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The Big Picture

Page 15

by Carroll, Sean M.


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  idea, but if that idea predicts that certain outcomes happen only 1 percent

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  of the time, and those outcomes keep happening, an honest Bayesian up-

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  dating will eventually lead you to assign a very low posterior credence. You

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  might assign a high prior credence to “Drinking coffee will give me the

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  ability to accurately predict the future.” Then you drink some coffee, make

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  predictions, find that your predictions didn’t come true, and update ap-

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  propriately. If you do that enough, the data will wipe out your original

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  prior. That’s called “changing your mind,” and it’s a good thing. Further-

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  more, since the likelihoods are meant to be objective, gathering more and

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  more data nudges everyone in the direction of the same set of ultimate be-

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  liefs about the world.

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  That’s how it’s supposed to work anyway. It’s up to each of us to honestly

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  carry out the process in good faith.

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  Evidence that favors one alternative automatically disfavors oth-

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  ers. Imagine we are comparing two propositions, X and Y, and we observe 18

  an outcome that has a 90 percent chance of happening under X and a 99

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  percent chance of happening under Y. According to Bayes’s Theorem, after

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  collecting that information, the credence we assign to X will go down.

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  That can seem counterintuitive. After all, if X were true, we would have

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  a 90 percent chance of obtaining that outcome— how can observing it

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  count as evidence against this theory? The answer is just that it’s even more

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  likely under the other theory. The shift in credences might not be large, but

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  it will always be there. As a result, the fact that you can come up with an

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  explanation for some event within some theory doesn’t mean that event

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  doesn’t lower the credence you have for the theory. The converse is also true:

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  if some observation would have favored one theory, but we obtained the

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  opposite of that observation, that result necessarily decreases our credence

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  for the theory.

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  Consider two theories: theism (God exists) and atheism (God doesn’t

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  exist). And imagine we lived in a world where the religious texts from dif-

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  ferent societies across the globe and throughout history were all perfectly

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  compatible with one another— they all told essentially the same stories and

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  promulgated consistent doctrine, even though there was no way for the

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  authors of those texts to have ever communicated.

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  Everyone would, sensibly, count that as evidence in favor of theism. You

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  could cook up some convoluted explanation for the widespread consistency

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  even under atheism: maybe there is a universal drive toward telling certain

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  kinds of stories, implanted in us by our evolutionary history. But we can’t

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  deny that theism provides a more straightforward explanation: God spread

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  his word to many different sets of people.

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  If that’s true, it follows as a matter of inescapable logic that the ab-

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  sence of consistency across sacred texts counts as evidence against theism.

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  If data D would increase our credence in theory X, then not- D necessar-12

  ily decreases it. It might not be hard to explain such inconsistency, even if

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  theism is true: maybe God plays favorites, or not everyone was listening

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  very carefully. That is part of estimating our likelihoods, but it doesn’t

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  change the qualitative result. In an honest accounting, the credence we

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  assign to a theory should go down every time we make observations that

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  are more probable in competing theories. The shift might be small, but it

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  is there.

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  All evidence matters. It’s not hard to pretend we’re being good Bayes-

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  ians while we’re actually cooking the books by looking at some evidence but

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  not all of it.

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  Let’s say a friend tells you that they believe in the Loch Ness Monster.

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  There are pictures, they say, and they provide good evidence. Surely, you

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  must admit, the likelihood of such pictures being taken is larger under the

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  theory that Nessie is real than under the theory that she isn’t.

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  True, but that’s far from the whole story. First, your prior for a monster

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  living in a remote Scottish lake should be pretty small. Even then, if the

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  evidence were sufficiently compelling, you should change your mind. But a

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  few grainy pictures aren’t all the evidence. We should also take into account

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  all of the searches in the loch that tried to find a monster and came up

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  empty. Not to mention the evidence that the original famous photograph

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  of Nessie was eventually admitted to be a hoax. We can’t pick and choose

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  which evidence we want to consider; everything relevant should be brought

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  to bear.

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  Bayes’s Theorem is one of those insights that can change the way we go

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  through life. Each of us comes equipped with a rich variety of beliefs, for or

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  against all sorts of propositions. Bayes teaches us (1) never to assign perfect

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  certainty to any such belief; (2) always to be prepared to update our cre-

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  dences when new evidence comes along; and (3) how exactly such evidence

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  alters the credences we assign. It’s a road map for coming closer and closer

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  to the truth.

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  Is It Okay to Doubt Everything?

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  ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the greatest philosophers of the twenti-

  eth century, began his doctoral studies at Cambridge as a student of

  Bertrand Russell, a massively influential thinker in his own right.

  Russell liked to tell the story of how a young Wittgenstein would deny that

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  anything empirical— an assertion about the real world, rather than a logical

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  provable statement— was truly knowable. In his relatively small quarters at

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  Cambridge, Russell challenged Wittgenstein to admit that there was not a

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  rhinoceros in the room. Wittgenstein refused. “My German engineer, I

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  think, is a fool,” Russell wrote in a letter, though he later changed his mind.

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  (Wittgenstein was Austrian, not German, and certainly no fool.)

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  It’s an old parlor game among philosophers, seeing who can be the best

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  at doubting seemingly obvious truths about the world. Skepticism, in the

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  sense of doubting anything, was a popular school of thought in ancient

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  Greece. The champions were the Pyrrhonists, followers of Pyrrho of Elis,

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  who insisted that we couldn’t even be sure about the fact that we can never

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  be sure about anything.

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  A more recent contestant in the game was the seventeenth- century

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  thinker René Descartes. He was not only a philosopher but also a mathe-

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  matician and scientist, laying the foundations for analytic geometry and

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  contributing to early work in mechanics and optics. If you have ever drawn

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  x and y axes on a piece of graph paper, your life has been affected by René 35S

  Descartes; he invented that little trick, which we now call “Cartesian coor-

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  dinates.” In his philosophizing, Descartes was very influenced by the

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  practice of mathematics. In particular, he was enchanted by the fact that in

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  math we can prove statements beyond any doubt— at least, once we accept

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  the relevant postulates.

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  René Descartes, philosopher, mathematician, and

  doubter of many things other than his own existence,

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  1596– 1650. (Painting after Frans Hals)

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  In 1641, Descartes published his celebrated Meditations on First Philos-

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  ophy. To this day it is one of the books most likely to be assigned to college 26

  students taking their first philosophy course. In Meditations, Descartes at-

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  tempts to be as skeptical as possible about our knowledge of the world. You

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  might think, for example, that you are sitting on a chair, and that the exis-

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  tence of that chair is beyond dispute. But is it really? After all, you’ve un-

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  doubtedly been quite sure about this or that belief in the past, and turned

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  out to be wrong. When we are dreaming or hallucinating, there’s no ques-

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  tion that we are “experiencing” things that aren’t actually happening. It’s

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  possible, Descartes suggests, that we are dreaming even now, or that our

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  senses are being tricked by an evil demon, one who (for whatever inscruta-

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  ble demonic reason) wants us to believe in a chair that doesn’t really exist.

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  But not to lose hope. Descartes concludes that there is one belief about

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  which skepticism is impossible: his own existence. Sure, he reasons, we can

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  doubt the existence of the sky and the Earth— our senses could be fooled.

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  But he can’t be skeptical about himself; if he didn’t exist, who was it who was

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  being skeptical? Descartes summarized this view in his famous cogito ergo

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  sum: I think, therefore I am. (He first wrote that Latin phrase in the later

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  work Principles of Philosophy, but the French formulation je pense, donc je suis 08

  appears in the earlier Discourse on Method, aimed at a broader audience.)

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  It would be an unsatisfying, solipsistic existence if each person could be

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  convinced only that they themselves existed, and had to reserve judgment

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  about everyone else. Descartes wants to build a foundation for justified

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  belief about the whole world, not just himself. But he’s not allowed to ap-

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  peal to anything he sees or experiences— after all, even if he himself exists,

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  that evil demon could still be tricking him when it comes to the evidence

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  of his senses.

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  So as Descartes’s meditations continue, he realizes that he can salvage

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  the reality of the world without ever leaving the comfort of his armchair.

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  Not only do I think, he says to himself, but I can hold in my mind an idea

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  of perfection— a clear and distinct idea, as a matter of fact. This idea, as well

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  as my own existence, must have some cause, and the only possible cause is

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  God. Indeed, God is himself perfect, and the property of “existing” is a

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  necessary aspect of perfection— it is more perfect to exist than to not exist.

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  Therefore, God exists.

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  And then we are off to the races. If we are confident not only in our own

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  existence but also in God’s, then we can be confident in much more than

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  that. After all, God is perfect, and a perfect being wouldn’t allow me to be

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  utterly deceived in everything I see and hear. God can overrule any tricky

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  demons that might be trying to mislead me. So the evidence of my senses,

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  and the objective reality of the world,
can largely be trusted. Now we can

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  start doing science, secure in the knowledge that we are discovering truths

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  about the universe.

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  Descartes was a Catholic, and thought of himself as defending his reli-

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  gious beliefs against the nagging doubts of skepticism. Not everyone else

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  saw it that way. His proofs for the existence of God were perceived as blood-

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  less and philosophical, divorced from the intense spiritual experience of

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  lived faith. He was accused of atheism, which for most of recorded history

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  was a way of saying “You don’t believe in God the way you are supposed to.”

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  (Atheism was one of the crimes for which Socrates was sentenced to death,

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  even though he talked about gods all the time. Meletus, one of his adversar-

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  ies, ended up accusing him both of atheism and of belief in demigods.)

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  Eventually, in 1663, Pope Alexander VII would place all of Descartes’s

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  works on the Church’s Index Librorum Prohibitorum, the list of officially

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  prohibited writings, where it joined books by Copernicus, Kepler, Bruno,

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  and Galileo, among others.

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  One of my college professors once told me that nobody could get a PhD in

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  philosophy without writing a refutation of Descartes. It remained unclear

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  which part of Descartes was supposed to be refuted— his initial skepticism

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  and ability to doubt everything, or his laying foundations for secure belief

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  through his conviction that both he and God certainly existed?

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  Opinions on the existence of God, and in particular on Descartes’s pur-

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  ported proofs, vary widely. But before even getting to that part of the argu-

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  ment, most people feel a visceral reaction against “Cartesian doubt.” It

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  strikes us as ridiculous and irritating to imagine that we can’t be sure of

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  anything at all, not even the existence of the chair on which we are sitting.

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  But in that part of his method, Descartes was completely correct. We

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  may be quite convinced that the world around us is real, but we can’t be

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  absolutely certain, beyond any conceivable doubt. We can even come up

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  with a number of scenarios under which we could be fooled, beyond Des-

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  cartes’s suggestions that we might be dreaming or being fooled by an evil

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  demon. We could be a brain in a vat, receiving false impulses from wires

 

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