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  chasing the defenders into the city. Arrian explains this as a desire to give

  the Halicarnassians a chance to surrender and thus spare the city. Such

  reasoning is rather unconvincing in a situation where the decision whether

  or not to surrender rested with Memnon, not the city’s inhabitants. The

  battle had shown the defenders’ determination to fight. For this reason and

  on account of the lateness of the day Alexander most probably decided not

  to risk turning a hard-fought victory into defeat in an all-out assault on the

  city.49

  Nevertheless the scale of inflicted losses and the serious damage to the

  fortifications made putting up further resistance pointless; another

  Macedonian assault could well have resulted in the city’s capture and the

  loss of all the armed forces gathered there. That is why that same night

  Memnon and Orontobates resolved to evacuate Halicarnassus. At

  approximately midnight the wooden towers on the walls, the ammunition

  sheds and the houses closest to the walls were all set ablaze. Behind this

  49 Diod., 17.26-27.4 (principal source); Arr., An. , 1.22; Curt., 5.2.8, 8.1.36. Lane

  Fox 1973, pp. 138-139; Green 1974, pp. 197-199; Bosworth 1980, pp. 147-148;

  Bosworth 1988, p. 49; Ashley 1998, pp. 208-209.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  143

  screen of smoke and flames Memnon evacuated weapons from the military

  magazines and some of the soldiers to the island of Kos. The remaining

  soldiers occupied the Salmakis fortress and the citadel on the Zephyros

  rock. At dawn Alexander saw the smouldering ruins of Halicarnassus and

  two strongholds still very much in enemy hands. A long and costly siege

  was at most only a partial success. On the one hand, thanks to advanced

  Macedonian siege techniques and the immense energy and determination

  of Alexander and his soldiers the city of Halicarnassus was taken, which

  no doubt gave the Macedonians some satisfaction. On the other hand, the

  military situation in Asia Minor did not change significantly for in Caria

  Memnon was still holding a military base, although with much reduced

  harbour. Alexander decided not to try and capture the two fortresses.

  Instead he ordered the city to be razed to the ground, sparing only the

  Mausoleum and temples. One can assume that for a time Halicarnassus as

  a city was dead, perhaps the synoikism was dissolved and the inhabitants

  moved back to their original settlements. Alexander left Ptolemaios in

  command of 3,200 soldiers to guard the two Persian fortresses, which

  were surrounded by moats and embankments.50

  The siege of Halicarnassus had dragged on until at least the middle of

  autumn. The onset of winter did not mean a break in the hostilities, but

  Alexander did expect the intensity of the fighting to lessen for a while. For

  this reason he sent back to Macedonia – under the command of his

  bodyguard, Ptolemaios the son of Seleucus – those soldiers who had

  recently married, so that they could spend the winter with their wives.

  Arrian claims that this act, more than any other, won the Macedonian

  troops over to Alexander. The campaign must have cost many more lives

  than the ancient authors record for the officers sent back to the homeland

  together with the newly-weds were ordered to raise as many infantry and

  cavalry reserves as possible. One of the officers, Cleander, was dispatched

  to Peloponnesus to levy mercenaries at Cape Tainaron, the main recruiting

  centre in Greece.51

  The rest of the army was divided in two. Parmenion together with the

  baggage train, one ile of hetairoi, the Thessalian cavalry and Corinthian

  League detachments headed for Sardis. His next objective was Phrygia.

  This region’s satrap, Atizyes, had fought at Granicus but managed to

  escape and now took refuge in his satrapy. Phrygia had undergone

  intensive Iranian colonisation and therefore Macedonian occupation of this

  50 Diod., 17.27.5-6; Arr., An. , 1.23. Bosworth 1988, p. 49; Ruzicka 1992, pp. 145-

  146; Ashley 1998, p. 209; Heckel 2006, p. 235, s.v. Ptolemy [5].

  51 Arr., An. , 1.24.1-2; Curt., 3.1.1. Heckel 1992, p. 286.

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  territory would deprive the Persians of a major recruiting ground. 52

  Alexander and the bulk of the army now moved east to Lycia and

  Pamphylia. This campaign no doubt lasted until the start of 333 and its

  objective, according to Arrian, was to occupy the coastline. Obviously this

  could not have meant the occupying of the entire myriad of natural

  harbours in this province, but only the cities that had furnished ships to

  Memnon and that could provide him with a base. The late season in the

  year paradoxically worked to the advantage of the Macedonians for,

  although it somewhat hindered troop movement, it more importantly

  deprived enemy seaports of the protection that would otherwise have been

  provided by the powerful Persian fleet. The construction of ancient ships

  was too weak to withstand the waves of a rough sea, therefore military

  vessels suspended all operations from November to March. Thus in the

  winter Memnon’s predominance at sea had very little significance.

  According to Arrian thirty cities surrendered to Alexander without a

  struggle; the author actually mentions Hyparna, Telmessus, Pinara,

  Xanthus, Phaselis and Patara with its important harbour. But our sources

  do not tell us the exact route taken by the Macedonian army. Bearing in

  mind Alexander’s war objectives and the winter conditions, which would

  have made crossing the mountains between Lycia and Pisidia very difficult

  if not impossible, it is most likely that the Macedonians chose the seacoast

  route. Though it only became apparent a year later, one of the

  consequences of the Lycian campaign was the acquisition of the Lycian

  fleet.53

  It is likely that Alexander stayed at Phaselis until the end of the

  334/333 winter. It was reportedly there that he received news of the real or

  only supposed treason of the last son of Aeropus of Lyncestis, Alexander,

  an experienced officer and commander of the Thessalian cavalry, which

  was the second most important cavalry formation after the hetairoi.

  Parmenion captured a Persian called Sisines, whom as a trusted envoy,

  Darius III had ostensibly sent to the satrap Atizyes. Sisines, however,

  revealed that the real objective of his mission was to reply to secret

  correspondence that had been sent by Alexander of Lyncestis via the

  Macedonian fugitive Amyntas. Sisines was supposed to tell Alexander that

  Darius pledged to give the traitor 1,000 talents of gold in return for the

  assassination of his namesake, the Macedonian king. After discussing the

  matter with his friends, the king instructed Parmenion to have Alexander

  of Lyncestis arrested and imprisoned. The arrestee was eventually

  executed without trial shortly after the end of the Philotas affair.

  52 Arr., An. , 1.24.3. Bosworth 1980, pp. 155-156; Debord 1999, p. 449.

  53 Arr., An. , 1.24.3-6, 2.20.2. Keen 1996; Debord 1999, pp. 449-450.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  145

  Command of the Thessalian cavalry, which remained pa
rt of Parmenion’s

  army, was most probably taken over by Philip, the son of Menelaus, who

  had up until then commanded the allied Peloponnesian cavalry. This

  version of how the treason was discovered is given by Arrian, whose

  source was Ptolemy, and it is indirectly confirmed by Justin. Diodorus,

  however, gives a different version in which the arrest occurred many

  months later, shortly after the Battle of Issus, and Alexander received

  news of the planned assassination in a letter from Olympias. Arrian’s

  version is also unconvincing because it includes a lengthy episode in

  which the Macedonian king discovers the evil intentions of Alexander of

  Lyncestis through mysterious omens. This seems to suggest that Arrian

  himself had doubts about Sisines’s alleged mission and therefore tries to

  further justify the arrest with signs from the heavens. Whatever the truth, it

  is at this time that the sources fall silent about Alexander of Lyncestis.

  Moreover, even if he was only arrested after the letter from Olympias,

  there is no reason to doubt that Parmenion had actually sent Sisines with

  his story to Alexander. One way or another, Alexander, the son of Aeropus,

  was certainly out of favour with the king by 333.54

  Alexander’s next step in his campaign in the coastal provinces of Asia

  Minor was the occupation of Pamphylia. The first objective in this

  province was the city of Perge. Some of the army with supply wagons

  travelled along a road specially built by Thracian soldiers over Mount

  Climax, while Alexander and rest of the army took the road along the

  coast of the Gulf of Antalya. When the winds blew from the south, parts of

  this road would be flooded by the sea. However, when Alexander’s army

  reached these sections the winds changed direction and blew from the

  north, thus allowing the army to pass. This of course was interpreted by

  Alexander and his soldiers as a sign that the gods were favourable to

  them.55 In Pamphylia Alexander took Perge and next headed for Side. On

  the way he received envoys from Aspendus with whom he made an

  agreement that in return for a lump sum payment of 50 talents and a herd

  of horses specially bred for the Great King he would not station soldiers in

  their city. After capturing Side and installing a local garrison, Alexander

  learned that Aspendus was not intending to keep its part of the deal. At

  stake were not only prestige and the money from the tribute but also the

  strategic significance of Aspendus, which lay at the estuary of the river

  54 Arr., An. , 1.25.3-9; Just., 11.7.1; Diod., 17.32.1, 17.80.2; Curt., 7.1.5-9. Lane

  Fox 1973, pp. 143-148 (questions Arrian); Bosworth 1988, pp. 50-51; Heckel 1992,

  pp. 357-359; Hammond 1996, pp. 88-89.

  55 Callisth., FGrH, 124 F31; Arr., An. , 1.26.1-2; Plu., Alex. , 17.6-9 (quoting Menander, fr. 751); J., AJ, 2.16.5; App., BC, 2.149; Ps.-Callisth., 1.28.

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  Chapter IV

  Eurymedon. For these reasons Alexander immediately led his army to that

  city. At the mere sight of the Macedonians the Aspendians again changed

  their mind. This time the terms and conditions of capitulation were much

  harsher: the previously agreed war contribution was doubled; now there

  was also an obligation to pay tributes; the city was put under the control of

  the local satrap and now it was also obliged to submit hostages. Being

  situated in Pamphylia, Aspendus was clearly not included in the declared

  restoration of freedom that applied to the cities of Ionia, Aeolis and Caria,

  and as a polis that had broken a treaty it could not expect much mercy

  from its conqueror.56 It was most probably then that Alexander nominated

  Nearchus, a trusted companion since his early youth, satrap of Lycia.57

  From Aspendus the Macedonian army returned to Perge and thence it

  headed for Phrygia. The first and perhaps greatest obstacle was the city of

  Termessus (today Gülük). Situated some 40 km to the north-west of Perge

  in Pisidia, Termessus guarded a pass into the Maeander valley. On account

  of the inaccessible Pisidian Mountains surrounding it, the city had not

  been subjugated to the rule of Persian satraps and now its inhabitants also

  had no intention of allowing the Macedonians to pass through their land.

  The terrain was shaped in such a way that there was only one road leading

  through a narrow valley between two mountains at an altitude of 1,000 m.

  This road the Termessians easily blocked, but deceived by the sight of the

  Macedonians appearing to be calmly bivouacking, they returned to their

  city leaving behind only some guards to keep watch. Alexander then

  launched a surprise attack with Macedonian archers, light infantry and

  some specially selected hoplites. Next he led his army through this

  dangerous zone. Despite Strabo’s claim, the Macedonians did not take the

  city of Termessus for they lacked the necessary siege equipment. 58

  However, the fight with the Termessians inclined the inhabitants of

  another Pisidian city called Selge, who were bitter enemies of their

  neighbours the Termessians, to offer an alliance with the Macedonian king.

  Alexander willingly accepted their offer and next marched his army for

  Sagalassus, which was situated 80 km to the north and belonged to a chain

  of fortresses stretching all the way to Celaenae. Thanks to the farming of

  fertile valleys this was a large and prosperous city. Its Pisidian inhabitants

  had the reputation of being good soldiers and their defensive position was

  all the more difficult to capture on account of it being located on a 200-

  56 Arr., An. ,1.25.5-27.4; It. Alex. , 26. Debord 1999, p. 451-452; Nawotka 2003a, p.

  30.

  57 Arr., An. , 3.6.6. Bosworth 1980, p. 284; Heckel 1992, p. 228.

  58 Arr., An. , 1.27.5-8; Str., 14.3.9. Magie 1950, pp. 263-264; Bosworth 1980, pp.

  169-170.

  From Abydus to Alexandria

  147

  300 m ridge. Moreover, they were now supported by a detachment of their

  kinfolk, the Termessians, who had already once been defeated by

  Alexander. At the start of the battle of Sagalassus, the Pisidians initially

  had the upper hand. They successfully repulsed an attack by the

  Macedonian archers and even killed their commander, Cleander. However,

  they were unable to withstand an attack by the Agrians and a much better

  armoured phalanx. Approximately 500 Pisidian soldiers were killed and

  the rest fled from the battlefield. The escape of those lightly armoured

  barbarians was made easier because, though better in battle, Macedonian

  armour was heavier and this made it harder for the soldiers wearing it to

  keep up. Moreover, the mountainous terrain precluded the use of cavalry.

  However, the Macedonians were able to capture the city and the

  occupation of the rest of Pisidia posed not further major problems.59

  Alexander’s army next set its course for Phrygia to meet up with

  Parmenion’s corps. Their route cut across the Anatolian Plateau from

  Sagalassus via what is today the city of Isparta, thence west to the north-

  eastern shore of the salt lake Ascania (Burdur Gölü) and next north to

  reach Celaenae, some 30 km to the north west of the said lake, on the fifthr />
  day. Being the residence of the satrap of Phrygia, the city had a garrison

  comprising 100 Greek mercenaries and 1,000 Carian soldiers, whose

  armour and training were traditionally considered equal to those of the

  Greek hoplites. These soldiers abandoned the city and instead decided to

  defend just the acropolis. Arrian grossly exaggerates in calling it

  impenetrable for it was connected to the ridge of a neighbouring mountain

  to the southeast. Alexander occupied the city and began beleaguering the

  acropolis. However, the good fortifications and without doubt the

  defenders’ fighting skills made the siege a prolonged affair. The defenders

  offered to capitulate if a relief force did not arrive within 60 days. And that

  is what eventually happened. Alexander left a garrison of 1,500 soldiers at

  Celaenae. As satrap of Phrygia he appointed Antigonus ‘Monophthalmus’

  (the One-Eyed), who had so far commanded the allied Greek infantry.

  Antigonus – who in 333 was around 49 and therefore much older than

  Alexander – became a leading figure in the Diadochi period after the

  king’s death. His nomination as satrap was the first really important

  appointment in his career and it was only now that he was able to show his

  considerable leadership and administrative skills as well as charisma

  which would later distinguish him from all the other Diadochi. His satrapy

  was of key strategic importance in Asia Minor as it encompassed the

  junction of major routes including the Royal Road, which any army

  59 Arr., An. , 1.28; Plu., Alex. , 18.1; It. Alex. , 26. Magie 1950, p. 1139; Bosworth 1980, pp. 159-172; Debord 1999, p. 454.

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  wishing to control this part of the continent had to use. One has to

  remember that so far only a small part of Asia Minor – the Aegean coast

  and a few inland regions in the west of this vast peninsula – was in

  Macedonian hands. The Persian generals were now raising an army in the

  north of Asia Minor. Bearing indirect testimony as to their preparations for

 

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