Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018
Page 8
3.5 India begins a new buildup
By the late-2000s, the GOI was sufficiently alarmed that it agreed to the Army’s request for 7 to 11 new mountain divisions. This was not an overreaction, because by 2006 their railroad to Lhasa was complete, and they planned more lines in Tibet. Their roads from Chengdu had improved, though they were still prone to landslides and vulnerable to snow closures. They twice reconstructed the Quingdo-Lhasa highway, which in 1994 carried 8-million tons of freight, including 2-million tons of oil.[38] Though their division total was reducing, they still had over 100, active and reserve. By 1977, they had built a 1078-km, 159-cm oil product pipeline to Lhasa,[39] capable of carrying 5,900-barrels/day[40] for 200-days/year. This amounted to 90-million liters of gasoline and 60-million liters of diesel. Shipments were suspended during the winter as the cold created blockages in the oil flow. Winter temperatures can drop as low as -30 to -40 C. In 2001-2004 the pipeline, numbered G13, was rehabilitated to extend its life to 2034. An expansion to Xigatse is proposed. A 1,305-km gas pipeline with a 1.2-billion meter3 capacity is planned. While this may be export natural gas from Tibet to the rest of China, smaller pipelines can be built for in-Tibet use, say for power-plants at army garrisons.
India first raised 56th and 71st Mountain Divisions in 2008, and split the IV Corps AOR between IV Corps (west Arnuachal) and III Corps, which was originally raised as a CI formation, but now became responsible for east Arunachal:
Minimum 7-division plan cleared by GOI around 2005
Before 2008
IV Corps with 2, 5, 21 Divisions; 57 as Eastern Command Reserve in wartime
After 2008
IV with 5, 71, 21 Divisions; III with 2, 56, 57 Divisions
2016
XVII Strike with 59, 72
??
Second mountain strike corps with two divisions – 37 and 38 were suggested
??
1 division Himachal
??
New division Uttarakhand
??
Nepal border 2 divisions
??
1 division, AOR unknown
This buildup, which may have been based on the Sundarji Plan, alarmed MEA, MoF, and others because it was an offensive buildup. The Indian Army was tired of being pushed around by the Chinese. The planned addition of two strike corps was an obvious signal of the offensive intent, but so were the other additions. For example, the build-up added one new division on the Bomdila-Tawang axis. 5th Division was responsible for this axis; 21st Division protected its flank from Chinese seeking to bypass 5th Division by attacking through Bhutan. An independent brigade in the Tenga Valley provided a reserve. Now, however, the corps has three divisions. With the addition of the new 71st Division, IV Corps can go on the offensive. Shortening the corps AOR to exclude eastern Arunachal permits it to focus on attacking. Similarly, in eastern Arunachal just one division was available, the 2nd, at Tezu. With III Corps taking over the eastern front, it now had a new division, 56th, and a corps reserve, 57th, enabling offensive action along the axis Walong-Rima (Tibet). The planned addition of a division each in Himachal and Uttarakhand was also an increase in offensive capability in the so-called Middle Sector. Take Uttarakhand, for example. It had 9th (I) Brigade at Joshimath to protect the Tibet border, and 6th Division to protect the Nepal border from any Chinese attempt to outflank India through Nepal. This was a defensive posture, allowing only an offensive limited to the division’s reserve brigade. With a new division and a corps HQ, the Army could mount a strong offensive in the Middle Sector, aided by the proposed new division from Himachal. This two-division offensive would cut the main Chinese line of communication between West and East Tibet. Though the Army was not thinking about Mansarovar, India’s most sacred lake, annexation of the area around the lake becomes possible. Everything the Army does is linked. An offensive in the Middle Sector assists an offensive in southeastern Ladakh. The plans would have permitted a two-division corps to protect the Nepal border against a Chinese offensive through that country, which is now drifting away into Beijing’s orbit. The Army’s plan is logical and necessary. No one wins a war by remaining on the defensive.
3.6 How MEA and MoF sabotaged the new buildup
The plan, however, created danger for the MEA, whose China strategy can be summed up in one word: appeasement. Or, if you prefer, the “There’s no one here except us mice” theory. India must lay low, and not create a threat the Chinese will be “forced” to counter. Aside from the MEA genuinely believing it is right and the Army wrong, on the bureaucratic level the Army’s plan transfers control of China policy to the Army and takes it away from MEA. This is, of course, a simplistic statement, but such is unavoidable in a short analysis.
But why should the MoF care? It has no China policy to protect. The MoF understood the need to improve our defenses and provided funds for two more divisions. But it did not see the need for the strike corps, failing to appreciate that offensive is the onbverse of a strong defense. Just fending off the enemy is insufficient. That leaves him free to try again, and again, as has happened with Pakistan. Also, by sticking with only defense, the initiative is handed to the enemy, who will use the initiative to break our defense. Aside from the ideological slant, MoF does not like a plan requiring perhaps Rs 520,000-crores over 10-years shoved in its face and ordered to sign checks. Normally, one might think that the MoF is simply does what the Prime Minister tells it to do. But it baulks when not given the extra resources to write the checks. Its immediate reaction, understandably, is to ask: where will the money come from? It must come from new taxes or reducing subsidies. Or if MoF is to sign checks for $84-billion over 8-years with no money coming in, it must cut existing civilian programs, each of which is backed by powerful political interests looking at the next election. Adding to the deficit is, correctly, a very bad idea. Reducing subsidies costs votes. Imposing new taxes means diverting money from other spending and can inhibit growth. Meantime, running down defense costs no votes. My estimate is below.
Estimate for commanding superiority against China
Formation
Each, Rs crores
Total, Rs crores
1 1/3rd strike corps
90,000
90,000
1 mechanized div
30,000
30,000
7 mtn divisions
20,000
140,000
2 corps HQs & troops
30,000
60, 000
O & M cost
25,000/yr
200,000/8 years
520,000 = $75-billion INR70=USD1
This is avery approximate calculation and provides only for a minimal number of helicopters. This gives three divisions for a second mountain strike corps, 1 to bring XVII Corps to strength, corps HQ for Uttarakhand and Himachal plus 3 mountain divisions; one mountain division for XIV Corps (8 + one new), new corps HQ for south Ladakh + 1 new mechanized division and three mountain divisions for contingencies in Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar border.
It no use for me or you to say this represents only a 20+% increase in defense spending, which has been wrongly reduced by half in the last 25-years as a percent of GDP. The increase was only an effort to reverse the decline in defense spending as a percentage of GDP. The MoF will not proceed without an order from the Prime Minister/Cabinet. So why did not the concerned prime ministers give that order?
The answer lies in the reality that while the prime minister at the time (2004-2014) theoretically signed on to the Army/MoD plan, neither he nor other interest groups were convinced of the urgency. Indian attitudes toward defense spending have been “just enough”. Though the decision makers understand there is a threat, they do not see it as an imminent threat in the way it was understood after the 1962 War. The notion of building military power to deter and to influence the enemy is alien. The military is not permitted to lobby on its own behalf, as opposed to – say - the US.
And instead of the Army raising the
alarm by pressuring the media (which also is outside of the ambit of acceptable behavior), think tanks, MoD, MoF, MEA, legislators, and ministers, the military stays quiet because it is indoctrinated not to involve itself in internal matters. We have this peculiar situation where the military has no right to represent its needs to anyone except MoD, which is often unhelpful. Equally important, the Army did an end-run around the GOI by breaking out war reserves to equip the four divisions that has been raised – after using the reserves to raise 63 Rashtriya Rifles battalions. The previous political leadership was wishy-washy about defense. The new government, taking over in 2014, made a strong promise to the public that it would do what was necessary for a strong defense. But when asked to sanction funds, caught between differing constituencies wanting money, far from increasing the defense budget, the government has continued to reduce the percentage GDP on defense. What makes this worse is that allocations barely keep up with inflation on the revenue side and has fallen severely behind on inflation on the capital side.
This second is rapidly accelerating because of technology developments. Fifty-five years ago, a MiG-21 could be acquired for $1-million. Okay, it wasn’t top of the line. An F-4 Phantom in the mid-1960s cost $3-million. But the MiG-21 was perfectly adequate to face Pakistan and China. Today the Rafale’s flyaway is $150-million. In 1970, India’s GDP was $60-billion. Today it is 50x higher, but the Rafale versus MiG-21 is 150x higher. Nor can India reduce the size of its air force, because of the rise of China. The longer modernization/expansion is put off, the harder the job appears, and the easier for India to be itself, which means ignore the problem.
At last, we seemed to understand that a purely defensive posture is a losing proposition. The MoD should have bought these agencies on board by explaining the plan. If MoD failed to achieve consensus, it was up to the Prime Minister to lay down the law and explain why the buildup was undertaken. It is unclear, however, if the Prime Minister knew the reasons accepted by a previous government. In which case MoD should have taken the lead to explain, with the help of the Joint Chiefs and the intelligence community. Things in India, however, do not work rationally. Decision-making at the highest level is best called Trumpian Way of Rule, even though we have been at it long before Trump was around. Trump makes impulsive, ad hoc decisions without himself understanding the reasoning because there is no reasoning.
By 2012, when XVII Strike Corps should have raised, GOI had already been afflicted with ague and was shivering, shaking, and collapsing so much it could not function. GOI decided it had no money, and that XVII would take seven years to raise, by 2019. In 2018 it should have started raising the Kashmir strike corps; this was canceled, and 72 Division of XVII raised at Pathankot. That was the end of the buildup, aborted after four divisions, not even the minimum seven the Army had been promised, forget eleven divisions. With seven, the Army would have had a second mountain strike corps, deployable either in Ladakh or against Pakistan, and one division in Himachal Pradesh. And even the first strike corps has been only partly funded.
GOI blamed the previous government for not having provide adequate money for the strike corps in 2012-2017. It amazes that the GOI can lie with a straight face, and moreover, disown responsibility by saying the previous administration was at fault. If the previous plans are wrong, the new government’s duty is to change them. Are the five-year plans set in stone? Will current GOI be executed Dracula fashion if they deviate? Is GOI saying its first 3-years in office (the full term is 2014-2019) were decided by the previous and they are bound by the previous plans? Made by a government that the current government heavily, and correctly, criticized for insufficiency of money spent on defense and endangering India’s security?
While I’ve given the background to the failure of the buildup, none of that exonerates MEA from following a policy that subordinates India to China. It is not the MEA’s business to decide military force levels or to assess threats. Obviously, MEA is not in China’s pay to keep Indian defenses weak, but whatever MEA’s motives, the outcome is a weaker India. MEA has some of the smartest people in the country; they are loyal and patriotic. Are they then cowards that they don’t want India to arm in the face of a rising China that is determined to reduce us to second-class status? They are not cowards. But they are so determined to maintain control of India’s foreign policy, that they can’t think beyond their narrow institutional interest.
3.7 Foreign and Defense policy are two faces of the same coin.
They are not separate. From the day India became independent, however, Nehru considered himself the foreign policy maven (on what basis, by the way? That he was intelligent, handsome, well-spoken and was comfortable with westerners?). He disliked the military and did not even see why it was needed since our foreign policy was Peace on Earth and Goodwill to All humans and and Cockroaches. At no point did this paradoxical man, who sacrificed so much for independence and loved India so much, understand that foreign policy is the Velvet Glove that hides the Iron Fist. No one will compromise just because we’ve climbed a high moral horse and appointed ourselves the world’s savior. They will compromise only when they know if they don’t, we will beat them to death. That’s the military’s job. In every country – the US, China, Russia for example, their departments of state are integral to the national security team – in partnership with the military and intelligence agencies, under the guidance of the president or prime minister. India has sham structures that leave the military without a real say. Indeed, the GOI does not want a Chief of Defense Staff because it sees that as a potential threat.[41] [42]If the government does not trust the military enough to let it have proper command structures, why have a military? The GOI’s pettiness knows no limits. India has the largest army in the world by far but has only a single 4-star general, whereas seven more are clearly required, one as Vice Chief of Staff, the others as Army Commanders.
Nehru alone ran India’s foreign policy
He was comfortable in the company of the high-minded intellectuals who ran the MEA. In turn, they were happy to do as he wanted, because they too were part of the pseudo-Socialist British ethos. They bought wholeheartedly into Nehru’s idea of India as the leader of a morality-based New World Order. They loved their role as educators to the barbarian west, especially the savage Americans.They equally loved their role as shepherd to the newly independent 3rd World, teaching them with love and kindness what they should think. Meanwhile, of course, the great mass of our people suffered silently in their grinding poverty. Our intellectual elite had no time for them because they were lecturing the US upon its anti-communist crusade and falling for Soviet blandishments. Mrs. Gandhi always kept her hand in foreign affairs, but she was more focused on domestic politics and centralizing power. She followed the lead of her foreign policy advisors, who may as well have been getting their instructions directly from Moscow. As for poor, unfortunate Rajiv, he didn’t have a single serious thought in his handsome head, and he relied on his advisors who, in an abrupt 180-turn, were now busy selling themselves to the US. Vajpayee was idealistic, intellectual, and trusting. But he let hope overwhelm experience. When faced with Pakistan’s attack on India in 1999, he quietly and sorrowfully told his Pakistani counterpart “What have you done?” His job was to say: if its war you want, its war you get, and we are declaring war right now. Manmohan Singh was another good man, modest and self-deprecating. But his management style was hands-off; he waited for his subordinates to see the error of their ways and to reform themselves. Manmohan Singh had little interest in foreign affairs; he was more concerned with his people. Nonetheless, he was not running a joint ashram where India’s adversaries came for enlightenment. His job in 2008 and during Pakistan’s non-stop war against Kashmir was to say: you will now learn not to mess with us. Did Vajpayee’s and Manmohan Singh’s peaceful humanism lead the Pakistanis and Chinese to say: wow, they are such good men, we must change out bad ways? No. It encouraged them to fear India, not at all and push us more.
N
o capable leader for a coordinated defense policy
This meant that from 1947 until today, there has been no leader capable of coordinating MEA, MOD, and Intelligence to work as a team. Remember, it is the natural tendency of Intelligence to work on its own, and to keep its secrets, revealing the minimum to serve its purposes. We think of intelligence as fact-based and objective. It is anything but, not just in India but world-wide. Readers will dispute this: isn’t the National Security Advisor coordinating everything? First, of our five advisors, three have been from the foreign service, and two from the Indian Police Service, specifically the Intelligence Bureau. None have any defense background. An NSA ranks as a minister of state. As far as the NSA office is concerned, making a raid against Burma-based Indian rebels and the tiniest of strikes against Pakistan, is the height of macho toughness. Instead, they have humiliated India in the eyes of our adversaries. In any case, the military has no one to speak for it. The lack of defense specifics in GOI agencies is total.
The Ministry of Finance as an obstructer
Then there is the Ministry of Finance, whose sole job seems to be to obstruct defense. There is nothing mala fide about this. Defense expenditure is shown under one head. Though in India defense is only 12.2% of Central government spending, as a single number it overwhelms. MoF looks at the sum requested by MoD, which it is in no position to analyze, and immediately revolts: “We are a poor country, we must reduce wasteful spending to maximize spending on development.”