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  Today we know that the Great King was not a tyrant standing above the

  law. His government also served the interests of the aristocracy and magi.

  Moreover, together they were all bound by tradition and established

  ideology to serve as the guardians of what was for Iranians the one and

  only true religion.38

  Another factor to consider was the great war of Xerxes I in the years

  480-479, his occupation of mainland Greece and the destruction of

  Athenian temples, which for centuries was considered to be the

  quintessential act of eastern barbarity. Although defeated in the great 5th-

  century wars, Persia had not ceased being a threat to Greek states in the

  century that followed, though there were no more epic battles where Greek

  hoplites had to defend the freedom of their poleis against many thousands

  of barbarians driven on with whips as recorded by Herodotus. Aware of

  the ineffectiveness of earlier military efforts, the Persians now changed

  their policy. Intricate diplomacy and financial support distributed to

  various Greek states in the last part of the Peloponnesian and during the

  Corinthian War in the beginning of the 4th century let Persia to eventually

  recover all its lost territories in Asia Minor. The empire also gained

  control of numerous Greek islands in the Aegean, whereas the chaos of the

  4th century allowed successive Persian rulers to continue influencing

  events in mainland Greece through the skilful use of subsidies, diplomacy

  and the threat of military intervention. No wonder that to Greek public

  opinion Persia was the enemy par excellence. Even in 341 Demosthenes,

  who was after all looking for Persian help against Philip II, had to assure

  38 X., HG, 4.1.37 in Brownson’s translation (Loeb). Frye 1964, pp. 36-37; Barceló

  1993, pp. 217-218; Hornblower 1994, pp. 54-56; Billows 1994, pp. 60-70; Carlier

  1995, pp. 143-144; Briant 1996, pp. 350-351; Klinkott 2000.

  The Heir to the Throne

  63

  the Athenians that the Macedonian monarch was an even greater threat

  than the Great King.39

  Many Greek physicians, artists and architects were employed in the

  courts of the Great King and his satraps, whereas for good pay Greek

  mercenaries served in Persian armies in their thousands. The best Greek

  commanders fought in the many wars that took place in the western

  regions of the vast Achaemenid empire in the 4th century including: King

  Agesilaus of Sparta, Pammenes of Thebes, the Athenians Conon,

  Iphicrates, Timotheos, Chabrias, Chares, Charidemus as well as the

  brothers Mentor and Memnon of Rhodes. Yet Greek authors, particularly

  Diodorus, who is our major source for this era, overstate the importance of

  Greek generals and mercenaries in wars fought by Persia in the 4th century.

  They concentrate exclusively on the role played by Greek soldiers on the

  Persian pay. That is why many modern historians have succumbed to the

  illusion of Persia’s military weakness against Alexander’s imminent

  invasion and have willingly portrayed it as a colossus with feet of clay.

  Looking at Alexander’s defeat of Persia with the benefit of hindsight it is

  easy to forget that for most of the 4th-century before the Macedonian

  conquest, despite internal problems, the Achaemenid state had generally

  experienced political successes. Artaxerxes II recovered the Greek cities of

  Asia Minor that had been lost in the 5th century. At the start of his reign

  Artaxerxes III quelled the rebellion of the western satraps, next in 345 he

  crushed the resistance of Phoenician cities before finally in 343 re-

  conquering Egypt, which for 61 years had been independent of Persia. In

  Asia Minor, which was much closer to Greece, tyrants attempting to gain

  quasi-independence, such as Hermias of Atarneus, were removed. The

  Great King’s authority over the satraps was once again restored and, after

  ending his military actions, Artaxerxes III ordered them to disband their

  mercenary armies, so as they would no longer be able to act too

  independently. The reign of Artaxerxes IV (338-336) was too short-lived

  to allow us to assess it. On the other hand, his successor, Darius III, will

  probably always be associated with the odium of defeat and incompetence,

  because he had the misfortune of facing in battle the greatest military

  leader of ancient times – Alexander the Great. However, when Darius

  ascended the throne he was already a known figure. Under Artaxerxes III

  he had acquired fame as a warrior. Moreover, the fact that he had managed

  to take over the throne and dispose of Bagoas without causing political

  unrest indicates that he must have acquired the trust of the Iranian

  aristocracy and magi. We also know that at the start of his reign he briskly

  39 D., 10.33.4. Badian 1985, p. 427; Hammond 1994, p. 165; Tuplin 1996, pp. 153-

  154; Flower 2000, p. 104.

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  Chapter II

  quelled Khababash’s rebellion in Egypt thus once again restoring peace to

  the Persian Empire.40

  In 4th-century Greek literature there is a strong tendency to contrast the

  manliness and triumphant valour of the Greeks with Persian effeminacy

  induced by excessive luxury. To a certain extent this was a continuation of

  a theme that had already appeared in the work of Herodotus, whilst at the

  same time it also reflected the popular views of the school of Hippocrates

  which noted how climate and living conditions affected human character

  and behaviour. Ctesias’ gossipy and sensationalistic Persica provided

  colourful examples to support such theories. According to the most

  important political writers of 4th-century Greece – Plato, Aristotle,

  Isocrates and Theopompus – the Persians were typical barbarians

  degenerated by luxury, gluttony and sex. They were regarded to have the

  mentality of slaves, whose behaviour betrayed a mixture of cowardice,

  servility, arrogance and pride. These views were expressed most

  effectively by the writer, soldier and philosopher Xenophon. His most

  famous work, Anabasis, relates the story of Greek mercenaries (including

  Xenophon himself) who, serving the pretender to the Persian throne Cyrus

  the Younger, venture as far as Babylon and then after Cyrus’s death fight

  repeated battles against the Persians until they reach Greek settlements on

  the Black Sea coast. On the other hand, in his Hellenica the same author

  glorifies the Spartan king Agesilaus and his struggle for the freedom of

  Greek cities in Asia Minor. Xenophon contrasts hard, athletic, seasoned

  Greek fighters with feeble and unmanly Persians: ‘And again, believing

  that to feel contempt for one's enemies infuses a certain courage for the

  fight, Agesilaus gave orders to his heralds that the barbarians who were

  captured by the Greek raiding parties should be exposed for sale naked.

  Thus the soldiers, seeing that these men were white-skinned because they

  never were without their clothing, and soft and unused to toil because they

  always rode in carriages, came to the conclusion that the war with them

  would be in no way different from having to fight with women.’41

  These well written and popular boo
ks as well as the works of other

  anti-Persian authors, particularly Ephorus of Cyme – author of the first

  Greek universal history, which was later used as a source by Diodorus,

  Strabo, Plutarch and Pompeius Trogus – give the impression that the

  40 Parke 1933, pp. 105-112, 122-132, 165-169; Starr 1976, pp. 63-66; Ruzicka

  1993, pp. 85-91; Hornblower 1994, pp. 45-48; Burstein 2000; Brosius 2003, pp.

  170-171. One new book (Briant 2003) is largely devoted to the image of Darius III

  in historiographic tradition.

  41 H., HG, 3.4.19 in Brownson’s translation (Loeb). Momigliano 1975, pp. 129-

  137; Starr 1976, pp. 50-60; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 80-85; Tuplin 1996, pp. 153-162.

  The Heir to the Throne

  65

  Persian Empire was weak and the only forces of value were the Greek

  mercenaries. Xenophon relates what Antiochus of Arcadia, a envoy to the

  Persian court, said: ‘the King had bakers, and cooks, and wine-pourers,

  and door-keepers in vast numbers, but as for men who could fight with

  Greeks, he said that though he sought diligently he could not see any.’

  Nonetheless such views cannot be regarded as reflecting the true state of

  affairs but merely the Hellenocentric outlook of the authors, who regarded

  the polis to be the universal model for a proper state and a state’s military

  power to be measured by its ability to deploy a citizens’ army of hoplites.

  Yet the basic Persian military formation was the Iranian cavalry, whereas

  Greek mercenaries were only hired in the western part of the empire.

  Despite the large numbers of mercenaries employed, as many as 20,000

  soldiers in the 340s, they never formed independent armies realising Greek

  political aims. Instead they were merely a part of the Persian army,

  following the orders of the Great King and his satraps. These mercenaries

  were commanded by Persian or Greek officers, in return for whose loyal

  service the king would frequently grant them land and gradually

  incorporate them into the ruling aristocracy. Naturally the lack of a native

  infantry was a potential source of danger to the state, but only in the

  eventuality of the Great King no longer being able to recruit Greek

  mercenaries. As long as the market for mercenaries remained open, the

  recruitment of Greeks was not a sign of any weakness or decline but of

  Persian appreciation of the difference between Greek and Asian infantry.

  In antiquity infantry soldiers were drafted from the peasantry and those in

  the Asian part of the Persian Empire were too poor to be able to afford

  hoplite armour, they lacked the social models of how to behave like

  phalangites and, besides, serfs never made good recruitment material for

  such military formations. Therefore, on account of Persia’s social structure,

  the Great King could not use his Asian subjects to form large efficient

  infantry units and thus the drafting of Greek mercenaries was the simplest

  alternative. The only Persian infantry formation of military value, though

  also inferior to the Greek hoplites, was what the ancient authors call the

  ‘immortal’ guard. The name itself is actually yet another example of how

  little the ancient Greeks understood Persia. The Persian name for the guard

  was anušiya meaning servants or companions, whereas the Greeks

  confused the name with another Persian word anuša, which indeed means

  immortals. Thanks to the skilful use of Greek mercenaries, Iranian cavalry

  and a fleet provided by Greek and Phoenician cities, the rulers of Persia

  were for a long time able to successfully realise their foreign policy.42

  42 X., HG, 7.1.38, after Brownson (Loeb). See also Plb., 3.6.9-12 for the importance

  of Xenophon’s picture of Persia’s weakness. Hornblower 1994, pp. 80-83, 92;

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  Chapter II

  This fact, even though it was painfully felt by the Greeks, especially

  those living in Asia Minor, had no effect on the popularly held myth of

  contemptible Persian military ineptitude and low morale. The 4th-century

  Persian victories over the Greeks were explained simply by the lack of

  unity among Greek states. It is worth noting that in the 4th century,

  especially after 386 when the Persians regained full and, as it seemed,

  permanent control of Greek cities in Asia Minor, Greek political authors

  began treating compatriots living in that region as one political entity and

  it was then that calls for their liberation first appeared. Some scholars

  assume that many of the contemptuous opinions about Persians were

  inspired by Greeks living in Asia Minor, who were hoping for a new

  Greco-Persian war that would free them from the Great King. By

  emphasising the structural weakness of the Achaemenid Empire they

  wished to facilitate the decision of mainland Greeks to invade. Plutarch

  even names an associate of Plato, Delios of Ephesus, who was apparently

  sent as an envoy from Asia Minor to Alexander to persuade him to invade

  Persia and liberate the Greeks there.43 Unfortunately we do not know

  Plutarch’s source.

  The main theme in Greek political literature after the Peloponnesian

  War concerned a lack of political stability and constant conflicts, which no

  doubt reflected the mood among the Greek public. The remedy advocated

  by writers and orators was to unite the conflicting poleis with a common

  cause. It was at the start of the 4th century that the idea of Panhellenism

  first appeared in speeches given by the famous sophist Gorgias of Leontini

  and the Athenian rhetorician Lysias. This concept stressed that, despite

  their various differences, the Greeks had much more in common with each

  other than with barbarians. The most influential 4th-century propagator of

  Panhellenism was Isocrates. After years of unsuccessfully searching for a

  polis capable of uniting the Greeks, in 346 Isocrates decided that Philip II

  was the best suited ruler to become hegemon and tried to persuade Greek

  public opinion that this was the case. According to a plan that Isocrates

  had formulated most fully in several works ( Panegyricus, Philippus and

  letters he wrote to Philip II), the union of Greek states was to be built on a

  common cause to fight their arch enemy Persia. One of the things the

  Athenian author could not bear was the fact that, unlike his Greek

  compatriots, the barbarians in Asia were living in prosperity and their

  Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 90-92, Briant 1996, pp. 803-809. About mercenaries in

  general see now: Trundle 2004.

  43 Seager, Tuplin 1980; Flower 1994, p. 89; Hornblower 1994, p. 211. The

  embassy of Delios: Plu., mor. , 1126d; see Brunt 1993, p. 291; Flower 1994, p.107;

  Ruzicka 1997, pp. 124-125.

  The Heir to the Throne

  67

  economy was thriving. One could say that this conflicted with his sense of

  justice. Isocrates was not alone among the Greeks in thinking that they

  were created by nature to rule over barbarians like the Persians.

  Experiences of the great Persian wars in the 5th century served as evidence

  that by diverting its energies away from internal conflicts to overseas

  expansion a united Greece would ultimately defeat Persia. For Isocrates

  the key issue w
as to remedy Greek demographic and social problems

  without starting a revolution involving the redistribution of land and other

  actions that could harm the rich. Through the large-scale colonisation of

  conquered land in Asia, war with Persia was to be a painless way of

  alleviating Greece’s social tensions. Philip would be rewarded with wealth

  and fame as well as esteem among the Greek peoples. In keeping with the

  Greek literary tradition, Isocrates enhanced his arguments with references

  to mythology, which in J. Burchkhardt’s words, was the ideal basis of

  Greek existence. Isocrates argued that as the descendent of Heracles Philip

  was bound to conquer Asia and there found new cities. Finally it should be

  stressed that in Antiquity there was nothing unethical in conquering other

  countries for, quite unlike today, war was seen as a natural state of affairs,

  though of course prolonged conflicts were not considered a good thing.44

  Although Isocrates’s views are well known, the extent to which he and

  other Panhellenists influenced the decisions made by Philip II and later by

  Alexander remains highly controversial. Indeed, Isocrates does not overtly

  claim that Philip’s decision to invade Persia was made on his persuasion.

  The only fairly certain thing is that both the Greek elites and the general

  Greek public feared and disliked Persia. The Greek elites were people the

  Argead kings were very much in touch with and whose acceptance they on

  more than one occasion were eager to gain. Moreover, among the

  proponents of war with Persia were Aristotle and Callisthenes, who were

  very close to Philip and Alexander. The fact that Persia was indeed

  perceived as the arch enemy of Greece should lead us to rejecting the

  opinion that the Panhellenic idea of invading Persia was just a propaganda

  ploy or a mere marketing tool used by Isocrates to draw the attention of

  potential clients, especially Philip II, to his school. Sanctioned by the

  League of Corinth, Philip’s declaration of war against Persia had two

  official goals: to liberate the Greeks in Asia Minor and to avenge crimes

  committed by the Persians 150 years earlier, particularly the destruction of