire must strive and attempt something, (as good perhaps,) and cannot go forth into nothing, nor be absolutely inactive.
In a word, which way soever the Diatribe turns itself, it cannot keep clear of inconsistencies and contradictory assertions; nor avoid making that very “Free-will” which it defends, as much a bond-captive as it is a bond-captive itself. For, in attempting to liberate “Free-will,” it is so entangled, that it is bound, together with “Free-will,” in bonds indissoluble.
Moreover, it is a mere logical figment that in man there is a medium, a mere willing, nor can they who assert this prove it; it arose from an ignorance of things and an observance of terms. As though the thing were always in reality, as it is set forth in terms; and there are with the Sophists many such misconceptions. Whereas the matter rather stands as Christ saith, “He that is not with Me is against Me.” (Matt. xii. 30.) He does not say, He that is not with Me is yet not against Me, but in the medium. For if God be in us, Satan is from us, and it is present with us to will nothing but good. But if God be not in us, Satan is in us, and it is present with us to will evil only, Neither God nor Satan admit of a mere abstracted willing in us; but, as you yourself rightly said, when our liberty is lost we are compelled to serve sin: that is, we will sin and evil, we speak sin and evil, we do sin and evil.
Behold then! invincible and all-powerful truth has driven the witless Diatribe to that dilemma, and so turned its wisdom into foolishness, that whereas, its design was to speak against me, it is compelled to speak for me against itself; just in the same way as “Free-will” does any thing good; for when it attempts so to do, the more it acts against evil the more it acts against good. So that the Diatribe is, in saying, exactly what “Freewill” is in doing. Though the whole Diatribe itself, is nothing else but a notable effort of “Free-will,” condemning by defending, and defending by condemning: that is, being a twofold fool, while it would appear to be wise.
This, then, is the state of the first opinion compared with itself: - it denies that a man can will any thing good; but yet that a desire remains; which desire, however, is not his own!
Sect. L. - NOW let us compare this opinion with the remaining two.
The next of these, is that opinion ‘more severe still,’ which holds, that “Free-will” avails unto nothing but to sin. And this indeed is Augustine’s opinion, expressed, as well in many other places, as more especially, in his book “Concerning the Spirit and the Letter;” in (if I mistake not) the fourth or fifth chapter, where he uses those very words.
The third, is that ‘most severe’ opinion; that “Free-will” is a mere empty term, and that every thing which we do, is done from necessity under the bondage of sin. - It is with these two that the Diatribe conflicts.
I here observe, that perhaps it may be, that I am not able to discuss this point intelligibly, from not being sufficiently acquainted with the Latin or with the German. But I call God to witness, that I wish nothing else to be said or to be understood by the words of the last two opinions than what is said in the first opinion: nor does Augustine wish any thing else to be understood, nor do I understand any thing else from his words, than that which the first opinion asserts: so that, the three opinions brought forward by the Diatribe are with me nothing else than my one sentiment. For when it is granted and established, that “Free-will,” having once lost its liberty, is compulsively bound to the service of sin, and cannot will any thing good: I, from these words, can understand nothing else than that “Free-will” is a mere empty term, whose reality is lost. And a lost liberty, according to my grammar, is no liberty at all. And to give the name of liberty to that which has no liberty, is to give it an empty term. If I am wrong here, let him set me right who can. If these observations be obscure or ambiguous, let him who can, illustrate and make them plain. I for my part, cannot call that health which is lost, health; and if I were to ascribe it to one who was sick, I should think I was giving him nothing else than an empty name,
But away with these enormities of words. For who would bear such an abuse of the manner of speaking, as that we should say a man has “Free-will,” and yet at the same time assert, that when that liberty is once lost, he is compulsively bound to the service of sin, and cannot will any thing good? These things are contrary to common sense, and utterly destroy the common manner of speaking. The Diatribe is rather to be condemned, which in a drowsy way, foists forth its own words without any regard to the words of others. It does not, I say, consider what it is, nor how much it is to assert, that man, when his liberty is lost, is compelled to serve sin and cannot will any thing good. For if it were at all vigilant or observant, it would plainly see, that the sentiment contained in the three opinions is one and the same, which it makes to be diverse and contrary. For if a man, when he has lost his liberty, is compelled to serve sin, and cannot will good, what conclusion concerning him can be more justly drawn, than that he can do nothing but sin, and will evil? And such a conclusion, the Sophists themselves would draw, even by their syllogisms. Wherefore, the Diatribe, unhappily, contends against the last two opinions, and approves the first; whereas, that is precisely the same as the other two; and thus again, as usual, it condemns itself and approves my sentiments, in one and the same article.
Sect. LI. - LET us now come to that passage in Ecclesiasticus, and also with it compare that first ‘probable opinion.’ The opinion saith, ‘Freewill cannot will good.’ The passage in Ecclesiasticus is adduced to prove, that “Free-will” is something, and can do something. Therefore, the opinion which is to be proved by Ecclesiasticus, asserts one thing; and Ecclesiasticus, which is adduced to prove it, asserts another. This is just as if any one, setting about to prove that Christ was the Messiah, should adduce a passage which proves that Pilate was governor of Syria, or any thing else equally discordant. It is in the same way that “Free-will” is here proved. But, not to mention my having above made it manifest, that nothing clear or certain can be said or pr
oved concerning “Free-will,” as to what it is, or what it can do, it is worth while to examine the whole passage thoroughly.
First he saith, “God made man in the beginning.’’ Here he speaks of the creation of man; nor does he say any thing, as yet, concerning either “Free-will” or the commandments.
Then he goes on, “and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” And what is here? Is “Freewill” built upon this? But there is not here any mention of commandments, for the doing of which “Free-will” is required; nor do we read any thing of this kind in the creation of man. If any thing be understood by “the hand of his own counsel,” that should rather be understood which is in Genesis i. and ii.: that man was made lord of all things that he might freely exercise dominion over them: and as Moses saith, “Let us make man, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea:” nor can any thing else be proved from those words: for it is in these things only that man may act of his own will, as being subject unto him. And moreover, he calls this man’s counsel, in contradiction as it were to the counsel of God. But after this, when He has said, that man was made and left thus in the hand of his own counsel - he adds,
“He added moreover His commandments and His precepts.” Unto what did He add them? Certainly unto that counsel and will of man, and over and above unto that constituting of His dominion over other things. By which commandments He took from man the dominion over one part of His creatures, (that is, over the tree of knowledge of good and evil,) and willed rather that he should not be free. - Having added the commandments, He then comes to the will of man towards God and towards the things of God.
“If thou wilt keep the commandments they shall preserve thee,” &c. From this part, therefore, “If thou wilt,” begins the question concerning “Free-will.” So that, from Ecclesiasticus we learn, that man is constituted as divided into two kingdoms. - The one, is that in which he is led according to his own will and counsel, without the precepts and the commandments of God: that is, in those things which are beneath him. Here he has dominion and is lord, as “left in the hand of his own counsel.” Not that God so leaves him to himself, as that He does not co-operate with him; but He commits unto him the free use of things according to his own will, without prohibiting him by any laws or injunctions. As we may say, by way of similitude, the Gospel has left us in the hands of our own counsel, that we may use, and have dominion over all things as we will. But Moses and the Pope left us not in that counsel, but restrained us by laws, and subjected us rather to their own will. - But in the other kingdom, he is not left in the hand of his own counsel, but is directed and led according to the Will and Counsel of God. And as, in his own kingdom, he is led according to his own will, without the precepts of another; so, in the kingdom of God, he is led according to the precepts of another, without his own will. And this is what Ecclesiasticus means, when he says, “He added moreover His commandments and His precepts: saying, If thou wilt,”& c.
If, therefore, these things be satisfactorily clear, I have made it fully evident, that this passage of Ecclesiasticus does not make for “Freewill,” but directly against it: seeing that, it subjects man to the precepts and will of God, and takes from him his “Free-will.” But if they be not satisfactorily clear, I have at least made it manifest, that this passage cannot make for “Freewill;” seeing that, it may be understood in a sense different from that which they put upon it, that is, in my sense already stated, which is not absurd, but most holy and in harmony with the whole Scripture. Whereas, their sense militates against the whole Scripture, and is fetched from this one passage only, contrary to the tenor of the whole Scripture. I stand therefore, secure in the good sense, the negative of “Free-will,” until they shall have confirmed their strained and forced affirmative.
When, therefore, Ecclesiasticus says, “If thou wilt keep the commandments, and keep the faith that pleaseth Me, they shall preserve thee,” I do not see that “Free-will” can be proved from those words. For, “if thou wilt,” is a verb of the subjunctive mood, which asserts nothing: as the logicians say, ‘a conditional asserts nothing indicatively:’ such as, if the devil be God, he is deservedly worshipped: if an ass fly, an ass has wings, so also, if there be “Free-will,” grace is nothing at all. Therefore, if Ecclesiasticus had wished to assert “Free-will,” he ought to have spoken thus: - man is able to keep the commandments of God, or, man, has the power to keep the commandments.
Sect. LII. - BUT here the Diatribe will sharply retort - “Ecclesiasticus by saying, “if thou wilt keep,” signifies that there is a will in man, to keep, and not to keep: otherwise, what is the use of saying unto him who has no will, “if thou wilt?” Would it not be ridiculous if any were to say to a blind man, if thou wilt see, thou mayest find a treasure? Or, to a deaf man, if thou wilt hear, I will relate to thee an excellent story? This would be to laugh at their misery” –
I answer: These are the arguments of human reason, which is wont to shoot forth many such sprigs of wisdom. Wherefore, I must dispute now, not with Ecclesiasticus, but with human reason concerning a conclusion; for she, by her conclusions and syllogisms, interprets and twists the Scriptures of God just which way she pleases. But I will enter upon this willingly, and with confidence, knowing, that she can prate nothing but follies and absurdities; and that more especially, when she attempts to make a shew of her wisdom in these divine matters.
First then, if I should demand of her how it can be proved, that the freedom of the will in man is signified and inferred, wherever these expressions are used, ‘if thou wilt,’ ‘if thou shalt do,’ ‘if thou shalt hear;’ she would say, because the nature of words, and the common use of speech among men, seem to require it. Therefore, she judges of divine things and words according to the customs and things of men; than which, what can be more perverse; seeing that, the former things are heavenly, the latter earthly. Like a fool, therefore, she exposes herself, making it manifest that she has not a thought concerning God but what is human.
But, what if I prove, that the nature of words and the use of speech even among men, are not always of that tendency, as to make a laughing stock of those to whom it is said, ‘if thou wilt,’ ‘if thou shalt do it.’ ‘if thou shalt hear?’ - How often do parents thus play with their children, when they bid them come to them, or do this or that, for this purpose only, that it may plainly appear to them how unable they are to do it, and that they may call for the aid of the parent’s hand? How often does a faithful physician bid his obstinate patient do or omit those things which are either injurious to him or impossible, to the intent that, he may bring him, by an experience, to the knowledge of his disease or his weakness? And what is more general and common, than to use words of insult or provocation, when we would show either enemies or friends, what they can do and what they cannot do?
I merely go over these things, to shew Reason her own conclusions, and how absurdly she tacks them to the Scriptures: moreover, how blind she must be not to see, that they do not always stand good even in human words and things. But the case is, if she see it to be done once, she rushes on headlong, taking it for granted, that it is done generally in all the things of God and men, thus making, according to the way of her wisdom, of a particularity an universality.
If then God, as a Father, deal with us as with sons, that He might shew us who are in ignorance our impotency, or as a faithful physician, that He might make our disease known unto us, or that He might insult His enemies who proudly resist His counsel; and for this end, say to us by proposed laws (as being those means by which He accomplishes His design the most effectually) ‘do,’ ‘hear,’ ‘keep,’ or, ‘if thou wilt,’ ‘if thou wilt do,’ ‘if thou wilt hear;’ can this be drawn herefrom as a just conclusion - therefore, either we have free power to act, or God laughs at us? Why is this not rather drawn as a conclusion - therefore, God tries us, that by His law He might bring us to a knowledge of our impotency, if we be His friends; or, He thereby righteously and deservedly insults and derides us, if we be His
proud enemies.’ For this, as Paul teaches, is the intent of the divine legislation. (Rom. iii. 20; v. 20. Gal. iii. 19, 24.) Because human nature is blind, so that it knows not its own powers, or rather its own diseases. Moreover, being proud, it self-conceitedly imagines, that it knows and can do all things. To remedy which pride and ignorance, God can use no means more effectual than His proposed law: of which we shall say more in its place: let it suffice to have thus touched upon it here, to refute this conclusion of carnal and absurd wisdom: - ‘if thou wilt’ - therefore thou art able to will freely.
The Diatribe dreams, that man is whole and sound, as, to human appearance, he is in his own affairs; and therefore, from these words, ‘if thou wilt,’ ‘if thou wilt do,’ ‘if thou wilt hear,’ it pertly argues, that man, if his will be not free, is laughed at. Whereas, the Scripture describes man as corrupt and a captive; and added to that, as proudly contemning and ignorant of his corruption and captivity: and therefore, by those words, it goads him and rouses him up, that he might know, by a real experience, how unable he is to do any one of those things.
Sect. LIII. - BUT I will attack the Diatribe itself. If thou really think, O Madam Reason! that these conclusions stand good, ‘If thou wilt - therefore thou hast a free power,’ why dost thou not follow the same thyself? For thou sayest, according to that ‘probable opinion,’ that “Free-will” cannot will any thing good. By what conclusion then can such a sentiment flow from this passage also, ‘if thou wilt keep,’ when thou sayest that the conclusion flowing from this, is, that man can will and not will freely? What! can bitter and sweet flow from the same fountain? Dost thou not here much more deride man thyself, when thou sayest, that he can keep that, which he can neither will nor choose? Therefore, neither dost thou, from thy heart, believe that this is a just conclusion, ‘if thou wilt - therefore thou hast a free power,’ although thou contendest for it with so much zeal, or, if thou dost believe it, then thou dost not, from thy heart, say, that that opinion is ‘probable,’ which holds that man cannot will good. Thus, reason is so caught in the conclusions and words of her own wisdom, that she knows not what she says, nor concerning what she speaks: nay, knows nothing but that which it is most right she should know - that “Free-will” is defended with such arguments as mutually devour, and put an end to each other; just as the Midianites destroyed each other by mutual slaughter, when they fought against Gideon and the people of God. Judges vii.
Collected Works of Martin Luther Page 417