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nerve among the Macedonian soldiers, whose pride had been deeply
injured. If the creation of this new army unit had been intended as a
political ploy to discipline the Macedonian troops by showing them that
they could be replaced by other soldiers, it failed completely. For the time
being the Macedonian veterans merely cast scorn on the young Iranian
phalangites by calling them dancers, but soon their pent-up negative
emotions would explode.36
4. The mutiny at Opis
Towards the end of spring 324 Alexander together with the hypaspists and
some of the Companion cavalry sailed down the Pasitigris into the Persian
Gulf and thence up the Tigris to the town of Opis situated to the north of
Babylon. There Alexander and his men met up with the rest of the army,
which had marched from Susa under Hephaestion’s command. On their
voyage up the Tigris the Macedonians encountered some weirs that had
been built during Achaemenid rule. They were most probably used for
irrigation purposes but at the time the Macedonians believed them to be
deliberately constructed defences against attacks from the sea. Therefore,
for the sake freeing river traffic, Alexander had the weirs dismantled.37
Alexander’s voyage was probably associated with his current plans of
conquering Arabia, for which the free access of his fleet to all the great
rivers of Mesopotamia was considered essential. One may assume that the
inspiration for this project came from the Persians inscriptions and reliefs
Alexander had seen in Susa and Persepolis which included Arabia as part
of the Achaemenid Empire. Arabia was never a Persian satrapy but some
of its territories had acknowledged Persian suzerainty and it had been
considered a fief of the Achaemenid Empire. Although Arabia had
probably broken its ties with the Persian state by the end of the 5th century
monumental art continued to present the Persian Empire as it had been
during the time of its greatest territorial expansion. The successor of the
Achaemenids may have therefore seen the conquest of this land as a
36 Arr., An. , 7.6; Diod., 17.108.1-2; Plu., Alex. , 71.1-3, 71.6. Lane Fox 1973, pp.
422-423; Hamilton 1973, pp. 134-135; Hamilton 1999, pp. 128-129; Green 1974,
pp. 446-447.
37 Arr., An. , 7.7; Str., 16.1.9.
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fulfilment of that empire’s political ideology.38 On the other hand, Nearchus’
voyage had actually ‘rediscovered’ the Arabian Peninsula. Although
Scylax had already discovered this peninsula two centuries earlier, there is
no evidence that his voyage was well remembered in the years 325-323.
At a time which is now difficult to pinpoint but before Nearchus’ return
Alexander dispatched a reconnaissance expedition from Egypt to discover
whether circumnavigation of the Arabian Peninsula was possible. This
expedition was not successful. After receiving information regarding the
Arabian Peninsula in the winter of 325/324, Alexander called for another
expedition. This time a fleet, making use of the monsoon winds, set out
from Heroonpolis in Egypt in the late summer of 324 with the intention of
sailing all the way to Susa. The fleet got as far as Qana in southern Arabia
and then turned back on account of tales of dry land that blocked further
progress. Such stories were invented by local merchants who jealously
guarded the Peninsula’s secrets from the Europeans to protect their
monopoly in the trading of incense and spices.39 The next steps in the
conquest of Arabia were supposed to be made in the spring of 323.
Meantime in mid summer 324 at Opis Alexander summoned together
the entire Macedonian army. He announced to the assembled soldiers that
all those who were no longer fit for military service due to old age or
wounds would be discharged from the army but he would grant them such
rewards that they would become the objects of general envy back home.
Alexander’s intention was to satisfy the Macedonian veterans’ expectations
for they had for a long time been longing to return home. Yet in the
atmosphere of growing tension between the army and their commander-in-
chief, instead of gratitude, the soldiers felt offended, so much so that the
offer released an outburst of complaints. The soldiers, who still held the
Macedonian traditional views of simplicity and contempt for foreigners,
were outraged by the orientalization of Alexander’s court and by the
inclusion of Iranians in positions of privilege and power, positions which
should have been reserved for the victor only. Alexander’s words
provoked uproar, the gravely offended soldiers started demanding to be all
relieved of further military service; one even sarcastically suggested that
Alexander should continue fighting wars together with his father Ammon.
Now Alexander was enraged. He ordered his hypaspists to arrest thirteen
of the most outspoken critics and have them immediately executed. This
had a sobering effect on the rest of the army, which now fell silent, and it
38 Högemann 1985, pp. 12-17, 124; Badian 1998, p. 220.
39 Thphr., HP, 9.4.1-9; Arr., Ind. , 32.7, 43.9; Str., 16.3.2, 16.3.4, 16.4.4; Plin., Nat. , 6.98. Högemann 1985, pp. 73-87.
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was then that Alexander delivered another speech.40 The words related to
us by Arrian and Curtius are merely a display of the historians’ own
rhetorical skills but that such a speech was actually delivered cannot be
doubted. Nor should we doubt the basic arguments later related by the
authors for modern research has shown that they clearly fit the late 4th-
century cultural context. In a direct response to the ridicule of his having a
divine father in Ammon, Alexander started by reciting the achievements of
his earthly father Philip II, who had raised Macedonia from a very humble
level of civilization to become the greatest power in the Balkans. He went
on to recount his own military achievements, recalling the countries he had
conquered and their riches that were now Macedonian property. To those
who complained of the wounds and toil they had had to endure he recalled
the wounds he himself had suffered. He also reminded the soldiers of all
the booty and other benefits they have received, including the settlement
of the debts they had wantonly incurred. Finally he bade them all to depart
as they wished, for he himself desired to be left under the protection of the
barbarians he had conquered: to desert one’s king in a foreign land was
virtually the most indelible military dishonour to a Macedonian.41
Having delivered this speech, Alexander retired to his quarters and saw
no one for two days. On the third day he ostentatiously distributed army
commands among Persians, some of whom he also advanced to the court
distinction of ‘royal kinsmen’. What is worse, the Iranian detachments
now received the distinguished names that had previously only been held
by Macedonian army units. All this was part of Alexander’s arsenal in the
psychological war he was conducting against his defiant soldiers; at Opis
the final outcome was different to what even
tually happened at Hyphasis.
This time the Macedonians concluded that their king could really do
without them by relying on mercenary and Iranian detachments. This time
on the third day the king’s residence was thronged with soldiers begging
for forgiveness and promising to surrender the instigators. Alexander
relented and when Callines, one of the veterans of the Companion cavalry,
said how it grieved the Macedonians that their king called Persians his
kinsmen, Alexander immediately declared that henceforth all Macedonian
soldiers were his kinsmen. The soldiers could hardly conceal their joy as
they returned to the camp and thus the mutiny ended.42
40 Arr., An. , 7.8; Diod., 17.109.2; Curt., 10.2.8, 10.2.12-14, 10.2.30; Plu., Alex. , 71.2-3; Just., 12.11.
41 Arr., An. , 7.9-10; Curt., 10.2.15-29; cf. Plu., mor. , 327a-b. Tarn 1948, ii, pp.
290-296; Errington 1990, pp. 107-112; Hammond 1996, pp. 248-249; Nagle 1996.
42 Arr., An. , 7.11.1-8; Diod., 17.108.3; Curt., 10.3.1-4.3; Plu., Alex. , 71.4-8; Just., 12.12. Heckel 2006, p. 76.
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Confrontations between mass gatherings of the Macedonian army and
their monarch such as occurred on the Hyphasis or at Opis never happened
in Philip II’s time. The events on the Hyphasis and at Opis were the result
of very specific circumstances but in both cases they were also the
outcome of events that had happened earlier: Alexander had previously
summoned his army ad hoc to use it as an element in the internal politics
of the Macedonian elites. This is what happened during the Philotas affair
and when Alexander wished to justify his murder of Cleitus. These gave
the soldiers a sense of power and the ability to play a role in the decision
making process normally reserved for the king and his aristocratic advisers.
With his exceptional charisma and political talent, Alexander was nearly
always able to control the crowd into which the army in such situations
changed. However, this tradition of soldiers participating in the making of
political decisions which developed during his reign was to have great
significance in the diadochi period, when there was no one able to
command the authority that had been previously held by the last of the
great Argeads.43
The reconciliation between Alexander and his soldiers was celebrated
with a great banquet for 9,000 people. Of those invited the Macedonians
sat closest to the king and a bit further away the Persians and other guests.
The feast was preceded by the offering of sacrifices by Greek priests and
Iranian magi as well as a prayer for ‘the harmony and unity of the
Macedonian and Persian state’. This statement, recorded by Arrian in his
work, probably reveals Alexander’s intention of creating an empire that
was cosmopolitan but where the Macedonians, whom he had earlier called
his kinsmen and were now seated closest to him, would hold a privileged
position.44
Despite the reconciliation, the plan to discharge veterans went ahead.
10,000 foot soldiers and 1,500 horsemen were sent back. This does not
mean that so many soldiers were genuinely unfit. Plutarch mentions a
soldier being caught simulating disability to avoid further military service
and we can assume that there were many more similar cases that were
never discovered. Alexander made sure that the discharged veterans had a
really good send off: they were to receive army pay for their journey home
and an additional one talent (the equivalent of 20 years of army pay) each.
Alexander also advised them to leave behind their Asian concubines and
any children they might have with them, promising that they would be
raised as Macedonians at his expense. This way Alexander wanted to
make the veterans feel even more grateful to him and also ensure that in a
43 Errington 1978, pp. 110-113; Anson 1991; McKechnie 1999, p. 56.
44 Arr., An. , 7.11.9. Badian 1958a, pp. 429-439; Bosworth 1988, pp. 160-161.
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353
dozen or so years’ time he could have reputedly as many as 10,000
soldiers for whom the only homeland would be the army camp and the
only authority their commander-in-chief. As another mark of respect to his
Macedonians, the king also decided he would also pay the orphans of
deceased soldiers. In a letter to Antipater Alexander wrote that the
veterans were to receive an honourable homecoming welcome and the
right occupy the best seats in theatres, which was the customary way of
distinguishing those who had done the kingdom a particularly great service.
The veterans were also to feel greater security during the homeward
journey as their appointed commander was Craterus, the best and the most
respected of the Macedonian generals, known for his conservative views.45
Craterus’ mission was not only to lead the veterans back to Macedonia
but, above all, to replace Antipater, who had very bad relations with the
women of the royal house, as the king’s proxy in the Balkans. Antipater
was to hand authority over to Craterus and personally bring to Alexander’s
court new Macedonian reinforcements to make up for the old soldiers now
being sent home. The contingent of veterans proceeded at such a slow
pace that they were still in Cilicia when they received news of Alexander’s
death in the summer of 323. There Craterus was supervising preparations
for a naval campaign in the Mediterranean.46 As a trusted representative of
the king in this region he was also in touch with Greece and Macedonia. It
was on Alexander’s instructions that he contacted the Athenian politician
and general Phocion. This was a man the king held in great esteem as is
evidenced by the fact that after the Battle of Gaugamela Phocion and
Antipater were the only correspondents Alexander continued to greet in
the traditional Greek fashion. At a time not specified by the sources
Alexander offered Phocion 100 talents as a gift. Although this was not a
bribe but as an expression of generosity and sincere friendship, the
Athenian statesman, who was proud of his independence and also liked to
show off his material self-denial, turned the offer down. Now Craterus was
to make Phocion a new offer in the king’s name: the revenues of a town in
Asia Minor which had not been officially liberated in 334 and which
therefore was the personal property of the king. Naturally, this offer was
also rejected, in response to which Alexander simply commented that he
could not consider his friend those who did not want anything from him.
Both Alexander’s offers, and in particular the one concerning the town’s
revenues, were typical of the Achaemenid system of government, in which
45 Arr., An. , 7.12.1-3; Diod., 17.110.3, 18.4.1; Curt., 10.4; Plu., Alex. , 41.9-10, 71.8-8; Plu., mor. , 181a, 339c-d; Just., 12.12.
46 Arr., An. , 7.12.4-7; Diod., 18.4.1, 18.12.1. Bosworth 1988, p. 161; Bosworth
1988a, pp. 209-210; Bosworth 2002, p. 31; Blackwell 1999, pp. 155-157.
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the monarch offered presents to the most powerful men in circle as a mark
of distinction. Different than in Greece where gifts were granted by peers
to help cement a ritualised friendship ( xenia), in Persia presents given by
the monarch could not be rejected. Both the offer of granting a town’s
revenues as well as the king’s reaction to Phocion’s rejection show that
Alexander thought and acted as the successor to the Achaemenids and he
no longer attached enough importance to winning over members of the
Greek ruling elites in a way that was for them natural and easy to accept.
The ability to establish bonds with the Greek ruling elites was one of the
secrets of Philip II’s might. His son did not feel it necessary to devote so
much effort, care and attention to such matters and this was an indirect
cause of the political crisis in Greece and Macedonia after his death.47
Though summoned to do so, Antipater did not appear before
Alexander, nor did he raise let alone personally deliver the reinforcements
his king expected to replace the veterans he had sent home. Instead
Antipater sent his oldest son, Cassander, whose presence at Babylon is
recorded in the late spring of 323. In Justin’s account, widely accepted in
modern historiography, Antipater feared for his life on account of what
had happened to those Alexander had considered to be his rivals, for
example, Parmenion, who was of Antipater’s generation. Justin uses this
information to explain the role Antipater was supposed to have played in
the alleged poisoning of Alexander. However, we can be fairly certain that
Alexander died of natural causes (see Chapter VIII.1) and this makes the
version that Antipater feared for his life less plausible. One cannot speak
of any enmity between Alexander and his regent in the Balkans as the king
continued to consider Antipater’s youngest son, Iolaus, to be one of his
most trusted courtiers, responsible for what the monarch drank. Cassander
appeared in Babylon in the late spring of 323, which would mean that he
had probably left Pella a couple of months earlier, i.e. after Antipater had
received written summons from the king. If Antipater had genuine reasons
to fear Alexander’s true intentions he would probably not have sent