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  a counteroffensive was the large-scale production of coins at the mint in

  Sinope; this money was needed to pay the soldiers. Thanks to these coins

  we know the names of the chief Persian commanders: Mithropastes,

  Hydarnes and the satrap of Caria Orontobates. No doubt on the Great

  King’s instructions, these generals were preparing to cut Alexander’s line

  of communication with the Asia Minor coast and thus themselves gain

  access to the Persian fleet. Before he left Celaenae or – according to

  Arrian – later in Gordium, Alexander received envoys from Athens who

  requested him to release their fellow citizens who had been captured at

  Granicus. These prisoners were, however, much too valuable as hostages

  ensuring Athens’s continued loyalty at what was still a very uncertain time.

  Therefore Alexander promised the envoys that he would release the

  captives but only once the war was ended.60

  From Celaenae Alexander’s army marched across Phrygia to Gordium,

  where it was supposed to meet up with Parmenion’s corps. The 290-km

  journey must have taken the soldiers about a month, though they were

  marching on the well built Royal Road. Taking into account the several

  month long campaigns in Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia as well as the trek

  across Phrygia, one can assume that Alexander reached Gordium no

  earlier than in May 333. The fact that the sources record no incidents

  during the march across Phrygia suggests that the area had already been

  pacified by Parmenion. Alexander’s complicated itinerary so far as well as

  the actions undertaken on his instructions by his commanders suggest that

  occupying the entire coastline to deprive the Persian fleet of a base was

  not the Macedonian king’s only objective. The aim of this campaign seems

  also to have been the conquest of the whole of southern and central

  Anatolia, which, despite their defeat at Granicus, was still in Persian

  hands.61

  Gordium, situated on the river Sangarius, on the border between both

  Phrygias (Great Phrygia and Hellespontine Phrygia) and onetime capital of

  60 Curt., 3.1.1-10 (principal source); Arr., An. , 1.29.1-3, 5-6. Magie 1950, p. 983;

  Bosworth 1980, pp. 172-174; Atkinson 1980, pp. 80-84; Seibert 1985, pp. 54-56;

  Briant 1996, p. 851. The career of Antigonus Monophthalmus: Briant 1973;

  Billows 1990; Heckel 1992, pp. 50-56.

  61 Arr., An. , 1.29.3; Diod., 17.27.6; Curt., 3.1.11. Bosworth 1980, p. 174; Seibert

  1985, p. 56; Debord 1999, p. 455.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  149

  the Phrygian state, was long past its former glory. First destroyed by the

  Cimmerians at the start of the 7th century and then again by Cyrus the

  Great in 547/546, it was now rebuilt but its previous political importance

  was gone. In Persian times it was not the residence of satraps but of lower

  ranking officials. The city itself was quite large, archaeologists have

  established that it covered an area of 100 hectares, but now it was chiefly a

  centre for local crafts and trade. The district that at the time of the

  Phrygian state had been inhabited by powerful political elites, in

  Alexander’s day was the site of workshops.62 The most important edifice

  in the Gordium acropolis was the temple of the Phrygian deity called

  Basileus (King). The Greeks and Macedonians associated him with Zeus,

  therefore the father of Heracles, the mythical ancestor of the Argeads. It

  was there, or according to certain authors in a palace in that acropolis, that

  Gordias’s legendary cart was kept. Gordias was the father of Midas, the

  founder of the Phrygian dynasty. According to legend, Gordias was a

  simple peasant who once whilst ploughing received a sign from Zeus in

  the form of an eagle landing on the yoke of his oxen. The famous cart was

  fastened to the yoke by an intricate knot (or knots) of cornel bark with the

  ends of the fastening hidden. Legend also had it that whoever managed to

  untie this knot would become ruler of Asia. Towards the end of his stay in

  Gordium Alexander went to the acropolis to examine the famous cart.

  Though according to popular 4th-century legends the Phrygians’ original

  homeland was Macedonia, one need not suppose that this was why

  Alexander decided to go there. He could have simply wanted to see the

  cart out of curiosity, according to Arrian, driven by an insurmountable

  urge ( pothos). Assuming that the Gordian knot legend originated from the

  time of the Phrygian monarchy, i.e. at the start of the first millennium, the

  word ‘Asia’ would have had its original Hittite meaning, referring to the

  north-western part of Asia Minor, in other words, more or less the area

  covered by the Phrygian monarchy. With time the meaning of the word

  was extended to encompass the entire continent, and in the political sense

  the Achaemenid Empire (see Chapter V.3). Bearing in mind his intention,

  officially declared at the Hellespont, to conquer the Persian Empire and

  the fact that he always attached great importance to symbols and

  prophesies, Alexander could not but rise to the challenge, especially when

  he was accompanied by a crowd of Macedonians and local inhabitants.

  With the ends concealed, the knot was impossible to untie, so Alexander

  was forced to resort to an unconventional solution. The sources provide us

  with two versions as to what happened next. A version originating from

  62 Arr., An. , 1.29.5; Just., 11.7.3. Bosworth 1980, p. 175; Mellink 1988, pp. 228-

  231; Voigt, Young 1999, pp. 191-241.

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  Chapter IV

  Aristobulus states that Alexander removed a pin that was slotted through

  the cart’s shaft and this way also separated the yoke from the shaft. The

  other version, belonging to the Vulgate and therefore originating from

  Cleitarchus, states that Alexander cut the knot with his sword completely

  (Arrian, Curtius) or partially (Plutarch, Justin); in the Plutarch and Justin’s

  version Alexander merely wished to find the ends of the binding bark

  which enabled him to next untie the knot. Arrian himself was unable to

  decide which version of separating the yoke from the cart was more

  plausible, therefore today scholars can only conclude that the version

  where Alexander cut the knot with his sword, being so much more vivid

  and characteristic of the young king’s impetuous nature, was generally

  preferred by the ancient authors. Whichever version was true, Alexander

  and his companions returned from that site convinced that a prophecy had

  been fulfilled, as was confirmed that very night by Zeus with thunder and

  lightning. The following day a grateful Alexander offered sacrifices to the

  gods.63

  It was at Gordium that, after a long trek across Asia Minor, the newly-

  married men returned from their winter stay in Macedonia. Accompanying

  them were new reserves: 3,000 infantry and 300 cavalry from Macedonia

  and as well as 200 horsemen from Thessaly and 150 from Elis. This was

  the first of three batches of reinforcements from Macedonia and Greece

  that Alexander would receive in 333. The constant need for new troops

  resulted not only because of larger numbers of soldiers l
eft on garrison

  duty in newly and not necessarily completely conquered territories but also

  because of losses incurred as a result of the war. Apart from those killed in

  the actual fighting, which the sources inform us about, there must have

  also been losses which the sources ignore, for instance, as a result of

  wounds after which soldiers were incapacitated and perhaps eventually

  died. Moreover, it should be noted that if in European campaigns in early

  modern times twice as many soldiers died from diseases than were killed

  in battles, then proportion must have been at least similar in Alexander’s

  day. This problem would have been compounded in the Macedonian army

  by the state of ancient medicine, which may have been adequate for

  treating wounds but virtually helpless against diseases. Finally, the

  63 Arr., An. , 2.3; Curt., 3.1.14-16; Plu., Alex. , 18.2-4; Just., 11.7; Marsyas, FGrH, 135/6 F4. Tarn 1948, ii, pp. 262-265; Bosworth 1980, pp. 194-188; Hamilton 1999,

  pp. 46-47; Zahrnt 2001; Squilace 2005, pp. 211-213. Alexander’s visit and the

  legend of origins of the Phrygians: Fredricksmeyer 1961. Pothos as curiosity:

  O’Brien 1992, p. 50. Asia in this context: Schachermeyr 1973, p. 192; Atkinson

  1980, p. 87; Oost 1981, pp. 265-266; Nawotka 2004.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  151

  necessity to recruit more soldiers in 333 was also of course associated with

  the impending confrontation with the great army of Darius III.64

  The Persian counteroffensive of 333 began with the arrival of spring.

  Darius III now appointed Memnon the commander-in-chief of the entire

  war and further strengthened his position with additional funds for him to

  be able to maintain the great fleet and mercenary army. Memnon almost

  certainly realised the futility of trying to confront the superior Macedonian

  army in a pitched battle and that is why he reverted to his original plan

  once proclaimed in Zeleia to the satraps of Asia Minor and consisting of

  shifting the war to Greece. The first step to this end would be an

  occupation of the Aegean archipelago, which would provide Memnon with

  a base for operations in Greece. This would also make it possible to next

  occupy the Hellespont and thus effectively cut Alexander off from

  Macedonia. War in Greece and a serious threat to Macedonian security

  would force Alexander to return to Europe. A similar manoeuvre had been

  successfully conducted by Persia 60 years earlier, when they skilfully

  applied diversionary tactics in Greece to effectively stop the Spartan King

  Agesilaus’ military operations in Asia Minor. From his base on the Island

  of Kos Memnon set sail with 300 ships north towards the largest island

  poleis. At least some of these were ruled by oligarchies that towards the

  end of Philip II’s reign had switched to his side and joined the League of

  Corinth. Now in face of Memnon’s formidable fleet they quickly changed

  sides again. Chios switched allegiance without a struggle. Four of the five

  states on Lesbos surrendered instantly: Antissa, Methymna, Pyrrha and

  Eresus. In the largest state Mytilene, however, the garrison of mercenaries

  that had been sent there by Alexander and the citizens decided to resist.

  Memnon therefore cut the city off from the other states by constructing a

  double stockade stretching to the sea on either side and also blocked the

  seaport with his ships, thus depriving the defenders of any hope of

  receiving help. He then managed the lure the much weaker Mytilenean

  fleet into a sea battle which his navy easily won. Memnon also had time to

  concentrate on things other than the siege of Mytilene. The Greek states of

  the Cyclades came over to his side, others he was able to win over with

  bribes. The pro-Macedonian camp was now beset by terrifying rumours of

  an imminent invasion of Euboea.65

  64 Arr., An. , 1.29.4. Bosworth 1980, pp. 174-175; Ruffin 1992; Salazar 2000, pp.

  68-72.

  65 Arr., An. , 2.1.1-2; Diod., 17.18.2, 17.29; Fron., Str. , 2.5.46. Burn 1952, pp. 82-83; Lane Fox 1973, pp. 152-153; Hamilton 1974, p. 63; Hammond 1996, pp. 89-90;

  Debord 1999, pp. 457-459.

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  Chapter IV

  News of Memnon’s successes demonstrated all too vividly just how

  dangerous Alexander’s decision to disband his fleet in the autumn of 334

  really was. He could now only passively look on as events in the Aegean

  unfolded. His attempt to defeat the Persian fleet by depriving it of ports in

  Asia Minor had so far failed. It is possible that Alexander extended his

  stay at Gordium for more than initially intended because of what was

  happening in the Aegean and uncertainty as to whether or not he would

  have to return to Macedonia.66 It was then that his strategy changed; allied

  states were instructed to start rebuilding ships, which were next to join up

  at the Hellespont with the remnants of the squadron Alexander had kept

  after his capture of Miletus. Hegelochus was appointed commander of the

  Hellespontine region and Alexander’s trusted officer, Amphoterus the

  younger brother of Craterus, was appointed his subordinate commander of

  the fleet. They were entrusted with what was at that stage the quite

  impossible mission of liberating Lesbos, Chios and Kos. For this purpose

  they were given 500 talents. Another 600 talents was sent to Antipater,

  thanks to which a second Macedonian squadron of ships was assembled

  for the defence of Greece. The ships were sent from Euboea and the

  Peloponnesus and the fleet was commanded by Proteas.67

  We will of course never know whether or not the much delayed steps

  to build a Macedonian naval force would have been able to stop the

  Persian counteroffensive, had Memnon lived longer. As it happened,

  during the siege of Mytilene Memnon fell ill and died. If there was a

  turning point in this phase of the conflict between Alexander and Darius, it

  would be the death of Memnon, a man trusted by the Great King and

  endowed with a strategic perception and tactical skills that no

  contemporary could match, apart from Alexander. On his deathbed,

  Memnon appointed as acting commander, until a further decision was

  made by the Great King, his brother-in-law Pharnabazus. The new

  commander was assisted by another Persian aristocrat Autophradates.

  Initially nothing changed in the way the Persian forces prosecuted the war;

  under the new command the Persians vigorously attacked Mytilene. Soon

  the inhabitants decided to capitulate, but they secured for the mercenary

  garrison the right to freely leave the city. Pharnabazus’ terms for

  capitulation were as follows: an annulment of the city’s alliance with

  Alexander; the return of exiles, who were to receive back half of their

  previously owned property; the acceptance of Persian suzerainty and,

  under the pretext of saving the vanquished citizens’ face, a restoration of

  66 Murison 1972, pp. 404-405.

  67 Arr., An. , 2.2.3-4; Curt., 3.1.19-20. Atkinson 1980, pp. 92-95; Heckel 1992, pp.

  6-12.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  153

  the provisions of the King’s Peace of 387/386 even though they had never

  really applied to Lesbos. One of t
he former exiles was appointed tyrant of

  Mytilene and a Persian garrison was now installed in the city, which was

  commanded by Lycomedes of Rhodes and no doubt comprised Greek

  mercenaries. Pharnabazus also ordered the defeated city to pay a

  contribution, which was the first sign that in the Aegean the Persians were

  beginning to have financial problems. Their monthly expenditure

  exceeded 300 talents and now there were no more tributes coming in from

  Asia Minor.68

  After the settling of these affairs at Mytilene the Persian commanders

  split up: Autophradates continued the conquest of other Greek islands,

  while Pharnabazus sailed with the mercenary army to Lycia. This could

  have led to the opening of a new and important front in Asia Minor for the

  army of the Persian satrap Orontobates was still stationed in neighbouring

  Caria. However, before this could happen, command of Pharnabazus’

  mercenaries was taken over by Memnon’s nephew Thymondas, sent by

  Darius III to bring these troops over to the royal army. As a consolation,

  Pharnabazus was officially appointed to the post previously held by

  Memnon. So Pharnabazus now rejoined Autophradates and, commanding

  100 ships, together they sailed for the island of Tenedos (today Bozca

  Ada). The island capitulated on similar terms to those that had been

  imposed on Mytilene. Hegelochus, the Macedonian commander of the

  Hellespontine region, still did not have enough ships to be able to help

  allies. This success was important insofar as it gave the Persian fleet a base

  just off the coast of the Troad from which access to the Hellespont could

  be easily controlled. And in those times it was via the Hellespont that all

  the most important trade routes ran, for instance, the transport of Black

  Sea grain to Athens. Meanwhile the ships of Autophradates, operating

  from the island of Samothrace, posed a serious threat to Macedonia. Coins

  provide evidence that Autophradates’ army actually landed in the Troad. It

  was in the late summer or early autumn of 333 that they also landed in

  Ionia and fought a victorious battle against detachments from Ephesus.

 

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