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  influence in the Macedonian state. We know that Alexander rejected this

  advice, no doubt because he did not wish to offend the powerful adviser

  whose daughter he would have to consider less worthy of marriage. For

  the time being the young king preferred to keep rival parties at his court

  parties in balance.36

  36 Diod., 17.16; Arr., An. , 1.11.1. Baynham 1994, p. 334; Baynham 1998; Weber

  2009, p. 87.

  CHAPTER IV:

  FROM ABYDOS TO ALEXANDRIA

  1. Granicus – the first victory

  If we take into consideration the differences in human and material

  resources as well as the differences in territorial size between Macedonia

  and the Persian Empire, then Alexander’s expedition must be the most

  remarkable military feat in world history. It should also be remembered

  that in its 3,000-year history Iran has only been successfully attacked and

  conquered from the west twice: in the mid 7th century AD by the Arabs, at

  a time when Persia was severely weakened by total defeat in a war against

  the Eastern Roman Empire, and by Alexander, at a time when the

  Achaemenid Empire was actually experiencing a territorial and military

  revival. An ocean of ink has been spilled on a generally futile debate over

  Alexander’s real motives for taking on such an immensely powerful

  neighbour.1 As is usually the case, the state of the sources is to blame.

  Only Arrian writes about Alexander being driven by an overwhelming

  urge ( pothos). It is probable that Arrian had derived this notion from a

  source citing the exact words uttered by Alexander at key moments in his

  career. Therefore even if we do not accept the romantic image of

  Alexander constantly trying to achieve the seemingly impossible, we

  cannot entirely reject pothos as a factor. It was indeed a part of

  Macedonian culture to identify oneself with heroes from the past as well as

  the need to prove one’s worth in the eyes of one’s companions ( hetairoi)

  through feats that others had failed to achieve. Therefore this

  overwhelming urge to cross ever newer boundaries served to confirm that

  Alexander reigned supreme over everyone else in terms of areté

  (manliness/virtue). As the descendent of Heracles and Achilles, who in

  Antiquity were unquestioningly considered to be historic figures, and also

  as an avid reader of Homer, the young king was wont to measure his

  achievements on a heroic scale. That is why more than once in his career

  he tried not only to equal or outdo his contemporaries but also the deeds of

  1 Discussion related in Seibert 1998.

  110

  Chapter IV

  mythological figures.2 Of course modern historiography desires to find

  more rational motives for an undertaking as great as the conquest of the

  Achaemenid Empire, whose success, apart from the young king’s personal

  valour and ingenious army manoeuvres in the battlefield, would have

  required effective intelligence gathering and hard-headed logistical

  planning on a quite unprecedented scale.

  Meanwhile the sources tell us nothing about Alexander’s objectives

  and plans. We do not even know if at the start of the campaign he merely

  intended to realise his father’s limited aims, or whether from the outset he

  planned to conquer the entire Persian Empire. The fact that the sources are

  silent on these issues does not necessarily mean they are defective or

  written too long after the events they describe. Conversely, they could just

  as well be reflecting the actual situation, i.e. the lack of consideration of

  such matters in Alexander’s circle. Perhaps it is as W.W. Tarn put it that

  Alexander decided to conquer Persia because he never thought of not

  doing it. Decades before these events Plato had written3 that the natural

  state of politics was war. And indeed in the Greek world a state could

  always expect to be at war with its neighbours unless they were bound by

  a peace treaty, whereas such treaties were anyhow usually only valid for a

  limited period. If that was how the Greeks thought, then war would have

  been even more natural to the king of Macedonia, who was traditionally

  above all a tribal leader and only later a legislator, judge or administrator.

  Moreover, one cannot forget that Alexander had to do something with the

  immensely powerful and efficient but equally expensive war machine he

  had inherited from Philip II. The Macedonian king’s permanent revenues

  from the exploitation of forests, mines, including gold mines, customs

  duties and taxes were not enough to cover the cost of maintaining such an

  army. Besides, Philip II had left his son a legacy of glorious victories but

  an empty treasury. Even the booty taken from Illyria, Thrace and Thebes

  was soon spent. According to the sources, by the spring of 334 Alexander

  had only enough provisions to last his army for 30 days and 70 talents,

  which would have sufficed for no more than two weeks of his army’s pay.4

  Therefore if neither Macedonia’s permanent revenues nor her traditional

  2 Ehrenberg 1938, pp. 52-61; Brunt 1965; Goukowsky 1975, pp. 325-326; O’Brien

  1992, p. 50; Stewart 1993, pp. 78-88; Austin 2003, pp. 121-123.

  3 Tarn 1948, p. 8; Pl., Lg. , 625e.

  4 Duris and Phylarchus after Chares, Aristobulus and Onesicritus – all quoted in:

  Plu., Alex. , 15.2; Plu., mor. , 327d-e, 342d. Badian 1985, p. 423; Ashley 1998, pp.

  187-189; Hamilton 1999, pp. 36-37; Le Rider 2003, pp. 39-40; Nawotka 2003, pp.

  36, 91; Austin 2003, pp. 122-124; Thomas 2007, pp. 59-61, 141-142 on

  Macedonian monarchy.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  111

  plundering zones in the Balkans were enough to maintain such a huge

  army, Alexander was left with the options of either demobilising this army

  or invading Asia. As has been soberly noted by Seibert, although the first

  option could have theoretically refilled the royal coffers within one or two

  years, it is highly unlikely that this would have been a practical solution if

  only on account of the fact that since his ascension to the throne Alexander

  had had to fight for his political existence and was only victorious thanks

  to the very army he had inherited from Philip.5 From the ideological point

  of view, Alexander’s plans were supported by the mission of the follower

  of Plato, Delios of Ephesus, who had been sent by some Greeks of Asia

  Minor to urge for a war of liberation against their Persian oppressors.6

  The decision to wage war was made and in the early spring of 334,

  most probably in March, the Macedonian army began its trek to the East.

  The soldiers were personally commanded by Alexander. The administration

  of Macedonia and control of Greece and the Balkans was handed over to

  the tried and trusted Antipater, who was also left with 12,000 infantry and

  1,500 cavalry. The sources give various figures for Alexander’s army at

  the start of the expedition. Citing after Callisthenes, Polybius states that

  Alexander landed in Asia with 40,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry. Arrian

  claims there were 30,000 infantry and over 5,000 cavalry, whereas Justin

  states there were 32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry. The most detailed


  information regarding Alexander’s army is provided by Diodorus. He

  mentions 32,000 infantry, 12,000 of whom were Macedonians, 7,000 allies

  (Corinthian League), 5,000 mercenaries, 7,000 soldiers from Odrysian,

  Triballian and Illyrian tribes as well as 1,000 Agrianians and archers. The

  cavalry was to include 5,100 horsemen: 1,800 Macedonians, 1,800

  Thessalians, 600 from the League of Corinth and 900 riders from Thrace

  and Paionia. Plutarch, known as having examined the largest number of no

  longer extant sources, does not give a detailed breakdown of the numbers

  of troops included but does state that the lowest figure for Alexander’s

  army was 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, whereas the highest figure

  was 43,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry. Both these assessments came from

  authors who were Alexander’s contemporaries – Ptolemy and Anaximenes

  of Lampsacus. None of these figures is so great as to be rejected as a

  rhetorical exaggeration, which ancient authors indeed frequently used

  when relating the size of armies or of battle losses. Only the much later

  Itinerarium Alexandri stands out by stating that there were 5,000 cavalry

  and only 10,000 infantry, though even here the infantry figure is given

  only in reference to Alexander’s ‘own soldiers’ and therefore in all

  5 Seibert 1998, p. 55; but see Wirth 1971, pp. 139-142.

  6 Plu., mor. , 1126d; see above n. 43 to chapter II.

  112

  Chapter IV

  probability Macedonians. Perhaps the different numbers given for

  Alexander’s army arises from the particular moment the sources relate

  them. The lower number could refer to the size of Alexander’s army that

  left Macedonia, whereas the higher number could refer to Alexander’s

  army after the expeditionary corps of 336 joined it at Abydos. If that was

  the case, we can estimate the overall number of Alexander’s most essential

  infantry, i.e. the phalanx, to be c. 15,000. Wishing to illustrate Alexander’s

  heroic and generous nature, Plutarch relates the following anecdote: on

  leaving Macedonia the young king reportedly distributed among his

  friends all his royal possessions, and when asked what he would keep for

  himself, he replied ‘hope’. Despite its romanticism, this story seems to be

  at least partly confirmed in an inscription at Calindoea in Mygdonia in the

  north of the Chalcidice Peninsula stating that Alexander had granted

  individual Macedonians land there. Of course this does not imply that he

  gave away all his property for in Macedonia’s later history royal lands

  certainly existed. It is, however, very plausible that he simply left some of

  his property as a deposit against loans he had acquired for the military

  campaign; Alexander had apparently raise 800 talents that way.7

  Alexander was accompanied on his expedition to Asia by Thracian

  princes. They were invited to do so in order to give the impression that this

  was a privilege, but in reality they were also hostages ensuring that there

  subjects and fellow tribesmen would not dare to rise. Historians believe

  that this was also the purpose of taking the League of Corinth contingent.

  This contingent was small, especially if we consider that Justin claims the

  League of Corinth was able to muster 200,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry,

  but that does not appear to have mattered to Alexander. We do not see him

  using this contingent in any important actions in battles, more often than

  not the king entrusted it garrison duties – a necessary task but one of

  secondary importance. Some scholars presume that the Greek states

  dispatched only such soldiers they were glad to see the back of. Regardless

  of that, it would be difficult to see great cohesion and military value in a

  contingent of 7,000 hoplites from dozens of different poleis who had never

  been on the same battlefield before, at least not on the same side.

  Moreover, one has to remember that there were many Greek mercenaries

  in the Persian ranks whom Corinthian League soldiers would not have

  7 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F35 (= Plb., 12.19.1); Diod., 17.17.3-5; Arr., An. , 1.11, 7.9.6; Plu., Alex. , 15.1-6; Plu., mor. , 327d-e; Just., 11.6; It. Alex. , 17-18; Fron., Str. , 4.2.4. Milns 1966, p. 167; Hamilton 1974, p. 53; Hamilton 1999, pp. 36-37; Green

  1974, pp. 155-156; Dąbrowa 1988, p. 33; Bosworth 1988, pp. 259-260; Le Rider

  2003, pp. 46-47; Worthington 2004, p. 48. Inscription of Calindoea: SEG 36.626;

  see Errington 1998, pp. 79-82.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  113

  been eager to fight. It is also characteristic that of the mighty Athenian

  fleet said to comprise as many as 400 triremes, only 20 ships were sent to

  Asia and there is no mention of their making any significant contribution

  to the campaign. The above comments could most certainly not be said

  about the Thessalian contingent. Their cavalry was in no way inferior to

  that of the Macedonians and in battles it played an equally important role.8

  The Macedonian army marched alongside Lake Kerkini, crossed the

  River Strymon at Amphipolis and then marched to the south of the

  Pangaion Mountains via Abdera and Maroneia, crossed the river Hebros

  (Maritza), passed the city of Pactya and crossed the river Melas at the foot

  of the Thracian Chersonese (Gallipoli) to finally reach Sestus on the

  Hellespont. Olympias escorted Alexander for the start of the journey up to

  Amphipolis, where they parted company and she saw her son no more.

  The whole route from Macedonia to the Hellespont was approximately

  500 km long and it took Alexander’s army 20 days to cover. The choice of

  route was no doubt simply dictated by the road condition and the terrain,

  but it is also worth noting that it was with slogans of vengeance for

  Persian sacrilege in Greece that the campaign was started and now

  Alexander was retracing in the reverse order the route taken by the great

  army of Xerxes in 480.9

  As today, in ancient times the Hellespont was considered to be the

  border between Europe and Asia. The symbolic significance of this strait

  is presented in Book vii of Herodotus’s The Histories, where he describes

  the great Persian army crossing the Hellespont on a pontoon bridge

  straddling two continents as well as the speeches, sacrifices and prayers

  that accompanied this momentous event. Regardless of the historical

  veracity of this image, it did function in the collective memory of the

  Greeks as a symbol of Persian might but also of something that displeased

  the gods, namely Xerxes’ excessive pride or hubris in building a bridge

  across two continents and thus overreaching the boundaries of what was

  permissible to mere mortals. The Greeks knew that it was indeed his

  hubris that sealed the ultimate fate of that entire expedition. Therefore it is

  unsurprising that at the start of this campaign to avenge crimes committed

  by Xerxes Alexander alluded not only to his expedition but also to the

  very first pan-Hellenic campaign: the Trojan War, which in Alexander’s

  time was not considered to be a mere work of fiction but a genuine

  historical fact and actually the very beginning of Greek history. It was also

  8 Fron., Str. , 2.11.3; Just., 9.5,
11.5. Bosworth 1988, pp. 264-266; Heckel 1997, p.

  191.

  9 Arr., An. , 1.11.5; It. Alex. , 18. Engels 1978, pp. 26-29; Bosworth 1988, p. 38; Brosius 2003a, p. 228.

  114

  Chapter IV

  in association with the Trojan War that in 396 the Spartan king Agesilaus

  began his expedition into Asia Minor to liberate Greek cities by offering

  sacrifices at Aulis as Agamemnon had done before his expedition.

  Therefore there was already an established symbolism associated with

  political enterprises of the type that was undertaken in the early spring of

  334. Before he crossed the Hellespont, Alexander headed for Elaius on the

  southern end of Chersonese to offer sacrifices to Protesilaos, the first

  Greek warrior of the Trojan expedition to set foot in Asia and be killed.

  Arrian relates that the sacrifices were made with an intention that this

  expedition would be more providential than that of Protesilaos. The visit to

  this Greek warrior’s sanctuary linked the symbolism of the Trojan War

  with the need to avenge the crimes committed by Xerxes. In 480 this was

  the first Greek religious edifice in Europe to be destroyed by the Persians,

  and indeed it was for the sacrilegious destruction of shrines that Alexander

  was now intending to punish Persia. The emphasis on Panhellenic

  symbolism was particularly important on account of the fact that

  Macedonian leadership had so recently been questioned by Thebes. The

  visit to Elaius and other religiously symbolic gestures cost the entire

  expedition time. It has been estimated that the excursions to sanctuaries

  Alexander made at the start of the expedition added 70 km to the route. In

  other words, they must have delayed the army’s progress by several days

  although speed was such a high priority for the Macedonian king. This

  illustrates just how important it was for Alexander to gain the favour of the

  gods in what was much more than merely a logistical and strategic

  undertaking.10

 

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