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  land, which, like the properties of his brother Mentor, was presumably

  situated in the Troad on the former estates ( peraia) of Chios and Mytilene.

  This and the failure to give Memnon command of the infantry can only

  confirm the claim in the sources that the satraps were jealous of him. Some

  historians also suppose that the satraps wished to defeat Alexander with

  the Iranian cavalry to in a sense compensate for the defeat of the earlier

  Macedonian expedition by the Greek infantry. P. Briant also points to an

  important aspect of Persian culture that prohibited them from accepting

  scorched earth tactics. It was a fundamental part of Achaemenid ideology

  that the Great King and his representatives, the satraps, were duty bound to

  protect royal subjects. It was indeed this duty that gave the state the moral

  right to demand tributes and other services from the people. Memnon’s

  suggestion contravened this important principle and therefore if only for

  this reason the satraps could not accept it.20 Thus the decisions fell and

  now all there was left to do was fight the battle.

  The Granicus is now known as the Kocabaş Çay, which in its lower

  reaches up to the Marmara Sea is called Biga Çay. It was along this stretch

  of the river to the north of a tributary (today called Koça Çayi) that the

  battle was fought. On a 5 km long section from Koça Çayi to the Iğel

  trench, confined by marshes in the north, there is a stretch of flat terrain

  that was very suitable for cavalry. The ancient authors present Granicus as

  a large river with a strong current and steep banks that made it difficult to

  cross: ‘for one can see that many parts of it are deep; its banks, as you see,

  are very high, sometimes like cliffs,’ ‘but most of his army were afraid of

  the depth of the river, and of the roughness and unevenness of the farther

  bank, up which they would have to climb while fighting,’ and ‘precipitous

  positions covered with infantry and cavalry, and through a stream that

  swept men off their feet and surged about them’. Today the Kocabaş Çay

  (Granicus) has a channel 15-25 metres wide, whereas in May, the month

  the battle is said to have taken place, the river is no more than 5-7 metres

  wide, half a meter deep, and flows slowly. The eastern bank, which was

  occupied by the Persians, is higher than the western bank, but both sides

  20 Diod., 17.18.2-3; Arr., An. , 1.12.9; Polyaen., 4.3.15. Engels 1978, pp. 18-22;

  Briant 1980, pp. 43-45; Briant 1996, pp. 841-842; Seibert 1985, p. 37; McCoy

  1989, pp. 428-430; Wirth 1989, p. 16; Heckel 1997, p. 195; Ashley 1998, pp. 187-

  190; Debord 1999, pp. 434-435.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  121

  could be crossed by the cavalry. However, if the infantry tried to cross, the

  phalanx line would undoubtedly have been broken and the resulting

  confusion would not have rendered its attack effective.21

  We have three major accounts of the battle, of: Arrian, Diodorus and

  Plutarch. Their rhetoric is somewhat confusing and the accounts also differ

  from each other with regard to certain details, such as the time of the day

  the battle was fought. All the authors agree that the Macedonian army

  reached the Granicus in the afternoon, but there are two versions of what

  happened next. According to Diodorus the Macedonians set up camp and

  attacked the Persians at dawn the next day. According to Arrian and

  Plutarch the Macedonians attacked immediately, and this was possible

  because on their way to the river they were already marching in battle

  formation. Both Arrian and Plutarch also mention a council held by the

  Macedonian commanders. According to Arrian, Parmenion advised

  Alexander to postpone the attack until dawn the following day assuming

  that the much inferior Persian infantry would not dare spend the night near

  the river and that at daybreak it would be easy to cross. In response

  Alexander is said to have uttered one of his famous sentences: ‘I should

  feel it a disgrace if, after crossing the Hellespont so easily, this small

  stream… should bar our way for a moment.’ Ancient authors more than

  once relate disputes between Alexander and Parmenion regarding not only

  military tactics but also the strategy of the entire war. In these accounts a

  careful Parmenion weighing up the pros and cons of each possible move is

  contrasted with a young and impatient Alexander eager to achieve great

  things. In these confrontations, befitting his literary persona, Alexander

  not only always wins the battle of words but is also always successful in

  victoriously realising the very plans the old general advised him against.

  Such accounts are therefore a literary topos, which makes it virtually

  impossible to conduct historical analysis if we cannot even establish

  whether such discussions between the Macedonians ever took place. This

  topos was probably started in Callisthenes’ book, where Parmenion was

  presented as foil to enhance Alexander’s glory. In the case of Granicus,

  delaying the battle would have given the weaker Persians an opportunity

  to escape; whereas Alexander’s determination to march swiftly shows that

  he wanted a confrontation as soon as possible. Moreover the king’s option

  of attacking in the second part of the day was logical as it meant that the

  Persians would have to fight with the sun in the eyes, whereas in the

  morning the Macedonians would have been facing the sun in the east. The

  21 Arr., An. , 1.13.4; Plu., Alex. , 16.2, 16.4. Topography of the battlefield: Janke 1904, pp. 126-135; Nikolaitis 1974; Foss 1973; Harl 1997, p. 304; Sabin 2007, p.

  129.

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  Chapter IV

  experienced Parmenion would have known that too. Therefore in all

  probability the Macedonian army attacked at the first available opportunity:

  in the afternoon the same day the army reached the banks of the river

  Granicus.22

  The Persian cavalry was positioned along the entire section of the

  river’s eastern bank, whereas the Persian infantry was stationed on slightly

  higher ground a certain distance behind the cavalry. Such a positioning of

  the Persian army has been frequently criticised by modern historians as it

  did not allow the Persian cavalry to gather enough momentum to make full

  use of the force of its charge. It is obvious that the cavalry needed some

  distance from the river bank to do this. However, the fact of the matter was

  that the Persian cavalry tactic at the time was not to charge at the enemy in

  tight formation with lances – this was only first tried against Alexander’s

  army at Issus. An earlier tactic, still used at Granicus, was to approach the

  enemy and thrown javelins at it, so as to disrupt the advancing battle

  formations. Only then did they start to attack with curved swords. In the

  escalating confusion the fast and well trained Persian horsemen usually

  gained the upper hand. And that must have been what the Persians hoped

  would happen on this occasion. Alexander traditionally commanded the

  right wing together with the companion cavalry, whereas the left wing was

  entrusted to Parmenion, who had the Thessalian cavalry and the Greek

&
nbsp; allies under his command. The first unit to attack was composed of scouts

  armed with sarissai, Paionians and one ile (squadron) of hetairoi all

  commanded by Amyntas, the son of Arrhabaeus. The Persians in turn had

  concentrated their best forces on their left wing – this was where we are

  told the satraps Arsamenes (or Arsames) of Cilicia, Spithridates of Lydia

  and Ionia and Arsites himself were positioned. The commander of the

  Cappadocian cavalry, Mithrobuzanes, was also probably a satrap.

  According to Arrian the Persians had spotted Alexander in his magnificent

  armour and wished to resolve the battle by clashing with him directly. Of

  course this was also what Alexander wanted to achieve, and this feudal

  code of conduct respected by aristocrats on both sides would ultimately

  work to his advantage.23

  Amyntas’ detachment was attacked as it tried to ascend the eastern

  bank. First Persians threw javelins at the Macedonians and then advanced

  towards the enemy, thus descending the bank and entering the river. That

  was without doubt exactly what Alexander wanted to happen for he

  22 Diod., 17.19.3 (similar in It. Alex. , 20); Plu., Alex. , 16.2-3; Arr., An. , 1.13.2-7.

  Badian 1977, pp. 271-277; Bosworth 1988, p. 41; Ashley 1998, pp. 191-192.

  23 Diod., 17.19; Arr., An. , 1.14. Badian 1977, pp. 277-287; Harl 1997, pp. 306-313;

  Debord 1999, pp. 430-431.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  123

  immediately attacked the Persians in the river channel, where they no

  longer had the advantage of holding the high ground. The Macedonians

  were better armed than the Persians, especially as they had longer spears

  which were especially important in the first moment impact. The

  ferociously attacking Companion cavalry personally led by Alexander

  gradually pushed the Persians back up the eastern bank until both sides

  were out on land above the river channel. Alexander himself was the focal

  point of the entire battle, personally fighting many duels with Persian

  aristocrats desperately trying to kill him. Alexander’s spear broke at the

  very start of the clash but one of the hetairoi, Demaratus, gave him his

  own. It was then that Mithridates, Darius III’s son-in-law, attacked

  Alexander but was instantly killed with the sarissa spearhead thrust into

  his face. Hereupon Rhoesaces, Spithridates’ brother, struck Alexander on

  the head, crushing his helmet and possibly wounding him. Despite this, the

  Macedonian king managed to kill the assailant with his spear. Meanwhile

  Spithridates had raised his sword and was poised to strike down on

  Alexander. Now it was Cleitus who managed to forestall the disaster by

  hacking off the Persian’s arm at the shoulder. Alexander and those

  Macedonians around him were also attacked by another group of Persian

  aristocrats, courtiers and relatives of the Great King, among them

  Pharnaces, the brother-in-law of Darius III, and Mithrobuzanes. Meanwhile

  the battle was also being fought on the Macedonians’ left flank, but we

  know virtually nothing about it apart from the fact that the Thessalian

  cavalry distinguished themselves with superior riding skills and

  manoeuvres. One can assume that when the Macedonian companion

  cavalry defeated the elite cavalry squadron of Persian aristocrats, the rest

  of the Persian cavalry fell into disarray and fled. But Alexander quickly

  halted the chase to unite the Macedonian cavalry with the phalanx, who in

  the meantime had crossed the Granicus. Now together they attacked the

  Persian infantry. The local detachments immediately fled, whereas the

  Greek mercenaries tried to negotiate terms for capitulation. But Alexander

  refused to negotiate and instead personally led the attack. The fighting was

  vicious though probably not as spectacular as in the earlier phase of the

  battle. Alexander’s horse was killed and most of the Macedonian

  casualties were incurred in this particular clash. Of course the vast

  numerical superiority of the Macedonians meant that the outcome was a

  foregone conclusion. Despite a valiant effort, the Greek mercenaries were

  defeated, with 2,000 of them taken captive. Alexander decided to make an

  example of these prisoners by punishing them harshly: they were cast in

  chains and shipped off to Macedonia as slaves. In doing so he was

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  Chapter IV

  fulfilling the mandate of the League of Corinth which prohibited all

  Greeks from militarily serving Persia.24

  The Battle of Granicus was a decisive Macedonian victory. Here

  Alexander displayed attributes as a military commander that would also

  serve him well in other battles: an ability to assess the terrain and select

  the most advantageous place to attack the enemy, an understanding of

  when to attack and a strong faith in his own abilities as well as those of his

  soldiers. Added to this was Alexander’s reckless courage. He would risk

  his life without considering the dramatic consequences his death, without a

  nominated successor, would have to Macedonia.25 There is considerable

  divergence in claims of how many soldiers were killed on either side. On

  the Macedonian side figures vary from 34 (according to Plutarch, who

  derived these figures from Aristobulus) to 129 (Justin). The Persians were

  to have lost from 1,000 (Arrian) to 2,500 (Plutarch) cavalry and between

  over 10,000 (Diodorus) and 20,000 (Plutarch) infantry. Of course one has

  to bear in mind that ancient authors would minimise the number of those

  killed on whichever side they considered ‘theirs’ and exaggerate the

  enemy losses. Thus only Justin’s figure for the number of Macedonians

  killed seems in any way plausible, especially when we consider that as

  many as 25 hetairoi fell and therefore losses among the less well trained

  and equipped soldiers must have been proportionally higher. There can be

  little doubt that the Persian losses were indeed high for Alexander was

  wont to chase and destroy the defeated enemy, so that it could not regroup

  and fight again. Many distinguished Persian aristocrats were also killed,

  fighting courageously in the most difficult section of the battle against

  Alexander and his Companions. The Persian commander-in-chief, Arsites,

  managed to escape from the battlefield but, blaming himself for the defeat,

  soon afterwards committed suicide. Alexander now undertook every

  measure to gain from this military victory as much political and

  propaganda capital as possible. He ensured that his wounded soldiers were

  cared for and personally visited them. The families of those killed were

  exempted from taxation. Alexander honoured the memory of the 25 fallen

  hetairoi with bronze statues at Dion, the commission for which was given

  to Lysippus, the greatest sculptor of the era. Of what was plundered from

  the Persians Alexander sent to Athens 300 complete sets of armour as a

  votive offering to the goddess Athena with the inscription ‘Alexander the

  son of Philip and all the Greeks except the Lacedaemonians from the

  24 Diod., 17.19-21; Arr., An. , 1.15-16; Plu., Alex. , 16.3-14; Plu., mor. , 326f-327a; P.Hamb. 652; It. Alex. , 21-23. Badian 1977, pp. 287-291; Bosworth 1988, pp. 42-43
; Harl 1997, pp. 313-324.

  25 Badian 1977, p. 293; Bosworth 1988, pp. 42-43.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  125

  Barbarians who dwell in Asia’. Thus at the Acropolis, whose temples had

  been desecrated by Xerxes 146 years earlier, there was now visible

  evidence that Alexander was realising the Panhellenic vendetta. It is also

  possible that there was irony in Alexander’s gesture, because among those

  captured at Granicus and sent in chains as slaves to Macedonia there could

  have been many Athenians – though probably not majority as claimed in

  Itinerarium Alexandri. Their release from captivity was for a long time an

  object of Athenian diplomatic efforts. 26 The purple gowns, precious

  utensils and other valuable items found in the Persian camp now became

  the victor’s property. These things Alexander sent as a gift to his mother,

  which she most probably next submitted as expensive offerings at

  Delphi.27

  A direct consequence of the Battle of Granicus was the capture of

  Daskyleion, the capital of Hellespontine Phrygia, which surrendered to

  Parmenion without putting up resistance. Alexander nominated the

  Macedonian Calas his satrap in Phrygia and stipulated that the amount of

  tributes collected was to be the same as it had been under Persian rule.

  These first administrative decisions to be made on conquered land became

  guidelines to be applied – with only a few exceptions, discussed later – in

  all lands subsequently acquired by Alexander during his campaign: as an

  heir of the Achaemenids Alexander took over their territories without

  changing the established administrative and financial systems. Insofar as

  we are able to judge on the basis of very imperfect numismatic evidence, it

  was indeed as an Achaemenid successor that Alexander was perceived by

  the Greeks of Asia Minor for he appears in satrap attire on coins

  autonomously issued by some of their cities.28

  2. Freedom for Greeks of Asia

  The main Macedonian force commanded by Alexander now headed for

  Sardis. The sources do not specify which route the army took other than

 

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