Analysis of India's Ability to Fight a 2-front War 2018
Page 29
Head
Percent of budget
PNR Billion
Pay & Allowances
38%
423
Ops & Maint
22%
245
Civil works
13%
141
Equipment
26%
282
Pensions
Not included in defense budget
260
Armed Forces Development Program
Not included in defense budget
100
Service %
USD Billion
Army
47
4.54
Air Force
20
1.93
Navy
10
0.95
Equipment
23
2.22
9.64
[The equipment budget covers only part of the equipment purchased annually; major equipment excluded, but definition of “major” not specified. Border forces and nuclear weapons spending excluded.]
Though this is not a discussion of Pakistan’s historical defense spending, the following data helps to put the current spending in perspective.
In 1948, Pakistan spent 41% of its budget on defense.[213] 2018-19’s budget is an indefinitely affordable 3.2%. While true that likely total spending excluding pensions is 4% (my back-of-envelope estimate), Pakistan take only 17% of GDP as taxes. As the country develops, this percentage will grow, permitting both an increase in real terms plus a reduction from 4% of GDP.
Using SIPRI data, Mirza, Jaspal, and Ijaz note that in 1989 Pakistan spent 6.4% of GDP on defense, and this dropped to its lowest ever in the country’s history, when it spent 2.8% in 2010 (p. 164). As a percentage of the government budget, in 1994 Pakistan spent 29% on defense and it fell to 10.2% in 2010 (p. 165). By 2018 this had risen to 19.4%, almost double, but since growth stepped up, the burden rose by just 0.4% of GDP 2010-2018. India, on the other hand, has dropped from around 3.5% of GDP in 1990 to 1.6% in 2018, less than half. Pakistan can afford to maintain its 30-division equivalents and 19 fighter squadron in it spends, but our establishment, already short of 8 divisions and at least 10 fighter squadrons of our minimum defense, is much too large for 1.6%. At 3.5% we’d be fine. At 1.6%, we’d have to cut by 50% or so.
One more statistic, if readers can stand it. Pakistan spent 8.5% of its GDP on defense in 1966.[214] This was right after the 1965 War and before China became a reliable ally. Pakistan had to expand its military to meet the Indian threat. If in 1959-1962 had raised the six divisions the Army wanted for the north, the outcome of the war would have been quite different. Similarly, if Pakistan had filled out 6th Armored Division, rebuilt 8th Division, and reraised 9th Division prior to attacking India, it would have easily taken Chaamb and likely Poonch as well. It’s failing the-stitch-in-time-saves-nine syndrome.
Can Pakistan be persuaded to N-disarm?
Two points. If the US wants Pakistan to lower its N-threshold, Washington will have to strengthen Pakistan’s defense, to Pakistan’s satisfaction. Decades of studying Pakistan’s defense lead me to believe that nothing less than $6-billion/year grant aid will suffice. Bulk supply of the following items is required: fighters, helicopters, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and SP artillery. The numbers required in a 10-year package are enormous:
Item
@ $mil
Number
Total $billion
Comments
F-16/70
$150
150
$22.5
6 squadrons + fill out existing 4 squadrons
Tank M-1A2
$10
1500
$15
30 battalions, 10 for each of 3 strike corps
IFV M-2A3
$5
1500
$7.5
30 battalions, 10 for each of 3 strike corps
AH-64
$60
60
$3.6
3 squadrons, each 14 plus 6 reserves/trg
CH-47
$60
40
$2.4
3 squadrons, each 10+3, 1 per Command
M-109A7
$6
650
$4
32 regiments
Total, $55-billion plus $5-billion miscellaneous. This does not count transport aircraft, AEW, UAVs, SAMs, trucks etc. It assumes that for the Navy Pakistan will keep its new and on-order Chinese warships
This translates into three strike corps (reequip two, raise one) each of one armored and one mechanized division, plus a corps armored brigade; one heavy attack helicopter battalion of 14 per corps plus reserves; one CH-47 squadron for each of three theatres (north, center, south); and 25 SP 155mm regiments, divided between six divisions. This, in turn, frees up existing tanks, APCs, and SP artillery to mechanize four divisions, including those already with an armored brigade. Adding the four existing mechanized divisions (25th, 26th, Corps Reserves IV and XXX Corps), this will give Pakistan 14 divisions, a powerful defense against India.
But will this persuade Pakistan to put its nuclear warheads into joint Pakistan-US custody? No. Pakistanis believe the US has betrayed them on several occasions: 1962, 1971, 1999, and the Indo-US rapprochement are four major betrayals. No matter how much the US helps Pakistan, it makes little sense for Islamabad to give up its N-weapons. I am ignoring the obvious point that backing Pakistan to the above extent will irrevocably alienate India. India is hugely upset that the US agreed to sell Pakistan just eight F-16s; the above package is fifty times larger. The analysis, then, shows the option of US satisfying Pakistan’s conventional defense requirements in exchange of surrender of N-weapons will not work.
While Pakistan may have only 25 divisions, excluding the security, airborne, and air defense divisions, it has 90+ brigades or the equivalent of 30 divisions. Now consider India. To avoid upsetting the authorities, though they are unlikely to care, the India list is by corps, north to south. Again, treat this as 90% accurate.
IB = Infantry brigade; MIB = Mechanized Infantry Brigade; AB = Armored Brigade
Corps
MIB
AB
IB
Total
XIV
Only those facing Pakistan
4
4
XV
8
8
XVI
2
11
13
IX
1
9
10
XI
1
1
11
13
X
3
7
10
XII
Includes 2 Command Reserves
1
1
9
12
I
6
4
10
II
5
5
10
XXI
4
5
9
Total
2
22
75
99
Nominally, the balance is India’s 100 brigades to Pakistan’s 90. Not covered, however, are the following requirements: (a) new armored division for XII Corps; (b) convert 18 RAPID X Corps to armored; (c) new armored div for XI Corps; and (d) new armored division for IX Corps. This does not include CI reinforcements for Kashmir. Partly this is because, with four new armored divisions for a total seven, I assume India will engage in an off-the-bat offensive. brigades for Kashmir Valley internal security Valley; 4th Division in the Pathankot Corridor, weakening I Strike Corps, 57th Mountain Division to North Punjab, one brigade of 17th Mountain Division to Punjab, and 23rd Division to South Punjab/North Rajasthan, weakening XXI Strike Corps. And there is nothing for AHQ Reserve except a single parachute brigade. Adding to the difficul
ties is that while we’ve added four armored brigades since 1990, all by converting infantry (4th, 12th, and most recently 7th and 10th Divisions), Pakistan had added twelve armored/mechanized, about half by converting infantry and half new. The three armored brigades for the China front will be required there and cannot be shifted. We have 22 with one more to come for the eighth RAPID, Pakistan has 25, with several more to come. Of course, ours have four regiments/battalions; theirs have three. Against that, in 1990, we had 24 they had twelve. Again, please treat these figures as approximate for Pakistan.
Now, if we are going to have to withdraw China front troops to reinforce gaps in the west, that’s the end of any chance of surprise. In theory, at least, XVII Corps (two divisions) and III Corps’ reserve division can be temporarily withdrawn without serious damage to our northern posture.
Railroads, Roads, and Mobilization Time
Division Movement Time to hypothetical war station
6th Mountain (Bareilly)
7 days to Srinagar
72nd Mountain (Pathankot)
3 days to Pathankot-Jammu Corridor
59th Mountain (Panagarh)
15 days to North Punjab
20th Mountain (Binaguri)
15 days to South Punjab
21st Mountain (Rangia)
15 days to North Rajasthan or western front reserve
The table assumes that thanks to better road and rail communication, more civil airlift resources, and more flat cars, India’s mobilization time of divisions is reduced from 21-days in 2001 to 15-days now. This table looks simple, yet it is complex. Everything in it is predicated on “it depends.” First, some explanation of the real world the military faces. The discussion here is linear, but everything in war happens simultaneously. For example, why have 3-days been allocated for 72nd Division to move from Pathankot to the Pathankot-Jammu Corridor? Is it not just 110-km from Pathankot to Jammu, perhaps a 6-hour movement at worst? (a) The Corridor is the primary line-of-communications for the four corps in Jammu and Kashmir. (b) II Corps formations will also be moving into the Corridor. (c) There will be panicked civilians everywhere. (d) Supply traffic for Northern Command will be heavy. True, now there is a two-track rail line; up until 1975, the line ended at Pathankot. Still, in 1971, for example, we had only one corps HQ and five divisions (3, 19, 25, 10, 26) regularly stationed in Jammu & Kashmir, the civilian population was less than half of today’s, and at a very rough guess, there were probably one-tenth the vehicles on the road. Between 2001 and 2012 alone, motor vehicles in J & K expanded by three times, to 900,000. There is also the nicely made 4-lane NH 44, but vulnerable to landslides in parts. Pakistan artillery can easily interdict both the road and railway. A back-up road Pathankot-Dalhousie-Dhar-Udhampur exists, but at this time it is unclear how much traffic it can take, and being almost entirely in the mountains, is vulnerable to weather. The Army has on many occasions demanded the backup road be brought to standard. For today’s needs that means 4-lanes with curves and inclines suitable for heavy vehicle transporters. The way India is going with its border infrastructure, the chances of this happening are low. Very generally, NH 44 is 10-20 km from the Pakistan border; the backup road is safe from interdiction at 50+ km away.
In the last few years, India has at last made progress in providing the Army with heavy vehicle flat cars, and the civilian sector’s inventory of flats has also rapidly increased as the economy has grown.
Though the railway situation in the west is much better than it was 25-years ago, particularly thanks to converting all lines to broad gauge, there are still gaps. The Army needs the ability to shift several divisions simultaneously on a north-south axis all the way from Pathankot to Bhuj. This means double tracking. The Indian Railways cannot pay for non-commercial lines, e.g., Jaisalmer- Barmer-Bhuj, or double track, on its own. Indian Railways can undertake lines only if the cost-benefit ratio is satisfactory. At that, because it does not have unlimited money, it must see on an all-India basis where its money is best deployed. Strategic railways need to be subsidized. Moreover, strategic railways must be resilient, meaning built to operate in the face of damage from air attacks. All of several ways to do this cost money.
Incidentally, by 2020 China will complete a 1471-km rail line from Golmo to Korla in Sinkiang, allowing a speedier building in Tibet from the divisions in Sinkiang. Currently, there are four, which have not been disbanded despite the shift to brigades, 4, 6, 8, and 11. These will almost certainly go to Ladakh and the Central Sector (Himachal and Uttarakhand).
Pakistan mobilization
Below are peacetime stations for Pakistan’s divisions.
Division
Location
Time to border
FCNA
Gilgit, Astore, Skardu, Dansam
M + 1 to 3
12
On border
M + 1
19
Reserve
M+1 to 2
23
On border
M+1
6 Armd
Gujranwala
M+1
17
Kharian
M+1
8
Sialkot
M+1
15
Sialkot
M+1
New Armd
Sialkot
M+1
37
Gujranwala
M+1
New Mech
Lahore
M+1
7
Peshawar
M+3 to 5
9
Kohat
M+3 to 5
10
Lahore
M+1
11
Lahore
M+1
40
Okara (on border)
M+1
1 Armored
Multan
M+2 to 3
35
Bhawalpur
M+1 to 3
26 Mech
Bhawalpur
M+1 to 2
16
Pano Aqil
M+1 to 2
18
Hyderabad
M+2 to 3
25 Mech
Karachi
M+3
33
Quetta
M+3 to 5
41
Quetta
M+3 to 5
Some explanations. M+1 means 24-hours. Many formations have brigades either on the border or within 6-12 hours of the border. Many can get a battalion to the border in 6-hours, sometimes less. This list is hypothetical because no crisis appears out of the air. There is a buildup of tension, and at some point, a country decides there may be a war, and starts preparing. This can be days and weeks ahead of hostilities. All this table means is that compared to India, Pakistan has a high percentage of forces on the border or close to the border.
Yet people can make mistakes. In March 1965, when Pakistan attacked the Rann of Kutch, India assumed it would lead to war and sent many divisions from their peacetime stations to the front. Thus, India was ready when Pakistan attacked Chaamb. Pakistan made another mistake when it nonchalantly assumed India would not cross the international border thought that had been explicit for 17-years. Another mistake: Pakistan should have attacked in Spring 1963 rather than waiting 2 ½ years which permitted India to more than make up for divisions shifted to the China front. Yet another mistake: Pakistan’s finance minister refused to sanction two additional divisions desperately required to get some balance against India in the west. The two divisions raised 6th Armored and 11th Infantry, represented no net increment of strength because they were formed from existing resources. Another mistake: not splitting 12th Division into two and expecting one division HQ to control seven brigades during the 1965 War. And because Pakistan had taken away 8th Division’s brigades to form 11th Division and reinforce other sectors, it had a ready-made extra division HQ. Inducting HQ 7th Division at the last moment was insufficient. I am picking on Paki
stan, but India also has made its share of big mistakes since 1947. The purpose is simply to show that an army must seize an opportunity as it presents itself, or the moment passes.
India Airlift
Using 2015 figures for the Indian civil airline fleet, it should in 2018 be possible to think of a 500-aircraft emergency pool available for defense purposes. Current orders suggest a fleet size of 1500 toward the end of the next decade. Assuming 100 troops per aircraft and two sorties a day for half the current fleet, India theoretically can lift 50,000 troops a day. Why not all the fleet? For one thing, critical civilian traffic must continue, particularly for a longer war, because you don’t want to disrupt the economy. For another, fifty-thousand troops represent two divisions with generous room for corps and army troops. Theoretically, it should not be necessary to shift more than six divisions from east to west and vice versa. This is a big simplification of the real-life situation. A mass shift requires advanced planning and training of airlines and the military. There is the matter of air base capacity. Shifting 59th Division from Panagarh to – say – Pathankot would require 150 flights, and there is no way 300 arrivals and departures can be handled by two air bases with limited facilities. All these problems can be resolved with the expenditure of money: adding runways, expanding parking space, providing freight handling equipment and so on. And none of this gives a solution to the primary problem of moving vehicles and heavy equipment.