by Amanda
felt it important to have unwritten laws that were only fully known to the
initiated ruling elite. Conversely, democracies in many cases even forbade
the use of laws that had not been published in writing and therefore indeed
followed principles that also apply to modern states today. It is fortunate
that at least some inscriptions in stone of the resolutions passed by ancient
Greek democracies have survived to this day. However, this is only a
small fraction of evidence giving us merely a tiny glimpse into the
histories of numerous poleis; such local histories were of only minor and
sporadic interest to the ancient authors. Although most of the ancient
inscriptions are gone, the numbers that have survived from particular
poleis may be assumed to be statistically proportionate to the original
numbers. The association of the number of inscriptions a polis produced
with the type of government it had is very well illustrated in the states of
continental Greece. That is why we have approximately 1,400 decrees
from democratic Athens and only a few similar documents from very large
but oligarchic poleis such as Sparta, Thebes or Corinth. More significantly,
in the history of Athens alone we can trace that many more inscriptions
were produced in periods of democratic rule than in its periods of
oligarchic rule.
The same principle of associating the number of public inscriptions –
decrees of the council and people – with the type of government may be
applied to the poleis of 4th-century Asia Minor. The inscriptions of about
half of the 60 or so ancient poleis of Ionia, Aeolis and Caria have survived
to this day. Although taking into account the problems with the exact
dating of Greek inscriptions, one can say that in the years 334-301 three
times more public documents were produced in this region than in years
400-335 preceding Alexander’s expedition. Thus the average annual
number of decrees passed rose six fold after Alexander’s arrival in relation
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to the average year before his arrival. The trend is most noticeable in large
cities producing a proportionately large number of inscriptions. The most
striking example is Ephesus, where from the entire 4th century up to
Alexander the city’s popular assembly left behind just one extant
inscription, whereas for the last third of the century as many as 44. Both
their large number as well as the evidence of working of the legislative
process at the time show that this was a vibrant and active democracy.
This indeed also confirms the image of Ephesus presented by the ancient
authors, especially Arrian, of a city whose population predominantly
opposed its oligarchic government, which had to basically rely on the
support of the Persian garrison.
There are other examples that can be shown but it is more important to
see the general picture of political changes within the Greek poleis of Asia
Minor in 334 as transpires from extant epigraphic sources. In Ionia, Aeolis
and the Greek cities of the Carian coast the arrival of the Macedonian
army was followed by a legislative explosion, which is a typical sign of
democratic government. Not all the poleis under Persian rule were ruled
by oligarchies, but even those that did manage to preserve their democratic
systems became much more active and radical after Alexander’s arrival.
An example of such democratic revitalisation and a greater opening up of
public initiative is Iasus in Caria, which in 334 was liberated from the
restrictions imposed upon it by its Hecatomnid rulers. In Alexander’s time
we have not only an active assembly but even evidence of assembly pay
( ekklesiastikon) being paid to enable participation of even the poorest
citizens without their having to suffer financial loses. In Greek political
theory assembly pay was an aspect of the most radical type of democracy
and its appearance in Asia Minor at that time is a measure of how deep the
political changes were after Alexander’s arrival. The decision to topple
oligarchies and establish democracies in Ionia, Aeolis and Caria had
fundamental and far-reaching consequences. Whereas up to Alexander’s
reign oligarchies and democracies had been considered equally legitimate
forms of government, the Hellenistic era saw the decided predominance of
democratic systems of government in the Greek world. Though
Alexander’s decisions were not the only reason for this change, they did
contribute to the triumph of democracy.
Fortunately, to this day we have an extensive fragment of inscribed
text from Alexander’s address to the Ionian city of Priene which sheds
light on another two important issues concerning the status of poleis in
Ionia, Aeolis and Caria: the control of rural territories and state finances.
After his victory at Granicus Alexander considered himself the rightful
successor of the Achaemenids and therefore he felt authorised, as is
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133
recorded in this inscription, to carefully delimitate royal territories from
those belonging to Priene. Only the inhabitants of the former were obliged
to pay tributes ( phoros), whereas the inhabitants of the rural areas
belonging to Priene as well as the inhabitants of the city itself were not.
This confirms the abovementioned passage from Arrian stating that
Alexander freed the Greek poleis from the paying of tributes. Unlike other
Greek states in the region, Priene was also relieved from having to pay
contributions ( syntaxis) for the war against Persia, most probably on
account of it taking on other military obligations. To many historians the
difference between tribute ( phoros) and contribution ( syntaxis) seems to
be no more than in the way they sound. To them the latter was simply the
same tax with a nicer name but nonetheless going to a ruler who decided
everything. However, 4th-century Greeks had a very different opinion on
the subject and in all known documents from the period the two forms of
taxation were carefully distinguished. We know that the poleis of Asia
Minor made individual alliances with Alexander through treaties and
although we do not know their content, we can assume that they formed
the basis for collecting syntaxis. One needs to remember that to most of
these cities the war against Persia was one of liberation. Insofar as we are
able to discern, only the oligarchies, which relied on Persian support to
remain in power, thought differently. Therefore the collecting of
contributions, like in other military alliances, was something quite obvious.
Priene, some of the island poleis as well as some of the Asian mainland
Greek states provided soldiers and ships for the war effort and therefore
did not have to pay contributions. It is probable that Alexander collected
syntaxis up until 330, that is, while he was still fighting the war with the
Corinthian League’s mandate. Although the level of contributions was
probably similar to that of the tributes, at least some of the poleis soon
began to feel the financial benefits of the political change for now their
&nb
sp; territories were integrated with the landed properties of Iranian aristocrats
and that meant a broader tax base for the city’s treasury.
These facts should not, however, be used to paint an idealised picture
of Alexander in 334 being the altruistic liberator of Asia Minor willingly
supported by the region’s poleis. The examples of Miletus and Aspendus
as well as of Tyre beyond the Greek zone (see Chapter IV.5) show that in
the war between Alexander and Darius III there was no option of
remaining neutral. In those days neutrality was a privilege of only very
powerful states or ones of such marginal importance that the belligerent
powers saw no need to have them on their side. Some of the poleis in Asia
Minor joined Alexander’s side of their own free will. The Macedonian
king offered alliances with all states in Ionia, Aeolis and Caria that
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guaranteed independent rule and even the running of independent foreign
policies, though of course not as far as the war against the Great King was
concerned. Inscriptions show that after 334 the poleis of Asia Minor were
sending out ambassadors and signing treaties with other states, even those
beyond Alexander’s sphere of influence. They also acquired the support of
influential foreigners by granting them citizenship and official rewards for
services rendered. In other words, they had their own foreign policies like
normal Greek states.
As usual we can only make assumptions as to what Alexander’s true
intentions were. Purely military considerations were without doubt of
considerable importance. Despite his victory at Granicus, Alexander was
still in a much weaker position than the powerful Persian Empire and he
needed allies. The poleis of Asia Minor, which ten years earlier had
supplied Artaxerxes III with 6,000 hoplites for his Egypt expedition,
possessed considerable military potential. The experiences of Ephesus,
Miletus and the island states show that Macedonian or Persian garrisons,
generally composed of small Greek mercenary units, could only function
with the support of the citizens. The hostile stance of the Ephesians made
the city’s mercenary garrison flee, whereas the public support for the
oligarchy at Miletus allowed it to fight the Macedonians. Moreover many
poleis in Asia Minor were surrounded by defensive walls and were
therefore mighty fortresses. Alexander did indeed have siege engines that
made it possible to capture any of these cities individually, but he lacked
the time and means to make laying siege to all of them feasible. By
winning the cities over to his side Alexander avoided the necessity of
expensive and time consuming sieges. One must also not forget the
ideological aspect. The war against Persia was started under the slogan of
liberating the Greeks of Asia Minor. Therefore at the very start of his
campaign Alexander had to convincingly liberate some of these cities to
remain credible in the Greek world. With the perspective of time we can
clearly see that this positive image was indeed the one Greeks of Asia
Minor saw in him. For centuries later Alexander was still recognised in
their collective memories as a benefactor and liberator. Some cities even
worshipped him as a god.
Alexander also gained the support of adjacent islands. Some had taken
Philip’s side during Parmenion’s offensive and even joined the League of
Corinth. However, once Memnon’s counteroffensive started proving to be
successful, most switched back to the Persian side. After Granicus the
situation changed yet again and the supporters of Macedonia returned to
power. The best illustration of this an inscription from Chios which
contains an edict issued by Alexander in 334 to settle affairs after yet
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135
another political change. In this document Alexander appears as the
hegemon of the League of Corinth. As such he orders the return to Chios
of the pro-Macedonian exiles and for their political opponents to be
brought before the League’s court to be tried for treasonable collaboration
with the Persians. Moreover, he calls together a college of legislators to
write a democratic constitution for the polis. This may have been a
violation of the Corinth resolutions, which forbade the imposition of
constitutional changes, but it certainly suited Alexander’s Asia Minor
policy of relying on democracies in Greek states. Finally Chios, along with
other island poleis, was obliged to contribute to the war effort. In its case it
provided 20 triremes, that is, as many as the mighty Athens.36
Alexander most certainly did not rest his further military plans solely
on political declarations, even if they were as far-reaching as the restoring
of liberty to the Greek cities of Ionia and Caria. Having fulfilled his
religious obligations at Ephesus, he set off with the rest of his army to
Miletus. It was to this city that some of those defeated at Granicus had fled,
including for a time Memnon, before he moved on to Halicarnassus.
Hegesistratus, the commander of the Greek mercenary garrison serving the
Persians at Miletus, sent letters to Alexander expressing his willingness to
capitulate. No doubt he was under the impression of Macedonian
successes in other parts of western Asia Minor. Yet in the meantime the
Persian side had started preparing its revenge for these early defeats. The
Great King had appointed the tried, tested and trusted Greek military
leader Memnon commander-in-chief of his land army and navy in that part
of Asia Minor. Now a huge Persian armada comprising 400 ships provided
by Phoenician, Cypriot and Greek cities still under Persian rule sailed
towards Miletus. Expecting this relief to arrive in time, Hegesistratus
changed his mind and decided to defend the city after all. However, a
much smaller fleet of 160 ships commanded by Alexander’s admiral
Nicanor managed to precede the Persian fleet by three days. Despite its
numerical inferiority, this fleet was able to take up an advantageous
position in the Miletus roadstead by the island of Lade, which could now
be defended by a formidable crew of Thracians and 4,000 other
mercenaries. When the Persian fleet eventually arrived it was forced to
moor near the Mycale peninsula, some 15 km from Miletus. All it could
now do was to try and entice the enemy into battle out in the open sea.
According to Arrian’s here somewhat implausible account, the usually
cautious Parmenion was also supposed to advise Alexander to do so, but
Alexander sensibly rejected this idea on account of the quantitative and
36 Syll. 3 283. Heisserer 1980, pp. 79-95.
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Chapter IV
qualitative superiority of the enemy’s fleet, being as it was manned by
more experienced crews. Alexander forbade his men to respond to the
Persian fleet’s daily provocations. Instead he had his troops guard the
mouth of the river Maeander, from where the Persian sailors had been
taking drinking water. Henceforth the Persians had to sail to their base at
Samos for their daily supplies of food and
water, which further hindered
their freedom to manoeuvre around Miletus.37
Miletus was situated on the tip of a peninsula, 2 km long and 1 km
wide, jutting out northwards into the sea. The city, even if smaller than in
Hellenistic and Roman times, was surrounded by strong walls. Outside
there was a weakly fortified settlement (so-called external town) situated
most probably on Kalabak-Tepe hill, where the centre of old Miletus had
been in Archaic times. It was taken over by Alexander’s troops without
resistance. For two days the Macedonians tried, unsuccessfully, to breach
the main city’s walls and finally Alexander ordered siege engines to be
brought up. This development, together with the effective see blockade,
changed the mood within the city. Now Glaucippus, the leader or one of
the leaders of the local oligarchy speaking on behalf of the citizens and the
Greek mercenaries, put forward an offer to Alexander: the city would
remain neutral and the port would be open to both sides of the conflict.
Alexander responded by instructing Glaucippus to tell the Milesians to
prepare for battle because the city was to be stormed at sunrise. The siege
engines destroyed a large section of the wall and Macedonian soldiers
entered the city. The defenders, deprived of the support of their fleet,
which was forced to look on helplessly, now only thought of saving their
own lives. On account of the Macedonian fleet being in the port, the 300
Greek mercenaries were unable to get to the Persian ships, so instead they
waded over most probably to what was one of two islets c. 250 m to the
north east of the Miletus peninsula. After what had happened to their
comrades at Granicus, they were ready to fight to the end; meanwhile the
Macedonians had already lowered the ladders from their ships and were
poised to attack. This time, however, Alexander was merciful to the brave
Greek soldiers and spared them their lives on condition that they served
him. The inhabitants of Miletus were also more fortunate than those of
most cities that were taken by force at the time when the victor’s law