by Amanda
meant a right to plunder and the selling of captives as slaves. But this
war’s official mission was Panhellenic revenge for Persian crimes against
the Greeks and in this context no other city, except for perhaps Athens,
was more ideologically symbolic than Miletus. This city had led the Ionian
37 Arr., An. , 1.18-19 (principal source); Diod., 17.22.1. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 131-
133.
From Abydus to Alexandria
137
revolt of 499 and six years later it was captured by the Persians, destroyed
and its people deported to Asia. A repetition of the Theban solution here
could have led the Greek public to draw on very obvious parallels with the
actions of the maligned Xerxes. Alexander therefore had no option but to
forgive Miletus for taking the wrong side in the war. A visible sign of the
grace of the new ruler was his acceptance of the title, though not the
responsibilities, of Stephanephoros, the eponymous official in Miletus,
who gave the name to a year.38
Despite the important role it had played in the siege, Alexander
decided to disband his fleet after the capture of Miletus. This surprising
and controversial decision Alexander justified by the fact that his ships
would be unable to compete out at sea with the much stronger Persians
and that he could defeat the enemy fleet by capturing the seaports of Asia
Minor with his land forces. This was a risky assumption as it is difficult to
imagine how Alexander’s army could have held all the important centres
along the coastline. Indeed, a year later Alexander saw it fit to start
rebuilding his fleet. Nevertheless, capturing the seaports could
significantly hinder the Persian fleet as ancient ships needed to moor next
to the land at night for the oarsmen to rest and were unable to carry large
supplies of food and water. Therefore their effective fighting range did not
exceed 30 nautical miles from their bases. However, the real reason for
disbanding the fleet was no doubt the lack of financial resources, a
problem which is indeed mentioned in the sources. Even the relatively
small number of 160 ships with approximately 32,000 sailors and oarsmen
would have probably cost Alexander 160 talents at month, for it was the
royal treasury that had to cover these costs rather than the cities that
actually provided the ships. Up to that point ancient authors do not record
any really significant amounts of captured booty. It has been estimated that
the keeping of the army and fleet cost Alexander 450 talents a month,
which greatly exceeded the funds he had at his disposal. That is most
probably why Alexander decided to take only enough ships to transport his
men and equipment, whereas the Athenian contingent no doubt served
primarily as guarantee of Athen’s loyalty.39
38 Arr., An. , 1.19; Diod., 17.22; Plu., Alex. , 17.2; Milet i.3.122.ii.81. Bosworth 1980, p. 141, Bosworth 1988, p. 250; Romane 1994; Graeve 2000.
39 Arr., An. , 1.20.1; Diod., 17.22.5. Lane Fox 1973, pp. 134, 143; Bosworth 1980,
pp. 141-143; Bosworth 1988, p. 47; Badian 1985, p. 428; Romane 1994, p. 69;
Briant 1996, p. 845; Ashley 1998, pp. 91-92; Le Rider 2003, pp. 103-108, 115-117.
138
Chapter IV
3. From Halicarnassus to Cilicia:
the campaign in Asia Minor
The capture of Miletus did not end Persian resistance on the south-western
coast of Asia Minor. The most important Persian fortress in the region was
Halicarnassus, which Alexander could not leave to the rear of his army for
fear of it becoming the base for a counteroffensive in Ionia. Here Memnon
managed to raise a large army of mercenaries, no doubt partly composed
of garrison detachments that had escaped from other cities in Ionia and
Aeolis. Additional help could also be provided by the crews of Persian
ships. Control of the seaport also meant that the fortress had a constant
supply of provisions. Memnon’s tactic was in all likelihood to try and
wear out Alexander’s army in a hard, protracted siege so that later, with
Halicarnassus still in Persian hands, the Asia Minor counteroffensive
could be launched. Although the city had existed since the start of the 9th
century, the Halicarnassus the Macedonians saw in 334 was really the
creation of Maussolus, who in 370 moved his capital there from Mylasa.
Maussolus greatly increased the city’s size by populating it with the
inhabitants of neighbouring towns that had been incorporated into
Halicarnassus through synoikism. One of the reasons why Maussolus
transferred his capital to Halicarnassus was the desire to have greater
control over the Greek seacoast and island states, something which the
inland Mylasa could not provide. The city’s most important feature was its
defensibility. It overlooked the bay and Maussolus had over 5 km of
massive walls built for its protection. Citadels were built at the end of the
two peninsulas on both sides of bay: the one on Zephyros rock was also
the satrap’s palace, whereas the other on the Salmakis peninsula was
simply a military stronghold. There were jetties extending from both
peninsulas that further narrowed the entrance into the bay and made the
city easier to defend from the sea, though this was not that significant in
334 as the Persian fleet dominated the sea anyway. Whilst waiting for
Alexander’s army to arrive, Memnon carefully strengthened weak points
in the city’s fortifications. Before the fighting began he also sent his
family to Darius’s court, ostensibly on his own initiative to ensure their
safety, but more likely than not this was the Great King’s guarantee that
his Greek commander would remain loyal.40
The Macedonian army reached Halicarnassus by the end of summer or
in early autumn, having occupied on the way the coastal cities of Caria.
40 Ar., An. , 1.20.2-3; Diod., 17.23.4-6; Vitr., 2.8.10-11. Bean, Cook 1955; Ruzicka
1992, pp. 34, 137-138; Debord 1999, pp. 303, 375-376, 385-386.
From Abydus to Alexandria
139
We may assume that at least Iasus went over to Alexander’s side of its
own accord for Gorgus, a prominent citizen of that city, remained in
Alexander’s circle for years and in the Macedonian command reached the
important post of hoplophylax (warden or arms).41 Correctly expecting
Halicarnassus to put up a stiff resistance, Alexander had his army pitch
camp 5 stades (900 m) from the city’s walls. Immediately on the first day
the Macedonians attacked the fortifications, to which the defenders
responded with a sally from the Mylasa gate. Both the attacks were
unsuccessful but a certain pattern in the fighting already emerged.
Halicarnassus could not be taken without siege engines and until those
arrived, the only option was to impose a blockade. In the meantime
Alexander tried to capture Myndus situated on the eastern edge of the
Bodrum peninsula. Apparently someone had promised to secretly open the
gate, but the night-time attack failed. The collaborator had either changed
his mind or been discovered. The defenders put up a stiff resistance and
were supported by soldiers shipped over from Halicarnassus 16 km away.
&
nbsp; It turned out that without siege engines and ladders, which the
Macedonians had also failed to take, the town could not be taken.
Alexander ordered a retreat to the camp outside Halicarnassus.42
However, even before the siege began in earnest Alexander did have a
significant political success. He was offered the support of Maussolus’
sister Ada (I), who had ruled Caria in the years 344/43 – 341/40. Persians
only recognised as satraps the male members of the Hecatomnid dynasty.
That is why Artaxerxes III did not intervene when control of Caria was
wrested from Ada by her brother Pixodarus, the same one who in 337 had
tried to become Philip II’s ally by offering the hand of his daughter Ada (II)
to Arrhidaeus in marriage. After Pixodarus’ death Darius nominated Ada’s
(II) eventual Iranian husband Orontobates to be the next satrap.
Meanwhile Maussolus’ sister had to make do with just the fortress at
Alinda (later renamed Alexandria ad Latmum). With the arrival of the
Macedonian army in Caria Ada sensed the opportunity. She surrendered
Alinda to Alexander and offered to recognise him as her son. This was in
accordance with a Near Eastern tradition of extending paternal or maternal
terminology to include people beyond the biological family if it served the
legitimisation of rule over conquered territories. Ada’s support could
prove to be of key importance in also gaining the support of the Carian
people whilst their satrap Orontobates was at war with the Macedonians.
Alexander therefore accepted the Carian princess’s kind offer. He left her
41 Ephippus, FGrH, 126 F5. Heisserer 1980, pp. 169-203; Debord 1999, pp. 146-
148.
42 Arr., An. , 1.20.4-7.
140
Chapter IV
in control of Alinda and after the capture of Halicarnasus nominated her
satrap of Caria, though he gave actual command of the regional army to
the Macedonian Ptolemaios. This division of power formed a certain
pattern that was also visible in Alexander’s later nominations. Whilst
giving military control to Macedonians, Alexander entrusted civilian
control to oriental rulers who knew local conditions, customs and the ins
and outs of the Achaemenid administration. According to an anecdote
passed on by Plutarch, Ada took up her new maternal role in all
seriousness. Every day she sent Alexander treats and offer him the services
of the very best bakers and cooks. According to this tale Alexander
naturally declined these offers, putting physical exertion always above the
delights of the table.43
Alexander continued a military technique practiced under Philip II
whereby siege engines were first dismantled, transported in component
parts – usually by sea – and within a relatively short space of time
reassembled just outside the besieged city’s walls. The Macedonians were
fortunate in that the Persian fleet failed to capture their shipment of siege
engine parts. After Halicarnassus the same siege engines were also used at
Tyre and Gaza. They belonged to a new generation of machinery that had
been constructed with the benefit of experience gained from the great
sieges at the end of Philip II’s reign. Their chief constructor was Diades –
the apprentice and from 334 successor of Philip II’s master engineer,
Polyeidus of Thessaly. 44 Among his inventions was a drill called the
trypanon, which had a roof to protect it against missiles cast down by the
defenders as it was brought up against a city wall. Wall fragments could
also be dislodged with the korax or ‘raven’. One of the most difficult and
refined of the available technical constructions was the mobile siege
tower.45
Once the machines were reassembled a series of attacks on the city
commenced. The accounts of these attacks given by Arrian and Diodorus
differ from each other substantially. As with his description of the siege of
Miletus, Arrian considerably downplays the difficulties Alexander must
have encountered and gives the impression that the siege was a short
struggle easily won by the Macedonians. We can almost be certain that
this was not the case, for why then would Alexander have spent so much
43 Arr., An. , 1.23.6-8; Diod., 17.24.2-3; Plu., Alex. , 22.7-8; Plu., mor. , 127b, 180a, 1099c. Berve 1926, no. 674; Wilcken 1967, pp. 93-94; Bosworth 1980, pp. 152-154; Bosworth 1988, pp. 229-230; Hornblower 1982, pp. 45-51; Ruzicka 1992, p.
144; Brosius 1996, pp. 21-22; Debord 1999, pp. 139-140, 160.
44 Diod., 17.24.1; Ath. Mech., 10-15.9; Vitr., 10.3-8. Marsden 1977.
45 Ath. Mech., 14.4; Vitr., 10.3.7.
From Abydus to Alexandria
141
time camped outside Halicarnassus? Despite his oratorical style, Diodorus’
account seems much more plausible as it most probably was based –
directly or indirectly – on an account given by one of the city’s defenders,
and therefore someone not inclined to glorify Alexander. 46 The
Macedonians began by filling up the moat. Next they brought up the siege
towers and roofed battering rams. This way they managed to create an
opening in the wall through which they tried to enter the city. However,
amid the rubble the defenders, ably commanded by Memnon, were able to
repulse the attackers. In the night Memnon organised a sally beyond the
walls to set fire to the siege towers. The initially surprised Macedonian
guards did manage to put out the flames in time and there ensued a
ferocious battle beneath the walls in which Memnon’s soldiers were
supported by city’s defenders raining down missiles on the Macedonians
from the walls.47 Later on the siege engines toppled two of the city’s
towers, but Memnon managed to get a new wall raised behind the rubble
and thus seal off the breach. Nor did he idly observe further Macedonian
attempts to breach the walls but instead raised a wooded tower on the
other side from which catapults fired missiles at the attackers. Soon
afterwards another battle began beneath the walls. The ancient authors
claim that this mêlée was started accidentally by two drunken
Macedonians who decided to raid the city on their own and got into a fight
with some Halicarnassian volunteers, to which gradually soldiers from
both sides joined. The scale of this incident and the sheer improbability of
it being started without the prior knowledge of commanders on either side
suggest that it may have in fact been another raid by the defenders which
was noticed by the Macedonian drunks, who then raised the alarm.
Alexander’s personal intervention eventually forced the defenders to
retreat into the city. Nevertheless it was Alexander who now requested a
truce so that the bodies of fallen Macedonians could be taken away, which
in Antiquity signified the acknowledgement of a lost skirmish. Despite the
opinions of the Athenian mercenary commanders Ephialtes and
Thrasybulus, Memnon did allow the bodies of the fallen to be taken away.
Arrian, who glorifies Alexander, naturally fails to mention this episode.48
The following day the siege engines were moved up to the improvised
wall behind the breach. During a successive raid the defenders had
&n
bsp; managed to burn down one siege tower and several siege sheds.
Nonetheless the defenders’ situation was worsening on account of
46 Bosworth 1980, p. 147.
47 Diod., 17.24.3-25.5; Arr., An. , 1.20.8-10. Bosworth 1988, p. 48.
48 Diod., 17.25.5-6; Arr., An. , 1.21.1-4. Lane Fox 1973, p. 138; Bosworth 1980, p.
146; Romane 1994, pp. 72-73; Ober 1996, pp. 56-61; Wheeler 2007, p. 212.
142
Chapter IV
persistent Macedonian attacks against ever weaker fortifications. It was for
this reason the Memnon summoned a war council to decide what to do
next. He accepted the suggestion of the Athenian Ephialtes to launch yet
another sortie but this time with a much larger number of men. Ephialtes
himself was put in charge of two thousand of the best soldiers, half of
whom were given torches. At daybreak the mercenary hoplites personally
commanded by Ephialtes formed a deep phalanx and attacked the
Macedonians while the torchbearers set fire to the machines. Once again
Alexander’s swift intervention saved the engines from destruction, but in
the battle that now raged between the old and new walls Ephialtes and his
men were decidedly gaining the upper hand. With missiles raining down
on them from the walls, the Macedonians were forced to retreat. Making
use of the moment, Memnon sent another unit of men to attack. Alexander
was saved from defeat by a detachment of veterans that now entered the
fray. Once the valiant Ephialtes, who had been fighting at the very front of
the phalanx, was slain, the defenders of Halicarnassus were forced to
retreat. They suffered heavy casualties, especially when a bridge they were
fleeing across to return to the city collapsed. Arrian states that on that day
Memnon lost 1,000 men, whereas Alexander lost only 40. The latter figure
is of course unacceptable when one considers that the battle lasted hours
and the Macedonian casualties included the commander of the king’s
bodyguards, the commander of the archers as well as other officers.
Though victorious on the battlefield, Alexander stopped his soldiers from